device-identity: what a machine is, as a chain of signed statements checked offline (manufacturer credential, owners, firmware attestation, anchored on 28001; 175/175 with the AIP-23 verifier); conformance: the device-bundle vectors and the rules that cover them; control-plane console; README
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# Device identity
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What a machine is, said by a chain of signed statements that anyone checks offline: who made it, which firmware it runs, who owns
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it, what it may do, whether it is still in service, and what it says about itself right now. Every link is signed with a
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post-quantum signature and bound to the link before it. One verifier judges the whole chain, names every rule that refused, and
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says VALID, PARTIAL or INVALID.
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Node.js 24 only (`node:crypto`: Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65, FIPS 204), no dependencies. It imports the hybrid identities of
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[`../identity`](../identity/) and, for the AIP-23 envelope, [`../proof-kinds`](../proof-kinds/). The two commands that touch a
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chain (`notarize`, `reading`) use [`../agents`](../agents/) and the `ethers` package.
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**Read this first.** The device key is a **software key**, and the verifier judges the chain it is **shown**. Nothing here binds
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the key to hardware, and nothing says that the transfers shown are all the transfers there are. See
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[What it is not](#what-it-is-not) before deciding what a VALID verdict is worth to you.
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## The chain
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| link | who signs | what it says |
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|---|---|---|
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| 1. manufacture | the manufacturer, a hybrid identity (Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65, both required) | a credential of type `DeviceManufacture`: this device key `K` (ML-DSA-65), this model, this serial. The device id is derived from `K` (`aere-device:` + the first 20 bytes of the SHA-256 of its SPKI). The credential can name a recall list of the manufacturer (an identity status list) |
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| 2. firmware | the manufacturer | a release: model, version, a sequence number that only grows, the SHA-256 of the image, optionally the hash of a Proof of Software attestation of that image. And a short-lived **firmware policy**: the lowest sequence still allowed and the digests retracted |
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| 3. ownership | each owner in turn | the manufacturer is the first owner. A **transfer** is signed by the owner before it and names the hash of the link before it (the manufacture credential, then the previous transfer). The current owner signs an **authorization**: the actions the device may ask for, a time window, the ownership head it was given under |
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| 4. status | the manufacturer or the current owner | a registry of signed records: `active`, `suspended`, `retired`. The manufacturer's retirement is final. The owner's holds while the chain shown says it owns the device: see [Status](#status-whose-record-counts-and-for-how-long) |
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| 5. attestation | the device, with `K` | a fresh statement: the verifier's nonce and audience, the device's clock, the digest and the sequence of the firmware it runs, the ownership head it knows, the action it asks for |
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The attestation has an AIP-23 envelope (kind `device`) that commits to it by hash. That envelope can be notarized on Aere
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Network; a verifier that reads it back through the AIP-23 reference verifier, under a post-quantum certified anchor, learns a time
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at which the attestation already existed, written by the chain and chosen by nobody in this list. On the mainnet of today that
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reading says the validators certified the block with post-quantum seals; the finality is the one of the chain it was notarized on.
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Purposes are separated: a signature made for one kind of link (`firmware`, `firmware-policy`, `transfer`, `authorization`,
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`status`, `attestation`) does not verify as another.
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## The verdict
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`verifyDevice(bundle, options)` makes **every check it can reach**: it does not stop at the first refusal. Each row of its answer
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is `{ link, name, pass, detail, rule }`; a check that could not be made is `{ pass: null, unjudged: <cause> }`.
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- **INVALID**: at least one rule refused. `rules` lists every rule that did, by name.
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- **PARTIAL**: nothing refused, and something was not brought or not read. `unjudged` names each cause. A link missing from the
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bundle, the verifier's own nonce or audience, the manufacturers it trusts, the recall list, a current firmware policy (or one
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that is signed and cannot be read), a current status record (or one of the manufacturer or of the owner that cannot be read), a
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status record of another manufacturer the verifier trusts, a Proof of Software attestation the release names, a notarization
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the envelope claims and nobody read, a hardware root this verifier cannot judge, something handed to the verifier in another
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shape than the one it reads or beyond the number of things it judges: each keeps the verdict from VALID.
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- **VALID**: every link was brought and judged, and what could revoke it was read.
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Four causes are **named and do not change the verdict** (the export `NOTATE`):
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- `manufacture-status-none`: the manufacture credential names no recall list.
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- `status-ignored`: a status record that is not applied because it is not a record of who may speak about this device now. That
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is a record of a stranger; a record that is not signed, whose signature does not verify, or that stands under an id its keys
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do not derive; a record of a previous owner whose device id is not a device id; the current owner's `active` under another
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ownership head than the current one; an `active` whose time cannot be read.
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- `status-prior-ownership`: the status records of a **previous** owner.
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- `status-future`: a status record dated in the verifier's future.
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Each has a row that says what was seen; `verify` prints them on a line of their own (`noted, the verdict stands: ...`). A VALID
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verdict with `status-prior-ownership` beside it is not the same news as a plain VALID: read
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[Status](#status-whose-record-counts-and-for-how-long).
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The verifier judges on **its own clock** (`now`), with a tolerance of 60 seconds (`clockSkewS`, 0 to 600) given only to
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beginnings (a validity that starts, a record that takes effect) and to a date written by a clock that runs fast, never to endings.
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An ending includes its last instant; the edge of the tolerance is inside it. The attestation must be dated **no more than that
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tolerance ahead** of the verifier's clock and **no more than `maxAgeS` (300 s) before it**: a date further ahead than the
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tolerance is refused, also when it is well inside the allowed age.
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A time is an RFC 3339 UTC text (`2026-10-05T12:00:00Z`, with up to three decimals of a second). A time without a zone, with a
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zone offset, or one that is not a date is not a time. In a link of the bundle, the bundle cannot be read (`unreadable`). In a
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firmware policy or a recall list handed to the verifier, that policy or list cannot be read (PARTIAL). In a status record, see
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[Status](#status-whose-record-counts-and-for-how-long): a retirement or a suspension is applied all the same, an `active` is
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not believed.
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What the verifier brings, and what happens without it:
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| option | without it |
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|---|---|
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| `nonce`, `audience` | PARTIAL: an old attestation, or one made for another verifier, would be accepted |
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| `trustedManufacturers` (ids or public keys) | PARTIAL: anyone can issue a manufacture credential with their own keys |
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| `statusLists` (the manufacturer's recall lists) | PARTIAL when the credential names a list: a recall that was not handed cannot be seen |
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| `firmwarePolicies` | PARTIAL: a retracted or outdated firmware cannot be seen |
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| `statusRecords` | PARTIAL: a suspension or a retirement cannot be seen |
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| `softwareAttestation` | PARTIAL when the release names one |
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| `anchors` (the verifier's readings of the notarized envelope) | PARTIAL when the envelope claims a notarization |
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A configuration of the verifier that cannot be read (a clock that is not a time, a tolerance outside 0 to 600 seconds, a trusted
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manufacturer that is neither an id nor a set of public keys, a list that is not a list) is not an invalid bundle: `verifyDevice`
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throws an error that begins with `verifyDevice:`.
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### What the verifier is handed: its shape, and how much of it is judged
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`statusRecords`, `firmwarePolicies`, `statusLists` and `anchors` are flat lists of objects. An element that is not one (a list
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inside the list, a registry object `{ records: [...] }`, a file of another kind, `null`) holds things that were **not read**. It is
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not passed over: it is named with the cause of its kind (`status-unread`, `firmware-policy-unread`, `manufacture-status-unread`,
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`witness-unread`) and the verdict is PARTIAL. The command line reads a file that holds a list, or `{ "records": [...] }`, element
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by element, so a registry kept in one file is judged whole.
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At most 512 status records, 64 firmware policies, 64 recall lists and 64 readings are judged (the exports
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`MAX_STATUS_RECORDS`, `MAX_FIRMWARE_POLICIES`, `MAX_STATUS_LISTS`, `MAX_READINGS`). What lies beyond is not read, and the verdict
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says so (PARTIAL, with the same causes): a padded registry cannot make the verifier work without end, nor push a retirement out
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of sight in silence. Hand the verifier the records of the device it judges, not a whole registry.
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### Rules that decide the hard cases
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- **Firmware.** With several current policies of the manufacturer the strictest holds: the highest floor, and a digest retracted
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by any of them stays retracted. A release below the floor is refused (`firmware-rollback`), a retracted one too
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(`firmware-retracted`). The device must attest the digest and the sequence of the release shown (`attestation-firmware`).
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A policy signed by the manufacturer for this model, not out of its validity, that **cannot be read** (a retracted entry that
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is not `0x` and 64 hex digits, a floor that is not a whole number from 0 up, a validity that is not a time, a version this
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verifier does not read) is not read as a policy that retracts nothing: the verdict is PARTIAL (`firmware-policy-unread`), also
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when a clean policy stands beside it. What the readable policies refuse is still refused. An expired policy says nothing about
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now. The same holds for a recall list of the manufacturer whose validity is not a time (`manufacture-status-unread`). A policy
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or a list counts as the manufacturer's only when it names the manufacturer as its issuer **and** its signature verifies with
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the manufacturer's keys.
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- **Ownership.** A transfer counts only when signed by the owner at that point of the chain (`transfer-from`), and each transfer
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is dated after the one before it. An authorization counts only when granted by the current owner of the chain shown, under its
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ownership head (`authorization-owner`, `authorization-ownership`), and when it was in force both on the verifier's clock and
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at the time the device attested (`authorization-window`). In the chain that is shown, a previous owner that still signs is
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refused. The verifier cannot refuse an owner the chain does not show: see
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[What it is not](#what-it-is-not), "It judges the chain it is shown".
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- **Replay.** The attestation carries the verifier's nonce and audience and must be recent on the verifier's clock, and not
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dated ahead of it (`nonce`, `audience`, `freshness`). With the verifier's reading of the notarized envelope, an attestation
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dated after the moment its envelope was already on the chain is refused (`witness-time`); with several readings the earliest
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is the bound. A reading is a time in whole seconds: one in milliseconds, or written as text, is not used, and the verdict is
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PARTIAL (`witness-unread`).
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- **Keys and signatures.** The device key must be a canonical ML-DSA-65 public key and the device id must be derived from it, in
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the manufacture credential and in the attestation, and the two must be the same key (`device-key`, `device-id`,
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`attestation-key`, `attestation-device`). An Ed25519 key in a field named ML-DSA-65 is refused. The hybrid signatures need
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both halves, and each signature must declare its scheme. Every signature, like the device key, is accepted in **one text
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only**, its canonical base64: the same bytes in another base64 text are refused.
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- **The form of a link.** A link of the bundle is exactly `{ statement, signature }`, and a signature object exactly its members
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(`alg`, `ed25519`, `mldsa65`; for the device `alg`, `value`). One member more, beside the statement or inside the signature,
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is refused by the signature rule of that link (`manufacture-signature`, `firmware-signature`, `transfer-signature`,
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`authorization-signature`, `attestation-signature`). The hash of a link covers the whole object and only the statement is
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under the signature: without this rule anybody could give one signed statement another text, and so another hash. With it a
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link has one hash. A status record and a firmware policy are named by no hash; their signature object is held to the same
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form, and a member more beside their statement and their signature is not looked at.
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### Status: whose record counts, and for how long
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- **The manufacturer.** Its records always count, whatever ownership head they name. **The manufacturer's retirement is
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final**: no later record lifts it, its own included, and no sale does. When both the manufacturer and the owner retired the
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device, the row names the manufacturer's.
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- **The current owner.** Its `retired` and its `suspended` count under any ownership head, and under none: the owner of now can
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only harm itself by signing one, so the head written in the record is not a condition. Its `active` counts only under the
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current ownership head. **The owner's retirement holds while the chain shown says it owns the device**: its own later
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`active` does not lift it, and it stops binding in a chain that shows a transfer to another identity.
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- **Bought back.** An owner that sold the device and owns it again is the current owner again. Every `retired` and `suspended`
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record it ever signed, under any ownership head, counts again: its old retirement comes back with the device. Nothing it signs
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lifts that retirement; only a transfer to another identity does.
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- **A previous owner.** A transfer starts a new ownership, and the records of the owner before **do not bind** the owner of
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now. The reason is the seller and the date: a seller can sign a retirement **after** the sale and date it before the sale,
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and nothing in a signed record says when it was really signed. If such a record were binding, anyone who once owned a device
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could disable it for ever. So it is not applied. It is also **not silent**: each previous owner whose records are in the
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registry gets one row with the cause `status-prior-ownership` and the number of its records, `subject.priorOwnership` lists
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what the records of each previous owner say (`retired` if any says so, else the state of its highest record), and `verify`
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prints it. The verdict stands; a relying party that wants to refuse a device a previous owner retired reads that field and
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decides.
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- **What this means, plainly.** An owner **cannot retire a device for good**. It can retire it for as long as the chain shown
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says it owns it; whoever it transfers the device to, another identity of its own included, starts a new ownership in which
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the earlier retirement is named and not applied. And a chain can be shown shorter than it is, which makes the retirement of
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the real owner of now a stranger's record (see [What it is not](#what-it-is-not)). A definitive retirement by the owner (a
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"kill switch" that survives a sale) needs a **witness**: of time, for the retirement and the transfer, and of the ownership
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head. **That is not built here.** Until it is, the only definitive retirement is the manufacturer's.
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- **Which device a record is about.** The device id in a record is compared like a digest: its hex in upper case is the same
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id. A record that names another device is not about this one. A record whose device id is **not a device id at all** (a space
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after it, a number, a list) may have been meant for this device: when the manufacturer or the current owner signed it, the
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registry is not read as clean and the verdict is PARTIAL (`status-unread`); from anybody else it is ignored, and named.
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- **Another manufacturer the verifier trusts.** One device key can be certified by two manufacturers. A status record validly
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signed by a manufacturer the verifier trusts, other than the one of the credential shown, is **not applied** (a manufacturer
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does not retire the devices of another) and **not passed over** either: this verifier cannot judge by what right that
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manufacturer speaks about this key, so the verdict is PARTIAL (`status-other-manufacturer`). The same record from a
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manufacturer the verifier does not trust, or under a trusted manufacturer's id with keys that do not derive it, is a stranger's
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record.
