agents/x402: a 2-of-2 contract wallet (ERC-1271) that neither the agent nor its owner can spend from alone
AereAgentWallet2of2 holds the agent's tokens and accepts only the agent's signature followed by the policy service's, over the same digest. In the new cosign mode the wallet service signs only its half, after every check it already made, and the agent adds its half only after it recomputes the payment itself (payer, recipient, amount, the nonce of its own ledger entry, validity, digest, declared policy signer). verifica-plati.mjs requires the wallet's code on chain to be exactly the compiled contract with the two signers; recompileaza-contract.mjs recompiles the published artifact byte for byte with solc 0.8.23. Tests: co-signing 16/16, payment verifier 14/14, negative control 30/30, wallet 25/25. On the public testnet 28001 on 2026-09-29: 13/13 with the 2-of-2 wallet (the agent alone and the policy signer alone refused by the facilitator and by the token asked on chain) and 9/9 with the wallet key. Evidence in dovezi-28001/. Nothing here has been run on the Aere Network mainnet.
This commit is contained in:
1 parent
2293c1da86
commit
8b608fe57f
20 files changed
+1480
-40
No files matched your search
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ notarization command of the verification layer, and the agents' x402 wallet (EIP
|
||||
| [`proof-kinds/`](proof-kinds/) | the AIP-23 envelope builder the verification layer uses: fourteen proof kinds, one envelope format, digests instead of raw content |
|
||||
| [`readiness/`](readiness/) | the post-quantum readiness scanner of a public hostname: real TLS handshakes (hybrid only, hybrid preferred, TLS 1.2), HSTS, the certificate; no connection to an address not proven public; a rate limit per client that X-Forwarded-For cannot bypass |
|
||||
| [`control-plane/`](control-plane/) | from findings to a finished migration: a prioritized plan from the inventory and the scanner, its execution through the gateway, KMS and PKI with consent per action and a measured proof afterwards, recipes for the servers the products do not touch and a rescan that judges them, a compliance report against NIST IR 8547, the EU roadmap and optionally CNSA 2.0, and a console that checks it all again |
|
||||
| [`agents/`](agents/) | limits an AI agent cannot break unseen: a post-quantum identity (ML-DSA-65), a policy (spending per time window, allowed tools and recipients, which actions need human approval), a signed ledger of every action judged against the policy, approvals and revocation signed by people, and a verifier that re-runs the policy over the whole ledger without trusting the agent; two branches of one ledger are a proof of equivocation anyone can check; and a wallet that pays over x402 only what the agent's ledger records and its policy allows, run on the public testnet with its evidence |
|
||||
| [`agents/`](agents/) | limits an AI agent cannot break unseen: a post-quantum identity (ML-DSA-65), a policy (spending per time window, allowed tools and recipients, which actions need human approval), a signed ledger of every action judged against the policy, approvals and revocation signed by people, and a verifier that re-runs the policy over the whole ledger without trusting the agent; two branches of one ledger are a proof of equivocation anyone can check; and a wallet that pays over x402 only what the agent's ledger records and its policy allows, either holding the payment key for the owner or co-signing from a 2-of-2 contract wallet that neither the agent nor the owner can spend alone; both run on the public testnet with their evidence |
|
||||
|
||||
Each component's README says what it is **not** and what is **not measured**. No third party has reviewed any of them.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ test, counts as a failure of the control. Results measured on 2026-09-29 (Node.j
|
||||
| proof-kinds | 24/24 with the same verifier (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-proof-kinds.mjs`) | six negative controls inside the test |
|
||||
| readiness | 6/6 (`node proba-adrese-private.mjs`: the private-address rules, and a local listener no scan may touch) | the rate limit and the queue bound are tested where the service runs, not here (its README says so) |
|
||||
| control-plane | planner 30/30, command line 9/9, execution 30/30 on real products started locally, remediation 33/33 on real TLS servers, compliance report 27/27 (with the AIP-23 verifier), console 8/8 | remediation 7/7, compliance report 3/3 in this repository |
|
||||
| agents | policy 27/27 with the AIP-23 verifier (without it 25 run, 2 are reported as skipped and the exit code is 2), ledger 51/51, approval and revocation 39/39, command line 23/23 through files and processes only (on Linux and macOS one more test checks the key file mode; not measured here); x402 wallet 25/25 and payment verifier 10/10 without a network; on the public testnet 28001, 9/9 (`x402/proba-x402-testnet.mjs`, needs a funded testnet key) | 26/26 (`node control-negativ-aprobare.mjs`); x402 21/21 (`node x402/control-negativ-wallet.mjs`) |
|
||||
| agents | policy 27/27 with the AIP-23 verifier (without it 25 run, 2 are reported as skipped and the exit code is 2), ledger 51/51, approval and revocation 39/39, command line 23/23 through files and processes only (on Linux and macOS one more test checks the key file mode; not measured here); x402 wallet 25/25, 2-of-2 co-signing 16/16 and payment verifier 14/14 without a network; on the public testnet 28001, 9/9 with the wallet key and 13/13 with the 2-of-2 contract wallet (`x402/proba-x402-testnet.mjs`, `x402/proba-cosign-testnet.mjs`, each needs a funded testnet key); the contract's artifact recompiles byte for byte with solc 0.8.23 (`node x402/recompileaza-contract.mjs --solc <solc>`) | 26/26 (`node control-negativ-aprobare.mjs`); x402 30/30 (`node x402/control-negativ-wallet.mjs`); the contract's own tests (7) and their negative control (4/4) run in the Aere Network contracts project, not in this repository |
|
||||
|
||||
Code comments, most function and variable names (also many exported between the files of a component), test names and control
|
||||
messages are in Romanian, and so are the two command words of the KMS HSM tool (explained in its README). Error codes, error
|
||||
@@ -43,4 +43,4 @@ interface, command line and data (`definePolicy`, `verifyLedger`, `approve`, ...
|
||||
|
||||
## Licence
|
||||
|
||||
MIT, see [LICENSE](LICENSE). Files: 122 (pq-gateway 6, pq-kms 10, pq-pki 6, crypto-inventory 42, verify-layer 8, proof-kinds 3, control-plane 17, agents 24, readiness 4).
|
||||
MIT, see [LICENSE](LICENSE). Files: 132 (pq-gateway 6, pq-kms 10, pq-pki 6, crypto-inventory 42, verify-layer 8, proof-kinds 3, control-plane 17, agents 34, readiness 4).
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user