conformance: the identity presentation verifier enrolled (134 rules of 10 verifiers, 273 vectors); the reference verifier instruction names all five files beside verify-proof.mjs; module READMEs point to aere.network/tools
This commit is contained in:
1 parent
c9798a0013
commit
5fb38c5d0b
88 files changed
+20246
-179
No files matched your search
+96
-54
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
Every component beside this one ships its own verifier and its own way of saying no: the AIP-23 reference verifier prints four
|
||||
levels, the payment modules return `reasons`, the market judge `motive`, the dataset module `ok`, the audit log and the agents'
|
||||
ledger a refusal text. This folder adds the one place that
|
||||
ledger a refusal text, the identity verifier a list of labelled rows. This folder adds the one place that
|
||||
says, in the same form for all of them, **this artifact passes or does not, at level N, for reason M**, and a set of vectors that any
|
||||
implementation, in any language, can be run against.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -24,13 +24,14 @@ are the ones those verifiers name, read from their code.
|
||||
| level | what it says |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `integrity` | the artifact is what it says: its hashes bind its content, and the rules it declares (a policy, deadlines, a challenge window, Merkle paths, a payout) hold when recomputed from the evidence supplied |
|
||||
| `authenticity` | the signature the artifact carries verifies, with a key of the scheme declared, and the identity it names is the one derived from that key (an ML-DSA signature on an AIP-23 envelope, the ML-DSA-65 signature of an audit head, the ML-DSA-65 key and signatures of an agent's ledger) |
|
||||
| `authenticity` | the signature the artifact carries verifies, with a key of the scheme declared, and the identity it names is the one derived from that key (an ML-DSA signature on an AIP-23 envelope, the ML-DSA-65 signature of an audit head, the ML-DSA-65 key and signatures of an agent's ledger; the hybrid Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65 signatures of a credential, of its presentation and of each delegation link, both halves required) |
|
||||
| `anchoring` | its `statementHash` (or, for a trust chain, the head of its ledger) is recorded in the notary contract, under a state root that a post-quantum anchor covers |
|
||||
| `finality` | that anchor's post-quantum certificate verifies. The finality is the one of the chain the artifact was notarized on |
|
||||
|
||||
Each level is `PASSED`, `FAILED` or `NOT_MEASURED`, with the reason; a level nobody judged says why (`cause`). The verdict is
|
||||
`INVALID` when a level failed; `PARTIAL` when nothing failed but something the artifact **claims** was not measured (a notarization
|
||||
claim not checked because the run was offline, a signature scheme the verifier cannot check, a timeline that is not terminal);
|
||||
claim not checked because the run was offline, a signature scheme the verifier cannot check, a timeline that is not terminal, a
|
||||
presentation judged without the verifier's audience, nonce or trusted issuers, a credential whose status list was not read);
|
||||
`VALID` otherwise, and only with integrity passed. A claim that was not checked is never `VALID`. `failed` is the sorted list of the
|
||||
rule ids that refused; the suite compares it as an exact set.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -40,8 +41,8 @@ verdict (`vectori/payment-receipt/company-p1-28001.valid.json`).
|
||||
|
||||
## What is enrolled
|
||||
|
||||
`REGULI.json` is derived from the code (`node deriva-reguli.mjs --verifica`): 97 rules of 9 verifiers, 13 artifact kinds. By level:
|
||||
83 rules are reported at `integrity`, 11 at `authenticity`, 3 at `anchoring` (one of them, `envelope.finality`, is reported at
|
||||
`REGULI.json` is derived from the code (`node deriva-reguli.mjs --verifica`): 134 rules of 10 verifiers, 14 artifact kinds. By level:
|
||||
111 rules are reported at `integrity`, 20 at `authenticity`, 3 at `anchoring` (one of them, `envelope.finality`, is reported at
|
||||
`anchoring` or at `finality` by the place that refused).
|
||||
|
||||
| artifact kind | judged by | rules |
|
||||
@@ -55,24 +56,29 @@ verdict (`vectori/payment-receipt/company-p1-28001.valid.json`).