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- **Anybody else.** See `status-ignored` above: ignored, and named.
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- **Suspension, active, time.** A suspension is lifted only by a later record of the signer that suspended, and it does not
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expire with its record. Of the records of one signer the one with the highest number holds, wherever it stands in the list;
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of two with one number, the stricter. `active` is believed only while its record is current. A record dated more than the
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tolerance ahead of the verifier's clock is not in effect yet: it is not applied, and it is named (`status-future`). A
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retirement or a suspension by who may give it is applied even when its date cannot be read; an `active` with such a date is
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not believed.
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- **A record this verifier cannot read.** A record signed by the manufacturer or by the current owner in a version, with a
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state or with a number this verifier does not read may be a retirement: the registry is not read as clean, and the verdict
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is PARTIAL (`status-unread`), whatever the other records say.
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The producer `statusRecord` has no default for whose record it writes: the manufacturer signs with `manufacture` (its own
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manufacture credential of the device) and names no ownership head; anybody else must name the ownership head it signs under.
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The 47 rules are the export `REGULI` of `device.mjs`; each check carries a marker with its rule id. The conformance suite
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([`../conformance`](../conformance/)) maps each to a public id (`device.<rule>`), a level and a sentence.
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## Use
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```sh
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node device-cli.mjs new-identity --out maker.keys.json # the manufacturer (key files are written 0600)
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node device-cli.mjs new-identity --out owner.keys.json
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node device-cli.mjs new-device --out device.key.json # the device key K
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node device-cli.mjs manufacture --manufacturer maker.keys.json --device device.key.json \
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--model AX-200 --serial SN-7 --days 3650 --out manufacture.json
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node device-cli.mjs release --signer maker.keys.json --model AX-200 --version 2.0.0 --sequence 2 \
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--image firmware.bin --out firmware.json
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node device-cli.mjs policy --manufacturer maker.keys.json --model AX-200 --min-sequence 2 --hours 24 --out policy.json
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node device-cli.mjs transfer --from maker.keys.json --to owner.keys.json --manufacture manufacture.json --out t1.json
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node device-cli.mjs authorize --owner owner.keys.json --manufacture manufacture.json --transfer t1.json \
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--action telemetry.publish --hours 24 --out authorization.json
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node device-cli.mjs status --by owner.keys.json --manufacture manufacture.json --transfer t1.json \
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--state active --seq 1 --hours 24 --out status.json
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# the verifier sends a nonce; the device answers
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node device-cli.mjs attest --device device.key.json --nonce n-123 --audience https://gateway.example \
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--firmware firmware.json --manufacture manufacture.json --transfer t1.json --action telemetry.publish --out attestation.json
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node device-cli.mjs bundle --manufacture manufacture.json --firmware firmware.json --transfer t1.json \
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--authorization authorization.json --attestation attestation.json --out bundle.json
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# the verifier
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node device-cli.mjs verify --bundle bundle.json --nonce n-123 --audience https://gateway.example \
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--trust <manufacturer id> --policy policy.json --status status.json
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```
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`verify` prints every row and the verdict (`--json` for the whole answer). What is named without changing the verdict is printed
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on a line of its own (`noted, the verdict stands: ...`), and so is what the status records of a previous owner say. `--to`
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takes a keys file, or a file with only the public keys of the new owner.
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**Exit codes.** For `verify`, 0 is VALID, 1 is INVALID and 2 is PARTIAL, and these three numbers mean nothing else. 3: no
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verdict was reached, because the usage is wrong or an input cannot be read (a file that is missing or is not JSON, a clock that
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is not a time, a trusted manufacturer that is neither an id nor keys). 4: an unexpected failure of `verify`. The other commands
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exit 0 when done, 1 when they failed, 2 when not measured (`notarize`, `reading`), and 3 for wrong usage or an input that cannot
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be read.
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**Files that hold several things.** A file given to `--status`, `--policy`, `--status-list` or `--reading` holds one object, a
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JSON list of them, or `{ "records": [...] }`; every element is handed to the verifier. An object of another form is handed as it
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is, and the verifier names it (PARTIAL).
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**What is printed.** Everything `verify` prints that came from a file (a model, an id, a date) passes through one function,
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`visible()`, exported by `device.mjs`: the C0 and C1 control characters, DEL, the Unicode line and paragraph separators, the
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bidirectional controls and the byte order mark are printed in a visible form (`\x1b`, `
`), and a backslash is doubled so
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that the form cannot be forged. A terminal executes nothing a bundle wrote, and a bundle cannot draw a second verdict line.
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`--json` prints JSON, whose strings escape control characters; its rows carry the text exactly as it came, so a program that
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shows them to a person passes them through `visible()` itself.
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`status` writes the record of whoever signs it: with the manufacturer's keys, a record of the manufacturer (no ownership head);
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with any other keys, a record under the ownership head of the chain given (`--manufacture` and every `--transfer`, in order).
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Give the whole chain: a record signed under an older head is still the owner's when it says `retired` or `suspended`, and is
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not believed when it says `active`.
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||||
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||||
With the chain as witness:
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||||
|
||||
```sh
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node device-cli.mjs envelope --attestation attestation.json --out envelope.json
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node device-cli.mjs notarize --envelope envelope.json --rpc <endpoint> --key-file <funded key> --out notarized.json
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node device-cli.mjs reading --envelope notarized.json --rpc <endpoint> --chain 28001 \
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--verify-proof <verify-proof.mjs> --out reading.json # made by the VERIFIER
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node device-cli.mjs bundle ... --anchor notarized.json --out bundle.json
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node device-cli.mjs verify --bundle bundle.json ... --reading reading.json
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```
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||||
`notarize` refuses chain 2800 unless `AERE_CONFIRM_MAINNET=yes`: there it is a real transaction paid by the key's account.
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||||
`reading` needs the AIP-23 reference verifier published at aere.network/tools: `verify-proof.mjs` with the five files beside it
|
||||
(`verify-anchor.mjs`, `mpt.mjs`, `falcon512.mjs`, `registry-v3.mjs`, `package.json`) and `npm install` done there. A reading
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||||
handed over by the party being verified proves nothing: it would be that party's own statement.
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||||
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||||
As a module:
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||||
|
||||
```js
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import * as D from './device.mjs';
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const r = D.verifyDevice(bundle, { now, nonce, audience, trustedManufacturers: [id], statusLists, firmwarePolicies, statusRecords, anchors });
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||||
// r.verdict, r.rules, r.unjudged, r.links, r.rows, r.subject
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||||
```
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||||
|
||||
`r.subject` (device id, model, serial, manufacturer, owner, firmware, action, state, `priorOwnership`: what the status records
|
||||
of each previous owner say and how many they are, and the witness reading used, with the chain the verifier says it read) is
|
||||
returned only when no rule refused. The rows carry text as the bundle wrote it: show them to a person through `D.visible()`.
|
||||
|
||||
## What it is not
|
||||
|
||||
- **It is not a hardware root of trust.** `K` is generated and held in software. Whoever can read the device's storage can copy
|
||||
`K`; the copy is indistinguishable from the device. A compromised device signs whatever it is told, including the digest of a
|
||||
firmware it does not run: the attestation says what the holder of `K` **claims** to run, not what was measured at boot. No TPM,
|
||||
no secure element, no TEE is used or checked anywhere in this module.
|
||||
- **What a hardware root would add, and where it would bind.** (1) An endorsement that `K` was generated inside a specific chip
|
||||
and cannot leave it: it would sit in the field `hardwareRoot` of the manufacture claims, beside `deviceKey`. (2) A quote, signed
|
||||
by that chip, over the measurements of the boot chain and the verifier's nonce: it would sit in the field `hardwareRoot` of
|
||||
the attestation, beside `firmware`. Both fields exist, are `null` in everything this module produces, and are **not used**:
|
||||
a value in either is reported as not judged (`hardware-root`) and the verdict is PARTIAL. Nothing here verifies an endorsement
|
||||
certificate or a quote.
|
||||
- **It judges the chain it is shown, and a chain can be shown shorter than it is.** Nothing in a bundle says that the transfers
|
||||
shown are all the transfers there are. Whoever holds `K` (a software key, which can be copied) and the documents of an earlier
|
||||
time (the manufacture credential, the earlier transfers, an authorization and an `active` record that are still current) can
|
||||
show a chain that **stops before the last sale**. In that chain the earlier owner is the current owner: its authorization
|
||||
counts, its records count, and a retirement signed by the real owner of now is a stranger's record, named `status-ignored` and
|
||||
not applied. The verdict is VALID. Rows K05 and K06 of the probe measure this, for a chain shown one transfer short and for
|
||||
one shown with no transfer at all. What holds against a chain shown shorter: the manufacturer's retirement, the manufacturer's
|
||||
recall list, the firmware policy, and the endings of the documents used (an authorization and an `active` record expire, which
|
||||
is why they should be short-lived). **The only retirement that holds against a shortened chain is the manufacturer's.**
|
||||
Closing this needs a witness of the **ownership head**: the head notarized at each transfer, and a verifier that reads the
|
||||
latest. It is not built here.
|
||||
- **No detection of a double sale by itself**, for the same reason: an owner that signs two different transfers at the same
|
||||
position makes two valid chains, and a verifier shown one of them cannot know the other exists.
|
||||
- **No definitive retirement by an owner.** The owner's retirement holds while the chain shown says it owns the device; a
|
||||
transfer starts a new ownership, in which the earlier retirement is named and not applied (see
|
||||
[Status](#status-whose-record-counts-and-for-how-long)). An owner that retires a device and then transfers it to another
|
||||
identity of its own has a device that verifies again, with `status-prior-ownership` beside the verdict. Closing that needs a
|
||||
witness of **when** the retirement and the transfer were signed (their notarization, read by the verifier). It is not built
|
||||
here. The manufacturer's retirement is final.
|
||||
- **Not a Proof of Software verifier.** When a release names a Proof of Software attestation, this verifier checks that the
|
||||
attestation handed is the one named (by hash), that it is a Proof of Software attestation, and that it lists the image digest.
|
||||
It does not verify the attestation's own signature, its builder credential or its SBOM: that is the job of the Proof of
|
||||
Software verifier.
|
||||
- **Not a statement about the real world.** It does not say who a manufacturer is; the verifier chooses whom it trusts
|
||||
(`trustedManufacturers`). It does not say the serial number is printed on the device.
|
||||
- **Not a registry service.** Recall lists, firmware policies and status records are files somebody publishes and the verifier
|
||||
fetches. A record the verifier was not handed cannot be seen; the verifier is told when it read none (PARTIAL), not when one
|
||||
was withheld among others it did read: a retirement left out of the records shown, beside a current `active` record, is not
|
||||
noticed. A record or a policy damaged on the way (its signature no longer verifies, or is not in its canonical text) is no
|
||||
longer a signed record: it is ignored like one that was withheld. Read the registry from who publishes it, not from the
|
||||
device.
|
||||
- **No time for the links but the one their signers wrote.** A transfer, an authorization and a status record carry the date
|
||||
their signer chose. Only the attestation can be bounded by the chain today (its envelope, notarized and read back).
|
||||
- **No key rotation or recovery** for `K` or for the identities. A device whose key is lost or copied is recalled by the
|
||||
manufacturer (the recall list) or retired (a status record), and made again.
|
||||
- **One signer for firmware.** A release must be signed by the manufacturer's own identity. Delegating release signing to a
|
||||
separate key is not built.
|
||||
- **Not a certification and not an audit.** No third party has reviewed this code.
|
||||
|
||||
## Not measured
|
||||
|
||||
- Any real device, any embedded implementation of the attestation, and the cost of an ML-DSA-65 signature on a constrained
|
||||
processor.
|
||||
- The chain as witness on Aere Network mainnet (2800): measured only on testnet 28001, where the finality is the testnet's.
|
||||
- The chain as witness with the verifier as it is now, end to end: the run on testnet 28001 was made on 2026-10-05 before the
|
||||
repairs of that day and of the next (see below). What was recorded then (the bundles, what the verifier brought, its two
|
||||
readings) is judged again offline by the verifier of now in the probe (row D08) and gives the six verdicts recorded; nothing
|
||||
was notarized or read on the chain again.
|
||||
- A witness of time for transfers, authorizations and status records, and a witness of the ownership head: none is built.
|
||||
- A second implementation of the verifier: the conformance suite's Python implementation covers none of the 47 rules.
|
||||
- The key-file mode on Linux and macOS (the tests ran on Windows, where the mode is not enforced).
|
||||
- A terminal: the row of the probe that measures what `verify` prints reads the BYTES of its output (no control byte but the
|
||||
line feeds the command writes); no terminal emulator was driven.
|
||||
- The conditions of the **producers** and of the key files (the functions that write links), one at a time. The search described
|
||||
below covers the verifier and everything it calls. What a producer refuses to write is a convenience to its caller, not a
|
||||
guarantee to a verifier, which must assume links written by other tools; rows D01 and D02 of the probe measure the refusals
|
||||
this page names. @@INAFARA@@ conditions lie there.
|
||||
- The conditions of `device-cli.mjs`, one at a time: the command line is covered by the plantings written by hand (the exit
|
||||
codes, the list files, what is printed), not by the search.
|
||||
- The kinds of change the search does not derive: a constant changed, an arithmetic operator changed, a statement removed, two
|
||||
conditions changed together.
|
||||
|
||||
## How it is checked
|
||||
|
||||
| what | command | measured |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| the probe | `AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs> node proba-device.mjs` | @@PROBA@@ |
|
||||
| the negative control | `node control-negativ-device.mjs` | @@CONTROL@@ |
|
||||
| the search for conditions without a row | `AERE_ACORN=<directory of the acorn parser> node mutanti-device.mjs` | @@MUTANTI@@ |
|
||||
| the chain as witness | `AERE_TESTNET_KEY_FILE=<funded testnet key> AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs> node proba-device-ancora-testnet.mjs` | 10/10 on testnet 28001 on 2026-10-05, with the verifier as it was before the repairs of that day: two envelopes notarized (two transactions), both read back by the published reference verifier under a post-quantum certified anchor (after 17 s and 16 s); the honest bundle VALID with the reading and PARTIAL without it; an attestation the device dated twenty minutes ahead, judged on a clock set to the time it claims, passes without the chain and is refused with the reading (`witness-time`); the envelope of another attestation and the reading of another envelope do not witness. Evidence in `dovezi-ancora-28001/`. Not run again after the repairs: the recorded bundles and readings give the same six verdicts under the verifier of now (row D08 of the probe, offline) |
|
||||
| the conformance suite | `node ../conformance/proba-conformance.mjs` | @@SUITA@@ |
|
||||
|
||||
An attack row of the probe requires the verdict INVALID **and the exact set of rules that refused**: refused for another reason is
|
||||
a red row. A row that must be PARTIAL requires the exact set of causes. Three things check that the rows can go red.
