control-plane: the judgement of an organization (one evidence pack, 25 kinds in eight domains, each judged again by its published verifier with the relying party's own trust, revocations and clock; 74/74, 75/75 with --online on testnet 28001, view 48/48; negative controls 45/45 and 20/20); the compliance report is made again from its own findings
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@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ notarization command of the verification layer and for the agents' x402 wallet (
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| [`verify-layer/`](verify-layer/) | an audit-log sidecar for any deployment: entries are AIP-23 envelopes in a hash chain, the runtime adapter records every running Docker or Kubernetes container without any secret value, and from 2026-10-18 the same for what the operator's own cloud CLI exports (AWS ECS, EC2, Lambda; Azure VMs, Container Instances, Container Apps, Web Apps; GCP Compute Engine, Cloud Run), read from the export file and never from an account, and the head of the chain can be signed by the operator (ML-DSA-65) and notarized on Aere Network under a post-quantum validator certificate; it says plainly what that proves (the history before a published head) and what it does not (that the host told the truth); the same log as a Merkle tree (RFC 9162): signed tree heads, and inclusion and consistency proofs of a few hashes that anyone checks without the log |
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| [`proof-kinds/`](proof-kinds/) | the AIP-23 envelope builder the verification layer uses: sixteen proof kinds (`secret-access` since 2026-10-18, `agent-witness-checkpoint` since 2026-10-19), one envelope format, digests instead of raw content |
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| [`readiness/`](readiness/) | the post-quantum readiness scanner of a public hostname: real TLS handshakes (hybrid only, hybrid preferred, TLS 1.2), HSTS, the certificate; no connection to an address not proven public; a rate limit per client that X-Forwarded-For cannot bypass |
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| [`control-plane/`](control-plane/) | from findings to a finished migration: a prioritized plan from the inventory and the scanner, its execution through the gateway, KMS and PKI with consent per action and a measured proof afterwards, recipes for the servers the products do not touch and a rescan that judges them, a compliance report against NIST IR 8547, the EU roadmap and optionally CNSA 2.0, and a console that checks it all again |
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| [`control-plane/`](control-plane/) | from findings to a finished migration: a prioritized plan from the inventory and the scanner, its execution through the gateway, KMS and PKI with consent per action and a measured proof afterwards, recipes for the servers the products do not touch and a rescan that judges them, a compliance report against NIST IR 8547, the EU roadmap and optionally CNSA 2.0, a console that checks it all again, and the judgement of an organization: one evidence pack of 25 kinds of artifact in eight domains (Shield, identity, compliance, AI, payments, devices, audit, proofs), each judged again by the published verifier of its kind with the trust, revocations and clock of the party that relies on it, into one verdict per domain and a summary never stronger than the weakest domain asked for |
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| [`agents/`](agents/) | limits an AI agent cannot break unseen: a post-quantum identity (ML-DSA-65), a policy (spending per time window, allowed tools and recipients, which actions need human approval), a signed ledger of every action judged against the policy, approvals and revocation signed by people, and a verifier that re-runs the policy over the whole ledger without trusting the agent; two branches of one ledger are a proof of equivocation anyone can check; and a wallet that pays over x402 only what the agent's ledger records and its policy allows, either holding the payment key for the owner or co-signing from a 2-of-2 contract wallet that neither the agent nor the owner can spend alone; both run on the public testnet with their evidence; and the chain as the witness of a ledger: a notarized head, read through the AIP-23 verifier under a post-quantum certified anchor, bounds entry times from below (a backdated entry is caught); and a hosted witness (sandbox on testnet 28001; mainnet at activation): the agent sends its ledger head signed with its ML-DSA-65 key, never the ledger, the witness checks it continues the last head it holds (a conflicting head is a proof of equivocation, kept and returned), logs it in an RFC 9162 tree whose checkpoints it signs and notarizes, and returns a receipt with an inclusion proof that anyone checks without the witness and that the ledger verifier takes as an anchor |
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| [`proof-of-ai/`](proof-of-ai/) | the AIP-23 envelope of an AI agent's action: model, version, weights digest, prompt, input, output, tools, agent, requester, as digests; verified by the same AIP-23 verifier as every other proof |