|
||||
| `audit-log` (a hash-chained log, alone or against an attested head, signed or not) | `verify-layer/sidecar.mjs` | 13: `auditlog.entry`, `.seq`, `.chain`, `.hash`, `.head-form`, `.head-hash`, `.head-unsigned`, `.head-scheme`, `.head-key`, `.head-signature`, `.head-signer`, `.head-short`, `.head-rewritten` |
|
||||
| `audit-inclusion`, `audit-consistency` (RFC 9162 proofs over that log) | `verify-layer/jurnal-arbore.mjs` | 12: `audittree.proof-form`, `.head-form`, `.head-hash`, `.inclusion-index`, `.inclusion-entry`, `.inclusion-envelope`, `.inclusion-leaf`, `.inclusion-path`, `.inclusion-head`, `.consistency-start`, `.consistency-end`, `.consistency` |
|
||||
| `agent-ledger` (an agent's signed ledger under its policy) | `agents/agent-ledger.mjs` | 16: `agents.ledger-form`, `.policy`, `.other-policy`, `.session`, `.key`, `.identity`, `.anchor`, `.seq`, `.chain`, `.body`, `.signature`, `.hash`, `.time`, `.revocation`, `.approvals`, `.decision` |
|
||||
| `identity-presentation` (a credential shown by its holder or by the last delegate of a chain, judged with what the verifier brings: its audience, its nonce, its clock, the issuers it trusts, the status lists and the revocations it was handed) | `identity/identity.mjs` | 37: `identity.form`, `.issuer-id`, `.holder-id`, `.credential-signature`, `.issuer-trusted`, `.credential-window`, `.status-list`, `.credential-revoked`, `.sd-distinct`, `.disclosure-readable`, `.disclosure-signed`, `.disclosure-once`, `.disclosure-plain`, `.claim-name`, `.binding-credential`, `.binding-disclosures`, `.binding-delegations`, `.presenter`, `.presentation-signature`, `.audience`, `.nonce`, `.freshness`, `.chain-length`, `.delegation-form`, `.delegation-ids`, `.delegation-from`, `.delegation-parent`, `.delegation-signature`, `.delegation-scope`, `.delegation-window`, `.delegation-depth`, `.delegation-narrows`, `.delegation-credential`, `.delegation-claims`, `.delegation-audience`, `.delegation-revoked`, `.unreadable` |
|
||||
|
||||
A module verifier exports the list of rules it can name (`REGULI`; its helper throws on any other) and marks its rules in one of two
|
||||
ways, both read by the derivation: a marker on every check of a rule (seven modules), or the rule named at every call of the
|
||||
ways, both read by the derivation: a marker on every check of a rule (eight modules), or the rule named at every call of the
|
||||
verifier's one refusal helper (`ai-trust`). The derivation requires declared == marked == mapped here. A rule added to a verifier and
|
||||
not mapped is a refusal of the derivation; a mapped rule without a vector is a refusal of the probe. For the reference verifier, a
|
||||
published program this suite does not edit, the rules are its level names, and each of the six places where its `finality` level
|
||||
can refuse is classified as `anchoring` or `finality` (a seventh place would be a refusal of the derivation).
|
||||
|
||||
**Not enrolled**, counted in the same file: `identity`. Its presentation verifier reports 41 labelled check rows, not rule ids, and
|
||||
its verdict depends on what the verifier brings (audience, nonce, clock, trusted issuers); a rule id per row and a vector input that
|
||||
carries those come first. Its SD-JWT, Travel Rule and compliance verifiers are not counted at all. Their own probes and negative
|
||||
controls stay what checks them.
|
||||
The identity verifier does not stop at its first refusal: it makes every check it can reach and names every rule that refused, so a
|
||||
vector may expect several. What it could not judge because the verifier did not bring it (no audience, no nonce, no trusted issuer,
|
||||
the status list the credential names not handed or not current) leaves the verdict `PARTIAL`, never `VALID`; the cause is named
|
||||
`not-supplied` (added to the verdict form on 2026-10-05).
|
||||
|
||||
**Not enrolled**, counted in the same file: three verifiers of the identity component that sit beside the enrolled one or on top of
|
||||
it: SD-JWT (26 calls of its refusal helper), Travel Rule (20 places that add a reason) and compliance (3). Their refusals are texts,
|
||||
not rule ids. Their own probes and negative controls stay what checks them.
