device-identity: third adversarial review and its repairs (with the release left out of a bundle, the firmware the device attests is still judged against the manufacturer's policies; a verifier clock and every time read strictly as RFC 3339 UTC, days that do not exist refused; C1, DEL and direction marks escaped on the terminal; a key file is never overwritten); probe 372/372, negative control 220/220. conformance: the halves of the device verifier mapped again (263/263 under the negative control) and the present-tense counts brought to the measurement of 2026-10-14 (467 vectors, 467/467 with the AIP-23 verifier as served)

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@@ -45,6 +45,31 @@ is `{ link, name, pass, detail, rule }`; a check that could not be made is `{ pa
shape than the one it reads or beyond the number of things it judges: each keeps the verdict from VALID.
- **VALID**: every link was brought and judged, and what could revoke it was read.
**PARTIAL is not a weaker VALID.** Whoever hands the bundle chooses which links it brings. A link left out turns every refusal
that link would have drawn into its `-missing` cause: a device the manufacturer retired, an authorization a stranger signed, an
attestation to an old nonce are each INVALID, and each is PARTIAL with the refused link left out (row W08 of the probe). It is
never VALID that way, and what can still be judged without the link is judged: with the release left out, the firmware the device
attests is judged against the policies all the same (rows W01 to W07). Admit on `verdict === 'VALID'`, or on a PARTIAL whose causes
are exactly the ones you chose not to bring. The field `valid` is `true` when no rule refused, PARTIAL included: it is not a
verdict.
Every cause, by the name `unjudged` gives it:
| cause | what was not brought or not read | verdict |
|---|---|---|
| `manufacture-missing`, `firmware-missing`, `authorization-missing`, `attestation-missing` | that link of the bundle | PARTIAL |
| `ownership-unrooted` | transfers shown without the manufacture credential they start from | PARTIAL |
| `manufacturer-trust` | the manufacturers the verifier trusts | PARTIAL |
| `manufacture-status-unread` | the recall list the credential names (none current, one that cannot be read, or something handed in its place) | PARTIAL |
| `firmware-policy-unread` | a current firmware policy that can be read | PARTIAL |
| `software-unread` | the Proof of Software attestation the release names | PARTIAL |
| `status-unread` | a status record that can be applied, or a record of the manufacturer or of the current owner that cannot be read | PARTIAL |
| `status-other-manufacturer` | a record of another manufacturer the verifier trusts (not applied, and not judged) | PARTIAL |
| `nonce`, `audience` | the verifier's own nonce, its own audience | PARTIAL |
| `hardware-root` | a hardware root carried by the credential or the attestation (never judged here) | PARTIAL |
| `witness-unread` | a reading of the notarization the envelope claims, or a reading that cannot be read | PARTIAL |
| `manufacture-status-none`, `status-ignored`, `status-prior-ownership`, `status-future` | see below | named, VALID stands |
Four causes are **named and do not change the verdict** (the export `NOTATE`):
- `manufacture-status-none`: the manufacture credential names no recall list.
@@ -66,8 +91,12 @@ tolerance ahead** of the verifier's clock and **no more than `maxAgeS` (300 s) b
tolerance is refused, also when it is well inside the allowed age.
A time is an RFC 3339 UTC text (`2026-10-05T12:00:00Z`, with up to three decimals of a second). A time without a zone, with a
zone offset, or one that is not a date is not a time. In a link of the bundle, the bundle cannot be read (`unreadable`). In a
firmware policy or a recall list handed to the verifier, that policy or list cannot be read (PARTIAL). In a status record, see
zone offset, or one that is not a date is not a time, and a day that does not exist is not a date: a date parser moves
`2026-02-30` to March 2 and `T24:00:00` to the next day, and this verifier refuses both. In a time a link of the bundle carries and
the verifier reads (the validity of the manufacture credential and when it was issued, the date of a transfer, the window of an
authorization, the date of the attestation), the bundle cannot be read (`unreadable`). The `issuedAt` of a release and of an
authorization are carried and not read: nothing is decided on them. In a firmware policy or a recall list handed to the verifier,
that policy or list cannot be read (PARTIAL). In a status record, see
[Status](#status-whose-record-counts-and-for-how-long): a retirement or a suspension is applied all the same, an `active` is
not believed.
@@ -85,7 +114,9 @@ What the verifier brings, and what happens without it:
A configuration of the verifier that cannot be read (a clock that is not a time, a tolerance outside 0 to 600 seconds, a trusted
manufacturer that is neither an id nor a set of public keys, a list that is not a list) is not an invalid bundle: `verifyDevice`
throws an error that begins with `verifyDevice:`.
throws an error that begins with `verifyDevice:`. The clock `now` is a `Date`, a number of milliseconds since 1970, or an RFC 3339
UTC text, and nothing else: a text without a zone (which a date parser reads as local time), `"1"` (which it reads as the year
2001), a date alone, `null` or a list are not a clock.