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| [`payments/`](payments/) | the risk step and the receipt of a payment for a person or a company: a declared policy (per-payment and sliding-window limits in USD per payer, assets allowed, counterparties refused with their source) gives a verdict anyone reproduces from the same inputs, with the signals it does not have named as unmeasured (no sanctions list, no identity tier); the receipt is an instruction (payer, payee, the amount in the asset and in USD at the rate declared as an input, the transaction, the verdict with its policy under hash) committed to by an AIP-23 settlement envelope, notarized and read back under a post-quantum certified anchor; a reader checks it against the policy, the inputs and the chain with plain JSON-RPC |
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@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ test, counts as a failure of the control. Results measured on 2026-09-29 (Node.j
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| verify-layer | 45/45 with the AIP-23 reference verifier, measured from a fresh clone on 2026-10-18 (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs> node proba-sidecar.mjs`, where verify-proof.mjs is the one served at aere.network/tools with verify-anchor.mjs, mpt.mjs, falcon512.mjs, registry-v3.mjs and package.json beside it and `npm install` done there; verify-proof.mjs alone gives 41/45, because the four finality checks need the anchor verifier); without it 40 run, 5 are reported as skipped and the exit code is 2; the cloud adapters 60/60 with the same verifier on 2026-10-18 (`node proba-adaptoare-cloud.mjs`: nine fixtures derived from the vendors' documented CLI and REST examples by `fixturi-cloud/deriva.mjs`; without the verifier 59 run and one is skipped; a real account is unmeasured and the README says so); the Merkle tree 20/20 (`node proba-arbore.mjs`: the reference roots of Certificate Transparency, every proof up to 64 leaves, each attack), measured 2026-09-30 | 37/37 from a fresh clone of this repository on 2026-10-18 (`node control-negativ-sidecar.mjs`: the ten original plantings plus the cloud adapter rules; the case that compares with the development history is skipped here, and is the 38th in the development tree); the tree 14/14 (`node control-negativ-arbore.mjs`) |
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| proof-kinds | 32/32 on 2026-10-19 with the same verifier (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-proof-kinds.mjs`: sixteen kinds, the allowed values of the `secret-access` fields and the head of the agents witness checkpoint included) | nine negative controls inside the test |
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| readiness | 6/6 (`node proba-adrese-private.mjs`: the private-address rules, and a local listener no scan may touch) | the rate limit and the queue bound are tested where the service runs, not here (its README says so) |
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| control-plane | planner 44/44 (2026-10-18: a key agreement or a client-side TLS configured by the application itself is not routed to the TLS gateway; a self-signed trust anchor is blocked, not "automatic through PKI"; test code is LOW with its own scope), command line 10/10, execution 30/30 on real products started locally, remediation 33/33 on real TLS servers (all five server profiles measured end to end on 2026-10-18: nginx, Apache, HAProxy, Node, Go), compliance report 30/30 (with the AIP-23 verifier; test-code findings are counted apart and are not "exposed today"), console 8/8; the console viewer in a real Chromium, phone and desktop, 26/26 (`node proba-consola-web.mjs`, measured 2026-09-30; needs `playwright-core` and a Chromium, otherwise it exits 2) | remediation 7/7, compliance report 3/3 in this repository; viewer 8/8 (`node control-negativ-consola-web.mjs`) |
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| control-plane | planner 44/44 (2026-10-18: a key agreement or a client-side TLS configured by the application itself is not routed to the TLS gateway; a self-signed trust anchor is blocked, not "automatic through PKI"; test code is LOW with its own scope), command line 10/10, execution 30/30 on real products started locally, remediation 33/33 on real TLS servers (all five server profiles measured end to end on 2026-10-18: nginx, Apache, HAProxy, Node, Go), compliance report 30/30 (with the AIP-23 verifier; test-code findings are counted apart and are not "exposed today"), console 8/8; organization judgement 74/74 on 2026-10-20 (`node proba-organizatie.mjs`: artifacts made by the real producers of each kind, the context of the relying party set against that of the pack, fourteen forged packs that used to pass now refused; 75/75 with `--online` on testnet 28001, said as a testnet) and its view in a real Chromium 48/48 (`node proba-organizatie-web.mjs`); the console viewer in a real Chromium, phone and desktop, 26/26 (`node proba-consola-web.mjs`, measured 2026-09-30; needs `playwright-core` and a Chromium, otherwise it exits 2) | remediation 7/7, compliance report 3/3 in this repository; viewer 8/8 (`node control-negativ-consola-web.mjs`); organization judgement 45/45 guards removed, each turning its named row red (`node control-negativ-organizatie.mjs`), and 20/20 defects planted in its view (`node control-negativ-organizatie-web.mjs`) |
