device-operation: machine operation log and reputation; conformance: 260 rules, 17 verifiers, 791 vectors
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@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
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Every component beside this one ships its own verifier and its own way of saying no: the AIP-23 reference verifier prints four
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levels, the payment modules return `reasons`, the market judge `motive`, the dataset module `ok`, the audit log and the agents'
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ledger a refusal text, the identity verifier and the device verifier a list of labelled rows. This folder adds the one place that
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ledger a refusal text, the identity verifier, the device verifier and the operation verifier of a machine a list of labelled rows, the
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reputation check of a machine a verdict and a reason. This folder adds the one place that
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says, in the same form for all of them, **this artifact passes or does not, at level N, for reason M**, and a set of vectors that any
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implementation, in any language, can be run against.
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@@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ are the ones those verifiers name, read from their code.
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| level | what it says |
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|---|---|
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| `integrity` | the artifact is what it says: its hashes bind its content, and the rules it declares (a policy, deadlines, a challenge window, Merkle paths, a payout) hold when recomputed from the evidence supplied |
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| `authenticity` | the signature the artifact carries verifies, with a key of the scheme declared, and the identity it names is the one derived from that key (an ML-DSA signature on an AIP-23 envelope, the ML-DSA-65 signature of an audit head, the ML-DSA-65 key and signatures of an agent's ledger; the hybrid Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65 signatures of a credential, of its presentation and of each delegation link, both halves required; the same hybrid signatures on a device's manufacture credential, firmware release, transfers, authorization and status records, and the ML-DSA-65 signature of the device on its attestation) |
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| `authenticity` | the signature the artifact carries verifies, with a key of the scheme declared, and the identity it names is the one derived from that key (an ML-DSA signature on an AIP-23 envelope, the ML-DSA-65 signature of an audit head, the ML-DSA-65 key and signatures of an agent's ledger; the hybrid Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65 signatures of a credential, of its presentation and of each delegation link, both halves required; the same hybrid signatures on a device's manufacture credential, firmware release, transfers, authorization and status records, and the ML-DSA-65 signature of the device on its attestation; the ML-DSA-65 signature of each operation record of a machine with the device key in force at its position, the manufacture credential of each key judged by the device verifier) |
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| `anchoring` | its `statementHash` (or, for a trust chain, the head of its ledger) is recorded in the notary contract, under a state root that a post-quantum anchor covers |
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| `finality` | that anchor's post-quantum certificate verifies. The finality is the one of the chain the artifact was notarized on |
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@@ -32,7 +33,8 @@ Each level is `PASSED`, `FAILED` or `NOT_MEASURED`, with the reason; a level nob
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`INVALID` when a level failed; `PARTIAL` when nothing failed but something the artifact **claims** was not measured (a notarization
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claim not checked because the run was offline, a signature scheme the verifier cannot check, a timeline that is not terminal, a
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presentation judged without the verifier's audience, nonce or trusted issuers, a credential whose status list was not read, a
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device bundle with a link missing or a registry nobody read);
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device bundle with a link missing or a registry nobody read, an operation log whose manufacturer's registry or anchors were not read,
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or which is not the latest the verifier holds);
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`VALID` otherwise, and only with integrity passed. A claim that was not checked is never `VALID`. `failed` is the sorted list of the
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rule ids that refused; the suite compares it as an exact set.
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@@ -42,9 +44,10 @@ verdict (`vectori/payment-receipt/company-p1-28001.valid.json`).
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## What is enrolled
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`REGULI.json` is derived from the code (`node deriva-reguli.mjs --verifica`): 241 rules of 15 verifiers, 21 artifact kinds (since
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2026-10-19: 241 with `sdjwt.hybrid-half`, AIP-25 finding C1; 2026-10-18: 239 when the Travel Rule and the compliance verifiers were enrolled, 240 with `identity.request` later that day; 213 rules of 13 verifiers and 17 kinds after the SD-JWT
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verifiers earlier that day; 181 rules of 11 verifiers, 15 kinds before). By level: 188 rules are reported at `integrity`, 50 at
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`REGULI.json` is derived from the code (`node deriva-reguli.mjs --verifica`): 260 rules of 17 verifiers, 23 artifact kinds (since
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2026-10-20, when the operation log of a machine and its reputation were enrolled; 2026-10-19: 241 rules of 15 verifiers and 21 kinds,
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with `sdjwt.hybrid-half`, AIP-25 finding C1; 2026-10-18: 239 when the Travel Rule and the compliance verifiers were enrolled, 240 with `identity.request` later that day; 213 rules of 13 verifiers and 17 kinds after the SD-JWT
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verifiers earlier that day; 181 rules of 11 verifiers, 15 kinds before). By level: 203 rules are reported at `integrity`, 54 at
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`authenticity`, 3 at `anchoring` (one of them, `envelope.finality`, is reported at `anchoring` or at `finality` by the place that refused).