|
||||
|
||||
## The vectors
|
||||
|
||||
`vectori/` holds 206 vectors (197 offline, 9 that read testnet 28001), listed with their digests in `vectori/INDEX.json`:
|
||||
envelope 64, payment-risk 11, payment-receipt 10, market-timeline 26, dataset 22, ai-trust-bundle 24, audit-log 17, audit-inclusion
|
||||
10, audit-consistency 4, agent-ledger 18. By expected verdict: 40 `VALID`, 5 `PARTIAL`, 161 `INVALID`. None is typed by hand
|
||||
`vectori/` holds 273 vectors (264 offline, 9 that read testnet 28001), listed with their digests in `vectori/INDEX.json`:
|
||||
envelope 64, payment-risk 11, payment-receipt 10, market-timeline 26, dataset 22, ai-trust-bundle 24, audit-log 19, audit-inclusion
|
||||
10, audit-consistency 4, agent-ledger 18, identity-presentation 65. By expected verdict: 45 `VALID`, 11 `PARTIAL`, 217 `INVALID`. None is typed by hand
|
||||
(`node genereaza-vectori.mjs --verifica` regenerates them and compares byte for byte):
|
||||
|
||||
- the 16 AIP-23 kinds come from their producers on fixed inputs (the same envelopes as the published AIP-23 kind vectors); the audit
|
||||
@@ -84,26 +90,30 @@ envelope 64, payment-risk 11, payment-receipt 10, market-timeline 26, dataset 22
|
||||
with an Ed25519 key that declares itself ml-dsa-65; an audit head signed by an operator key, by another key, and by a classical
|
||||
key; the ledger of an agent (a tool call, a payment, a payment refused above the limit, a tool call) with the forged siblings
|
||||
that only the agent's key can make (an empty approvals list, a false decision, a revocation entry without a revocation) and one
|
||||
written with a classical key; three trust chains of a fresh agent (allowed, refused by the policy, dated apart); an envelope with
|
||||
written with a classical key; three trust chains of a fresh agent (allowed, refused by the policy, dated apart); the presentations of one identity credential
|
||||
(an issuer, a holder, a phone, a session key, a stranger and an impostor issuer: six hybrid key pairs), its status lists, its
|
||||
delegations and revocations, with the forged siblings that only a key holder can make (a statement changed and signed again by
|
||||
the issuer, the holder or a delegate) and one credential from an issuer whose "ML-DSA-65" key is an Ed25519 key; an envelope with
|
||||
random content that nobody notarized; a dataset of 16 records with random salts; and the transaction of the recorded receipt read
|
||||
from the chain (two read calls).
|
||||
|
||||
An `INVALID` vector names its `base` and its `mutation`: **one operation** (set, remove or add at one JSON path) applied to the input
|
||||
of a vector that is not invalid, and it must be refused for exactly the rules in `expected.failed`, not merely refused: 137 of the
|
||||
161 are made this way. Where the rule sits under a hash or a signature, one place is not reachable (changing an amount under the
|
||||
instruction hash trips the binding first; a false decision in a ledger must still be signed by the agent): the other 24 are made at
|
||||
of a vector that is not invalid, and it must be refused for exactly the rules in `expected.failed`, not merely refused: 159 of the
|
||||
217 are made this way. Where the rule sits under a hash or a signature, one place is not reachable (changing an amount under the
|
||||
instruction hash trips the binding first; a false decision in a ledger must still be signed by the agent; a disclosure the issuer never signed must still be signed for by
|
||||
the holder): the other 58 are made at
|
||||
the producer, the commitments above the change recomputed with the published formulas, and every path that moved is declared
|
||||
(`mutation.changed`). Five vectors expect two rules: rules that guard the same field cannot be separated (a looser policy shown
|
||||
(`mutation.changed`). Nine vectors expect two rules: rules that guard the same field cannot be separated (a looser policy shown
|
||||
under a receipt also makes the risk verdict not reproduce; a Proof of AI envelope that is changed is also no longer the one the
|
||||
ledger links).
|
||||
ledger links; a delegation chain cut after it was signed for is also not presented by its last delegate).