### What the verifier is handed: its shape, and how much of it is judged
@@ -111,7 +142,11 @@ of sight in silence. Hand the verifier the records of the device it judges, not
when a clean policy stands beside it. What the readable policies refuse is still refused. An expired policy says nothing about
now. The same holds for a recall list of the manufacturer whose validity is not a time (`manufacture-status-unread`). A policy
or a list counts as the manufacturer's only when it names the manufacturer as its issuer **and** its signature verifies with
the manufacturer's keys.
the manufacturer's keys. **With the release left out** (`firmware-missing`), the firmware the device attests, its digest and its
sequence, is judged against the same policies of the manufacturer of the credential for its model: a retracted digest or a
sequence below the floor is refused all the same (`firmware-retracted`, `firmware-rollback`), and no current policy is said
(`firmware-policy-unread`). Leaving the release out keeps the verdict from VALID; it does not hide what the device itself says
it runs.
- **Ownership.** A transfer counts only when signed by the owner at that point of the chain (`transfer-from`), and each transfer
is dated after the one before it. An authorization counts only when granted by the current owner of the chain shown, under its
ownership head (`authorization-owner`, `authorization-ownership`), and when it was in force both on the verifier's clock and
@@ -122,12 +157,15 @@ of sight in silence. Hand the verifier the records of the device it judges, not
dated ahead of it (`nonce`, `audience`, `freshness`). With the verifier's reading of the notarized envelope, an attestation
dated after the moment its envelope was already on the chain is refused (`witness-time`); with several readings the earliest
is the bound. A reading is a time in whole seconds: one in milliseconds, or written as text, is not used, and the verdict is
PARTIAL (`witness-unread`).
PARTIAL (`witness-unread`). The witness is offered by whoever hands the bundle: a bundle without an envelope is judged without
one (on the verifier's clock and nonce), and a reading handed for an envelope the bundle does not carry is not used.
- **Keys and signatures.** The device key must be a canonical ML-DSA-65 public key and the device id must be derived from it, in
the manufacture credential and in the attestation, and the two must be the same key (`device-key`, `device-id`,
`attestation-key`, `attestation-device`). An Ed25519 key in a field named ML-DSA-65 is refused. The hybrid signatures need
both halves, and each signature must declare its scheme. Every signature, like the device key, is accepted in **one text
only**, its canonical base64: the same bytes in another base64 text are refused.
both halves, and each signature must declare its scheme. Every signature of a link, of a status record and of a firmware
policy, like the device key, is accepted in **one text only**, its canonical base64: the same bytes in another base64 text are
refused. A recall list is an identity status list, judged by the identity verifier's signature check, which does not hold its
signature to one text; a list is named by no hash, so nothing depends on that text.
- **The form of a link.** A link of the bundle is exactly `{ statement, signature }`, and a signature object exactly its members
(`alg`, `ed25519`, `mldsa65`; for the device `alg`, `value`). One member more, beside the statement or inside the signature,
is refused by the signature rule of that link (`manufacture-signature`, `firmware-signature`, `transfer-signature`,
@@ -192,7 +230,7 @@ The 47 rules are the export `REGULI` of `device.mjs`; each check carries a marke
## Use
```sh
node device-cli.mjs new-identity --out maker.keys.json # the manufacturer (key files are written 0600)
node device-cli.mjs new-identity --out maker.keys.json # the manufacturer (a key file is created 0600, never written over)
node device-cli.mjs new-identity --out owner.keys.json
node device-cli.mjs new-device --out device.key.json # the device key K
@@ -234,10 +272,13 @@ is, and the verifier names it (PARTIAL).
**What is printed.** Everything `verify` prints that came from a file (a model, an id, a date) passes through one function,
`visible()`, exported by `device.mjs`: the C0 and C1 control characters, DEL, the Unicode line and paragraph separators, the
bidirectional controls and the byte order mark are printed in a visible form (`\x1b`, `
`), and a backslash is doubled so
that the form cannot be forged. A terminal executes nothing a bundle wrote, and a bundle cannot draw a second verdict line.
`--json` prints JSON, whose strings escape control characters; its rows carry the text exactly as it came, so a program that
shows them to a person passes them through `visible()` itself.
bidirectional controls (U+061C, U+200E, U+200F, U+202A to U+202E, U+2066 to U+2069: the characters Unicode gives the property
Bidi_Control) and the byte order mark are printed in a visible form (`\x1b`, `\u2028`), and a backslash is doubled so that the
form cannot be forged. A terminal executes nothing a bundle wrote, and a bundle cannot draw a second verdict line. `--json`
prints JSON through `visibleJson()`, also exported: JSON escapes C0, and every other character `visible()` replaces is written
as a `\u` escape, so the bytes printed hold no control character but the line feeds of the layout, and the text parses to
exactly the same value. Its rows carry the text exactly as it came, so a program that shows them to a person passes them
through `visible()` itself.