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Each rule taken out whole.** The negative control takes each of the 47 rules out of a copy, one at a time, and requires
|
||||
that the rows which expect that rule, and only they, go red.
|
||||
2. **Plantings written by hand** (`plantari-device.mjs`), each with its rows named beside it, and exactly those rows must go
|
||||
red. They are the defects of behaviour (no purpose separation, one half of a hybrid signature accepted, a retirement lifted,
|
||||
a previous owner's record applied or passed in silence, the last record in the list holding instead of the highest, the
|
||||
loosest policy holding, something handed in another shape dropped in silence, text printed as it came, an input that cannot
|
||||
be read exiting like a verdict) and the conditions that a search by mutation does not derive: a tolerance **given** to an
|
||||
ending, an order turned round, and two checks that guard one thing taken out together (where either alone holds, a single
|
||||
planting shows nothing, and the planting says so). A planting whose pattern is not found exactly once, or after which the
|
||||
probe does not reach its summary, counts as a failure of the control.
|
||||
3. **A search derived from the code** (`mutanti-device.mjs`). A list written by hand stays behind the code, so the conditions
|
||||
of the verifier, one at a time, are not listed: a parser derives them. Each side of every `&&` and `||`, every `===` and
|
||||
`!==` made always true and always false, every `<`, `<=`, `>`, `>=` moved by its edge and made always true, every clock
|
||||
tolerance removed, and every yes-or-no call made to answer yes and to answer no. The probe runs on each; a mutant that leaves
|
||||
every row green is a condition without a row. The form checks are searched like the rest: each field a link must have is a
|
||||
row (section R of the probe: the field replaced by values of the wrong form and the link signed again by its signer), each
|
||||
edge of an interval is a row (section T). Survivors are allowed only when declared in the tool with the reason no row can
|
||||
see them; the run fails on an undeclared survivor and on a declaration that names none.
|
||||
|
||||
What the search does not cover is listed under [Not measured](#not-measured). It needs the `acorn` parser, which is not a
|
||||
dependency of the verifier and is not shipped here; without it the search reports NEMASURAT and measures nothing.
|
||||
|
||||
`fixturi/firmware-2.0.0.bin` is a made-up image. `fixturi/atestare-firmware.json` is a probe fixture: a Proof of Software
|
||||
attestation of that image, written by the Proof of Software tool outside any source repository (its `source` is null), with a
|
||||
key made for it and discarded. Every other key is made at the start of a run and discarded at its end.
|
||||
`dovezi-ancora-28001/` holds the evidence of the testnet run: no private key is in it.
|
||||
|
||||
Code comments are in English; a few internal names are Romanian (`REGULI` rules, `NEJUDECATE` not judged, `PARTIALE`,
|
||||
`OPRIRI` stops, `PAZA` guard, `ECHIVALENTI` equivalents, `PRODUCATORI` producers).
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env node
|
||||
// control-negativ-device.mjs: the negative control of proba-device.mjs. Each guard is taken out of a COPY of this directory (with
|
||||
// the files it imports), the probe runs on the copy, and the rows that depend on that guard, AND ONLY THEY, must go red.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 1. the witness: the untouched copy is green;
|
||||
// 2. one planting per RULE the verifier names (all its marked checks made true): the red rows must be exactly the rows whose
|
||||
// `expects` lists that rule (read from the probe's own --json, not typed here);
|
||||
// 3. the plantings of plantari-device.mjs, each with the rows it must turn red beside it. A check made of several conditions is planted out
|
||||
// one CONDITION at a time (a whole rule taken out says nothing about each half of it). Two checks that guard the same thing
|
||||
// are planted out TOGETHER, and the planting says so.
|
||||
// Three states: VERDE (exactly those rows went red), ROSU (others did, or none), STRICAT (a pattern is not in the file exactly
|
||||
// once, or the probe on the copy did not reach its summary: a red that measures nothing). STRICAT counts as a failure.
|
||||
// node control-negativ-device.mjs [--doar <text>] exit 0 = the witness green and every planting red on exactly its rows
|
||||
import fs from 'node:fs'; import os from 'node:os'; import path from 'node:path'; import { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
|
||||
|
||||
const AICI = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)); const NUME = path.basename(AICI);
|
||||
const DEV_VERIFY = path.resolve(AICI, '..', '..', 'verificator-falcon', 'verify-proof.mjs');
|
||||
const VERIFY = process.env.AERE_VERIFY_PROOF || (fs.existsSync(DEV_VERIFY) ? DEV_VERIFY : '');
|
||||
import { PLANTARI, M, C } from './plantari-device.mjs';
|
||||
const PLANT = " || String(1) === '1' /*PLANTAT*/";
|
||||
|
||||
const a = process.argv.slice(2); const doar = a.includes('--doar') ? a[a.indexOf('--doar') + 1] : null;
|
||||
let verzi = 0, rosii = 0, stricate = 0;
|
||||
const rand = (stare, text) => { console.log(` [${stare.padEnd(7)}] ${text}`); if (stare === 'VERDE') verzi++; else if (stare === 'ROSU') rosii++; else stricate++; };
|
||||
|
||||
// the copy: this directory and the files it imports from its neighbours, under the same relative names
|
||||
const T = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'aere-device-control-'));
|
||||
function copie(nume) {
|
||||
const R = path.join(T, nume); const d = path.join(R, NUME); fs.mkdirSync(d, { recursive: true });
|
||||
for (const e of fs.readdirSync(AICI, { withFileTypes: true })) { if (e.isDirectory()) { if (e.name === 'fixturi' || e.name === 'dovezi-ancora-28001') fs.cpSync(path.join(AICI, e.name), path.join(d, e.name), { recursive: true }); } else fs.copyFileSync(path.join(AICI, e.name), path.join(d, e.name)); }
|
||||
const vecini = new Set(); for (const f of [M, C, 'proba-device.mjs']) for (const m of fs.readFileSync(path.join(AICI, f), 'utf8').matchAll(/from '\.\.\/([^']+)'/g)) vecini.add(m[1]);
|
||||
for (const v of vecini) { const q = path.join(R, v); fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(q), { recursive: true }); fs.copyFileSync(path.join(AICI, '..', v), q); }
|
||||
return d;
|
||||
}
|
||||
function proba(d) {
|
||||
return new Promise((gata) => {
|
||||
const c = spawn(process.execPath, [path.join(d, 'proba-device.mjs'), '--json'], { env: { ...process.env, ...(VERIFY ? { AERE_VERIFY_PROOF: VERIFY } : {}) }, stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'] }); let out = '', err = '';
|
||||
c.stdout.on('data', (x) => { out += x; }); c.stderr.on('data', (x) => { err += x; });
|
||||
c.on('close', () => { try { gata(JSON.parse(out.trim().split('\n').slice(-1)[0])); } catch { gata({ eroare: (err || out).trim().split('\n').slice(-2).join(' | ').slice(0, 300) }); } });
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
async function inParalel(sarcini, n = 6) { const rez = new Array(sarcini.length); let k = 0; await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: Math.min(n, sarcini.length) }, async () => { while (k < sarcini.length) { const i = k++; rez[i] = await sarcini[i](); } })); return rez; }
|
||||
|
||||
try {
|
||||
console.log('1. the witness: the untouched copy');
|
||||
const martor = await proba(copie('martor'));
|
||||
if (martor.eroare || !Array.isArray(martor.rows)) { rand('STRICAT', 'the probe on the untouched copy did not reach its summary: ' + (martor.eroare || '')); throw new Error('stop'); }
|
||||
const rosiiMartor = martor.rows.filter((r) => r.state === 'ROSU').map((r) => r.id);
|
||||
rand(rosiiMartor.length ? 'ROSU' : 'VERDE', `the untouched copy: ${martor.verzi} green, ${martor.rosii} red, ${martor.nemasurat} not measured` + (rosiiMartor.length ? ' (' + rosiiMartor.join(', ') + ')' : ''));
|
||||
if (rosiiMartor.length) throw new Error('stop');
|
||||
const nemas = new Set(martor.rows.filter((r) => r.state !== 'VERDE').map((r) => r.id)); const iduri = new Set(martor.rows.map((r) => r.id));
|
||||
const { REGULI } = await import('./device.mjs');
|
||||
const cazuri = [];
|
||||
for (const r of REGULI) cazuri.push({ nume: `rule ${r} taken out (every marked check of it made true)`, fisier: M, regula: r, asteptate: martor.rows.filter((x) => x.expects.includes(r)).map((x) => x.id) });
|
||||
PLANTARI.forEach(([nume, fisier, de, cu, asteptate], i) => cazuri.push({ nume, fisier, de: [de].flat(), cu: [cu].flat(), asteptate: typeof asteptate === 'function' ? asteptate(martor.rows) : asteptate, i }));
|
||||
const alese = cazuri.filter((c) => !doar || c.nume.includes(doar));
|
||||
if (doar) console.log(` (FILTERED: --doar ${doar}: ${alese.length} of ${cazuri.length} plantings; the others are NOT controlled by this run)`);
|
||||
console.log(`2-3. ${alese.length} plantings, each on its own copy (${REGULI.length} whole rules, ${PLANTARI.length} more)`);
|
||||
const rez = await inParalel(alese.map((c, k) => async () => {
|
||||
const lipsa = c.asteptate.filter((id) => !iduri.has(id)); if (lipsa.length) return { stricat: `the planting names rows the probe does not have: ${lipsa.join(', ')}` };
|
||||
const d = copie('p' + k); const f = path.join(d, c.fisier); const src = fs.readFileSync(f, 'utf8'); let text = src;
|
||||
if (c.regula) { const n = src.split(`/*PAZA:${c.regula}*/`).length - 1; if (n < 1) return { stricat: `no /*PAZA:${c.regula}*/ marker in ${c.fisier}` }; text = src.split(`/*PAZA:${c.regula}*/`).join(PLANT); }
|
||||
else for (const [j, de] of c.de.entries()) { const n = src.split(de).length - 1; if (n !== 1) return { stricat: `pattern ${j + 1} appears ${n} times in ${c.fisier} (exactly once is required)` }; const m = text.split(de).length - 1; if (m !== 1) return { stricat: `pattern ${j + 1} is no longer there once after the pattern before it was replaced` }; text = text.replace(de, () => c.cu[j]); }
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(f, text); const r = await proba(d); fs.rmSync(path.dirname(d), { recursive: true, force: true }); return r;
|
||||
}));
|
||||
alese.forEach((c, k) => {
|
||||
const r = rez[k];
|
||||
if (r.stricat || r.eroare || !Array.isArray(r.rows)) return rand('STRICAT', `${c.nume}: ${r.stricat || 'the probe on the planted copy did not reach its summary: ' + (r.eroare || '')}`);
|
||||
if (r.rows.length !== martor.rows.length) return rand('STRICAT', `${c.nume}: the planted probe ran ${r.rows.length} rows, the witness ${martor.rows.length}`);
|
||||
const cazute = r.rows.filter((x) => x.state === 'ROSU').map((x) => x.id).sort(), ast = [...c.asteptate].sort();
|
||||
const altele = r.rows.filter((x) => x.state !== 'VERDE' && x.state !== 'ROSU' && !nemas.has(x.id)).map((x) => x.id);
|
||||
const ok = ast.length > 0 && cazute.join() === ast.join() && !altele.length;
|
||||
rand(ok ? 'VERDE' : 'ROSU', `${c.nume}: ${cazute.length} row(s) red` + (ok ? `, exactly its ${ast.length} (${ast.join(', ')})` : `; required exactly [${ast.join(', ')}], red [${cazute.join(', ')}]` + (altele.length ? `, no longer measured [${altele.join(', ')}]` : '')));
|
||||
});
|
||||
if (doar) rand('STRICAT', `${cazuri.length - alese.length} plantings left out by --doar`);
|
||||
} catch (e) { if (e.message !== 'stop') throw e; } finally { fs.rmSync(T, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
|
||||
console.log(`\ndevice identity (control): ${verzi} VERDE, ${rosii} ROSU, ${stricate} STRICAT`);
|
||||
process.exitCode = rosii || stricate ? 1 : 0;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env node
|
||||
// device-cli.mjs: AERE Device Identity from the command line, through files only. Key files are written with mode 0600 and never
|
||||
// printed; every other file is a signed link that can be published.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// new-identity --out keys.json a hybrid identity (Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65): a manufacturer or an owner
|
||||
// new-device --out device.key.json a device key K (ML-DSA-65)
|
||||
// manufacture --manufacturer keys.json --device device.key.json --model M --serial S --days N
|
||||
// [--status-list ID --status-index N] --out manufacture.json
|
||||
// release --signer keys.json --model M --version V --sequence N (--image file | --digest 0x..) [--software attestation.json] --out fw.json
|
||||
// policy --manufacturer keys.json --model M [--min-sequence N] [--retract 0x..]... --hours N --out policy.json
|
||||
// transfer --from keys.json --to keys-or-public.json --manufacture manufacture.json [--transfer t.json]... --out tN.json
|
||||
// authorize --owner keys.json --manufacture manufacture.json [--transfer t.json]... --action a [--action b]... --hours N --out auth.json
|
||||
// status --by keys.json --manufacture manufacture.json [--transfer t.json]... --state active|suspended|retired --seq N --hours N --out status.json
|
||||
// with the manufacturer's keys: a record of the manufacturer (no ownership head); with any other keys: a record under the
|
||||
// ownership head of the chain given (give every transfer, in order)
|
||||
// attest --device device.key.json --nonce X --audience A --firmware fw.json --manufacture manufacture.json [--transfer t.json]... --action a --out att.json
|
||||
// bundle [--manufacture f] [--firmware f] [--transfer f]... [--authorization f] [--attestation f] [--anchor envelope.json] --out bundle.json
|
||||
// envelope --attestation att.json --out envelope.json the AIP-23 envelope (kind device) of an attestation
|
||||
// notarize --envelope envelope.json --rpc URL --key-file f --out notarized.json
|
||||
// refuses chain 2800 (mainnet: a real transaction paid by the key's account) unless AERE_CONFIRM_MAINNET=yes
|
||||
// reading --envelope notarized.json --rpc URL [--chain N] [--verify-proof verify-proof.mjs] --out reading.json
|
||||
// the VERIFIER's reading of the notarization, through the AIP-23 reference verifier, under a post-quantum certified anchor
|
||||
// verify --bundle bundle.json [--now T] [--nonce X] [--audience A] [--trust id-or-keys.json]... [--status-list f]... [--policy f]...
