conformance: the identity presentation verifier enrolled (134 rules of 10 verifiers, 273 vectors); the reference verifier instruction names all five files beside verify-proof.mjs; module READMEs point to aere.network/tools

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Every component beside this one ships its own verifier and its own way of saying no: the AIP-23 reference verifier prints four
levels, the payment modules return `reasons`, the market judge `motive`, the dataset module `ok`, the audit log and the agents'
ledger a refusal text. This folder adds the one place that
ledger a refusal text, the identity verifier a list of labelled rows. This folder adds the one place that
says, in the same form for all of them, **this artifact passes or does not, at level N, for reason M**, and a set of vectors that any
implementation, in any language, can be run against.
@@ -24,13 +24,14 @@ are the ones those verifiers name, read from their code.
| level | what it says |
|---|---|
| `integrity` | the artifact is what it says: its hashes bind its content, and the rules it declares (a policy, deadlines, a challenge window, Merkle paths, a payout) hold when recomputed from the evidence supplied |
| `authenticity` | the signature the artifact carries verifies, with a key of the scheme declared, and the identity it names is the one derived from that key (an ML-DSA signature on an AIP-23 envelope, the ML-DSA-65 signature of an audit head, the ML-DSA-65 key and signatures of an agent's ledger) |
| `authenticity` | the signature the artifact carries verifies, with a key of the scheme declared, and the identity it names is the one derived from that key (an ML-DSA signature on an AIP-23 envelope, the ML-DSA-65 signature of an audit head, the ML-DSA-65 key and signatures of an agent's ledger; the hybrid Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65 signatures of a credential, of its presentation and of each delegation link, both halves required) |
| `anchoring` | its `statementHash` (or, for a trust chain, the head of its ledger) is recorded in the notary contract, under a state root that a post-quantum anchor covers |
| `finality` | that anchor's post-quantum certificate verifies. The finality is the one of the chain the artifact was notarized on |
Each level is `PASSED`, `FAILED` or `NOT_MEASURED`, with the reason; a level nobody judged says why (`cause`). The verdict is
`INVALID` when a level failed; `PARTIAL` when nothing failed but something the artifact **claims** was not measured (a notarization
claim not checked because the run was offline, a signature scheme the verifier cannot check, a timeline that is not terminal);
claim not checked because the run was offline, a signature scheme the verifier cannot check, a timeline that is not terminal, a
presentation judged without the verifier's audience, nonce or trusted issuers, a credential whose status list was not read);
`VALID` otherwise, and only with integrity passed. A claim that was not checked is never `VALID`. `failed` is the sorted list of the
rule ids that refused; the suite compares it as an exact set.
@@ -40,8 +41,8 @@ verdict (`vectori/payment-receipt/company-p1-28001.valid.json`).
## What is enrolled
`REGULI.json` is derived from the code (`node deriva-reguli.mjs --verifica`): 97 rules of 9 verifiers, 13 artifact kinds. By level:
83 rules are reported at `integrity`, 11 at `authenticity`, 3 at `anchoring` (one of them, `envelope.finality`, is reported at
`REGULI.json` is derived from the code (`node deriva-reguli.mjs --verifica`): 134 rules of 10 verifiers, 14 artifact kinds. By level:
111 rules are reported at `integrity`, 20 at `authenticity`, 3 at `anchoring` (one of them, `envelope.finality`, is reported at
`anchoring` or at `finality` by the place that refused).
| artifact kind | judged by | rules |
@@ -55,24 +56,29 @@ verdict (`vectori/payment-receipt/company-p1-28001.valid.json`).