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| identity | 52/52 (`node proba-identity.mjs`, a presentation optionally signed for one exact request (`request`) included, with the AIP-23 verifier for its envelope test; without it that test is reported as skipped and the exit code is 2), compliance 18/18 (`node proba-conformitate.mjs`) and Travel Rule 20/20 (`node proba-travel-rule.mjs`) with the same verifier (without it each reports one test unmeasured and exits 2; 2026-10-18: a missing originator id or nonce is a refusal, found when the verifier was enrolled in the conformance suite), SD-JWT 31/31 (`node proba-sdjwt.mjs`, the RFC 9901 vectors and fixtures derived from @sd-jwt/core 0.23.0 included; since 2026-10-19 the keys of an AERE identity are judged on their ML-DSA-65 half by default, the Ed25519 half only on request, and every verdict says `postQuantum`), SD-JWT VC 11/11 (`node proba-sdjwt-vc.mjs`); interoperability with @sd-jwt/core and jose in both directions 26/26 and 28/28 (`interop/`, with those libraries installed in a folder you name; otherwise reported unmeasured), measured 2026-10-18, before the 2026-10-19 change; the scripts now ask for the Ed25519 half explicitly and have not been re-run since | 57/57 (`node control-negativ-identity.mjs`); compliance 17/17 (`node control-negativ-conformitate.mjs`); Travel Rule 20/20 (`node control-negativ-travel-rule.mjs`); SD-JWT 39/39 (`node control-negativ-sdjwt.mjs`); SD-JWT VC 20/20 (`node control-negativ-sdjwt-vc.mjs`) |
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| agents | policy 27/27 with the AIP-23 verifier (without it 25 run, 2 are reported as skipped and the exit code is 2), ledger 59/59 on 2026-10-19 (since then an equivocation proof must be made with the agent's ML-DSA-65 key), approval and revocation 39/39, the chain as witness 26/26 without a network and 7/7 on testnet 28001 on 2026-09-30 (`proba-agent-ancora-testnet.mjs`, needs a funded testnet key and the AIP-23 verifier), command line 23/23 through files and processes only (on Linux and macOS one more test checks the key file mode; not measured here); the hosted witness 154/154 without a network, measured from a fresh clone of this repository on 2026-10-19 (four more rows, for the Cloud gateway door, run only where the gateway lives), with a local notary mock (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs> node proba-martor-agenti.mjs`; the AIP-23 rows need the verifier, without it they are skipped by name and the exit code is 2), and 75/75 on testnet 28001 earlier on 2026-10-19 with the form before that day's corrections; the current form has not been run on testnet yet (`proba-martor-agenti.mjs --testnet`, needs a funded testnet key or the faucet: a checkpoint notarized, the receipt VALID with post-quantum finality, a backdated ledger caught with it; evidence in `agents/dovezi-martor-agenti-28001/`); x402 wallet 25/25, 2-of-2 co-signing 16/16 and payment verifier 14/14 without a network; on the public testnet 28001, 9/9 with the wallet key and 13/13 with the 2-of-2 contract wallet (`agents/x402/proba-x402-testnet.mjs`, `agents/x402/proba-cosign-testnet.mjs`, each needs a funded testnet key); the contract's artifact recompiles byte for byte with solc 0.8.23 (`node x402/recompileaza-contract.mjs --solc <solc>`) | 28/28 (`node control-negativ-aprobare.mjs`); the chain as witness 11/11 (`node control-negativ-ancora.mjs`); the hosted witness 131/131, plus three changes of order that must leave the probe green (`node control-negativ-martor-agenti.mjs`); x402 30/30 (`node x402/control-negativ-wallet.mjs`); the contract's own tests (7) and their negative control (4/4) run in the Aere Network contracts project, not in this repository |
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| proof-of-ai | 6/6 with the AIP-23 verifier (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-proof-of-ai.mjs`); without it the probe reports NEMASURAT and exits 2 | one negative control inside the test (an envelope touched after its hash: INVALID) |
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@@ -54,9 +54,9 @@ test, counts as a failure of the control. Results measured on 2026-09-29 (Node.j
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| market-settlement | 20/20 on testnet 28001 on 2026-10-02 (`AERE_TESTNET_KEY_FILE=... AERE_ETHERS_DIR=... node proba-piata-28001.mjs`: five scenarios on AereComputeMarketV3 deployed from the committed artifact, every refusal by its named custom error, the provider's notarized envelope read back under a post-quantum certified anchor); the judge on the recorded timelines 26/26 without a chain (`node proba-judecata.mjs`: seven honest readings VALID, eighteen forged or malformed ones INVALID for their named reason, the settlement receipt) | 10/10 (`node proba-judecata.mjs --control-negativ`: form, completeness of the timeline, posting, deadline, window, arbiter, payout, result bytes, replay, proof, each planted out on a copy and each forged fixture then accepted) |