|
||||
// [--status f]... [--software attestation.json] [--reading reading.json]... [--max-age S] [--json]
|
||||
// a file given to --status, --policy, --status-list or --reading holds ONE object, a JSON list of them, or { "records": [...] }:
|
||||
// every element is handed to the verifier. What is in none of these forms is handed as it is, and the verifier names it
|
||||
// prints every row, the verdict, what is named without changing it (`noted, the verdict stands: ...`) and what the status
|
||||
// records of a previous owner say
|
||||
// Everything printed that came from a file passes through visible(): control characters are shown, never sent to the terminal
|
||||
// (--json prints JSON, whose strings escape them).
|
||||
// Exit codes. verify: 0 VALID, 1 INVALID, 2 PARTIAL, and these three numbers mean nothing else. The other commands: 0 done, 1 failed,
|
||||
// 2 not measured (notarize, reading). Every command: 3 no verdict and nothing done, because the usage is wrong or an input cannot be
|
||||
// read (a file that is missing or is not JSON, a clock that is not a time); verify alone: 4 an unexpected failure (never 1, which is INVALID).
|
||||
import fs from 'node:fs'; import path from 'node:path'; import os from 'node:os'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
|
||||
import * as ID from '../identity/identity.mjs';
|
||||
import { buildProof } from '../proof-kinds/proof-kinds.mjs';
|
||||
import * as D from './device.mjs';
|
||||
|
||||
class Folosire extends Error {}
|
||||
const COD_FOLOSIRE = 3, COD_CADERE = 4;
|
||||
/** the ONE place where the command line prints a line: whatever came from a file is made visible first (device.mjs, visible) */
|
||||
const spune = (text) => { console.log(D.visible(text)); };
|
||||
const striga = (text) => { console.error(D.visible(text)); };
|
||||
const [cmd, ...rest] = process.argv.slice(2);
|
||||
const get = (f) => { const i = rest.indexOf(f); return i >= 0 ? rest[i + 1] : undefined; };
|
||||
const toate = (f) => rest.flatMap((a, i) => (a === f && rest[i + 1] != null ? [rest[i + 1]] : []));
|
||||
const cere = (f) => { const v = get(f); if (v == null) throw new Folosire(`${cmd}: ${f} is required`); return v; };
|
||||
const numar = (f, imp = null) => { const v = get(f); if (v == null) { if (imp === null) throw new Folosire(`${cmd}: ${f} is required`); return imp; } const n = Number(v); if (!Number.isInteger(n) || n < 0) throw new Folosire(`${cmd}: ${f} is a whole number`); return n; };
|
||||
const citeste = (f) => { try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(f, 'utf8')); } catch (e) { throw new Folosire(`cannot read ${f}: ${e.message}`); } };
|
||||
const scrie = (o, f, { secret = false } = {}) => { if (!f) throw new Folosire(`${cmd}: --out is required`); fs.writeFileSync(f, JSON.stringify(o, null, 1) + '\n', secret ? { mode: 0o600 } : {}); };
|
||||
const identitate = (f) => ID.importKeys(citeste(f));
|
||||
/** what a file given to verify holds: one object, a list of them, or a registry { records: [...] }; flattened, every element is handed over */
|
||||
const netezeste = (x, adancime = 0) => (adancime > 8 ? [x] : Array.isArray(x) ? x.flatMap((y) => netezeste(y, adancime + 1)) : x && typeof x === 'object' && Array.isArray(x.records) && x.statement === undefined ? netezeste(x.records, adancime + 1) : [x]);
|
||||
const elemente = (f) => netezeste(citeste(f));
|
||||
/** the public keys of an identity: a keys file, a { id, public } file, or the public keys object itself */
|
||||
const publice = (f) => { const j = citeste(f); const p = j && j.public ? j.public : j; ID.publicKeyObjects(p); return p; };
|
||||
const inOre = (h) => new Date(Date.now() + h * 3600000).toISOString();
|
||||
const lant = () => ({ m: citeste(cere('--manufacture')), t: toate('--transfer').map(citeste) });
|
||||
|
||||
async function main() {
|
||||
if (cmd === 'new-identity') { const k = ID.generateKeys(); scrie(ID.exportKeys(k), get('--out'), { secret: true }); spune(k.id); return 0; }
|
||||
if (cmd === 'new-device') { const d = D.generateDeviceKey(); scrie(D.exportDeviceKey(d), get('--out'), { secret: true }); spune(d.deviceId); return 0; }
|
||||
if (cmd === 'manufacture') {
|
||||
const dk = citeste(cere('--device')); const status = get('--status-list') ? { list: get('--status-list'), index: numar('--status-index') } : null;
|
||||
const c = D.manufacture({ manufacturer: identitate(cere('--manufacturer')), deviceKey: dk.publicKey, model: cere('--model'), serial: cere('--serial'), validUntil: inOre(24 * numar('--days')), status });
|
||||
scrie(c, get('--out')); spune(`${c.statement.claims.deviceId} made by ${c.statement.issuer.id}`); return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (cmd === 'release') {
|
||||
const r = D.releaseFirmware({ signer: identitate(cere('--signer')), model: cere('--model'), version: cere('--version'), sequence: numar('--sequence'), image: get('--image') ? fs.readFileSync(get('--image')) : null, digest: get('--digest') || null,
|
||||
softwareAttestation: get('--software') ? citeste(get('--software')) : null });
|
||||
scrie(r, get('--out')); spune(`${r.statement.model} ${r.statement.version} (sequence ${r.statement.sequence}): ${r.statement.digest}`); return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (cmd === 'policy') { const p = D.firmwarePolicy({ manufacturer: identitate(cere('--manufacturer')), model: cere('--model'), minSequence: numar('--min-sequence', 0), retracted: toate('--retract'), validUntil: inOre(numar('--hours')) }); scrie(p, get('--out')); spune(`floor ${p.statement.minSequence}, ${p.statement.retracted.length} retracted, until ${p.statement.validUntil}`); return 0; }
|
||||
if (cmd === 'transfer') { const { m, t } = lant(); const x = D.transferOwnership({ from: identitate(cere('--from')), to: publice(cere('--to')), manufacture: m, transfers: t }); scrie(x, get('--out')); spune(`transfer ${x.statement.seq}: ${x.statement.from.id} -> ${x.statement.to.id}`); return 0; }
|
||||
if (cmd === 'authorize') { const { m, t } = lant(); const a = D.authorize({ owner: identitate(cere('--owner')), deviceId: m.statement.claims.deviceId, ownership: D.ownershipHead(m, t), actions: toate('--action'), notAfter: inOre(numar('--hours')) }); scrie(a, get('--out')); spune(`${a.statement.actions.join(', ')} until ${a.statement.notAfter}`); return 0; }
|
||||
if (cmd === 'status') {
|
||||
const { m, t } = lant(); const by = identitate(cere('--by')); const comun = { by, state: cere('--state'), seq: numar('--seq'), validUntil: inOre(numar('--hours')), reason: get('--reason') || null };
|
||||
// the manufacturer signs as the manufacturer of this credential and names no ownership head; anybody else names the head of the chain given (--transfer)
|
||||
const s = by.id === m.statement.issuer.id ? D.statusRecord({ ...comun, manufacture: m }) : D.statusRecord({ ...comun, deviceId: m.statement.claims.deviceId, ownership: D.ownershipHead(m, t) });
|
||||
scrie(s, get('--out')); spune(`${s.statement.state} (record ${s.statement.seq}) by ${s.statement.by.id}` + (s.statement.ownership ? ` under ownership head ${s.statement.ownership}` : ' (the manufacturer)')); return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (cmd === 'attest') { const { m, t } = lant(); const x = D.attest({ device: D.importDeviceKey(citeste(cere('--device'))), nonce: cere('--nonce'), audience: cere('--audience'), firmware: citeste(cere('--firmware')), ownership: D.ownershipHead(m, t), action: cere('--action') }); scrie(x, get('--out')); spune(`${x.statement.deviceId} attests at ${x.statement.at}`); return 0; }
|
||||
if (cmd === 'bundle') { const f = (n) => (get(n) ? citeste(get(n)) : null); scrie(D.bundle({ manufacture: f('--manufacture'), firmware: f('--firmware'), transfers: toate('--transfer').map(citeste), authorization: f('--authorization'), attestation: f('--attestation'), anchor: f('--anchor') }), get('--out')); return 0; }
|
||||
if (cmd === 'envelope') { const e = D.proofOfDevice(citeste(cere('--attestation')), buildProof); scrie(e, get('--out')); spune(e.statementHash); return 0; }
|
||||
if (cmd === 'notarize') {
|
||||
const { notarizeEnvelope } = await import('../agents/agent-ancora.mjs'); const { incarcaEthers } = await import('../agents/x402/wallet.mjs');
|
||||
let ethers; try { ethers = incarcaEthers(); } catch (e) { striga('NOT MEASURED: ' + e.message); return 2; }
|
||||
const r = await notarizeEnvelope({ envelope: citeste(cere('--envelope')), kind: 'aere-proof-of-device', rpc: cere('--rpc'), keyFile: cere('--key-file'), ethers });
|
||||
if (!r.ok) { striga(r.motiv); return r.cod === 1 ? 1 : 2; }
|
||||
scrie(r.envelope, get('--out')); const n = r.envelope.notarization; spune(`notarized on chain ${n.chainId}: firstSeen ${n.firstSeen}`); return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (cmd === 'reading') {
|
||||
const vp = get('--verify-proof') || process.env.AERE_VERIFY_PROOF; if (!vp || !fs.existsSync(vp)) { striga('NOT MEASURED: the AIP-23 reference verifier is needed (--verify-proof <verify-proof.mjs> or AERE_VERIFY_PROOF)'); return 2; }
|
||||
const r = await citesteAncora(citeste(cere('--envelope')), { verifyProof: vp, rpc: cere('--rpc'), chain: get('--chain') ? Number(get('--chain')) : null });
|
||||
if (r.stare !== 'PASSED') { striga((r.stare === 'FAILED' ? 'FAILED: ' : 'NOT MEASURED: ') + r.motiv); return r.stare === 'FAILED' ? 1 : 2; }
|
||||
scrie(r.reading, get('--out')); spune(`first seen on chain ${r.reading.chainId} at ${new Date(r.reading.at * 1000).toISOString()}`); return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (cmd === 'verify') {
|
||||
const o = {}; if (get('--now')) o.now = get('--now'); if (get('--nonce') != null) o.nonce = get('--nonce'); if (get('--audience') != null) o.audience = get('--audience'); if (get('--max-age')) o.maxAgeS = numar('--max-age');
|
||||
const tr = toate('--trust'); if (tr.length) o.trustedManufacturers = tr.map((x) => (/^aere-id:[0-9a-f]{40}$/.test(x) ? x : publice(x)));
|
||||
o.statusLists = toate('--status-list').flatMap(elemente); o.firmwarePolicies = toate('--policy').flatMap(elemente); o.statusRecords = toate('--status').flatMap(elemente); o.anchors = toate('--reading').flatMap(elemente);
|
||||
if (get('--software')) o.softwareAttestation = citeste(get('--software'));
|
||||
const pachet = citeste(cere('--bundle')); let r;
|
||||
try { r = D.verifyDevice(pachet, o); } catch (e) { if (/^verifyDevice: /.test(String(e && e.message))) throw new Folosire(e.message); throw e; } // the verifier's own configuration cannot be read: no verdict
|
||||
if (rest.includes('--json')) console.log(JSON.stringify(r, null, 1));
|
||||
else { for (const x of r.rows) spune(`${x.pass === true ? 'ok ' : x.pass === false ? 'FAIL' : '-- '} ${x.name}${x.pass === true || !x.detail ? '' : ': ' + x.detail}`);
|
||||
console.log('');
|
||||
spune(r.verdict + (r.rules.length ? ` (refused by: ${r.rules.join(', ')})` : '') + (r.verdict === 'PARTIAL' ? ` (not judged: ${r.unjudged.filter((c) => D.PARTIALE.includes(c)).join(', ')})` : ''));
|
||||
// what is named and does not change the verdict: said on its own line, never left to the rows alone
|
||||
const notate = r.unjudged.filter((c) => D.NOTATE.includes(c)); if (notate.length) spune(`noted, the verdict stands: ${notate.join(', ')}`);
|
||||
for (const p of (r.subject && r.subject.priorOwnership) || []) spune(`a previous owner (${p.owner}) signed ${p.records} status record(s) that say: ${p.state}. They do not bind the owner of now.`); }
|
||||
return r.verdict === 'VALID' ? 0 : r.verdict === 'INVALID' ? 1 : 2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
throw new Folosire('usage: device-cli.mjs new-identity|new-device|manufacture|release|policy|transfer|authorize|status|attest|bundle|envelope|notarize|reading|verify ... (see README.md)');
|
||||
}
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The verifier's reading of a notarized device envelope: the AIP-23 reference verifier is run on it with the chain's endpoint, and
|
||||
* the first-seen time it states under a certified anchor becomes { statementHash, at, chainId }. FAILED when the verifier refuses,
|
||||
* NEMASURAT when finality is pending or the verifier did not answer.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export async function citesteAncora(envelope, { verifyProof, rpc, chain = null }) {
|
||||
const { ruleazaVerificatorul, firstSeenFromVerdict } = await import('../agents/agent-ancora.mjs');
|
||||
const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'aere-device-ancora-')); const f = path.join(dir, 'e.json'); fs.writeFileSync(f, JSON.stringify(envelope));
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const lantul = chain || (envelope.notarization && Number(envelope.notarization.chainId)) || null;
|
||||
const v = await ruleazaVerificatorul(verifyProof, f, { rpc, chain: lantul });
|
||||
if (!v) return { stare: 'NEMASURAT', motiv: 'the AIP-23 verifier did not answer' };
|
||||
if (v.statementHash && String(v.statementHash).toLowerCase() !== envelope.statementHash) return { stare: 'FAILED', motiv: 'the verifier judged another statementHash' };
|
||||
const fsn = firstSeenFromVerdict(v); if (fsn.stare !== 'PASSED') return { stare: fsn.stare, motiv: fsn.motiv };
|
||||
return { stare: 'PASSED', reading: { v: 1, kind: 'aere-device-anchor-reading', statementHash: envelope.statementHash, at: fsn.at, chainId: lantul, witness: 'AereNotary first-seen under a post-quantum certified anchor' } };
|
||||
} finally { fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (process.argv[1] && path.resolve(process.argv[1]) === fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)) {
|
||||
main().then((c) => { process.exitCode = c; }, (e) => { striga(`device-cli: ${e && e.message}`); process.exitCode = e instanceof Folosire ? COD_FOLOSIRE : cmd === 'verify' ? COD_CADERE : 1; });
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,603 @@
|
||||
// AERE Device Identity (roadmap 31, 2026-10-05): what a machine is, said by a chain of signed statements that a stranger checks
|
||||
// offline. Node 24 only (node:crypto: Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65, FIPS 204); the hybrid identities are those of ../aere-identity.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// THE CHAIN, each link signed and bound to the one before it:
|
||||
// 1. manufacture the manufacturer (a hybrid identity, Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65, both required) issues a credential of type
|
||||
// DeviceManufacture: it made the device whose key is K (ML-DSA-65), of this model, with this serial. The device id
|
||||
// is derived from K. The credential can name a status list of the manufacturer (a recall).