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| artifact kind | judged by | rules |
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@@ -64,10 +67,12 @@ verifiers earlier that day; 181 rules of 11 verifiers, 15 kinds before). By leve
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| `sdjwt-vc-presentation` (an SD-JWT VC of `draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc`, judged as the SD-JWT above plus the profile: the credential type the verifier expects, and the Token Status List it fetched for the `status` the credential names) | `identity/sdjwt-vc.mjs` (enrolled 2026-10-18) | 9 of its own, on top of the 24 of `sdjwt`: `sdjwtvc.vct-expected`, `.vct`, `.vct-mismatch`, `.disclosed-protected`, `.form`, `.status-list`, `.status-index`, `.status-revoked`, `.status-unjudged` |
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| `travel-rule-binding`, `travel-rule-message`, `travel-rule-receipt` (the Travel Rule between VASPs: the beneficiary's KEM key binding with its VASP presentation, judged by the originator with its id, its nonce, its clock, the registries it trusts and their status lists; the sealed IVMS101 message, judged by the beneficiary with its id, its own KEM key pair, which decrypts, its clock, its registries and lists and its replay store; the signed receipt, judged by the originator with the message it sent and the beneficiary it accepted) | `identity/travel-rule.mjs` (enrolled 2026-10-18) | 23: `travelrule.binding-form`, `.binding-id`, `.binding-signature`, `.binding-window`, `.vasp-presentation`, `.vasp-status`, `.vasp-identity`, `.vasp-claim`, `.message-form`, `.message-id`, `.message-signature`, `.message-recipient`, `.message-kem-keys`, `.message-freshness`, `.replay-store`, `.replay`, `.kem-alg`, `.kem-open`, `.ciphertext`, `.receipt-form`, `.receipt-from`, `.receipt-signature`, `.receipt-message` |
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| `compliance-presentation` (a presentation of a credential judged against the verifier's compliance policy: the issuers it believes and the claims it requires, with the verifier's audience, nonce and clock, all required, and the status lists and revocations it holds) | `identity/conformitate.mjs` (enrolled 2026-10-18) | 3: `compliance.presentation`, `.status`, `.rule` |
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| `device-operation-log` (what a machine's device key signed about its operation over time: records rooted in the manufacture credential of its first key, rotations to keys the same manufacturer certified, anchor envelopes; judged with what the verifier brings: its clock and the tolerance of it, the manufacturers it trusts, the recall lists and the manufacturer's status records it read, its own readings of the notarized anchors and of the blocks the records name, records of the machine it holds from elsewhere) | `device-operation/operation.mjs` (enrolled 2026-10-20) | 17: `operation.form`, `.identity`, `.record-form`, `.record-key`, `.record-signature`, `.record-seq`, `.record-prev`, `.record-time`, `.record-counter`, `.key-window`, `.key-retired`, `.rotation`, `.anchor-envelope`, `.witness-time`, `.beacon-hash`, `.beacon-time`, `.equivocation` |
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| `device-reputation` (the figures somebody states for the facts of an operation log and the parameters chosen, checked by computing the published formula `aere-device-reputation/1` again) | `device-operation/reputation.mjs` (enrolled 2026-10-20) | 2: `reputation.form`, `.figures` |
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A module verifier exports the list of rules it can name (`REGULI`; its helper throws on any other) and marks its rules in one of two
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ways, both read by the derivation: a marker on every check of a rule (nine modules), or the rule named at every call of the
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verifier's one refusal helper (`ai-trust`). The derivation requires declared == marked == mapped here. A rule added to a verifier and
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ways, both read by the derivation: a marker on every check of a rule (fifteen modules; the reputation check carries its markers since
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2026-10-20, for this suite), or the rule named at every call of the verifier's one refusal helper (`ai-trust`). The derivation requires declared == marked == mapped here. A rule added to a verifier and
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not mapped is a refusal of the derivation; a mapped rule without a vector is a refusal of the probe. For the reference verifier, a
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published program this suite does not edit, the rules are its level names, and each of the six places where its `finality` level
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can refuse is classified as `anchoring` or `finality` (a seventh place would be a refusal of the derivation).
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@@ -114,14 +119,42 @@ the compliance verifier reports every rule of its policy not met as well (the ve
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the vectors expect both); a credential from an issuer or a registry whose status list the verifier does not hold is refused for its
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issuer and for its status at once.