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| verifiable-data | 23/23 with the AIP-23 verifier (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-verifiable-data.mjs`: honest answers VALID, ten forged or malformed ones INVALID for their named reason, availability sampling on a local server; the envelope row is NEMASURAT without the verifier, exit 2); the two chain rows of `--viu` measured on testnet 28001 on 2026-10-02 (a version notarized with a test key and read back under a post-quantum certified anchor; evidence in `dovezi/`) | 5/5 (`node proba-verifiable-data.mjs --control-negativ`: field commitment, index order, completeness, consistency, sampling, each planted out on a copy and each forged fixture then accepted) |
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| ai-trust | 16/16 with the AIP-23 verifier, measured 2026-10-05 (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-lant-de-incredere.mjs`: the whole chain on a committed fixture, then thirteen bundles broken on purpose, each refused for its named reason, among them an agent with a classical key and an audit head signed with one); without the verifier it exits 2 | 11/11 (`node proba-lant-de-incredere.mjs --control-negativ`) |
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| conformance | 12/12 on 2026-10-20 in the development repository, with the AIP-23 reference verifier of that repository (byte for byte the one served at aere.network/tools), Python 3 and testnet 28001 read (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs> node proba-conformance.mjs --online`: the rules and the vectors are what the code derives, every rule has a vector, every invalid vector is one operation from its base or one declared change at its producer, the published verifiers pass 791/791, an independent Python implementation passes the 171 it claims and the other 620 are reported not covered, 225,345 malformed inputs and 183 malformed envelope files each get a verdict); from a fresh clone of this repository the last measurement is of 2026-10-18, before the operation log was enrolled (11/11; the twelfth row, the comparison with the published AIP-23 kind vectors, needs their generator, which is not part of this copy, and is reported as information); without `--online` the nine chain vectors are reported unmeasured and the exit code is 2 | 342/342 on 2026-10-20: 260/260 rules (`node proba-conformance.mjs --control-negativ --online`: each rule planted out of its verifier in a copy; the vectors that expect it, and only they, must fail), then 76/76 conditions of the device verifier's compound checks, each planted out alone (exactly the vectors written for it must fail), then six controls of the instruments |
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| conformance | 12/12 on 2026-10-20 in the development repository, with the AIP-23 reference verifier of that repository (byte for byte the one served at aere.network/tools), Python 3 and testnet 28001 read (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs> node proba-conformance.mjs --online`: the rules and the vectors are what the code derives, every rule has a vector, every invalid vector is one operation from its base or one declared change at its producer, the published verifiers pass 791/791, an independent Python implementation passes the 171 it claims and the other 620 are reported not covered, 225,345 malformed inputs and 183 malformed envelope files each get a verdict); 11/11 from a fresh clone of this repository on 2026-10-20, alone in an empty folder, nothing written beside it and its tree left clean (the same command; the twelfth row, the comparison with the published AIP-23 kind vectors, needs their generator, which is not part of this copy, and is reported as information); without `--online` the nine chain vectors are reported unmeasured and the exit code is 2 | 342/342 on 2026-10-20: 260/260 rules (`node proba-conformance.mjs --control-negativ --online`: each rule planted out of its verifier in a copy; the vectors that expect it, and only they, must fail), then 76/76 conditions of the device verifier's compound checks, each planted out alone (exactly the vectors written for it must fail), then six controls of the instruments |
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| device-identity | 372/372 with the AIP-23 verifier, measured 2026-10-14 (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-device.mjs`: fifty-four bundles that must be VALID; seventy-seven with something not brought, not read or not readable, each PARTIAL for its named causes; two hundred and four attack rows, each refused for exactly its named rules, among them a clone with another key, a rolled-back or retracted firmware (also when the release is left out of the bundle), a previous owner that still signs, an owner's retirement written under no ownership head, a replayed attestation, an attestation dated ahead of the verifier's clock, a manufacturer the verifier does not trust, a retirement, a classical key under the ML-DSA-65 name, a signature in another base64 text, a day that does not exist; 804 damaged bundles each given a verdict; the command line through files only; the evidence recorded on testnet 28001 judged again offline); the chain as witness 10/10 on testnet 28001 on 2026-10-05, before the repairs of that day (`proba-device-ancora-testnet.mjs`, needs a funded testnet key and the AIP-23 verifier; not run again since: the bundles and readings it recorded give the same verdicts under the verifier of now) | 220/220 (`node control-negativ-device.mjs`: the untouched copy green; each of the 47 rules taken out of a copy, the rows that expect it, and only they, go red; 172 more plantings, most of them one condition of a compound check taken out alone, each with its rows) |