|
||||
// 2. firmware the manufacturer signs a release: model, version, a sequence number that only grows, the sha256 of the image,
|
||||
// optionally the hash of a Proof of Software attestation of that image. It also signs a short-lived firmware
|
||||
// policy: the lowest sequence still allowed and the digests it retracted. A release below the floor or
|
||||
// retracted is refused.
|
||||
// 3. ownership the manufacturer is the first owner. Ownership moves by transfers, each signed by the owner before it and
|
||||
// naming the hash of the link before it (the manufacture credential, then the previous transfer). The current
|
||||
// owner signs an authorization: what the device may do, until when, under which ownership head.
|
||||
// 4. status a registry of signed records (active, suspended, retired). The manufacturer's records always count, and its
|
||||
// retirement is never lifted. The current owner's retirement and suspension count whatever ownership head
|
||||
// they name (also none) and hold while it owns the device; its "active" counts only under the current head.
|
||||
// The records of a PREVIOUS owner do not bind the owner of now (a seller can sign, after the sale, a
|
||||
// retirement dated before it, and without a time witness the two cannot be told apart): they are named, with
|
||||
// the state they say, and the verdict stands. A suspension is lifted only by a later record of the one who
|
||||
// suspended; "active" is believed only while its record is current. A registry that was not read leaves the
|
||||
// verdict PARTIAL.
|
||||
// 5. attestation the device signs with K a fresh statement: the verifier's nonce and audience, its clock, the digest and the
|
||||
// sequence of the firmware it runs, the ownership head it knows, the action it asks for. The attestation has an
|
||||
// AIP-23 envelope (kind `device`) that can be notarized; a reading of that notarization under a post-quantum
|
||||
// certified anchor bounds the attestation's time from above with a clock nobody in this chain chose.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// THE VERDICT. verifyDevice makes every check it can reach and names every rule that refused (REGULI; each check carries a PAZA
|
||||
// marker). INVALID: a rule refused. PARTIAL: nothing refused, and something was not brought or not read (a link missing from the
|
||||
// bundle, the verifier's nonce, the manufacturers it trusts, a firmware policy, the status registry, a notarization nobody read):
|
||||
// the causes are named (NEJUDECATE; those in PARTIALE keep the verdict from VALID, those in NOTATE are named and the verdict
|
||||
// stands). VALID: every link was brought and judged.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// WHAT IT IS NOT. K is a software key. Nothing here binds K to hardware: no TPM, no secure element, no TEE. Whoever can read the
|
||||
// device's storage can copy K, and a compromised device signs whatever it is told, including the digest of a firmware it does not run.
|
||||
// The field `hardwareRoot` exists in the manufacture claims and in the attestation, is null in everything this module produces,
|
||||
// and a value in it is reported as not judged (the verdict is then PARTIAL): it is where an endorsement of K by a hardware root and
|
||||
// a quote over the measured boot would be carried. See README.md.
|
||||
import crypto from 'node:crypto';
|
||||
import { canonical, publicKeyObjects, idOf, issueCredential, credentialHash, verifyText, statusBit, ALG as ALG_HIBRID } from '../identity/identity.mjs';
|
||||
|
||||
export const VERSION = 1;
|
||||
export const ALG_DEVICE = 'ml-dsa-65';
|
||||
export const TYPE = 'DeviceManufacture';
|
||||
export const STATES = ['active', 'suspended', 'retired'];
|
||||
export const MAX_TRANSFERS = 64;
|
||||
export const CLOCK_SKEW_S = 60;
|
||||
// How many of the things a verifier hands are judged. Beyond the bound the rest is NOT read, and the verdict says so (PARTIAL): a
|
||||
// registry padded with records cannot make the verifier work without end, nor push a retirement out of sight in silence.
|
||||
export const MAX_STATUS_RECORDS = 512, MAX_FIRMWARE_POLICIES = 64, MAX_STATUS_LISTS = 64, MAX_READINGS = 64;
|
||||
const DOMENIU = 'aere-device/v1/';
|
||||
const SCOPURI = new Set(['firmware', 'firmware-policy', 'transfer', 'authorization', 'status', 'attestation']);
|
||||
const H32 = /^0x[0-9a-f]{64}$/;
|
||||
const DIGEST_SCRIS = /^0x[0-9a-f]{64}$/i; // a digest as somebody's tooling may have written it: the same digest in upper case
|
||||
const DEV = /^aere-device:[0-9a-f]{40}$/;
|
||||
const DEV_SCRIS = /^aere-device:([0-9a-fA-F]{40})$/; // a device id as somebody's tooling may have written it in a status record: its hex in upper case
|
||||
/** The device id a status record names, in its one text; null when what is written there is not a device id at all. */
|
||||
const idScris = (x) => { const m = typeof x === 'string' ? DEV_SCRIS.exec(x) : null; return m ? 'aere-device:' + m[1].toLowerCase() : null; };
|
||||
const NUME = /^[a-z][a-z0-9_.:-]{0,63}$/;
|
||||
const DATA = /^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}(\.\d{1,3})?Z$/;
|
||||
const AERE_ID = /^aere-id:[0-9a-f]{40}$/;
|
||||
|
||||
const sha = (b) => crypto.createHash('sha256').update(b).digest();
|
||||
const hex0x = (b) => '0x' + b.toString('hex');
|
||||
const hashOf = (o) => hex0x(sha(Buffer.from(canonical(o), 'utf8')));
|
||||
const ob = (x) => !!x && typeof x === 'object' && !Array.isArray(x);
|
||||
const sir = (x) => typeof x === 'string' && x.length > 0 && x.length <= 256;
|
||||
const iso = (d) => new Date(d).toISOString();
|
||||
function data(s, ce) { if (typeof s !== 'string' || !DATA.test(s) || Number.isNaN(Date.parse(s))) throw new Error(`aere-device: ${ce} is not an RFC 3339 UTC time`); return Date.parse(s); }
|
||||
// `a` is an identity that a form check, or the signature check of a record, already required to be an object; `b` may be absent (a
|
||||
// chain that keeps no owner)
|
||||
const aceeasi = (a, b) => ob(b) && a.id === b.id && canonical(a.keys) === canonical(b.keys);
|
||||
/** The id of a set of public keys, or NaN when they are not keys: NaN equals nothing, so an id written beside keys that derive none is never "the id of its keys". */
|
||||
const idDin = (keys) => { try { return idOf(keys); } catch { return NaN; } };
|
||||
/** A signature is carried in canonical base64: its bytes, encoded again, are the text given. One signature has one text, so one link has one hash. */
|
||||
const b64canonic = (s) => typeof s === 'string' && Buffer.from(s, 'base64').toString('base64') === s;
|
||||
const hibridCanonic = (sig) => b64canonic(sig.ed25519) && b64canonic(sig.mldsa65);
|
||||
// The hash of a link covers the whole { statement, signature }. The statement is under the signature; the two objects around it are
|
||||
// not. So a link is EXACTLY { statement, signature } and a signature exactly its members: one member more, added by anybody, would be
|
||||
// another text, and another hash, for the same signed statement.
|
||||
const numai = (o, chei) => ob(o) && Object.keys(o).every((k) => chei.includes(k));
|
||||
const LEGATURA = ['statement', 'signature'], SEMN_HIBRID = ['alg', 'ed25519', 'mldsa65'], SEMN_DISPOZITIV = ['alg', 'value'];
|
||||
/** The hash of a signed link ({ statement, signature }): what the next link names. */
|
||||
export const linkHash = (l) => hashOf(l);
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Text that came with a bundle (a model, an id, a date) and is about to be shown to a person: every C0 and C1 control character, DEL,
|
||||
* the Unicode line and paragraph separators, the bidirectional controls and the byte order mark are replaced by a visible form
|
||||
* (\xNN, \uNNNN), and a backslash is doubled so that the form cannot be forged. What is printed stays on its line, and a terminal
|
||||
* executes nothing a bundle wrote. The rows of verifyDevice carry the text as it came: print them through this.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
// the code points replaced: C0, DEL and C1, the two marks of direction, the line and paragraph separators with the bidirectional
|
||||
// embeddings and overrides after them, the bidirectional isolates, the byte order mark
|
||||
const DE_ARATAT = [[0x00, 0x1f], [0x7f, 0x9f], [0x200e, 0x200f], [0x2028, 0x202e], [0x2066, 0x2069], [0xfeff, 0xfeff]];
|
||||
export function visible(s) {
|
||||
let out = '';
|
||||
for (const c of String(s)) { const n = c.codePointAt(0);
|
||||
if (n === 0x5c) out += '\\\\';
|
||||
else if (DE_ARATAT.some(([de, la]) => n >= de && n <= la)) { const h = n.toString(16); out += h.length <= 2 ? '\\x' + h.padStart(2, '0') : '\\u' + h.padStart(4, '0'); }
|
||||
else out += c; }
|
||||
return out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------- the device key K (ML-DSA-65 alone)
|
||||
function cheiaDispozitivului(b64) {
|
||||
// a text that is not the canonical base64 of an ML-DSA-65 SPKI does not pass the three lines below: no check of its alphabet is needed before them
|
||||
const k = crypto.createPublicKey({ key: Buffer.from(b64, 'base64'), format: 'der', type: 'spki' });
|
||||
if (k.asymmetricKeyType !== ALG_DEVICE) throw new Error(`aere-device: the device key is a ${k.asymmetricKeyType} key, not ${ALG_DEVICE}`);
|
||||
if (k.export({ type: 'spki', format: 'der' }).toString('base64') !== b64) throw new Error('aere-device: the device key is not in its canonical form');
|
||||
return k;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/** The device id, derived from K: nobody can claim an id with another key. Throws when K is not a canonical ML-DSA-65 SPKI. */
|
||||
export function deviceIdOf(b64) { cheiaDispozitivului(b64); return 'aere-device:' + sha(Buffer.from(b64, 'base64')).toString('hex').slice(0, 40); }
|
||||
function dinCheie(priv) {
|
||||
const publicKey = crypto.createPublicKey(priv).export({ type: 'spki', format: 'der' }).toString('base64');
|
||||
const d = { deviceId: deviceIdOf(publicKey), publicKey };
|
||||
Object.defineProperty(d, 'privat', { value: priv, enumerable: false });
|
||||
return d;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/** A new device key. The private half is not enumerable (it does not leave through a JSON.stringify by mistake). */
|
||||
export function generateDeviceKey() { return dinCheie(crypto.generateKeyPairSync(ALG_DEVICE).privateKey); }
|
||||
/** The file form of a device key (private half included: written 0600, never beside what is published). */
|
||||
export function exportDeviceKey(d) {
|
||||
if (!d || !d.privat) throw new Error('aere-device: this is not a device private key');
|
||||
return { v: VERSION, kind: 'aere-device-key', deviceId: d.deviceId, publicKey: d.publicKey, private: d.privat.export({ type: 'pkcs8', format: 'der' }).toString('base64') };
|
||||
}
|
||||
export function importDeviceKey(j) {
|
||||
if (!j || j.kind !== 'aere-device-key' || j.v !== VERSION || typeof j.private !== 'string') throw new Error('aere-device: not an aere-device-key file');
|
||||
const priv = crypto.createPrivateKey({ key: Buffer.from(j.private, 'base64'), format: 'der', type: 'pkcs8' });
|
||||
if (priv.asymmetricKeyType !== ALG_DEVICE) throw new Error('aere-device: the private key is not ml-dsa-65');
|
||||
const d = dinCheie(priv);
|
||||
if (d.publicKey !== j.publicKey || d.deviceId !== j.deviceId) throw new Error('aere-device: the public key or the id in the file are not those of its private key');
|
||||
return d;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------- signatures, with purpose separation
|
||||
function mesaj(scop, text) { if (!SCOPURI.has(scop)) throw new Error('aere-device: unknown signing purpose ' + scop); return Buffer.from(DOMENIU + scop + '\n' + text, 'utf8'); }
|
||||
/** Hybrid signature of an identity (manufacturer, owner): Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65 over the same message, both required. */
|
||||
function semneaza(scop, statement, keys) {
|
||||
if (!keys || !keys.privat) throw new Error('aere-device: signing needs private keys');
|
||||
const m = mesaj(scop, canonical(statement));
|
||||
return { alg: ALG_HIBRID, ed25519: crypto.sign(null, m, keys.privat.ed25519).toString('base64'), mldsa65: crypto.sign(null, m, keys.privat.mldsa65).toString('base64') };
|
||||
}
|
||||
function verifica(scop, statement, sig, pub) {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
if (sig.alg !== ALG_HIBRID) return false; // a signature that is absent or is not an object throws here, and is no signature
|
||||
if (!hibridCanonic(sig)) return false; // the same bytes in another base64 text are not this signature
|
||||
if (!numai(sig, SEMN_HIBRID)) return false; // nor is the same signature with a member more beside it
|
||||
const k = publicKeyObjects(pub); const m = mesaj(scop, canonical(statement));
|
||||
return crypto.verify(null, m, k.ed25519, Buffer.from(sig.ed25519, 'base64')) && crypto.verify(null, m, k.mldsa65, Buffer.from(sig.mldsa65, 'base64'));
|
||||
} catch { return false; }
|
||||
}
|
||||
const cine = (keys) => ({ id: keys.id, keys: keys.public });
|
||||
/** The signing formulas, exported: a link is { statement, signature } with signature = signLink(purpose, statement, keys). */
|
||||
export const signLink = semneaza;
|
||||
export const verifyLink = verifica;
|
||||
/** The device's signature over an attestation statement: ML-DSA-65 with K, purpose `attestation`. */
|
||||
export function signAttestation(statement, device) {
|
||||
if (!device || !device.privat) throw new Error('aere-device: attesting needs the device private key');
|
||||
return { alg: ALG_DEVICE, value: crypto.sign(null, mesaj('attestation', canonical(statement)), device.privat).toString('base64') };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------- producers
|
||||
/** Link 1. The manufacturer's credential for a device key. `status`: { list, index } in a status list of the manufacturer. */
|
||||