| `audit-log` (a hash-chained log, alone or against an attested head, signed or not) | `verify-layer/sidecar.mjs` | 13: `auditlog.entry`, `.seq`, `.chain`, `.hash`, `.head-form`, `.head-hash`, `.head-unsigned`, `.head-scheme`, `.head-key`, `.head-signature`, `.head-signer`, `.head-short`, `.head-rewritten` |
| `audit-inclusion`, `audit-consistency` (RFC 9162 proofs over that log) | `verify-layer/jurnal-arbore.mjs` | 12: `audittree.proof-form`, `.head-form`, `.head-hash`, `.inclusion-index`, `.inclusion-entry`, `.inclusion-envelope`, `.inclusion-leaf`, `.inclusion-path`, `.inclusion-head`, `.consistency-start`, `.consistency-end`, `.consistency` |
| `agent-ledger` (an agent's signed ledger under its policy) | `agents/agent-ledger.mjs` | 16: `agents.ledger-form`, `.policy`, `.other-policy`, `.session`, `.key`, `.identity`, `.anchor`, `.seq`, `.chain`, `.body`, `.signature`, `.hash`, `.time`, `.revocation`, `.approvals`, `.decision` |
| `identity-presentation` (a credential shown by its holder or by the last delegate of a chain, judged with what the verifier brings: its audience, its nonce, its clock, the issuers it trusts, the status lists and the revocations it was handed) | `identity/identity.mjs` | 37: `identity.form`, `.issuer-id`, `.holder-id`, `.credential-signature`, `.issuer-trusted`, `.credential-window`, `.status-list`, `.credential-revoked`, `.sd-distinct`, `.disclosure-readable`, `.disclosure-signed`, `.disclosure-once`, `.disclosure-plain`, `.claim-name`, `.binding-credential`, `.binding-disclosures`, `.binding-delegations`, `.presenter`, `.presentation-signature`, `.audience`, `.nonce`, `.freshness`, `.chain-length`, `.delegation-form`, `.delegation-ids`, `.delegation-from`, `.delegation-parent`, `.delegation-signature`, `.delegation-scope`, `.delegation-window`, `.delegation-depth`, `.delegation-narrows`, `.delegation-credential`, `.delegation-claims`, `.delegation-audience`, `.delegation-revoked`, `.unreadable` |
A module verifier exports the list of rules it can name (`REGULI`; its helper throws on any other) and marks its rules in one of two
ways, both read by the derivation: a marker on every check of a rule (seven modules), or the rule named at every call of the
ways, both read by the derivation: a marker on every check of a rule (eight modules), or the rule named at every call of the
verifier's one refusal helper (`ai-trust`). The derivation requires declared == marked == mapped here. A rule added to a verifier and
not mapped is a refusal of the derivation; a mapped rule without a vector is a refusal of the probe. For the reference verifier, a
published program this suite does not edit, the rules are its level names, and each of the six places where its `finality` level
can refuse is classified as `anchoring` or `finality` (a seventh place would be a refusal of the derivation).
**Not enrolled**, counted in the same file: `identity`. Its presentation verifier reports 41 labelled check rows, not rule ids, and
its verdict depends on what the verifier brings (audience, nonce, clock, trusted issuers); a rule id per row and a vector input that
carries those come first. Its SD-JWT, Travel Rule and compliance verifiers are not counted at all. Their own probes and negative
controls stay what checks them.
The identity verifier does not stop at its first refusal: it makes every check it can reach and names every rule that refused, so a
vector may expect several. What it could not judge because the verifier did not bring it (no audience, no nonce, no trusted issuer,
the status list the credential names not handed or not current) leaves the verdict `PARTIAL`, never `VALID`; the cause is named
`not-supplied` (added to the verdict form on 2026-10-05).
**Not enrolled**, counted in the same file: three verifiers of the identity component that sit beside the enrolled one or on top of
it: SD-JWT (26 calls of its refusal helper), Travel Rule (20 places that add a reason) and compliance (3). Their refusals are texts,
not rule ids. Their own probes and negative controls stay what checks them.