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The operation verifier of a machine (enrolled on 2026-10-20) works like the device verifier, which it runs on the manufacture
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credential of each key: it makes every check of each record it reaches, names every rule that refused, and accepts the log
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up to the first record a rule refuses (the records after it are named, not judged). The manufacturers it trusts not brought, a recall
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list or the manufacturer's status registry not read (or a record in it that cannot be read, or a retirement signed by another
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manufacturer the verifier trusts), a hardware root, a log with no record or with more than are judged, records beyond the log shown,
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records of a retired key that no anchor read shows existed before the retirement, and a notarization an anchor claims and the
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verifier did not read: each leaves the verdict `PARTIAL`. What it names without changing its verdict (times no witness bounds, a block
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it did not read, a key used after the log rotated away from it or after its manufacturer retired it, a retirement not in effect yet,
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records beside the log that are not of its keys) the adapter writes in the reason of the integrity level. The adapter refuses to run if
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the causes the module declares as keeping its verdict from `VALID` are not exactly the ones mapped here, and if the verdict of the suite
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is not the verdict of the module. When the credential of the first key is refused, the walk judges no record at all: integrity is then
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`NOT_MEASURED` (`not-reached`), and the authenticity level names the refusal. Every reading of an anchor or of a block in these vectors is
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synthetic, written by the operation component's own world as the reading a verifier would make (that component says so too); no anchor of
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an operation record has been notarized on any chain. One refusal of this verifier is deliberately not a vector: a log from which the
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credential of the second key was taken out (its rotation names a key no credential of the log certifies). The verifier refuses it for
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`rotation`, but with that rule planted out the walk reaches a position with no key in force and the verifier's own guard against a walk
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that stops without a refusal throws; the control counted that vector as broken on 2026-10-20, and a crash is not a refusal. The operation
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component's own probe holds the case (its row A25).
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A reputation (enrolled on the same day) is a computation, not a signed statement: integrity says whether the figures stated are exactly
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what the published formula gives for the facts and the parameters, and the other three levels are `NOT_MEASURED` (`not-judged`). Its
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vectors are derived by the operation component's own producer of them, from its fixed source (eight logs made once, every key
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discarded), and taken here through this suite's forms; while they were being enrolled, the second implementation below showed that the
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set did not tell `<` from `<=` at two boundaries of the formula (a witnessed interval whose upper bound is exactly the end of its window;
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a record dated exactly at `to`): a copy of it with `<=` planted at either passed all 87 vectors the component had. Two windowings were added
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to that producer the same day (windows of 900 s, under which the anchor read ten minutes after a record lands exactly at the end of its
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window; a range that ends at the very time of record 12), and the same two plantings now fail 6 and 4 of its 103 vectors.
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## The vectors
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`vectori/` holds 634 vectors (625 offline, 9 that read testnet 28001; 22 MB, since every device, identity and Travel Rule vector carries its ML-DSA-65 keys and signatures), listed with their digests in `vectori/INDEX.json`:
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`vectori/` holds 791 vectors (782 offline, 9 that read testnet 28001; 29 MB, since every device, identity, Travel Rule and operation log vector carries its ML-DSA-65 keys and signatures), listed with their digests in `vectori/INDEX.json`:
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envelope 70 (since 2026-10-19: 67 plus the three of the new kind `agent-witness-checkpoint`), payment-risk 11, payment-receipt 10, market-timeline 26, dataset 22, ai-trust-bundle 24, audit-log 19, audit-inclusion
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10, audit-consistency 4, agent-ledger 18, identity-presentation 69, device-bundle 194, sdjwt-presentation 59, sdjwt-vc-presentation 32, travel-rule-binding 19, travel-rule-message 26, travel-rule-receipt 9, compliance-presentation 12. By expected verdict: 90 `VALID`, 70 `PARTIAL`, 474 `INVALID`. None is typed by hand
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10, audit-consistency 4, agent-ledger 18, identity-presentation 69, device-bundle 194, sdjwt-presentation 59, sdjwt-vc-presentation 32, travel-rule-binding 19, travel-rule-message 26, travel-rule-receipt 9, compliance-presentation 12, device-operation-log 54 and device-reputation 103 (both since 2026-10-20). By expected verdict: 158 `VALID`, 80 `PARTIAL`, 553 `INVALID`. None is typed by hand
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(`node genereaza-vectori.mjs --verifica` regenerates them and compares byte for byte):
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- the 17 AIP-23 kinds come from their producers on fixed inputs (the same envelopes as the published AIP-23 kind vectors; `secret-access`, the audit entry of the secrets service, since 2026-10-18); the audit
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- the 18 AIP-23 kinds come from their producers on fixed inputs (the same envelopes as the published AIP-23 kind vectors; `secret-access`, the audit entry of the secrets service, since 2026-10-18, `agent-witness-checkpoint` since 2026-10-19); the audit
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log, its heads and its inclusion and consistency proofs come from the verify-layer producers on fixed inputs;
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- the receipt, the five market timelines, the notarized dataset commitment and one trust chain of an AI result are the evidence
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recorded on testnet 28001 on 2026-10-02 beside those components;
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@@ -155,36 +188,51 @@ envelope 70 (since 2026-10-19: 67 plus the three of the new kind `agent-witness-