export function manufacture({ manufacturer, deviceKey, model, serial, validFrom, validUntil, status = null, now = new Date(), id = null }) {
|
||||
if (!sir(model) || !sir(serial)) throw new Error('aere-device: model and serial are required');
|
||||
const { credential } = issueCredential({ issuer: manufacturer, holder: manufacturer.public, type: TYPE, disclosable: [], validFrom, validUntil, status, now, id,
|
||||
claims: { deviceId: deviceIdOf(deviceKey), deviceKey, model, serial, hardwareRoot: null } });
|
||||
return credential;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/** Link 2. A firmware release, signed by the manufacturer. Give `image` (bytes) or `digest`; `softwareAttestation` is a Proof of Software attestation of the image. */
|
||||
export function releaseFirmware({ signer, model, version, sequence, image = null, digest = null, softwareAttestation = null, now = new Date() }) {
|
||||
const dg = image != null ? hex0x(sha(Buffer.from(image))) : String(digest).toLowerCase();
|
||||
if (!sir(model) || !sir(version) || !Number.isInteger(sequence) || sequence < 0 || !H32.test(dg)) throw new Error('aere-device: a release needs model, version, a sequence (integer >= 0) and the image or its digest');
|
||||
if (softwareAttestation != null && !softwareCovers(softwareAttestation, dg)) throw new Error('aere-device: the Proof of Software attestation does not cover this image');
|
||||
const statement = { v: VERSION, kind: 'aere-device-firmware', model, version, sequence, digest: dg, signer: cine(signer), issuedAt: iso(now),
|
||||
...(softwareAttestation != null ? { softwareAttestationHash: softwareAttestation.statementHash } : {}) };
|
||||
return { statement, signature: semneaza('firmware', statement, signer) };
|
||||
}
|
||||
/** Does a Proof of Software attestation hash to its statementHash and list an artifact with this digest? */
|
||||
export function softwareCovers(att, digest) {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
// anything that is not such an attestation throws on the way and is not one (the catch below)
|
||||
return att.statement.kind === 'aere-proof-of-software' && hex0x(sha(Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(att.statement), 'utf8'))) === att.statementHash
|
||||
&& att.statement.artifacts.some((a) => String(Object(a).sha256).toLowerCase() === digest);
|
||||
} catch { return false; }
|
||||
}
|
||||
/** The manufacturer's firmware policy for a model: the lowest sequence still allowed and the digests retracted. Short-lived on purpose. */
|
||||
export function firmwarePolicy({ manufacturer, model, minSequence = 0, retracted = [], validFrom, validUntil, now = new Date() }) {
|
||||
if (!sir(model) || !Number.isInteger(minSequence) || minSequence < 0) throw new Error('aere-device: a firmware policy needs a model and minSequence (integer >= 0)');
|
||||
const r = [...new Set(retracted.map((x) => String(x).toLowerCase()))].sort(); if (r.some((x) => !H32.test(x))) throw new Error('aere-device: retracted is a list of digests');
|
||||
const vf = validFrom || iso(now); if (data(vf, 'validFrom') >= data(validUntil, 'validUntil')) throw new Error('aere-device: validFrom must be before validUntil');
|
||||
const statement = { v: VERSION, kind: 'aere-device-firmware-policy', model, minSequence, retracted: r, issuer: cine(manufacturer), validFrom: vf, validUntil, issuedAt: iso(now) };
|
||||
return { statement, signature: semneaza('firmware-policy', statement, manufacturer) };
|
||||
}
|
||||
/** The ownership head: the hash of the last transfer, or of the manufacture credential when the device was never transferred. */
|
||||
export function ownershipHead(manufactureCredential, transfers = []) { return transfers.length ? linkHash(transfers[transfers.length - 1]) : credentialHash(manufactureCredential); }
|
||||
/** Link 3a. A transfer of ownership, signed by the owner before it. `transfers` is the chain so far. */
|
||||
export function transferOwnership({ from, to, manufacture: m, transfers = [], now = new Date() }) {
|
||||
publicKeyObjects(to);
|
||||
const statement = { v: VERSION, kind: 'aere-device-transfer', deviceId: m.statement.claims.deviceId, seq: transfers.length + 1, prev: ownershipHead(m, transfers),
|
||||
from: cine(from), to: { id: idOf(to), keys: to }, at: iso(now) };
|
||||
return { statement, signature: semneaza('transfer', statement, from) };
|
||||
}
|
||||
/** Link 3b. What the device may do, until when, said by its owner under an ownership head. */
|
||||
export function authorize({ owner, deviceId, ownership, actions, notBefore, notAfter, now = new Date() }) {
|
||||
if (!DEV.test(String(deviceId)) || !H32.test(String(ownership))) throw new Error('aere-device: an authorization names a device id and an ownership head');
|
||||
if (!Array.isArray(actions) || !actions.length || actions.some((a) => typeof a !== 'string' || !NUME.test(a))) throw new Error('aere-device: actions is a list of action names (lower case)');
|
||||
const nb = notBefore || iso(now); if (data(nb, 'notBefore') >= data(notAfter, 'notAfter')) throw new Error('aere-device: notBefore must be before notAfter');
|
||||
const statement = { v: VERSION, kind: 'aere-device-authorization', deviceId, ownership, owner: cine(owner), actions: [...new Set(actions)].sort(), notBefore: nb, notAfter, issuedAt: iso(now) };
|
||||
return { statement, signature: semneaza('authorization', statement, owner) };
|
||||
}
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Link 4. A status record. There is no default for whose record it is:
|
||||
* the manufacturer signs with `manufacture` (its own manufacture credential of the device) and names no ownership head;
|
||||
* anybody else names the ownership head it signs under (`ownership`, from ownershipHead) and the `deviceId`.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function statusRecord({ by, deviceId = null, state, seq, ownership, manufacture: m = null, validUntil, reason = null, now = new Date() }) {
|
||||
if (!by || !by.privat) throw new Error('aere-device: a status record needs the private keys of who signs it');
|
||||
const eProducator = m != null;
|
||||
if (eProducator) {
|
||||
if (!ob(m.statement) || !ob(m.statement.claims) || !aceeasi(cine(by), m.statement.issuer)) throw new Error('aere-device: `manufacture` is given by the manufacturer of that credential when it signs a status record; an owner names `ownership` instead');
|
||||
if (ownership != null) throw new Error('aere-device: a status record of the manufacturer names no ownership head');
|
||||
if (deviceId != null && deviceId !== m.statement.claims.deviceId) throw new Error('aere-device: the device id given is not the one of the manufacture credential');
|
||||
deviceId = m.statement.claims.deviceId;
|
||||
} else if (ownership == null) throw new Error('aere-device: a status record of anyone but the manufacturer names the ownership head it is signed under (`ownership`); the manufacturer signs with `manufacture` instead');
|
||||
const cap = eProducator || ownership == null ? null : ownership;
|
||||
if (cap !== null && !H32.test(String(cap))) throw new Error('aere-device: ownership is an ownership head (0x and 64 hex digits)');
|
||||
if (!DEV.test(String(deviceId)) || !STATES.includes(state) || !Number.isInteger(seq) || seq < 0) throw new Error('aere-device: a status record needs a device id, a state (' + STATES.join(', ') + ') and a seq');
|
||||
const at = iso(now); if (data(at, 'at') >= data(validUntil, 'validUntil')) throw new Error('aere-device: validUntil must be after the record');
|
||||
const statement = { v: VERSION, kind: 'aere-device-status', deviceId, state, seq, ownership: cap, by: cine(by), at, validUntil, ...(reason ? { reason: String(reason) } : {}) };
|
||||
return { statement, signature: semneaza('status', statement, by) };
|
||||
}
|
||||
/** Link 5. The device's fresh statement, signed with K. `firmware`: a release, or { digest, sequence } as the device measured it. */
|
||||
export function attest({ device, nonce, audience, firmware, ownership, action, now = new Date() }) {
|
||||
if (!device || !device.privat) throw new Error('aere-device: attesting needs the device private key');
|
||||
if (!sir(nonce) || !sir(audience)) throw new Error('aere-device: an attestation needs the verifier\'s nonce and audience');
|
||||
const f = firmware && firmware.statement ? firmware.statement : firmware;
|
||||
if (!f || !H32.test(String(f.digest)) || !Number.isInteger(f.sequence)) throw new Error('aere-device: an attestation names the digest and the sequence of the firmware that runs');
|
||||
if (!H32.test(String(ownership)) || typeof action !== 'string' || !NUME.test(action)) throw new Error('aere-device: an attestation names an ownership head and an action');
|
||||
const statement = { v: VERSION, kind: 'aere-device-attestation', deviceId: device.deviceId, key: device.publicKey, audience, nonce, at: iso(now),
|
||||
firmware: { digest: f.digest, sequence: f.sequence }, ownership, action, hardwareRoot: null };
|
||||
return { statement, signature: signAttestation(statement, device) };
|
||||
}
|
||||
/** The bundle a verifier is handed: the links that exist, nothing else. */
|
||||
export function bundle({ manufacture: m = null, firmware = null, transfers = [], authorization = null, attestation = null, anchor = null } = {}) {
|
||||
return { v: VERSION, kind: 'aere-device-bundle', ...(m ? { manufacture: m } : {}), ...(firmware ? { firmware } : {}), transfers,
|
||||
...(authorization ? { authorization } : {}), ...(attestation ? { attestation } : {}), ...(anchor ? { anchor } : {}) };
|
||||
}
|
||||
/** The hash an AIP-23 `device` envelope commits to: sha256 of the canonical text of the signed attestation. */
|
||||
export const attestationHash = (attestation) => hashOf(attestation);
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The AIP-23 envelope (kind `device`) of an attestation. `buildProof` is the one of ../proof-kinds, given by the caller. The envelope
|
||||
* commits to the signed attestation by hash; nothing of the attestation but the device id and the hash of K goes into it.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function proofOfDevice(attestation, buildProof) {
|
||||
const Q = attestation.statement;
|
||||
return buildProof('device', { deviceId: Q.deviceId, attestation: canonical(attestation), publicKey: Q.key, posture: 'firmware-sequence-' + Q.firmware.sequence, createdAt: Q.at });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------- the verifier
|
||||
// Every refusal names its rule. REGULI is the list the verifier can name (its helper throws on any other); every check of a rule
|
||||
// carries a PAZA marker with the rule id. A row is { link, name, pass, detail, rule }; a row that was not judged is
|
||||
// { link, name, pass: null, detail, unjudged: <cause> } with the cause from NEJUDECATE. OPRIRI are the rules after whose refusal
|
||||
// other checks were NOT made (the verifier returned, or dropped the link).
|
||||
export const REGULI = ['form',
|
||||
'manufacture-form', 'manufacturer-id', 'manufacture-holder', 'manufacture-signature', 'manufacturer-trusted', 'manufacture-window', 'manufacture-status-list', 'manufacture-revoked', 'device-key', 'device-id',
|
||||
'firmware-form', 'firmware-signer', 'firmware-signature', 'firmware-model', 'firmware-retracted', 'firmware-rollback', 'firmware-software',
|
||||
'chain-length', 'transfer-form', 'transfer-device', 'transfer-ids', 'transfer-from', 'transfer-prev', 'transfer-signature', 'transfer-time',
|
||||
'authorization-form', 'authorization-device', 'authorization-owner', 'authorization-ownership', 'authorization-signature', 'authorization-window', 'authorization-action',
|
||||
'status-retired', 'status-suspended',
|
||||
'attestation-form', 'attestation-key', 'attestation-device', 'attestation-signature', 'audience', 'nonce', 'freshness', 'attestation-firmware', 'attestation-ownership',
|
||||
'witness-envelope', 'witness-time', 'unreadable'];
|
||||
export const NEJUDECATE = ['manufacture-missing', 'manufacturer-trust', 'manufacture-status-none', 'manufacture-status-unread', 'firmware-missing', 'firmware-policy-unread', 'software-unread',
|
||||
'ownership-unrooted', 'authorization-missing', 'status-unread', 'status-other-manufacturer', 'status-ignored', 'status-prior-ownership', 'status-future', 'attestation-missing', 'audience', 'nonce', 'hardware-root', 'witness-unread'];
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The causes that are NAMED (in `unjudged` and in a row) and do not keep the verdict from VALID: a credential that names no status
|
||||
* list cannot be recalled through one; a status record that is not the manufacturer's or the current owner's is ignored; a status
|
||||
* record of a previous owner does not bind the owner of now; a status record dated in the verifier's future is not in effect yet.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export const NOTATE = ['manufacture-status-none', 'status-ignored', 'status-prior-ownership', 'status-future'];
|
||||
/** The causes that keep the verdict from VALID: every other one. */
|
||||
export const PARTIALE = NEJUDECATE.filter((c) => !NOTATE.includes(c));
|
||||
export const OPRIRI = ['form', 'manufacture-form', 'firmware-form', 'chain-length', 'transfer-form', 'authorization-form', 'attestation-form', 'unreadable'];
|
||||
export const LINKS = ['manufacture', 'firmware', 'ownership', 'authorization', 'status', 'attestation', 'witness'];
|
||||
class Nedeclarata extends Error {}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Verifies a device bundle with what the VERIFIER brings: its clock (`now`), its `nonce` and `audience`, the manufacturers it trusts
|
||||
* (ids or public keys), the manufacturer's status lists (identity status lists), the firmware policies and the status records it
|
||||
* read, a Proof of Software attestation of the firmware, and `anchors`: readings { statementHash, at (unix seconds) } it made itself
|
||||
* of the notarized envelope (the AIP-23 reference verifier, under a post-quantum certified anchor).