## The vectors
`vectori/` holds 206 vectors (197 offline, 9 that read testnet 28001), listed with their digests in `vectori/INDEX.json`:
envelope 64, payment-risk 11, payment-receipt 10, market-timeline 26, dataset 22, ai-trust-bundle 24, audit-log 17, audit-inclusion
10, audit-consistency 4, agent-ledger 18. By expected verdict: 40 `VALID`, 5 `PARTIAL`, 161 `INVALID`. None is typed by hand
`vectori/` holds 273 vectors (264 offline, 9 that read testnet 28001), listed with their digests in `vectori/INDEX.json`:
envelope 64, payment-risk 11, payment-receipt 10, market-timeline 26, dataset 22, ai-trust-bundle 24, audit-log 19, audit-inclusion
10, audit-consistency 4, agent-ledger 18, identity-presentation 65. By expected verdict: 45 `VALID`, 11 `PARTIAL`, 217 `INVALID`. None is typed by hand
(`node genereaza-vectori.mjs --verifica` regenerates them and compares byte for byte):
- the 16 AIP-23 kinds come from their producers on fixed inputs (the same envelopes as the published AIP-23 kind vectors); the audit
@@ -84,26 +90,30 @@ envelope 64, payment-risk 11, payment-receipt 10, market-timeline 26, dataset 22
with an Ed25519 key that declares itself ml-dsa-65; an audit head signed by an operator key, by another key, and by a classical
key; the ledger of an agent (a tool call, a payment, a payment refused above the limit, a tool call) with the forged siblings
that only the agent's key can make (an empty approvals list, a false decision, a revocation entry without a revocation) and one
written with a classical key; three trust chains of a fresh agent (allowed, refused by the policy, dated apart); an envelope with
written with a classical key; three trust chains of a fresh agent (allowed, refused by the policy, dated apart); the presentations of one identity credential
(an issuer, a holder, a phone, a session key, a stranger and an impostor issuer: six hybrid key pairs), its status lists, its
delegations and revocations, with the forged siblings that only a key holder can make (a statement changed and signed again by
the issuer, the holder or a delegate) and one credential from an issuer whose "ML-DSA-65" key is an Ed25519 key; an envelope with
random content that nobody notarized; a dataset of 16 records with random salts; and the transaction of the recorded receipt read
from the chain (two read calls).
An `INVALID` vector names its `base` and its `mutation`: **one operation** (set, remove or add at one JSON path) applied to the input
of a vector that is not invalid, and it must be refused for exactly the rules in `expected.failed`, not merely refused: 137 of the
161 are made this way. Where the rule sits under a hash or a signature, one place is not reachable (changing an amount under the
instruction hash trips the binding first; a false decision in a ledger must still be signed by the agent): the other 24 are made at
of a vector that is not invalid, and it must be refused for exactly the rules in `expected.failed`, not merely refused: 159 of the
217 are made this way. Where the rule sits under a hash or a signature, one place is not reachable (changing an amount under the
instruction hash trips the binding first; a false decision in a ledger must still be signed by the agent; a disclosure the issuer never signed must still be signed for by
the holder): the other 58 are made at
the producer, the commitments above the change recomputed with the published formulas, and every path that moved is declared
(`mutation.changed`). Five vectors expect two rules: rules that guard the same field cannot be separated (a looser policy shown
(`mutation.changed`). Nine vectors expect two rules: rules that guard the same field cannot be separated (a looser policy shown
under a receipt also makes the risk verdict not reproduce; a Proof of AI envelope that is changed is also no longer the one the
ledger links).
ledger links; a delegation chain cut after it was signed for is also not presented by its last delegate).
## Run it
```
AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs from aere.network/tools, with verify-anchor.mjs, mpt.mjs and package.json beside it and npm install done>
node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs" # the published verifiers behind the one verdict form: 197 offline vectors
AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs from aere.network/tools, with verify-anchor.mjs, mpt.mjs, falcon512.mjs, registry-v3.mjs and package.json beside it and npm install done>
node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs" # the published verifiers behind the one verdict form: 264 offline vectors
node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs" --online # and the 9 that read testnet 28001 (nothing is sent)
node conformance.mjs --impl "python3 implementare-integritate.py" # an independent implementation: 62 vectors, 144 reported NOT COVERED
node conformance.mjs --impl "python3 implementare-integritate.py" # an independent implementation: 62 vectors, 211 reported NOT COVERED
node conformance.mjs --impl "<your command>" # yours
node implementare-aere.mjs <artifact.json> [--online] # one artifact { artifact, input }: its verdict
```
@@ -111,7 +121,9 @@ node implementare-aere.mjs <artifact.json> [--online] # one arti
For the artifact `envelope` the input is `{ "envelope": <any JSON value> }`, or `{ "raw": "<the text of the file>" }` when the file is
not JSON at all: a file that is not an envelope is refused at the form level, by name, like any other. The other inputs are the ones
the vectors show (`{ log, head?, signer? }` for an audit log, `{ ledger, policy }` for an agent's ledger, `{ bundle }` for a trust
chain).
chain, `{ presentation, now, audience?, nonce?, trustedIssuers?, statusLists?, revocations?, maxAgeS? }` for a presentation of a
credential: `now`, the verifier's clock, is required, since a verdict on the clock of the machine that runs a vector would not
reproduce).
