device-identity: third adversarial review and its repairs (with the release left out of a bundle, the firmware the device attests is still judged against the manufacturer's policies; a verifier clock and every time read strictly as RFC 3339 UTC, days that do not exist refused; C1, DEL and direction marks escaped on the terminal; a key file is never overwritten); probe 372/372, negative control 220/220. conformance: the halves of the device verifier mapped again (263/263 under the negative control) and the present-tense counts brought to the measurement of 2026-10-14 (467 vectors, 467/467 with the AIP-23 verifier as served)

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@@ -94,9 +94,9 @@ not rule ids. Their own probes and negative controls stay what checks them.
## The vectors
`vectori/` holds 422 vectors (413 offline, 9 that read testnet 28001; 16 MB, since every device and identity vector carries its ML-DSA-65 keys and signatures), listed with their digests in `vectori/INDEX.json`:
`vectori/` holds 467 vectors (458 offline, 9 that read testnet 28001; 19 MB, since every device and identity vector carries its ML-DSA-65 keys and signatures), listed with their digests in `vectori/INDEX.json`:
envelope 64, payment-risk 11, payment-receipt 10, market-timeline 26, dataset 22, ai-trust-bundle 24, audit-log 19, audit-inclusion
10, audit-consistency 4, agent-ledger 18, identity-presentation 65, device-bundle 149. By expected verdict: 59 `VALID`, 47 `PARTIAL`, 316 `INVALID`. None is typed by hand
10, audit-consistency 4, agent-ledger 18, identity-presentation 65, device-bundle 194. By expected verdict: 64 `VALID`, 66 `PARTIAL`, 337 `INVALID`. None is typed by hand
(`node genereaza-vectori.mjs --verifica` regenerates them and compares byte for byte):
- the 16 AIP-23 kinds come from their producers on fixed inputs (the same envelopes as the published AIP-23 kind vectors); the audit
@@ -121,10 +121,10 @@ envelope 64, payment-risk 11, payment-receipt 10, market-timeline 26, dataset 22
from the chain (two read calls).
An `INVALID` vector names its `base` and its `mutation`: **one operation** (set, remove or add at one JSON path) applied to the input
of a vector that is not invalid, and it must be refused for exactly the rules in `expected.failed`, not merely refused: 209 of the
316 are made this way. Where the rule sits under a hash or a signature, one place is not reachable (changing an amount under the
of a vector that is not invalid, and it must be refused for exactly the rules in `expected.failed`, not merely refused: 221 of the
337 are made this way. Where the rule sits under a hash or a signature, one place is not reachable (changing an amount under the
instruction hash trips the binding first; a false decision in a ledger must still be signed by the agent; a disclosure the issuer never signed must still be signed for by
the holder; an authorization by a previous owner must still be signed by that owner): the other 107 are made at
the holder; an authorization by a previous owner must still be signed by that owner): the other 116 are made at
the producer, the commitments above the change recomputed with the published formulas, and every path that moved is declared
(`mutation.changed`). Eleven vectors expect more than one rule: rules that guard the same field cannot be separated (a looser policy shown
under a receipt also makes the risk verdict not reproduce; a Proof of AI envelope that is changed is also no longer the one the
@@ -136,9 +136,9 @@ key breaks both the id derivation and the match with the manufacturer's credenti
```
AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs from aere.network/tools, with verify-anchor.mjs, mpt.mjs, falcon512.mjs, registry-v3.mjs and package.json beside it and npm install done>
node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs" # the published verifiers behind the one verdict form: 413 offline vectors
node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs" # the published verifiers behind the one verdict form: 458 offline vectors
node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs" --online # and the 9 that read testnet 28001 (nothing is sent)
node conformance.mjs --impl "python3 implementare-integritate.py" # an independent implementation: 62 vectors, 360 reported NOT COVERED
node conformance.mjs --impl "python3 implementare-integritate.py" # an independent implementation: 62 vectors, 405 reported NOT COVERED
node conformance.mjs --impl "<your command>" # yours
node implementare-aere.mjs <artifact.json> [--online] # one artifact { artifact, input }: its verdict
```
@@ -161,12 +161,32 @@ refusal. Without `--online` an implementation must not open a connection.
`implementare-integritate.py` is the second implementation: Python, standard library only, written from the rules and not from the
JavaScript. It claims 6 of the 181 rules (the form and the statement hash of an envelope; the form, the commitment, the salted field
commitments and the RFC 9162 inclusion of a dataset record) and passes all 62 vectors it claims. It cannot check an ML-DSA signature
or read a chain, says so in its capabilities, and the runner reports the rest as not covered: 360 vectors, among them every vector of
or read a chain, says so in its capabilities, and the runner reports the rest as not covered: 405 vectors, among them every vector of
the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger, the identity presentations and the device bundles. For those six verifiers the
suite has one implementation, ours.