|
||||
* Returns { verdict, valid, rows, rules, unjudged, links, subject }: `valid` is "no rule refused"; `verdict` is VALID only when
|
||||
* nothing was left out either. `subject` (who, what, whose, the state, what the records of previous owners say, and the witness
|
||||
* reading used) is returned only when no rule refused.
|
||||
* The attestation must not be dated ahead of the verifier's clock by more than `clockSkewS`, nor be older than `maxAgeS`.
|
||||
* A Proof of Software attestation is checked for being the one the release names and for listing the image digest; its own
|
||||
* signature and its SBOM are judged by the Proof of Software verifier, not here.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function verifyDevice(b, { now = new Date(), nonce = null, audience = null, trustedManufacturers = null, statusLists = [], firmwarePolicies = [], statusRecords = [], softwareAttestation = null, anchors = [], maxAgeS = 300, clockSkewS = CLOCK_SKEW_S } = {}) {
|
||||
const rows = [];
|
||||
const ok = (rule, link, name, pass, detail = '') => { if (!REGULI.includes(rule)) throw new Nedeclarata('aere-device: undeclared rule ' + rule); rows.push({ link, name, pass: !!pass, detail: pass ? '' : detail, rule }); return !!pass; };
|
||||
const nejudecat = (cauza, link, name, detail) => { if (!NEJUDECATE.includes(cauza)) throw new Nedeclarata('aere-device: undeclared cause ' + cauza); rows.push({ link, name, pass: null, detail, unjudged: cauza }); };
|
||||
// the verifier's own configuration is validated first (a mistake of the verifier is not an invalid bundle)
|
||||
const acum = new Date(now).getTime(); if (Number.isNaN(acum)) throw new Error('verifyDevice: now is not a time');
|
||||
if (!Number.isInteger(clockSkewS) || clockSkewS < 0 || clockSkewS > 600) throw new Error('verifyDevice: clockSkewS is 0..600 seconds');
|
||||
if (!Number.isInteger(maxAgeS) || maxAgeS < 1) throw new Error('verifyDevice: maxAgeS is a positive number of seconds');
|
||||
if (trustedManufacturers != null && !Array.isArray(trustedManufacturers)) throw new Error('verifyDevice: trustedManufacturers is a list of ids or public keys');
|
||||
const incredere = trustedManufacturers == null ? null : trustedManufacturers.map((x) => { const id = typeof x === 'string' ? x : idDin(x);
|
||||
if (!AERE_ID.test(String(id))) throw new Error('verifyDevice: a trusted manufacturer is given by its id (aere-id: and 40 hex digits) or by its public keys'); return id; });
|
||||
if (![statusLists, firmwarePolicies, statusRecords, anchors].every(Array.isArray)) throw new Error('verifyDevice: statusLists, firmwarePolicies, statusRecords and anchors are lists');
|
||||
const sk = clockSkewS * 1000;
|
||||
let subject = null;
|
||||
const gata = () => {
|
||||
const rules = [...new Set(rows.filter((r) => r.pass === false).map((r) => r.rule))].sort(), unjudged = [...new Set(rows.filter((r) => r.pass === null).map((r) => r.unjudged))].sort();
|
||||
const links = Object.fromEntries(LINKS.map((l) => { const a = rows.filter((r) => r.link === l);
|
||||
return [l, a.some((r) => r.pass === false) ? 'FAILED' : a.some((r) => /-missing$/.test(r.unjudged)) ? 'NOT_SUPPLIED' : a.some((r) => PARTIALE.includes(r.unjudged)) ? 'NOT_JUDGED' : a.length ? 'PASSED' : 'ABSENT']; })); // rows, none refused and none left unjudged: PASSED (a note never stands alone in a link)
|
||||
const verdict = rules.length ? 'INVALID' : unjudged.some((c) => PARTIALE.includes(c)) ? 'PARTIAL' : 'VALID';
|
||||
return { verdict, valid: !rules.length, rows, rules, unjudged, links, subject: rules.length ? null : subject };
|
||||
};
|
||||
try {
|
||||
if (!((ob(b) && b.kind === 'aere-device-bundle' && b.v === VERSION && (b.transfers === undefined || Array.isArray(b.transfers))) /*PAZA:form*/)) { ok('form', 'bundle', 'bundle: well formed', false, 'not an aere-device-bundle'); return gata(); }
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- what the verifier handed: bounded, and nothing in it is skipped in silence. An element that is not the object read here (a
|
||||
// list inside the list, a registry object { records: [...] }, a file of another kind, null) holds things that were NOT read: it is
|
||||
// named with the cause of its kind and the verdict is not VALID. So is what lies beyond the bound on how many are judged.
|
||||
const adus = (lista, max, cauza, link, ce, eBun) => {
|
||||
if (lista.length > max) nejudecat(cauza, link, `${link}: more ${ce}s than are judged`, `${lista.length} ${ce}s were handed and the first ${max} are judged: the others were not read`);
|
||||
const judecate = lista.slice(0, max), bune = judecate.filter(eBun);
|
||||
if (bune.length < judecate.length) nejudecat(cauza, link, `${link}: something handed as a ${ce} is not one`, `${judecate.length - bune.length} of the ${judecate.length} element(s) handed as ${ce}s are not ${ce}s (a list inside the list, a registry object, another kind of file): nothing in them was read`);
|
||||
return bune;
|
||||
};
|
||||
const deFel = (kind) => (x) => ob(x) && ob(x.statement) && x.statement.kind === kind;
|
||||
const SL = adus(statusLists, MAX_STATUS_LISTS, 'manufacture-status-unread', 'manufacture', 'recall list', deFel('aere-status-list'));
|
||||
const FP = adus(firmwarePolicies, MAX_FIRMWARE_POLICIES, 'firmware-policy-unread', 'firmware', 'firmware policy', deFel('aere-device-firmware-policy'));
|
||||
const SR = adus(statusRecords, MAX_STATUS_RECORDS, 'status-unread', 'status', 'status record', deFel('aere-device-status'));
|
||||
const AN = adus(anchors, MAX_READINGS, 'witness-unread', 'witness', 'reading', (a) => ob(a) && typeof a.statementHash === 'string');
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- 1. manufacture: who made it, with which key
|
||||
const M = b.manufacture; let S = null, cheieM = null; // S: the usable manufacture statement; cheieM: the device id derived from the key it names
|
||||
if (M == null) nejudecat('manufacture-missing', 'manufacture', 'manufacture: credential', 'the bundle brings no manufacture credential: nothing says who made this device or which key is its key');
|
||||
else {
|
||||
const s = M.statement;
|
||||
if (!((ob(s) && s.kind === 'aere-credential' && s.v === 1 && s.type === TYPE && ob(s.issuer) && ob(s.holder) && Array.isArray(s.sd) && s.sd.length === 0 && ob(s.claims)
|
||||
&& ['deviceId', 'model', 'serial'].every((k) => sir(s.claims[k])) && typeof s.claims.deviceKey === 'string') /*PAZA:manufacture-form*/)) ok('manufacture-form', 'manufacture', 'manufacture: well formed', false, `not a ${TYPE} credential with deviceId, deviceKey, model and serial in the clear`);
|
||||
else {
|
||||
S = s;
|
||||
ok('manufacturer-id', 'manufacture', 'manufacture: the manufacturer id is the id of its keys', idDin(S.issuer.keys) === S.issuer.id /*PAZA:manufacturer-id*/, `manufacturer id ${S.issuer.id} is not derived from the keys in the credential`);
|
||||
ok('manufacture-holder', 'manufacture', 'manufacture: held by the manufacturer (the first owner)', aceeasi(S.holder, S.issuer) /*PAZA:manufacture-holder*/, 'the credential is held by somebody else: ownership leaves the manufacturer only by a signed transfer');
|
||||
ok('manufacture-signature', 'manufacture', `manufacture: signed by ${String(S.issuer.id)} (Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65, both)`, numai(M, LEGATURA) && numai(M.signature, SEMN_HIBRID) && hibridCanonic(M.signature) && verifyText('credential', canonical(S), M.signature, S.issuer.keys) /*PAZA:manufacture-signature*/, 'the hybrid signature does not verify with the manufacturer\'s keys, or is not in canonical base64');
|
||||
if (incredere == null) nejudecat('manufacturer-trust', 'manufacture', 'manufacture: manufacturer trusted', 'not judged: anyone can issue a manufacture credential with their own keys; pass trustedManufacturers to require who made the device');
|
||||
else ok('manufacturer-trusted', 'manufacture', 'manufacture: manufacturer trusted', incredere.includes(S.issuer.id) /*PAZA:manufacturer-trusted*/, `${S.issuer.id} is not among the ${incredere.length} trusted manufacturer(s)`);
|
||||
const vf = data(S.validFrom, 'validFrom'), vu = data(S.validUntil, 'validUntil');
|
||||
ok('manufacture-window', 'manufacture', `manufacture: valid at ${iso(acum)}`, vf - sk <= acum && acum <= vu /*PAZA:manufacture-window*/, `valid from ${S.validFrom} until ${S.validUntil}`);
|
||||
if (!S.status) nejudecat('manufacture-status-none', 'manufacture', 'manufacture: recall', 'the credential names no status list, so the manufacturer cannot recall it through one');
|
||||
else {
|
||||
const ale = SL.filter((l) => { try { return l.statement.id === S.status.list && aceeasi(l.statement.issuer, S.issuer) && verifyText('status-list', canonical(l.statement), l.signature, S.issuer.keys); } catch { return false; } });
|
||||
// a list of the manufacturer whose validity is not a time cannot be placed in time: it is not read as "not recalled", also beside a current one
|
||||
const curente = []; let listeNecitite = 0;
|
||||
for (const l of ale) { let inV = null; try { inV = data(l.statement.validFrom, 'status validFrom') - sk <= acum && acum <= data(l.statement.validUntil, 'status validUntil'); } catch { /* not a time: counted below */ }
|
||||
if (inV === null) listeNecitite++; else if (inV) curente.push(l); }
|
||||
if (listeNecitite) nejudecat('manufacture-status-unread', 'manufacture', 'manufacture: a recall list that cannot be read', `${listeNecitite} status list(s) signed by the manufacturer under this id carry a validity that is not a time: what they recall cannot be seen`);
|
||||
if (!curente.length) { if (!listeNecitite) nejudecat('manufacture-status-unread', 'manufacture', `manufacture: recall list ${S.status.list}`, ale.length ? `the manufacturer's status list(s) given are not valid at ${iso(acum)}: fetch a current one` : 'no status list of the manufacturer with this id was handed to the verifier; a recall it was not handed cannot be seen'); }
|
||||
else {
|
||||
let rev = false, citite = 0;
|
||||
for (const L of curente) { try { rev = statusBit(L, S.status.index) || rev; citite++; } catch (e) { if (!(false /*PAZA:manufacture-status-list*/)) ok('manufacture-status-list', 'manufacture', `manufacture: recall list ${S.status.list}`, false, String(e.message)); } }
|
||||
if (citite) ok('manufacture-revoked', 'manufacture', `manufacture: not recalled (status list ${S.status.list}, index ${S.status.index})`, !rev /*PAZA:manufacture-revoked*/, 'the manufacturer recalled this manufacture credential');
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
try { cheieM = deviceIdOf(S.claims.deviceKey); } catch { /* the row says */ }
|
||||
ok('device-key', 'manufacture', 'manufacture: the device key is an ML-DSA-65 key', cheieM !== null /*PAZA:device-key*/, 'the device key named by the manufacturer is not a canonical ML-DSA-65 public key (a classical key is not a post-quantum one because of the field it sits in)');
|
||||
if (cheieM !== null) ok('device-id', 'manufacture', 'manufacture: the device id is the id of the device key', cheieM === S.claims.deviceId /*PAZA:device-id*/, `device id ${S.claims.deviceId} is not derived from the device key`);
|
||||
if (S.claims.hardwareRoot != null) nejudecat('hardware-root', 'manufacture', 'manufacture: hardware root', 'the credential carries a hardware root; this verifier does not judge one, so nothing here says the key lives in hardware');
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- 2. firmware: which bytes, which version, signed by whom, still allowed
|
||||
const F = b.firmware; let R = null;
|
||||
if (F == null) nejudecat('firmware-missing', 'firmware', 'firmware: release', 'the bundle brings no firmware release: the digest the device attests names nothing a manufacturer signed');
|
||||
else {
|
||||
const r = F.statement;
|
||||
if (!((ob(r) && r.kind === 'aere-device-firmware' && r.v === VERSION && sir(r.model) && sir(r.version) && Number.isInteger(r.sequence) && r.sequence >= 0 && typeof r.digest === 'string' && H32.test(r.digest) && ob(r.signer)
|
||||
&& (r.softwareAttestationHash === undefined || (typeof r.softwareAttestationHash === 'string' && H32.test(r.softwareAttestationHash)))) /*PAZA:firmware-form*/)) ok('firmware-form', 'firmware', 'firmware: well formed', false, 'not an aere-device-firmware release with model, version, sequence and digest');
|
||||
else {
|
||||
R = r;
|
||||
ok('firmware-signer', 'firmware', 'firmware: released by the manufacturer of the device', idDin(R.signer.keys) === R.signer.id && (S === null || aceeasi(R.signer, S.issuer)) /*PAZA:firmware-signer*/, `released by ${R.signer.id}` + (S ? `, the device was made by ${S.issuer.id}` : ', an id not derived from its keys'));
|
||||
ok('firmware-signature', 'firmware', 'firmware: signed by who released it (Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65, both)', numai(F, LEGATURA) && verifica('firmware', R, F.signature, R.signer.keys) /*PAZA:firmware-signature*/, 'the hybrid signature does not verify with the signer\'s keys');
|
||||
if (S) ok('firmware-model', 'firmware', `firmware: built for model ${S.claims.model}`, R.model === S.claims.model /*PAZA:firmware-model*/, `the release is for model ${R.model}`);
|
||||
// The policies signed by the SAME signer for this model. Of those, the ones in force on the verifier's clock that can be READ
|
||||
// (the version this verifier reads, a floor that is a whole number, a list of digests) are judged; with several, the strictest
|
||||
// holds (a retraction is not lifted). One that is signed, not out of its validity, and cannot be read is NOT read as a clean
|
||||
// policy: what it retracts cannot be seen, and the verdict says so (PARTIAL), whatever the other policies say.
