device-operation: machine operation log and reputation; conformance: 260 rules, 17 verifiers, 791 vectors
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@@ -34,6 +34,11 @@ export const MODULE = {
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// from its real file: a planted copy of identity.mjs is reached only by the identity-presentation artifact
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travelrule: { url: new URL('../identity/travel-rule.mjs', import.meta.url), env: 'AERE_CONF_MODUL_TRAVELRULE' },
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compliance: { url: new URL('../identity/conformitate.mjs', import.meta.url), env: 'AERE_CONF_MODUL_COMPLIANCE' },
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// 2026-10-20 (B7): what a machine with an identity signs about its own operation over time, and the reputation computed from the facts
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// its verifier derives. The operation verifier imports device.mjs from its real file: a planted copy of device.mjs is reached only by the
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// device-bundle artifact. The reputation module is judged alone (its input is facts, not a log)
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operation: { url: new URL('../device-operation/operation.mjs', import.meta.url), env: 'AERE_CONF_MODUL_OPERATION' },
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reputation: { url: new URL('../device-operation/reputation.mjs', import.meta.url), env: 'AERE_CONF_MODUL_REPUTATION' },
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};
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export const caleModul = (k) => process.env[MODULE[k].env] || fileURLToPath(MODULE[k].url);
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export const incarca = (k) => import(pathToFileURL(caleModul(k)).href);
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@@ -330,6 +335,34 @@ export const VERIFICATOARE = {
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presentation: ['compliance.presentation', AU, 'the presentation is valid for this verifier, judged by the identity verifier with the policy\'s trusted issuers, this audience and nonce, the policy\'s allowed age, the status lists and revocations handed'],
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status: ['compliance.status', I, 'the credential status was judged from a current status list of the issuer handed to the verifier, when the policy requires it (requireStatus, true by default)'],
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rule: ['compliance.rule', I, 'every rule of the policy (equals, in, notIn, atLeast, present) holds on the claims the presentation establishes (the plain claims and the disclosed ones)'] } },
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// the operation log of a machine (enrolled 2026-10-20, B7): the records its device key signed over time, rooted in the manufacture
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// credential of its first key, with anchor envelopes, judged with what the verifier brings: its clock (and the tolerance of it), the
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// manufacturers it trusts, the recall lists and the manufacturer's status records it read, its own readings of the notarized anchors and of
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// the blocks the records name, and records of the machine it holds from elsewhere. The verifier makes every check of each record it reaches
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// and names every rule that refused; the log is accepted up to the first record a rule refuses, and the records after it are not judged
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'device-operation': { artifacts: ['device-operation-log'], sursa: 'operation', reguli: {
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form: ['operation.form', I, 'the file is an operation log of 1 to 16 manufacture credentials, a list of records and a list of anchors, with nothing else beside them'],
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identity: ['operation.identity', AU, 'the manufacture credential of each key is accepted by the device verifier (signature, ids, trusted manufacturer, recall list, device key); its validity window is judged at the time of each record'],
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'record-form': ['operation.record-form', I, 'every record is exactly { statement, signature } with v, kind, deviceId, seq, prev, at (an RFC 3339 UTC time from 1970), state, counter, measurement, after and next, in their forms'],
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'record-key': ['operation.record-key', AU, 'every record is signed by the key in force at its position (the first key, then the key each rotation names)'],
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'record-signature': ['operation.record-signature', AU, 'every record verifies with its device key (ML-DSA-65, the domain of operation records), the signature exactly { alg, value } in canonical base64'],
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'record-seq': ['operation.record-seq', I, 'every record carries its position'],
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'record-prev': ['operation.record-prev', I, 'every record names the hash of the one before it, and the first the hash of the manufacture credential of the first key'],
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'record-time': ['operation.record-time', I, 'record times do not go back, and none is ahead of the verifier\'s clock by more than its tolerance'],
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'record-counter': ['operation.record-counter', I, 'the counter does not go down'],
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'key-window': ['operation.key-window', I, 'every record is dated inside the validity of its key\'s manufacture credential (its start with the tolerance of the verifier\'s clock, its last instant inside)'],
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'key-retired': ['operation.key-retired', I, 'no record is dated at or after the manufacturer retired its key (a retirement whose date cannot be read holds from the start)'],