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name, a truncated ML-KEM ciphertext, a flipped ciphertext byte or another amount, each signed again by the originator, a receipt by
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another VASP); and one compliance exchange (an issuer, a holder, another issuer: three hybrid key pairs made and discarded; a KYC
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credential with six disclosable claims, the issuer's status list, a policy of four rules, and the holder's presentations: enough
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claims, too few, claims that break every rule, a credential from the other issuer, a revoked one);
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claims, too few, claims that break every rule, a credential from the other issuer, a revoked one); since 2026-10-20 also the
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operation log of one machine, made by the operation component's own world over its producers (a manufacturer, another manufacturer
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and a stranger: three hybrid key pairs; three ML-DSA-65 device keys; all made and discarded): six records at fixed times, the third
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rotating from the first key to the second, two anchor envelopes, a block named by every record, synthetic readings of both, the
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recall list, status records of the manufacturer and of the other one, and the siblings only a key holder can make (a record signed
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again with another key, position, predecessor, time or counter; credentials of the second key that end early, end at the last record,
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name another model or serial, or certify a third key; records of the same key for a position of the log, a record of the old key after
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the rotation, a record beyond the log); every vector built from it is checked at derivation against the operation verifier, so a
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vector that says what the verifier does not is not written;
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- the reputation vectors are derived by the operation component's own producer of them (its `genereaza-vectori.mjs`, from its fixed
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source of eight logs made once with every key discarded: the operation verifier gives the facts, the formula gives the reputation,
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one operation on a `VALID` input gives each `INVALID` one, in seven windowings); each is taken through this suite's forms here, and
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an `INVALID` one is its base here with the one operation applied here, required byte for byte equal to what the component derived;
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- the SD-JWT vectors have two more sources that are fixed text: the example of RFC 9901 Section 5 with the key of its Appendix A.5
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(`identity/fixturi-rfc9901.json`), and the tokens of `@sd-jwt/core` 0.23.0 and `@sd-jwt/sd-jwt-vc` 0.23.0 with the status lists of
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`@owf/token-status-list` 0.5.0 (`identity/interop/fixturi-interop-*.json`), which the identity component derived from those
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libraries' real output on 2026-10-18, with their public test keys.
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An `INVALID` vector names its `base` and its `mutation`: **one operation** (set, remove or add at one JSON path) applied to the input
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of a vector that is not invalid, and it must be refused for exactly the rules in `expected.failed`, not merely refused: 303 of the
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469 are made this way. Where the rule sits under a hash or a signature, one place is not reachable (changing an amount under the
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of a vector that is not invalid, and it must be refused for exactly the rules in `expected.failed`, not merely refused: 376 of the
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553 are made this way. Where the rule sits under a hash or a signature, one place is not reachable (changing an amount under the
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instruction hash trips the binding first; a false decision in a ledger must still be signed by the agent; a disclosure the issuer never signed must still be signed for by
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the holder; an authorization by a previous owner must still be signed by that owner; a digest repeated in an SD-JWT must still be
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signed by its issuer, a key binding JWT for another audience by its holder; a Travel Rule header addressed to another VASP, or with a
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cut ML-KEM ciphertext, must still be signed by the originator; a presentation without a request must still be signed by its holder): the other 166 are made at
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cut ML-KEM ciphertext, must still be signed by the originator; a presentation without a request must still be signed by its holder;
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an operation record with another position, predecessor, time or counter must still be signed by the device key, a credential of the
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second key that ends early or names another model by the manufacturer): the other 177 are made at
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the producer, the commitments above the change recomputed with the published formulas, and every path that moved is declared
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(`mutation.changed`). Twenty-four vectors expect more than one rule: rules that guard the same field cannot be separated (a looser policy shown
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(`mutation.changed`). Twenty-five vectors expect more than one rule: rules that guard the same field cannot be separated (a looser policy shown
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under a receipt also makes the risk verdict not reproduce; a Proof of AI envelope that is changed is also no longer the one the
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ledger links; a delegation chain cut after it was signed for is also not presented by its last delegate; a manufacture credential
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whose signature is changed is also no longer the link the first transfer names; a clone that claims the device's id with another
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key breaks both the id derivation and the match with the manufacturer's credential; a revoked VASP credential, or one from a registry
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whose list the verifier does not hold, fails the VASP presentation and the VASP status at once; a message opened by another VASP is
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not addressed to it and its originator's presentation was not made for it; a compliance presentation that is invalid for any reason
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also establishes no claim, so its policy's rules are not met either).