## How the suite itself is checked
Measured on 2026-10-14 (UTC), after the third review of the device verifier (Node.js 24.14.1; the AIP-23 reference verifier fetched
from aere.network/tools with its four sibling files and `npm install` done in an empty folder, as a stranger would; testnet 28001
read, nothing sent):
- `node proba-conformance.mjs --online`: 12 rows green, 0 red (in this published copy the comparison of the 16 kind envelopes with
the published AIP-23 kind vectors is printed as information; the twelfth row is green where their generator is). The rules and the
vectors are what the code derives now: 181 rules of 11 verifiers, 467 vectors. Every rule has a vector that expects it (181 of 181);
every artifact kind has a valid vector (15); every invalid vector is its base with one operation (221) or one declared producer
change (116); the published verifiers pass 467/467; the independent implementation passes all 62 it claims and the other 405 are
reported not covered; 96,757 malformed inputs given to the module verifiers each got a verdict and none threw (one vector,
`device-bundle/chain-of-64.partial`, is larger than 300,000 characters and is not damaged this way); 183 malformed envelope files
given to the reference verifier each got a verdict.
- `node proba-conformance.mjs --control-negativ --online`: 263 rows green, 0 red: 181 of 181 rules, 76 of 76 conditions of the device
verifier (under them 96 distinct device vectors fail, each exactly under the conditions written for it), six controls of the
instruments (an implementation that calls everything valid fails 426 of the 458 offline vectors, every one that is not plainly valid).
The finer counts in the paragraphs below (how many plantings of the device verifier no vector reaches, how many device vectors the
purpose separation breaks at once, and the `--pe-loc` measurement) are those of the measurement of 2026-10-05; they were not counted
again on 2026-10-14.
Measured on 2026-10-05 (Node.js 24.14.1, Python 3.14.4, testnet 28001 read):
- `node proba-conformance.mjs --online`: every row green, 11 in this copy (a twelfth, the comparison of the 16 kind envelopes with
@@ -247,7 +267,7 @@ On 2026-10-05, while the identity verifier was being enrolled, one more, fixed t
## What it is not, and what is not measured
- **Not a certification, not an audit, not a mark.** Passing says that an implementation agrees with the published verifiers on these
422 inputs. It does not say either of them is correct, and no third party has reviewed the verifiers, the vectors or this suite.
467 inputs. It does not say either of them is correct, and no third party has reviewed the verifiers, the vectors or this suite.
- **The vectors and the verifiers have the same authors.** The expected verdicts were written by the people who wrote the verifiers.
The second implementation is independent in code and language, not in authorship, and it covers 6 rules of 181; the other
175 rules, among them every rule of the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger, the identity verifier and the device
@@ -289,7 +309,7 @@ On 2026-10-05, while the identity verifier was being enrolled, one more, fixed t
survive a sale: after a transfer it is named and not applied (the manufacturer's is final). A retirement by an owner that holds
across a sale needs a witness of when it and the transfer were signed, which is not built; every time in a transfer, an
authorization and a status record of these vectors is the statement of the key holder that signed it.
- **What a damaged artifact can still pass.** Of the 70,358 malformed inputs, 3,889 were still accepted, at 192 distinct paths (81 of them in device bundles: a status record that decided nothing, such as a suspension already lifted, a stranger's record, a record not in effect yet or one of a previous owner; a recall list or a firmware policy that could not be read and stood beside a clean one, which damaged is no longer signed by the manufacturer and counts like one that was not handed; the envelope and its notarization claim, which are optional; and the signature of a Proof of Software attestation, which the device verifier does not read): parts a
- **What a damaged artifact can still pass.** Of the 96,757 malformed inputs (measured 2026-10-14), 4,280 were still accepted, at 187 distinct paths (76 of them in device bundles; the kinds that follow were listed on 2026-10-05, when the count was 81 and the device verifier had not had its third review: a status record that decided nothing, such as a suspension already lifted, a stranger's record, a record not in effect yet or one of a previous owner; a recall list or a firmware policy that could not be read and stood beside a clean one, which damaged is no longer signed by the manufacturer and counts like one that was not handed; the envelope and its notarization claim, which are optional; and the signature of a Proof of Software attestation, which the device verifier does not read): parts a
verifier treats as optional (the transaction facts of a receipt, the envelope of a timeline, the head of an audit log), a policy
field removed that falls back to its default, a log or a ledger without its last entry (still a valid shorter one), a revocation that was not in effect (damaged, it is
ignored as before), and fields no rule reads