|
||||
|
||||
## Run it
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs from aere.network/tools, with verify-anchor.mjs, mpt.mjs and package.json beside it and npm install done>
|
||||
node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs" # the published verifiers behind the one verdict form: 197 offline vectors
|
||||
AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs from aere.network/tools, with verify-anchor.mjs, mpt.mjs, falcon512.mjs, registry-v3.mjs and package.json beside it and npm install done>
|
||||
node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs" # the published verifiers behind the one verdict form: 264 offline vectors
|
||||
node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs" --online # and the 9 that read testnet 28001 (nothing is sent)
|
||||
node conformance.mjs --impl "python3 implementare-integritate.py" # an independent implementation: 62 vectors, 144 reported NOT COVERED
|
||||
node conformance.mjs --impl "python3 implementare-integritate.py" # an independent implementation: 62 vectors, 211 reported NOT COVERED
|
||||
node conformance.mjs --impl "<your command>" # yours
|
||||
node implementare-aere.mjs <artifact.json> [--online] # one artifact { artifact, input }: its verdict
|
||||
```
|
||||
@@ -111,7 +121,9 @@ node implementare-aere.mjs <artifact.json> [--online] # one arti
|
||||
For the artifact `envelope` the input is `{ "envelope": <any JSON value> }`, or `{ "raw": "<the text of the file>" }` when the file is
|
||||
not JSON at all: a file that is not an envelope is refused at the form level, by name, like any other. The other inputs are the ones
|
||||
the vectors show (`{ log, head?, signer? }` for an audit log, `{ ledger, policy }` for an agent's ledger, `{ bundle }` for a trust
|
||||
chain).
|
||||
chain, `{ presentation, now, audience?, nonce?, trustedIssuers?, statusLists?, revocations?, maxAgeS? }` for a presentation of a
|
||||
credential: `now`, the verifier's clock, is required, since a verdict on the clock of the machine that runs a vector would not
|
||||
reproduce).
|
||||
|
||||
An implementation is a command that answers three calls with JSON on stdout: `--capabilities` (`{ artifacts, rules, online, batch }`:
|
||||
what it claims to judge), `<vector.json> [--online]` (the verdict above for the file's `{ artifact, input }`), and, if it says
|
||||
@@ -121,34 +133,39 @@ exact set of failed rules and the state of each of the four levels are the expec
|
||||
refusal. Without `--online` an implementation must not open a connection.
|
||||
|
||||
`implementare-integritate.py` is the second implementation: Python, standard library only, written from the rules and not from the
|
||||
JavaScript. It claims 6 of the 97 rules (the form and the statement hash of an envelope; the form, the commitment, the salted field
|
||||
JavaScript. It claims 6 of the 134 rules (the form and the statement hash of an envelope; the form, the commitment, the salted field
|
||||
commitments and the RFC 9162 inclusion of a dataset record) and passes all 62 vectors it claims. It cannot check an ML-DSA signature
|
||||
or read a chain, says so in its capabilities, and the runner reports the rest as not covered: 144 vectors, among them every vector of
|
||||
the trust chain, the audit log and the agents' ledger. For those four verifiers the suite has one implementation, ours.
|
||||
or read a chain, says so in its capabilities, and the runner reports the rest as not covered: 211 vectors, among them every vector of
|
||||
the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger and the identity presentations. For those five verifiers the suite has one
|
||||
implementation, ours.