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also establishes no claim, so its policy's rules are not met either; an operation record taken out of a log leaves the next one at a
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position it does not carry and naming a record that is not before it).
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## Run it
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```
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AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs from aere.network/tools, with verify-anchor.mjs, mpt.mjs, falcon512.mjs, registry-v3.mjs and package.json beside it and npm install done>
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node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs" # the published verifiers behind the one verdict form: 617 offline vectors
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node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs" # the published verifiers behind the one verdict form: 782 offline vectors
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node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs" --online # and the 9 that read testnet 28001 (nothing is sent)
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node conformance.mjs --impl "python3 implementare-integritate.py" # an independent implementation: 62 vectors, 557 reported NOT COVERED
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node conformance.mjs --impl "python3 implementare-integritate.py" # an independent implementation: 171 vectors, 620 reported NOT COVERED
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node conformance.mjs --impl "<your command>" # yours
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node implementare-aere.mjs <artifact.json> [--online] # one artifact { artifact, input }: its verdict
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```
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@@ -203,9 +251,12 @@ Travel Rule verifier refuses instead of accepting on trust: a defect this suite'
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same day), `{ message, me, kem, registries, now,
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statusLists?, seen?, maxAgeS? }` for a Travel Rule message (`kem` is the beneficiary's key file, `aere-travel-rule-kem-keys`, with
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its private half; `seen` is the list of message ids already received, the replay store; without it nothing is opened), `{ receipt,
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message, beneficiaryId }` for a Travel Rule receipt, and `{ presentation, policy, audience, nonce, now, statusLists?, revocations? }` for
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a compliance presentation (`audience` and `nonce` required, as the module requires them): `now`, the verifier's clock, is required for
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all of them but the receipt, since a verdict on the clock of the machine that runs a vector would not reproduce).
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message, beneficiaryId }` for a Travel Rule receipt, `{ presentation, policy, audience, nonce, now, statusLists?, revocations? }` for
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a compliance presentation (`audience` and `nonce` required, as the module requires them), `{ log, now, clockSkewS?, trustedManufacturers?,
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statusLists?, statusRecords?, readings?, beacons?, otherRecords? }` for a machine's operation log (`statusRecords` absent says the
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manufacturer's registry was not read; a list, empty included, says what was read; `readings` and `beacons` are the verifier's own readings
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of the notarized anchors and of the blocks), and `{ facts, params, claimed }` for a reputation: `now`, the verifier's clock, is required for
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all of them but the receipt and the reputation, since a verdict on the clock of the machine that runs a vector would not reproduce).
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An implementation is a command that answers three calls with JSON on stdout: `--capabilities` (`{ artifacts, rules, online, batch }`:
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what it claims to judge), `<vector.json> [--online]` (the verdict above for the file's `{ artifact, input }`), and, if it says
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@@ -215,16 +266,59 @@ exact set of failed rules and the state of each of the four levels are the expec
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refusal. Without `--online` an implementation must not open a connection.
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`implementare-integritate.py` is the second implementation: Python, standard library only, written from the rules and not from the
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JavaScript. It claims 6 of the 240 rules (the form and the statement hash of an envelope; the form, the commitment, the salted field
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commitments and the RFC 9162 inclusion of a dataset record) and passes all 65 vectors it claims (measured 2026-10-18). It cannot check an ML-DSA signature
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or read a chain, says so in its capabilities, and the runner reports the rest as not covered: 561 vectors, among them every vector of
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JavaScript. It claims 8 of the 260 rules (the form and the statement hash of an envelope; the form, the commitment, the salted field
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commitments and the RFC 9162 inclusion of a dataset record; since 2026-10-20 the form and the figures of a reputation) and passes all
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171 vectors it claims (measured 2026-10-20). It cannot check an ML-DSA signature
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or read a chain, says so in its capabilities, and the runner reports the rest as not covered: 620 vectors, among them every vector of
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the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger, the identity presentations, the device bundles, the SD-JWT presentations, the
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Travel Rule artifacts and the compliance presentations. For those ten verifiers the suite has one implementation, ours (for SD-JWT,
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Travel Rule artifacts, the compliance presentations and the operation logs. For those eleven verifiers the suite has one implementation, ours (for SD-JWT,
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the identity component measured our verifier against `@sd-jwt/core` and `@sd-jwt/sd-jwt-vc` outside this suite; those libraries are
|
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not implementations of this suite's contract).