An implementation is a command that answers three calls with JSON on stdout: `--capabilities` (`{ artifacts, rules, online, batch }`:
what it claims to judge), `<vector.json> [--online]` (the verdict above for the file's `{ artifact, input }`), and, if it says
@@ -121,34 +133,39 @@ exact set of failed rules and the state of each of the four levels are the expec
refusal. Without `--online` an implementation must not open a connection.
`implementare-integritate.py` is the second implementation: Python, standard library only, written from the rules and not from the
JavaScript. It claims 6 of the 97 rules (the form and the statement hash of an envelope; the form, the commitment, the salted field
JavaScript. It claims 6 of the 134 rules (the form and the statement hash of an envelope; the form, the commitment, the salted field
commitments and the RFC 9162 inclusion of a dataset record) and passes all 62 vectors it claims. It cannot check an ML-DSA signature
or read a chain, says so in its capabilities, and the runner reports the rest as not covered: 144 vectors, among them every vector of
the trust chain, the audit log and the agents' ledger. For those four verifiers the suite has one implementation, ours.
or read a chain, says so in its capabilities, and the runner reports the rest as not covered: 211 vectors, among them every vector of
the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger and the identity presentations. For those five verifiers the suite has one
implementation, ours.
## How the suite itself is checked
Measured on 2026-10-05 (Node.js 24.14.1, Python 3.14.4, testnet 28001 read):
- `node proba-conformance.mjs --online`: every row green, 10 in this copy (an eleventh, the comparison of the 16 kind envelopes with
the published AIP-23 kind vectors, runs where their generator is, in the development repository: 11/11 there, and here it is
printed as information). The rules and the vectors are what the code derives now; every rule has a vector that expects it (97 of
97); every artifact kind has a valid vector (13); every invalid vector is its base with one operation (137) or one declared
producer change (24); the published verifiers pass 206/206; the independent implementation passes all 62 it claims; and 9,333
- `node proba-conformance.mjs --online`: every row green, 11 in this copy (a twelfth, the comparison of the 16 kind envelopes with
the published AIP-23 kind vectors, runs where their generator is, in the development repository: 12/12 there, and here it is
printed as information). The rules and the vectors are what the code derives now; every rule has a vector that expects it (134 of
134); every artifact kind has a valid vector (14); every invalid vector is its base with one operation (159) or one declared
producer change (58); the published verifiers pass 273/273; the independent implementation passes all 62 it claims; and 16,280
malformed inputs (every path of every offline vector that is not invalid removed, or replaced by null, a string, a number, a list,
an object) given to the module verifiers each got a verdict, none threw. That row covers the modules of seven verifiers; the
trust chain verifier is not in it (each case would run the reference verifier several times), and the reference verifier, a
program, was tried apart (below). Without `--online` the nine chain vectors are reported unmeasured and the exit code is 2.
- `node proba-conformance.mjs --control-negativ --online`: 97 of 97 rules. Each rule is planted out of its verifier, one at a time, in
an object) given to the module verifiers each got a verdict, none threw. That row covers the modules of eight verifiers; the
trust chain verifier is not in it (each case would run the reference verifier several times). The reference verifier, a program,
has a row of its own: 183 malformed envelope files (every path of a signed tree head and of a notarized envelope removed or
replaced; files that hold null, a number, a string, true, a list, an empty object, text that is not JSON, nothing) are given to
it, and each gets a verdict. That row contacts no public endpoint: the program goes to the chain whenever a file claims a
notarization, so a file that still carries the claim is run against a closed local endpoint and its finality is not measured. Without `--online` the nine chain vectors are reported unmeasured and the exit code is 2.
- `node proba-conformance.mjs --control-negativ --online`: 134 of 134 rules. Each rule is planted out of its verifier, one at a time, in
a copy (every check that carries its marker made true at run time; for `ai-trust`, its refusal helper made to drop the refusals of
that rule; for the reference verifier, the level made to pass); the suite is run against the planted verifier; the vectors that
expect the rule, **and only they**, must fail, and none may break. Then five controls of the instruments: an implementation that
calls everything valid fails every vector that is not plainly valid (165 of the 197 offline vectors); the coverage gate goes red when one rule's vector
expect the rule, **and only they**, must fail, and none may break. Then six controls of the instruments: an implementation that
calls everything valid fails every vector that is not plainly valid (232 of the 264 offline vectors); the coverage gate goes red when one rule's vector
is taken away; a rule added to a verifier and not mapped is refused by the derivation; a judge that throws again turns the
malformed-input row red; no planted copy is left behind.