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rotation: ['operation.rotation', AU, 'a rotation names a key that the next manufacture credential of the log certifies, from the same manufacturer, for the same model and serial, another key, with its device id derived from it'],
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'anchor-envelope': ['operation.anchor-envelope', I, 'every anchor is an AIP-23 time attestation whose hash reproduces, about a record of this log, with that record\'s device as its source'],
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'witness-time': ['operation.witness-time', I, 'no record is dated after its anchor was already on the chain, in the verifier\'s earliest reading'],
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'beacon-hash': ['operation.beacon-hash', I, 'a block a record names, when the verifier read it, carries the hash the record names'],
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'beacon-time': ['operation.beacon-time', I, 'no record is dated before the block it names existed, in the verifier\'s reading'],
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equivocation: ['operation.equivocation', I, 'no record handed to the verifier beside the log is another record of the same key for a position of the log'] } },
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// the reputation of a machine (enrolled 2026-10-20, B7): a statement of the figures the published formula aere-device-reputation/1 gives for
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// the facts of an operation log and the parameters chosen, checked by computing them again. It carries no signature of its own
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'device-reputation': { artifacts: ['device-reputation'], sursa: 'reputation', reguli: {
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form: ['reputation.form', I, 'the input is exactly { facts, params, claimed }, and the facts and the parameters are of the form the formula reads (every time a whole number of milliseconds up to 2^52, windows from 1 s to 366 days, at most 100,000 of them)'],
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figures: ['reputation.figures', I, 'the stated reputation is exactly what the formula gives for these facts and parameters, figures and evidence alike'] } },
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};
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/**
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* The FAILED sites of verify-proof's `finality` level, classified. `fragment` must appear on exactly one such source line; `re`
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@@ -380,6 +413,21 @@ export const NEJUDECATE_DEVICE = { 'manufacture-missing': ['integrity', 'not-sup
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* names and nobody read is a claim not checked (PARTIAL) only when the policy waived the status; when it requires it, the verifier refuses.
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*/
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export const NEJUDECATE_COMPLIANCE = { 'status-unread': ['integrity', 'claim-not-checked'], 'status-none': null, 'revocation-ignored': null, 'revocations-none': null, request: ['integrity', 'not-supplied'] };
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/**
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* What the operation verifier leaves UNJUDGED (2026-10-20), by the cause it names -> [level, cause of the suite], or null when the verifier
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* NAMES the cause and its verdict stands. PARTIAL: the manufacturers it trusts not brought, a recall list or the manufacturer's registry not
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* read (or a record in it that cannot be read, or a retirement signed by ANOTHER manufacturer the verifier trusts), a hardware root, a log
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* with no record or with more records than are judged, records beyond the log shown, records of a retired key that no anchor read shows
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* existed before the retirement, a notarization an anchor claims and the verifier did not read. Named, not PARTIAL (the adapter puts them in
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* the reason of the integrity level): a credential that names no recall list, a retirement dated in the verifier's future, a block a record
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* names that the verifier did not read, times no witness bounds, records beside the log that are not of its keys, a key used after the log
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* rotated away from it or after its manufacturer retired it, records after a refused one.
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* The adapter requires that the non-null causes are exactly the ones the module itself declares as keeping the verdict from VALID.
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*/
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export const NEJUDECATE_OPERATION = { 'manufacturer-trust': ['authenticity', 'not-supplied'], 'manufacture-status-unread': ['integrity', 'claim-not-checked'], 'manufacture-status-none': null,
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'hardware-root': ['authenticity', 'unmeasurable'], 'status-unread': ['integrity', 'claim-not-checked'], 'status-other-manufacturer': ['integrity', 'claim-not-checked'], 'status-future': null,
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'records-missing': ['integrity', 'incomplete'], 'records-unread': ['integrity', 'unmeasurable'], 'records-beyond': ['integrity', 'incomplete'], 'retired-unwitnessed': ['anchoring', 'unwitnessed'],
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'witness-unread': ['anchoring', 'claim-not-checked'], 'beacon-unread': null, 'time-unwitnessed': null, 'other-ignored': null, 'rotated-key-used': null, 'retired-key-used': null, 'after-refusal': null };
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/** Verifiers published beside these that the suite does NOT enrol yet, with the pattern that counts their refusal sites. Empty since
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* 2026-10-18: the Travel Rule and the compliance verifiers, the last two of the identity component, are enrolled above. */
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export const NEINROLATE = [];
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