|
||||
|
||||
Its reputation is written from the formula in words (the README of the operation component), not from either implementation the component
|
||||
ships (`reputation.mjs`, `reputation.py`), so that a misreading of the formula would have to be made a third time to pass unseen: a window is
|
||||
found by bisection over the window starts (the JavaScript divides; the component's Python divides too), the runs of uncovered windows in
|
||||
one pass over the windows, the first counted record and the lowest upper bound by taking the minimum (not by the order of the list), and
|
||||
the stated figures are compared as canonical texts this file writes, never as Python values (in Python `True == 1`, and a claim of `true`
|
||||
for a count of 1 must not pass). What it shares with them, and could share a misreading of: the member names and the shape of the output
|
||||
(read from the component's README and from a `VALID` vector's claim) and the patterns of the form of the facts (the README names the members
|
||||
and the bounds; the exact patterns, such as a name of `[a-z][a-z0-9-]{0,63}`, are the published form). Measured on 2026-10-20, outside
|
||||
the suite and not as a gate: 6,000 random cases (3,000 facts and parameters, with times aimed at window starts and ends, at `from` and at
|
||||
`to`, one millisecond either side; the formula's own figures and the same with one figure changed) gave the same verdict as `reputation.mjs`
|
||||
in all 6,000; a copy of this file with `<=` planted at the end of a window disagreed in 959.
|
||||
|
||||
## How the suite itself is checked
|
||||
|
||||
Measured on 2026-10-20 (UTC), when the operation log of a machine and its reputation were enrolled (the device operation component,
|
||||
`device-operation/`), on Node.js 24.14.1 and Python 3.14.4, offline, with the reference verifier of the development repository. Before
|
||||
the change, on the untouched tree: `deriva-reguli.mjs --verifica` `LA ZI` (241 rules of 15 verifiers), `genereaza-vectori.mjs --verifica`
|
||||
`LA ZI` (634 vectors). After it:
|
||||
|
||||
- `node proba-conformance.mjs`: 12 rows green, 0 red, 1 not measured (the 9 vectors that read testnet 28001). 260 rules of 17 verifiers
|
||||
derived from the code (declared == marked == mapped), 791 vectors (`LA ZI`; every vector that was there before stays byte for byte, and
|
||||
`surse-proaspete.json` only gained the source `deviceOperation`), every rule has a vector (260 of 260), every artifact kind has a VALID
|
||||
vector (23), every INVALID vector (553) is its base with one operation (376) or one declared producer change (177), the published
|
||||
verifiers pass 782 of 782 offline vectors, the independent Python implementation passes the 171 it claims and reports the other 620
|
||||
not covered, 225,345 malformed inputs each got a verdict and none threw (123,398 of them of the two new kinds; 8,366 still accepted, at
|
||||
305 distinct paths, 48 of them in operation logs and none in reputations), and 183 malformed envelope files each got a verdict.
|
||||
- `node proba-conformance.mjs --control-negativ` (offline), on the final set: 339 rows green, 0 red, 3 not measured (the three rules whose
|
||||
vectors need testnet 28001): 257 of 260 rules proven load-bearing, each of the 17 rules of the operation verifier and the 2 of the
|
||||
reputation (`reputation.form` 28 vectors, `reputation.figures` 19) among them, each failing exactly the vectors that expect it; 76 of 76
|
||||
halves of the device verifier; the six controls of the instruments (an implementation that calls everything valid fails 692 of the
|
||||
782 offline vectors). A first run, on a set with one vector more, gave 338 green, 0 red, 4 not measured or broken: that vector (the
|
||||
credential of the second key taken out) broke under the planting of `operation.rotation` instead of failing, and was taken out (see
|
||||
above).
|
||||
- the operation component, after the change: its probe 107/107, its negative control 62/62, its vectors `LA ZI` (103), both its
|
||||
implementations 103/103.