|
||||
|
||||
## How the suite itself is checked
|
||||
|
||||
Measured on 2026-10-05 (Node.js 24.14.1, Python 3.14.4, testnet 28001 read):
|
||||
|
||||
- `node proba-conformance.mjs --online`: every row green, 10 in this copy (an eleventh, the comparison of the 16 kind envelopes with
|
||||
the published AIP-23 kind vectors, runs where their generator is, in the development repository: 11/11 there, and here it is
|
||||
printed as information). The rules and the vectors are what the code derives now; every rule has a vector that expects it (97 of
|
||||
97); every artifact kind has a valid vector (13); every invalid vector is its base with one operation (137) or one declared
|
||||
producer change (24); the published verifiers pass 206/206; the independent implementation passes all 62 it claims; and 9,333
|
||||
- `node proba-conformance.mjs --online`: every row green, 11 in this copy (a twelfth, the comparison of the 16 kind envelopes with
|
||||
the published AIP-23 kind vectors, runs where their generator is, in the development repository: 12/12 there, and here it is
|
||||
printed as information). The rules and the vectors are what the code derives now; every rule has a vector that expects it (134 of
|
||||
134); every artifact kind has a valid vector (14); every invalid vector is its base with one operation (159) or one declared
|
||||
producer change (58); the published verifiers pass 273/273; the independent implementation passes all 62 it claims; and 16,280
|
||||
malformed inputs (every path of every offline vector that is not invalid removed, or replaced by null, a string, a number, a list,
|
||||
an object) given to the module verifiers each got a verdict, none threw. That row covers the modules of seven verifiers; the
|
||||
trust chain verifier is not in it (each case would run the reference verifier several times), and the reference verifier, a
|
||||
program, was tried apart (below). Without `--online` the nine chain vectors are reported unmeasured and the exit code is 2.
|
||||
- `node proba-conformance.mjs --control-negativ --online`: 97 of 97 rules. Each rule is planted out of its verifier, one at a time, in
|
||||
an object) given to the module verifiers each got a verdict, none threw. That row covers the modules of eight verifiers; the
|
||||
trust chain verifier is not in it (each case would run the reference verifier several times). The reference verifier, a program,
|
||||
has a row of its own: 183 malformed envelope files (every path of a signed tree head and of a notarized envelope removed or
|
||||
replaced; files that hold null, a number, a string, true, a list, an empty object, text that is not JSON, nothing) are given to
|
||||
it, and each gets a verdict. That row contacts no public endpoint: the program goes to the chain whenever a file claims a
|
||||
notarization, so a file that still carries the claim is run against a closed local endpoint and its finality is not measured. Without `--online` the nine chain vectors are reported unmeasured and the exit code is 2.
|
||||
- `node proba-conformance.mjs --control-negativ --online`: 134 of 134 rules. Each rule is planted out of its verifier, one at a time, in
|
||||
a copy (every check that carries its marker made true at run time; for `ai-trust`, its refusal helper made to drop the refusals of
|
||||
that rule; for the reference verifier, the level made to pass); the suite is run against the planted verifier; the vectors that
|
||||
expect the rule, **and only they**, must fail, and none may break. Then five controls of the instruments: an implementation that
|
||||
calls everything valid fails every vector that is not plainly valid (165 of the 197 offline vectors); the coverage gate goes red when one rule's vector
|
||||
expect the rule, **and only they**, must fail, and none may break. Then six controls of the instruments: an implementation that
|
||||
calls everything valid fails every vector that is not plainly valid (232 of the 264 offline vectors); the coverage gate goes red when one rule's vector
|
||||
is taken away; a rule added to a verifier and not mapped is refused by the derivation; a judge that throws again turns the
|
||||
malformed-input row red; no planted copy is left behind.
|
||||
- `node proba-conformance.mjs --pe-loc` is a measurement, not a gate: each of the 122 marked checks of the module verifiers
|
||||
planted out alone (the trust chain verifier has no per-check markers and is not in this count). For 87 of them a vector
|
||||
then fails. The others are checks whose vector trips a second check of the same rule at the same time, so removing one alone
|
||||
malformed-input row red; a reference verifier that throws again turns the malformed-envelope row red; no planted copy is left
|
||||
behind.
|
||||
- `node proba-conformance.mjs --pe-loc` is a measurement, not a gate: each of the 162 marked checks of the module verifiers
|
||||
planted out alone (the trust chain verifier has no per-check markers and is not in this count). For 127 of them a vector
|
||||
then fails (all 40 checks of the identity verifier among them). The others are checks whose vector trips a second check of the same rule at the same time, so removing one alone
|
||||
changes nothing (the three checks of `market.replay`, the three of `agents.anchor`, the run and neighbour checks of
|
||||
`dataset.completeness`), or checks no vector reaches (a dispute timed out before the arbitration timeout; five of the six checks
|
||||
of `agents.time`). The control above shows that each **rule** is load-bearing, not each of its checks.