- `node proba-conformance.mjs --pe-loc` is a measurement, not a gate: each of the 122 marked checks of the module verifiers
planted out alone (the trust chain verifier has no per-check markers and is not in this count). For 87 of them a vector
then fails. The others are checks whose vector trips a second check of the same rule at the same time, so removing one alone
malformed-input row red; a reference verifier that throws again turns the malformed-envelope row red; no planted copy is left
behind.
- `node proba-conformance.mjs --pe-loc` is a measurement, not a gate: each of the 162 marked checks of the module verifiers
planted out alone (the trust chain verifier has no per-check markers and is not in this count). For 127 of them a vector
then fails (all 40 checks of the identity verifier among them). The others are checks whose vector trips a second check of the same rule at the same time, so removing one alone
changes nothing (the three checks of `market.replay`, the three of `agents.anchor`, the run and neighbour checks of
`dataset.completeness`), or checks no vector reaches (a dispute timed out before the arbitration timeout; five of the six checks
of `agents.time`). The control above shows that each **rule** is load-bearing, not each of its checks.
@@ -162,7 +179,9 @@ vector or a probe row:
the agent key to be an ML-DSA-65 key, so the ledger of a "post-quantum identity" could be written and signed with an Ed25519 key
and verify. In each, the key was never required to be a key of the scheme declared. Each is now a refusal by name
(`envelope/signed-head.signature-classical-key`, `audit-log/signed-head.head-scheme-classical-key`,
`agent-ledger/four-entries.key-classical`);
`agent-ledger/four-entries.key-classical`). The audit head has a second vector since 2026-10-05,
`audit-log/signed-head-any-signer.head-scheme-classical-key`, the same head with no signer expected: with the scheme rule taken
out of the verifier, the first is still refused, for its signer, and this one is accepted;
- the reference verifier exited with an exception on a file holding the JSON value `null`, let a statement that is a list pass its
form level, and reported a malformed ML-DSA signature (no key, a key that cannot be parsed) as unmeasured "needs OpenSSL 3.5" on a
runtime that has it; each is now a refusal by name, and a file that is not JSON is refused at the form level instead of ending
@@ -175,13 +194,24 @@ vector or a probe row:
the truth passed. The time now comes from the reference verifier's reading under the anchor, and the claim is only compared with
it (`market-timeline/s1-28001.proof-claim-early`).
On 2026-10-05, while the identity verifier was being enrolled, one more, fixed the same day:
- **a fault of the issuer's keys was also blamed on the holder.** When the issuer keys in a credential could not be read (for
example an Ed25519 key in the field of the ML-DSA-65 key), the identity verifier refused the credential, as it must, and also
reported that the holder id is not the id of its keys: the two ids were derived in one step, and the first failure left the
second underived. The verdict was `INVALID` either way; the list of rules named one that had not been broken. Each id is now
derived on its own, and the vector `identity-presentation/direct.issuer-classical-key` expects exactly the two rules of the
issuer. That vector also measures that the identity verifier never accepted a classical key in the ML-DSA-65 field: its key
type was checked before this suite.
## What it is not, and what is not measured
- **Not a certification, not an audit, not a mark.** Passing says that an implementation agrees with the published verifiers on these
206 inputs. It does not say either of them is correct, and no third party has reviewed the verifiers, the vectors or this suite.
273 inputs. It does not say either of them is correct, and no third party has reviewed the verifiers, the vectors or this suite.
- **The vectors and the verifiers have the same authors.** The expected verdicts were written by the people who wrote the verifiers.
The second implementation is independent in code and language, not in authorship, and it covers 6 rules of 97; the other
91 rules, among them every rule of the trust chain, the audit log and the agents' ledger, are judged here by one implementation.
The second implementation is independent in code and language, not in authorship, and it covers 6 rules of 134; the other
128 rules, among them every rule of the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger and the identity verifier, are judged
here by one implementation.
- **Finality is the chain's.** The level says that the post-quantum certificate of the covering anchor verified on the chain where the
artifact was notarized. Every notarized vector here is on chain 28001, a testnet; nothing in this suite ran on mainnet.