|
||||
- the same day, 18:45-19:16Z, with testnet 28001 read and the reference verifier of the development repository (byte for byte the one
|
||||
served at aere.network/tools, checked that day): `node proba-conformance.mjs --online` 12 rows green, 0 red, 0 not measured (the
|
||||
published verifiers pass 791 of 791 vectors, the nine that read the chain among them); `node proba-conformance.mjs --control-negativ
|
||||
--online` 342 rows green, 0 red, 0 not measured, in 1,070 s: 260 of 260 rules proven load-bearing through their vectors (the three
|
||||
whose vectors read the chain among them), 76 of 76 conditions of the device verifier's compound checks, and the six controls of the
|
||||
instruments (an implementation that calls everything VALID fails 692 of the 782 offline vectors; no planted copy is left behind).
|
||||
|
||||
Not run after the change: `--online` (the new vectors read no chain) and `--pe-loc`.
|
||||
|
||||
Measured on 2026-10-19 (UTC), after the AIP-23 kind `agent-witness-checkpoint` was added (the checkpoint of the hosted agents witness,
|
||||
`agents/martor-agenti.mjs`; three envelope vectors: VALID, its statementHash cut short, one statement field changed; no rule changed). On
|
||||
Node.js 24.14.1, offline, with the development reference verifier: `node proba-conformance.mjs` gives 12 rows green, 0 red, 1 not measured
|
||||
@@ -434,11 +528,12 @@ On 2026-10-05, while the identity verifier was being enrolled, one more, fixed t
|
||||
## What it is not, and what is not measured
|
||||
|
||||
- **Not a certification, not an audit, not a mark.** Passing says that an implementation agrees with the published verifiers on these
|
||||
626 inputs. It does not say either of them is correct, and no third party has reviewed the verifiers, the vectors or this suite.
|
||||
791 inputs. It does not say either of them is correct, and no third party has reviewed the verifiers, the vectors or this suite.
|
||||
- **The vectors and the verifiers have the same authors.** The expected verdicts were written by the people who wrote the verifiers.
|
||||
The second implementation is independent in code and language, not in authorship, and it covers 6 rules of 240; the other
|
||||
234 rules, among them every rule of the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger, the identity verifier, the device
|
||||
verifier, the SD-JWT verifiers, the Travel Rule verifier and the compliance verifier, are judged here by one implementation.
|
||||
The second implementation is independent in code and language, not in authorship, and it covers 8 rules of 260; the other
|
||||
252 rules, among them every rule of the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger, the identity verifier, the device
|
||||
verifier, the SD-JWT verifiers, the Travel Rule verifier, the compliance verifier and the operation verifier, are judged here by one
|
||||
implementation. The reputation formula has three implementations by one team (the operation component's two, and this suite's).
|
||||
- **Finality is the chain's.** The level says that the post-quantum certificate of the covering anchor verified on the chain where the
|
||||
artifact was notarized. Every notarized vector here is on chain 28001, a testnet; nothing in this suite ran on mainnet.
|
||||
- **Five of the six finality refusals have no vector.** The reference verifier can refuse at its finality level in six places; the
|
||||
@@ -476,7 +571,17 @@ On 2026-10-05, while the identity verifier was being enrolled, one more, fixed t
|
||||
survive a sale: after a transfer it is named and not applied (the manufacturer's is final). A retirement by an owner that holds
|
||||
across a sale needs a witness of when it and the transfer were signed, which is not built; every time in a transfer, an
|
||||
authorization and a status record of these vectors is the statement of the key holder that signed it.
|
||||
- **What a damaged artifact can still pass.** Of the 100,825 malformed inputs (measured 2026-10-18), 4,766 were still accepted, at 255 distinct paths (76 of them in device bundles, 62 in Travel Rule receipts: the originator's presentation and signature inside the message handed with a receipt, which the receipt does not read; on 2026-10-14 the count was 96,757 inputs, 4,280 accepted at 187 paths; the kinds that follow were listed on 2026-10-05, when the count was 81 and the device verifier had not had its third review: a status record that decided nothing, such as a suspension already lifted, a stranger's record, a record not in effect yet or one of a previous owner; a recall list or a firmware policy that could not be read and stood beside a clean one, which damaged is no longer signed by the manufacturer and counts like one that was not handed; the envelope and its notarization claim, which are optional; and the signature of a Proof of Software attestation, which the device verifier does not read): parts a
|
||||
- **An operation log says what the holder of a software key signed, and its witnesses here are synthetic.** A `VALID` log says that
|
||||
these records were signed by the keys a manufacturer certified, in this order, with no gap, with no other record of the key in force
|
||||
for any of their positions among what the verifier was handed, and, where a witness bounds them, at those times; not that the machine
|
||||
did the work its records describe (the state, the counter and the measurement are the word of its own sensors), not that no other
|
||||
record exists (a record of a key the log rotated away from, or that its manufacturer retired, is named and does not change the
|
||||
verdict). Every reading of an anchor or of a block in these vectors is written by the operation component's world as a verifier would
|
||||
write it: no anchor of an operation record was notarized on any chain, and no block was read. A record dated before its key was retired
|
||||
counts only when an anchor read shows it existed before the retirement. A reputation `VALID` here says the figures are the formula's for
|
||||
the facts given; it does not say the facts are those of a log (whoever holds the log derives them again), and the figures computed from
|
||||
the device's clock are the device's word.
