verify-layer README: the test table names the complete served verifier set (verify-proof.mjs alone gives 41/45), the negative control from a fresh clone (37/37), and the one adapter check that needs the verifier

README.md

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ test, counts as a failure of the control. Results measured on 2026-09-29 (Node.j
 | pq-kms | 62/62 (`node test/proba.mjs`); HSM root on SoftHSM2 + OpenSC 20/20 (`pq-kms/test/proba-hsm.mjs`, Linux); sealed-file trust rules 7/7 (`pq-kms/test/proba-hsm-incredere.mjs`) | 16/16 (`node test/control-negativ.mjs`); sealed-file rules 2/2 in this repository (`pq-kms/test/control-negativ-hsm-incredere.mjs`) |
 | pq-pki | 27/27 (`node test/proba.mjs`), each verdict compared with OpenSSL 3.5 | 22/22 (`node test/control-negativ.mjs`) |
 | crypto-inventory | 68/68 (`node test/proba.mjs`, measured 2026-10-18 with the Rust, Swift and Kotlin detectors, glob imports, libcrux, BoringSSL, the libsignal Java/Node/Swift/Android APIs, CryptoKit, CommonCrypto, Security.framework, Android Keystore, Tink and OkHttp included); cost on hostile input 13/13 linear (`node test/proba-timp.mjs`) | 35/35 (`node test/control-negativ.mjs`); cost 5/5 in this repository (`node test/control-negativ-timp.mjs`; its fourth case compares with version 0.1.0 from the development history and is skipped here) |
-| verify-layer | 45/45 with the AIP-23 reference verifier, measured 2026-10-05 (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs from aere.network/tools> node proba-sidecar.mjs`); without it 40 run, 5 are reported as skipped and the exit code is 2; the cloud adapters 60/60 on 2026-10-18 (`node proba-adaptoare-cloud.mjs`: nine fixtures derived from the vendors' documented CLI and REST examples by `fixturi-cloud/deriva.mjs`; a real account is unmeasured and the README says so); the Merkle tree 20/20 (`node proba-arbore.mjs`: the reference roots of Certificate Transparency, every proof up to 64 leaves, each attack), measured 2026-09-30 | 38/38 in this repository on 2026-10-18 (`node control-negativ-sidecar.mjs`: the ten original plantings plus the cloud adapter rules; the case that compares with the development history is skipped here); the tree 14/14 (`node control-negativ-arbore.mjs`) |
+| verify-layer | 45/45 with the AIP-23 reference verifier, measured from a fresh clone on 2026-10-18 (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs> node proba-sidecar.mjs`, where verify-proof.mjs is the one served at aere.network/tools with verify-anchor.mjs, mpt.mjs, falcon512.mjs, registry-v3.mjs and package.json beside it and `npm install` done there; verify-proof.mjs alone gives 41/45, because the four finality checks need the anchor verifier); without it 40 run, 5 are reported as skipped and the exit code is 2; the cloud adapters 60/60 with the same verifier on 2026-10-18 (`node proba-adaptoare-cloud.mjs`: nine fixtures derived from the vendors' documented CLI and REST examples by `fixturi-cloud/deriva.mjs`; without the verifier 59 run and one is skipped; a real account is unmeasured and the README says so); the Merkle tree 20/20 (`node proba-arbore.mjs`: the reference roots of Certificate Transparency, every proof up to 64 leaves, each attack), measured 2026-09-30 | 37/37 from a fresh clone of this repository on 2026-10-18 (`node control-negativ-sidecar.mjs`: the ten original plantings plus the cloud adapter rules; the case that compares with the development history is skipped here, and is the 38th in the development tree); the tree 14/14 (`node control-negativ-arbore.mjs`) |
 | proof-kinds | 24/24 with the same verifier (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-proof-kinds.mjs`) | six negative controls inside the test |
 | readiness | 6/6 (`node proba-adrese-private.mjs`: the private-address rules, and a local listener no scan may touch) | the rate limit and the queue bound are tested where the service runs, not here (its README says so) |
 | control-plane | planner 44/44 (2026-10-18: a key agreement or a client-side TLS configured by the application itself is not routed to the TLS gateway; a self-signed trust anchor is blocked, not "automatic through PKI"; test code is LOW with its own scope), command line 10/10, execution 30/30 on real products started locally, remediation 33/33 on real TLS servers (all five server profiles measured end to end on 2026-10-18: nginx, Apache, HAProxy, Node, Go), compliance report 30/30 (with the AIP-23 verifier; test-code findings are counted apart and are not "exposed today"), console 8/8; the console viewer in a real Chromium, phone and desktop, 26/26 (`node proba-consola-web.mjs`, measured 2026-09-30; needs `playwright-core` and a Chromium, otherwise it exits 2) | remediation 7/7, compliance report 3/3 in this repository; viewer 8/8 (`node control-negativ-consola-web.mjs`) |

verify-layer/README.md

@@ -193,8 +193,8 @@ workload added, and on the same export with environment values planted (`fixturi
 copies in `fixturi-cloud/surse/`, and compared with them at every run): it requires exactly the running workloads with their
 identities, no planted value anywhere in the log or the descriptors (and the names present, as the positive control), another CLI's
 export refused by name, every descriptor re-hashing to the digest in its envelope, and every envelope `VALID` for the reference
-verifier. `control-negativ-sidecar.mjs` adds three plantings per adapter (the running filter removed, the names replaced by the
+verifier (looked for at `AERE_VERIFY_PROOF` as above; without it that one check is reported as skipped and the exit code is 2, with 59 run). `control-negativ-sidecar.mjs` adds three plantings per adapter (the running filter removed, the names replaced by the
-name/value pairs, the shape check removed) and requires each to turn its named check red: measured 38 of 38 on 2026-10-18. The
+name/value pairs, the shape check removed) and requires each to turn its named check red: measured 38 of 38 on 2026-10-18 in the development tree and 37 of 37 from a fresh clone of the public repository (the case that compares with the pre-review version is skipped there). The
 adapters are producers, not verifiers, so they name no rule of the conformance suite (`conformance/`), whose rules are those of the
 log and tree verifiers, unchanged.