|
||||
@@ -162,7 +179,9 @@ vector or a probe row:
|
||||
the agent key to be an ML-DSA-65 key, so the ledger of a "post-quantum identity" could be written and signed with an Ed25519 key
|
||||
and verify. In each, the key was never required to be a key of the scheme declared. Each is now a refusal by name
|
||||
(`envelope/signed-head.signature-classical-key`, `audit-log/signed-head.head-scheme-classical-key`,
|
||||
`agent-ledger/four-entries.key-classical`);
|
||||
`agent-ledger/four-entries.key-classical`). The audit head has a second vector since 2026-10-05,
|
||||
`audit-log/signed-head-any-signer.head-scheme-classical-key`, the same head with no signer expected: with the scheme rule taken
|
||||
out of the verifier, the first is still refused, for its signer, and this one is accepted;
|
||||
- the reference verifier exited with an exception on a file holding the JSON value `null`, let a statement that is a list pass its
|
||||
form level, and reported a malformed ML-DSA signature (no key, a key that cannot be parsed) as unmeasured "needs OpenSSL 3.5" on a
|
||||
runtime that has it; each is now a refusal by name, and a file that is not JSON is refused at the form level instead of ending
|
||||
@@ -175,13 +194,24 @@ vector or a probe row:
|
||||
the truth passed. The time now comes from the reference verifier's reading under the anchor, and the claim is only compared with
|
||||
it (`market-timeline/s1-28001.proof-claim-early`).
|
||||
|
||||
On 2026-10-05, while the identity verifier was being enrolled, one more, fixed the same day:
|
||||
|
||||
- **a fault of the issuer's keys was also blamed on the holder.** When the issuer keys in a credential could not be read (for
|
||||
example an Ed25519 key in the field of the ML-DSA-65 key), the identity verifier refused the credential, as it must, and also
|
||||
reported that the holder id is not the id of its keys: the two ids were derived in one step, and the first failure left the
|
||||
second underived. The verdict was `INVALID` either way; the list of rules named one that had not been broken. Each id is now
|
||||
derived on its own, and the vector `identity-presentation/direct.issuer-classical-key` expects exactly the two rules of the
|
||||
issuer. That vector also measures that the identity verifier never accepted a classical key in the ML-DSA-65 field: its key
|
||||
type was checked before this suite.
|
||||
|
||||
## What it is not, and what is not measured
|
||||
|
||||
- **Not a certification, not an audit, not a mark.** Passing says that an implementation agrees with the published verifiers on these
|
||||
206 inputs. It does not say either of them is correct, and no third party has reviewed the verifiers, the vectors or this suite.
|
||||
273 inputs. It does not say either of them is correct, and no third party has reviewed the verifiers, the vectors or this suite.
|
||||
- **The vectors and the verifiers have the same authors.** The expected verdicts were written by the people who wrote the verifiers.
|
||||
The second implementation is independent in code and language, not in authorship, and it covers 6 rules of 97; the other
|
||||
91 rules, among them every rule of the trust chain, the audit log and the agents' ledger, are judged here by one implementation.
|
||||
The second implementation is independent in code and language, not in authorship, and it covers 6 rules of 134; the other
|
||||
128 rules, among them every rule of the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger and the identity verifier, are judged
|
||||
here by one implementation.
|
||||
- **Finality is the chain's.** The level says that the post-quantum certificate of the covering anchor verified on the chain where the
|
||||
artifact was notarized. Every notarized vector here is on chain 28001, a testnet; nothing in this suite ran on mainnet.
|
||||
- **Five of the six finality refusals have no vector.** The reference verifier can refuse at its finality level in six places; the
|
||||
@@ -195,21 +225,33 @@ vector or a probe row:
|
||||
- **Offline, a notarization time is only a claim.** With the chain, `market.proof` takes the time an execution envelope was first
|
||||
seen from the reference verifier's reading under the anchor and refuses a claim that differs from it. Offline there is no such
|
||||
reading: the claim is all there is, the verdict is `PARTIAL`, and a `certified` field that an artifact brings itself is dropped.