|
||||
- **What a damaged artifact can still pass.** Of the 225,345 malformed inputs (measured 2026-10-20, after the operation log and the reputation were enrolled: 123,398 of them are theirs), 8,366 were still accepted, at 305 distinct paths (48 of them in operation logs: a block reading damaged, which takes away or weakens a lower bound on time (named when it cannot be read); the notarization claim of an anchor, which the verifier's own reading replaces, and the chain id of that reading (any other whole number is taken as the chain the verifier says it read); an anchor or the last record taken out, a shorter log; and records and status records handed beside the log that, damaged, are no longer signed by a key of the log or by its manufacturer and are passed over; none in reputations, where every damaged facts, parameters or claim was refused; 76 in device bundles, 62 in Travel Rule receipts: the originator's presentation and signature inside the message handed with a receipt, which the receipt does not read; on 2026-10-18 the count was 100,825 inputs, 4,766 accepted at 255 paths; on 2026-10-14 the count was 96,757 inputs, 4,280 accepted at 187 paths; the kinds that follow were listed on 2026-10-05, when the count was 81 and the device verifier had not had its third review: a status record that decided nothing, such as a suspension already lifted, a stranger's record, a record not in effect yet or one of a previous owner; a recall list or a firmware policy that could not be read and stood beside a clean one, which damaged is no longer signed by the manufacturer and counts like one that was not handed; the envelope and its notarization claim, which are optional; and the signature of a Proof of Software attestation, which the device verifier does not read): parts a
|
||||
verifier treats as optional (the transaction facts of a receipt, the envelope of a timeline, the head of an audit log), a policy
|
||||
field removed that falls back to its default, a log or a ledger without its last entry (still a valid shorter one), a revocation that was not in effect (damaged, it is
|
||||
ignored as before), and fields no rule reads
|
||||
@@ -489,7 +594,7 @@ On 2026-10-05, while the identity verifier was being enrolled, one more, fixed t
|
||||
- **Not part of AIP-23.** The rule ids, the four levels and the verdict form are this suite's reading of the published verifiers;
|
||||
AIP-23 defines the envelope. The device verifier is enrolled, and so are all five identity verifiers published beside these: the
|
||||
presentation verifier, the SD-JWT verifier and the SD-JWT VC profile, the Travel Rule verifier and the compliance verifier (the last
|
||||
two since 2026-10-18).
|
||||
two since 2026-10-18), and the operation verifier of a machine and its reputation check (since 2026-10-20).
|
||||
- **A Travel Rule verdict is the receiving party's, and the vectors carry one test decryption key.** A binding, a message or a receipt
|
||||
is judged with what the originator or the beneficiary brings: the registries it trusts, the status lists it holds, its clock, its
|
||||
nonce, its replay store, its KEM keys. `VALID` for a message says that it opened for this beneficiary, with these keys, on this
|
||||
@@ -508,4 +613,8 @@ On 2026-10-05, while the identity verifier was being enrolled, one more, fixed t
|
||||
the libraries' own verdicts in both directions. A verifier that resolves the issuer key from `iss` or `x5c`, fetches the status list
|
||||
or the type metadata, or takes an untyped token by default, is judged here on inputs where all of that is already brought.
|
||||
- **The Python implementation** writes numbers the way JavaScript does only for integers and plain decimals, and sorts keys by code
|
||||
point (JavaScript's order for keys in the Basic Multilingual Plane).
|
||||
point (JavaScript's order for keys in the Basic Multilingual Plane). It reads files with Python's json module: a file nested deeper
|
||||
than its recursion limit is not read (an error, which the runner scores `BROKEN`), and the words `NaN` and `Infinity`, which
|
||||
`JSON.parse` refuses, are read. No vector here is such a file; the margins of the JSON text of a reputation (a number of 5,000 digits,
|
||||
a claim nested 50,000 deep, 2^53 + 1, a member written twice) are measured by the operation component's probe on its two
|
||||
implementations, not on this one.
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user