`status` writes the record of whoever signs it: with the manufacturer's keys, a record of the manufacturer (no ownership head);
with any other keys, a record under the ownership head of the chain given (`--manufacture` and every `--transfer`, in order).
@@ -329,7 +370,7 @@ returned only when no rule refused. The rows carry text as the bundle wrote it:
processor.
- The chain as witness on Aere Network mainnet (2800): measured only on testnet 28001, where the finality is the testnet's.
- The chain as witness with the verifier as it is now, end to end: the run on testnet 28001 was made on 2026-10-05 before the
repairs of that day and of the next (see below). What was recorded then (the bundles, what the verifier brought, its two
repairs of that day, of the next and of 2026-10-14 (see below). What was recorded then (the bundles, what the verifier brought, its two
readings) is judged again offline by the verifier of now in the probe (row D08) and gives the six verdicts recorded; nothing
was notarized or read on the chain again.
- A witness of time for transfers, authorizations and status records, and a witness of the ownership head: none is built.
@@ -340,7 +381,7 @@ returned only when no rule refused. The rows carry text as the bundle wrote it:
- The conditions of the **producers** and of the key files (the functions that write links), one at a time. The search described
below covers the verifier and everything it calls. What a producer refuses to write is a convenience to its caller, not a
guarantee to a verifier, which must assume links written by other tools; rows D01 and D02 of the probe measure the refusals
this page names. @@INAFARA@@ conditions lie there.
this page names. The search counts 164 mutants there and runs none of them.
- The conditions of `device-cli.mjs`, one at a time: the command line is covered by the plantings written by hand (the exit
codes, the list files, what is printed), not by the search.
- The kinds of change the search does not derive: a constant changed, an arithmetic operator changed, a statement removed, two
@@ -350,11 +391,11 @@ returned only when no rule refused. The rows carry text as the bundle wrote it:
| what | command | measured |
|---|---|---|
| the probe | `AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs> node proba-device.mjs` | @@PROBA@@ |
| the negative control | `node control-negativ-device.mjs` | @@CONTROL@@ |
| the search for conditions without a row | `AERE_ACORN=<directory of the acorn parser> node mutanti-device.mjs` | @@MUTANTI@@ |
| the probe | `AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs> node proba-device.mjs` | 372/372 on 2026-10-14 (Node 24.14.1, Windows): 54 bundles that must be VALID; 77 PARTIAL, each for exactly its named causes; 204 attack rows, each refused for exactly its named rules; 37 other rows (the command line through files and processes, the envelope under the reference verifier, the evidence recorded on testnet 28001 judged again offline, the rows of the third adversarial review); 804 damaged bundles each given a verdict |
| the negative control | `node control-negativ-device.mjs` | 220/220 on 2026-10-14: the untouched copy green; each of the 47 rules taken out, the rows that expect it and only they go red; 172 more plantings, each with exactly its rows |
| the search for conditions without a row | `AERE_ACORN=<directory of the acorn parser> node mutanti-device.mjs` | 892 mutants of the verifier on 2026-10-14 (acorn 8.16.0): 890 killed (36 of them because the probe could no longer build its world), 2 survive, both declared in the tool with the reason no row can see them (two assertions of the verifier about itself); 164 more lie in the producers and the key files and are not run. The run before row W14 found one condition without a row (the release judged only when it is left out), and W14 was written for it |
| the chain as witness | `AERE_TESTNET_KEY_FILE=<funded testnet key> AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs> node proba-device-ancora-testnet.mjs` | 10/10 on testnet 28001 on 2026-10-05, with the verifier as it was before the repairs of that day: two envelopes notarized (two transactions), both read back by the published reference verifier under a post-quantum certified anchor (after 17 s and 16 s); the honest bundle VALID with the reading and PARTIAL without it; an attestation the device dated twenty minutes ahead, judged on a clock set to the time it claims, passes without the chain and is refused with the reading (`witness-time`); the envelope of another attestation and the reading of another envelope do not witness. Evidence in `dovezi-ancora-28001/`. Not run again after the repairs: the recorded bundles and readings give the same six verdicts under the verifier of now (row D08 of the probe, offline) |
| the conformance suite | `node ../conformance/proba-conformance.mjs` | @@SUITA@@ |
| the conformance suite | `node ../conformance/proba-conformance.mjs` | 12/12 on 2026-10-14 with the AIP-23 verifier, Python 3 and testnet 28001 read (`--online`; nothing is sent): 181 rules of 11 verifiers, the published verifiers pass 467 of 467 vectors, 194 of them device bundles |
An attack row of the probe requires the verdict INVALID **and the exact set of rules that refused**: refused for another reason is
a red row. A row that must be PARTIAL requires the exact set of causes. Three things check that the rows can go red.