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| device-operation | 107/107 on 2026-10-20 (`node proba-operation.mjs`: 18 logs that must be VALID, 15 PARTIAL each for its named causes, 48 attack rows each refused for exactly its named rules, 459 damaged logs each given a verdict, none counting a record the device did not sign; an adversarial review of 2026-10-20 found seven defects, among them a forged equivocation and a retired key that erased a witnessed history, each repaired with its row); the reputation's two implementations pass its 103 vectors 103/103 each through `../conformance/conformance.mjs` | 62/62 on 2026-10-20 (`node control-negativ-operation.mjs`: each of the 17 rules taken out of a copy, then 44 more plantings, each turning exactly its rows red; each defect of the review is put back by one planting) |
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| device-operation | 107/107 on 2026-10-20 (`node proba-operation.mjs`: 18 logs that must be VALID, 15 PARTIAL each for its named causes, 48 attack rows each refused for exactly its named rules, 459 damaged logs each given a verdict, none counting a record the device did not sign; an adversarial review of 2026-10-20 found seven defects, among them a forged equivocation and a retired key that erased a witnessed history, each repaired with its row); the reputation's two implementations pass its 103 vectors 103/103 each through `../conformance/conformance.mjs`; the same figures from a fresh clone of this repository on 2026-10-20 | 62/62 on 2026-10-20 (`node control-negativ-operation.mjs`: each of the 17 rules taken out of a copy, then 44 more plantings, each turning exactly its rows red; each defect of the review is put back by one planting; 62/62 also from the fresh clone) |
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| exposure-report | 164 passed and 1 `NEMASURAT` of 165 rows in the AERE development tree on 2026-10-14 (`node proba-expunere.mjs`: codec checks with real public vectors, mode 1 and mode 2 through four mock targets that serve recorded responses, the network guard's proof that in modes 1 and 2 nothing leaves the machine, the language gate, the AIP-23 `compliance` envelopes judged by the reference verifier; the `NEMASURAT` row is mode 3 against a real provider, which would send addresses to a third party); in this copy, after `npm install --ignore-scripts` in its directory: 153 passed, 0 red, 0 broken, 12 `NEMASURAT` with the reason (the rows compared with the AIP-23 verifier, the anchor verifier's RLP encoder and MPT walker and the shield's header pins, none of which is in this repository: with `AERE_PROOF_PROTOCOL_VERIFY`, `AERE_VERIFY_PROOF` and `AERE_EXPUNERE_PINI` naming them the rows run, 162 passed and 3 `NEMASURAT`; the scan of the directory for names from the AERE host inventory; the git-ignore row outside a git tree); the exit code is 0 unless a row is red or broken | inside the test, 2026-10-14: each rule has its reverse planting in a copy of the tool (a foreign provider planted on each network path is caught, a label planted in the language gate is refused, each classification rule taken out turns its row red, a `@noble/curves` 2.x planted first is passed over and alone is named as missing), and the recorded fixtures are judged against their declared date |
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Code comments, most function and variable names (also many exported between the files of a component), test names and control
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@@ -66,4 +66,4 @@ interface, command line and data (`definePolicy`, `verifyLedger`, `approve`, ...
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## Licence
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MIT, see [LICENSE](LICENSE). Files: 1247 (pq-gateway 9, pq-kms 10, pq-secrets 6, pq-pki 6, crypto-inventory 73, verify-layer 56, proof-kinds 3, control-plane 27, agents 44, identity 24, proof-of-ai 3, ai-trust 6, verifiable-data 7, market-settlement 10, payments 8, conformance 803, device-identity 11, device-operation 114, exposure-report 18, readiness 4).
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MIT, see [LICENSE](LICENSE). Files: 1253 (pq-gateway 9, pq-kms 10, pq-secrets 6, pq-pki 6, crypto-inventory 73, verify-layer 56, proof-kinds 3, control-plane 33, agents 44, identity 24, proof-of-ai 3, ai-trust 6, verifiable-data 7, market-settlement 10, payments 8, conformance 803, device-identity 11, device-operation 114, exposure-report 18, readiness 4).
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