|
||||
- **Authenticity is ML-DSA only.** The reference verifier checks ML-DSA signatures on envelopes, the audit log verifier the
|
||||
- **Authenticity is what each verifier checks.** The reference verifier checks ML-DSA signatures on envelopes, the audit log verifier the
|
||||
ML-DSA-65 signature of a head, the ledger verifier the agent's ML-DSA-65 key and signatures, each with a key that must be of the
|
||||
scheme declared; a hybrid signature (as on identity credentials) is reported unmeasured and the verdict is `PARTIAL`.
|
||||
scheme declared; the identity verifier the hybrid Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65 signatures of a credential, a presentation and each
|
||||
delegation link (both halves, each with a key of its type). A hybrid signature on an AIP-23 envelope is still reported
|
||||
unmeasured by the reference verifier, and the verdict is `PARTIAL`.
|
||||
- **Most times in a trust chain and in a ledger are claims.** A trust chain without a witness is `PARTIAL`: every time in it is the
|
||||
statement of whoever holds the keys. Three trust-chain vectors read a ledger head notarized on testnet 28001. No vector gives an
|
||||
agent's ledger an anchor that verifies: `agents.anchor` is reached only through an anchor that is refused, and five of the six
|
||||
checks of `agents.time` have no vector.
|
||||
- **What a damaged artifact can still pass.** Of the 9,333 malformed inputs, 1,870 were still accepted, at 94 distinct paths: parts a
|
||||
- **An identity verdict is the verifier's.** A presentation is judged on the clock, the audience, the nonce, the trusted issuers, the
|
||||
status lists and the revocations in the vector input: what a verifier brings decides the verdict. `VALID` for a delegated
|
||||
presentation says that no revocation handed to the verifier has taken effect, not that none exists; a revocation that cannot be
|
||||
attributed to the giver of the link or to the holder is ignored; a credential that names no status list cannot be revoked by
|
||||
its issuer and is still `VALID`. Every time in these vectors is the statement of a key holder: no vector notarizes a credential
|
||||
or a delegation. Nothing here says who an issuer is in the world.
|
||||
- **What a damaged artifact can still pass.** Of the 16,280 malformed inputs, 2,071 were still accepted, at 111 distinct paths: parts a
|
||||
verifier treats as optional (the transaction facts of a receipt, the envelope of a timeline, the head of an audit log), a policy
|
||||
field removed that falls back to its default, a log or a ledger without its last entry (still a valid shorter one), and fields no
|
||||
rule reads
|
||||
(`node proba-conformance.mjs --acceptate` lists them). A policy that cannot be defined makes the risk module throw, by design. The
|
||||
reference envelope verifier, a program, was tried apart with 526 malformed envelopes (every field removed or replaced, files that
|
||||
hold null, a number, a string, a list, text that is not JSON): each gets a verdict.
|
||||
field removed that falls back to its default, a log or a ledger without its last entry (still a valid shorter one), a revocation that was not in effect (damaged, it is
|
||||
ignored as before), and fields no rule reads
|
||||
(`node proba-conformance.mjs --acceptate` lists them). A policy that cannot be defined makes the risk module throw, by design. Of
|
||||
the 183 malformed envelope files given to the reference verifier (the probe's own row, measured at every run), 16 are still
|
||||
called `VALID`: an envelope with its signature or its notarization claim taken off (an unsigned, unnotarized envelope), and an
|
||||
envelope whose outer `v` or `kind` was damaged. Those two fields are outside the statement hash and the reference verifier does
|
||||
not read them; the statement carries its own `kind`, which is under the hash. (This file used to quote 526 malformed envelopes,
|
||||
a figure of 2026-10-03 from a run whose script was not kept; the row above replaces it.)
|
||||
- **Not part of AIP-23.** The rule ids, the four levels and the verdict form are this suite's reading of the published verifiers;
|
||||
AIP-23 defines the envelope. The identity verifiers published beside these are not enrolled.
|
||||
AIP-23 defines the envelope. Of the identity verifiers published beside these, the presentation verifier is enrolled; SD-JWT,
|
||||
Travel Rule and compliance are not.
|
||||
- **The Python implementation** writes numbers the way JavaScript does only for integers and plain decimals, and sorts keys by code
|
||||
point (JavaScript's order for keys in the Basic Multilingual Plane).
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user