- **Five of the six finality refusals have no vector.** The reference verifier can refuse at its finality level in six places; the
@@ -195,21 +225,33 @@ vector or a probe row:
- **Offline, a notarization time is only a claim.** With the chain, `market.proof` takes the time an execution envelope was first
seen from the reference verifier's reading under the anchor and refuses a claim that differs from it. Offline there is no such
reading: the claim is all there is, the verdict is `PARTIAL`, and a `certified` field that an artifact brings itself is dropped.
- **Authenticity is ML-DSA only.** The reference verifier checks ML-DSA signatures on envelopes, the audit log verifier the
- **Authenticity is what each verifier checks.** The reference verifier checks ML-DSA signatures on envelopes, the audit log verifier the
ML-DSA-65 signature of a head, the ledger verifier the agent's ML-DSA-65 key and signatures, each with a key that must be of the
scheme declared; a hybrid signature (as on identity credentials) is reported unmeasured and the verdict is `PARTIAL`.
scheme declared; the identity verifier the hybrid Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65 signatures of a credential, a presentation and each
delegation link (both halves, each with a key of its type). A hybrid signature on an AIP-23 envelope is still reported
unmeasured by the reference verifier, and the verdict is `PARTIAL`.
- **Most times in a trust chain and in a ledger are claims.** A trust chain without a witness is `PARTIAL`: every time in it is the
statement of whoever holds the keys. Three trust-chain vectors read a ledger head notarized on testnet 28001. No vector gives an
agent's ledger an anchor that verifies: `agents.anchor` is reached only through an anchor that is refused, and five of the six
checks of `agents.time` have no vector.
- **What a damaged artifact can still pass.** Of the 9,333 malformed inputs, 1,870 were still accepted, at 94 distinct paths: parts a
- **An identity verdict is the verifier's.** A presentation is judged on the clock, the audience, the nonce, the trusted issuers, the
status lists and the revocations in the vector input: what a verifier brings decides the verdict. `VALID` for a delegated
presentation says that no revocation handed to the verifier has taken effect, not that none exists; a revocation that cannot be
attributed to the giver of the link or to the holder is ignored; a credential that names no status list cannot be revoked by
its issuer and is still `VALID`. Every time in these vectors is the statement of a key holder: no vector notarizes a credential
or a delegation. Nothing here says who an issuer is in the world.
- **What a damaged artifact can still pass.** Of the 16,280 malformed inputs, 2,071 were still accepted, at 111 distinct paths: parts a
verifier treats as optional (the transaction facts of a receipt, the envelope of a timeline, the head of an audit log), a policy
field removed that falls back to its default, a log or a ledger without its last entry (still a valid shorter one), and fields no
rule reads
(`node proba-conformance.mjs --acceptate` lists them). A policy that cannot be defined makes the risk module throw, by design. The
reference envelope verifier, a program, was tried apart with 526 malformed envelopes (every field removed or replaced, files that
hold null, a number, a string, a list, text that is not JSON): each gets a verdict.
field removed that falls back to its default, a log or a ledger without its last entry (still a valid shorter one), a revocation that was not in effect (damaged, it is
ignored as before), and fields no rule reads
(`node proba-conformance.mjs --acceptate` lists them). A policy that cannot be defined makes the risk module throw, by design. Of
the 183 malformed envelope files given to the reference verifier (the probe's own row, measured at every run), 16 are still
called `VALID`: an envelope with its signature or its notarization claim taken off (an unsigned, unnotarized envelope), and an
envelope whose outer `v` or `kind` was damaged. Those two fields are outside the statement hash and the reference verifier does
not read them; the statement carries its own `kind`, which is under the hash. (This file used to quote 526 malformed envelopes,
a figure of 2026-10-03 from a run whose script was not kept; the row above replaces it.)
- **Not part of AIP-23.** The rule ids, the four levels and the verdict form are this suite's reading of the published verifiers;
AIP-23 defines the envelope. The identity verifiers published beside these are not enrolled.
AIP-23 defines the envelope. Of the identity verifiers published beside these, the presentation verifier is enrolled; SD-JWT,
Travel Rule and compliance are not.
- **The Python implementation** writes numbers the way JavaScript does only for integers and plain decimals, and sorts keys by code
point (JavaScript's order for keys in the Basic Multilingual Plane).