|
||||
const ale = FP.filter((p) => { try { const q = p.statement; return q.model === R.model && aceeasi(q.issuer, R.signer) && verifica('firmware-policy', q, p.signature, R.signer.keys); } catch { return false; } });
|
||||
const curente = [], necitite = [];
|
||||
for (const p of ale) { const q = p.statement; let inVigoare = null;
|
||||
if (q.v !== VERSION) { necitite.push('it is of a version this verifier does not read'); continue; }
|
||||
try { inVigoare = data(q.validFrom, 'policy validFrom') - sk <= acum && acum <= data(q.validUntil, 'policy validUntil'); } catch { /* a validity that is not a time: below */ }
|
||||
if (inVigoare === false) continue; // expired, or not yet in force: it says nothing about now
|
||||
if (inVigoare === null) necitite.push('its validity is not a time');
|
||||
else if (!(Number.isInteger(q.minSequence) && q.minSequence >= 0)) necitite.push('its floor is not a whole number from 0 up');
|
||||
else if (!(Array.isArray(q.retracted) && q.retracted.every((x) => typeof x === 'string' && DIGEST_SCRIS.test(x)))) necitite.push('its retracted list has an entry that is not a digest (0x and 64 hex digits)');
|
||||
else curente.push(p); }
|
||||
if (necitite.length) nejudecat('firmware-policy-unread', 'firmware', 'firmware: a policy that cannot be read', `${necitite.length} of the firmware policies signed by the manufacturer for this model cannot be read (${[...new Set(necitite)].join('; ')}): what such a policy retracts and the floor it sets cannot be seen, so it is not read as a policy that allows this release`);
|
||||
if (!curente.length) { if (!necitite.length) nejudecat('firmware-policy-unread', 'firmware', 'firmware: still allowed', ale.length ? `the firmware policies given are not valid at ${iso(acum)}: fetch a current one` : 'no firmware policy of the manufacturer for this model was handed to the verifier; a retracted or outdated firmware cannot be seen'); }
|
||||
else {
|
||||
const scris = (x) => String(x).toLowerCase(); // a digest written in upper case by the manufacturer's own tooling is the same digest
|
||||
const retras = curente.some((p) => p.statement.retracted.some((x) => scris(x) === R.digest)), prag = Math.max(...curente.map((p) => p.statement.minSequence));
|
||||
ok('firmware-retracted', 'firmware', 'firmware: not retracted', !retras /*PAZA:firmware-retracted*/, `the manufacturer retracted the firmware ${R.digest}`);
|
||||
ok('firmware-rollback', 'firmware', `firmware: sequence ${R.sequence} is at or above the floor ${prag}`, R.sequence >= prag /*PAZA:firmware-rollback*/, `version ${R.version} (sequence ${R.sequence}) is older than the lowest sequence the manufacturer still allows (${prag})`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (R.softwareAttestationHash !== undefined) {
|
||||
if (softwareAttestation == null) nejudecat('software-unread', 'firmware', 'firmware: Proof of Software', 'the release names a Proof of Software attestation that was not handed to the verifier');
|
||||
else ok('firmware-software', 'firmware', 'firmware: the Proof of Software attestation named covers this image', softwareAttestation.statementHash === R.softwareAttestationHash && softwareCovers(softwareAttestation, R.digest) /*PAZA:firmware-software*/, 'the attestation given is not the one the release names, or does not list an artifact with the firmware digest');
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- 3a. ownership: from the manufacturer, by transfers each signed by the owner before
|
||||
const T = b.transfers || []; let owner = S ? S.holder : null, head = S ? credentialHash(M) : null, lantBun = true;
|
||||
const idDispozitiv = S ? S.claims.deviceId : null;
|
||||
if (!S && T.length) nejudecat('ownership-unrooted', 'ownership', 'ownership: root', 'without a manufacture credential the first transfer has nothing to start from; the chain is checked only against itself');
|
||||
if (!(T.length <= MAX_TRANSFERS /*PAZA:chain-length*/)) { ok('chain-length', 'ownership', 'ownership: chain length', false, `${T.length} transfers, at most ${MAX_TRANSFERS}`); lantBun = false; }
|
||||
else {
|
||||
let tInainte = S ? data(S.issuedAt, 'issuedAt') - sk : -Infinity, dev0 = idDispozitiv; // with no credential beside the chain the first transfer has no time before it
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < T.length; i++) {
|
||||
const D = T[i] && T[i].statement, et = `transfer ${i + 1}/${T.length}`;
|
||||
if (!((ob(D) && D.kind === 'aere-device-transfer' && D.v === VERSION && typeof D.deviceId === 'string' && Number.isInteger(D.seq) && typeof D.prev === 'string' && ob(D.from) && ob(D.to)) /*PAZA:transfer-form*/)) { ok('transfer-form', 'ownership', `${et}: well formed`, false, 'not an aere-device-transfer'); lantBun = false; break; }
|
||||
if (dev0 === null) dev0 = D.deviceId;
|
||||
ok('transfer-device', 'ownership', `${et}: for this device`, D.deviceId === dev0 /*PAZA:transfer-device*/, `a transfer of ${D.deviceId}`);
|
||||
ok('transfer-ids', 'ownership', `${et}: from and to are the ids of their keys`, idDin(D.from.keys) === D.from.id && idDin(D.to.keys) === D.to.id /*PAZA:transfer-ids*/, 'an id not derived from its keys');
|
||||
if (owner) ok('transfer-from', 'ownership', `${et}: given by ${i === 0 ? 'the manufacturer' : 'the owner before'}`, aceeasi(D.from, owner) /*PAZA:transfer-from*/, `given by ${D.from.id}, the owner then was ${owner.id}`);
|
||||
ok('transfer-prev', 'ownership', `${et}: names the link before it`, D.seq === i + 1 && (head === null || D.prev === head) /*PAZA:transfer-prev*/, 'the sequence number or the hash of the link before is not the one of this chain');
|
||||
ok('transfer-signature', 'ownership', `${et}: signed by who gave it (Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65, both)`, numai(T[i], LEGATURA) && verifica('transfer', D, T[i].signature, D.from.keys) /*PAZA:transfer-signature*/, 'the hybrid signature does not verify');
|
||||
const t = data(D.at, 'transfer at');
|
||||
ok('transfer-time', 'ownership', `${et}: its time is after the link before and not in the future`, t >= tInainte && t <= acum + sk /*PAZA:transfer-time*/, `dated ${D.at}`);
|
||||
tInainte = t; owner = D.to; head = linkHash(T[i]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!lantBun) { owner = null; head = null; }
|
||||
if (S && T.length === 0) rows.push({ link: 'ownership', name: 'ownership: never transferred, the manufacturer is the owner', pass: true, detail: '' });
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- 5 (read first: the authorization is judged for the action the device asks). attestation: the device speaks, now
|
||||
const X = b.attestation; let Q = null;
|
||||
if (X == null) nejudecat('attestation-missing', 'attestation', 'attestation: fresh statement', 'the bundle brings no attestation: nothing here was said by the device, now, to this verifier');
|
||||
else {
|
||||
const q = X.statement;
|
||||
if (!((ob(q) && q.kind === 'aere-device-attestation' && q.v === VERSION && typeof q.deviceId === 'string' && typeof q.key === 'string' && sir(q.nonce) && sir(q.audience) && typeof q.at === 'string'
|
||||
&& ob(q.firmware) && typeof q.firmware.digest === 'string' && H32.test(q.firmware.digest) && Number.isInteger(q.firmware.sequence) && typeof q.ownership === 'string' && H32.test(q.ownership) && typeof q.action === 'string' && NUME.test(q.action) && ob(X.signature)) /*PAZA:attestation-form*/)) ok('attestation-form', 'attestation', 'attestation: well formed', false, 'not an aere-device-attestation with a nonce, an audience, a time, a firmware, an ownership head and an action');
|
||||
else {
|
||||
Q = q;
|
||||
let K = null, kd = NaN; try { K = cheiaDispozitivului(Q.key); kd = deviceIdOf(Q.key); } catch { /* the row says */ }
|
||||
ok('attestation-key', 'attestation', 'attestation: the key is an ML-DSA-65 key and the device id is derived from it', kd === Q.deviceId /*PAZA:attestation-key*/, `the key in the attestation is not a canonical ML-DSA-65 public key, or the device id ${Q.deviceId} is not derived from it`);
|
||||
if (S) ok('attestation-device', 'attestation', 'attestation: by the device the manufacturer made', Q.deviceId === S.claims.deviceId && Q.key === S.claims.deviceKey /*PAZA:attestation-device*/, `attested by ${Q.deviceId} with a key that is not the key the manufacturer certified for ${S.claims.deviceId}`);
|
||||
if (K) { let semn = false; try { semn = numai(X, LEGATURA) && numai(X.signature, SEMN_DISPOZITIV) && X.signature.alg === ALG_DEVICE && b64canonic(X.signature.value) && crypto.verify(null, mesaj('attestation', canonical(Q)), K, Buffer.from(X.signature.value, 'base64')); } catch { semn = false; }
|
||||
ok('attestation-signature', 'attestation', 'attestation: signed with the device key (ML-DSA-65)', semn /*PAZA:attestation-signature*/, 'the signature does not verify with the device key, or is not in canonical base64'); }
|
||||
if (audience == null) nejudecat('audience', 'attestation', 'attestation: audience', 'not judged: without the verifier\'s own audience an attestation made for another verifier is accepted');
|
||||
else ok('audience', 'attestation', `attestation: made for ${audience}`, Q.audience === audience /*PAZA:audience*/, `made for ${Q.audience}`);
|
||||
if (nonce == null) nejudecat('nonce', 'attestation', 'attestation: nonce', 'not judged: without the verifier\'s nonce an old attestation can be replayed');
|
||||
else ok('nonce', 'attestation', 'attestation: carries the verifier\'s nonce', Q.nonce === nonce /*PAZA:nonce*/, 'another nonce (a replay)');
|
||||
// two bounds on the verifier's clock: not ahead of it by more than the tolerance (a clock that runs fast, never a date chosen
|
||||
// in the future), and not older than maxAgeS
|
||||
const tq = data(Q.at, 'attestation at');
|
||||
ok('freshness', 'attestation', `attestation: dated at most ${clockSkewS} s ahead of the verifier's clock and at most ${maxAgeS} s before it`, tq <= acum + sk && acum - tq <= maxAgeS * 1000 /*PAZA:freshness*/, `dated ${Q.at}, ${Math.round((tq - acum) / 1000)} s from the verifier's clock (a positive number is ahead of it): at most ${clockSkewS} s ahead and at most ${maxAgeS} s before are allowed`);
|
||||
if (R) ok('attestation-firmware', 'attestation', 'attestation: runs the firmware of the release shown', Q.firmware.digest === R.digest && Q.firmware.sequence === R.sequence /*PAZA:attestation-firmware*/, `the device says it runs ${Q.firmware.digest} (sequence ${Q.firmware.sequence}), the release shown is ${R.digest} (sequence ${R.sequence})`);
|
||||
if (head !== null) ok('attestation-ownership', 'attestation', 'attestation: names the current ownership head', Q.ownership === head /*PAZA:attestation-ownership*/, 'the device names another ownership head than the chain shown (an older owner, or another chain)');
|
||||
if (q.hardwareRoot != null) nejudecat('hardware-root', 'attestation', 'attestation: hardware root', 'the attestation carries a hardware root; this verifier does not judge one, so nothing here says the key lives in hardware');
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// the device the authorization and the registry are about: the one the manufacturer made; with no credential, the one that attests
|
||||
const dev = idDispozitiv !== null ? idDispozitiv : Q !== null ? Q.deviceId : null;
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- 3b. authorization: what it may do, said by the owner of NOW
|
||||
const A = b.authorization; let Z = null;
|
||||
if (A == null) nejudecat('authorization-missing', 'authorization', 'authorization: grant', 'the bundle brings no authorization: nothing says what this device may do');
|
||||
else {
|
||||
const z = A.statement;
|
||||
if (!((ob(z) && z.kind === 'aere-device-authorization' && z.v === VERSION && typeof z.deviceId === 'string' && typeof z.ownership === 'string' && ob(z.owner) && Array.isArray(z.actions) && z.actions.length > 0
|
||||
&& z.actions.every((x) => typeof x === 'string' && NUME.test(x)) && canonical(z.actions) === canonical([...new Set(z.actions)].sort())) /*PAZA:authorization-form*/)) ok('authorization-form', 'authorization', 'authorization: well formed', false, 'not an aere-device-authorization with a sorted list of action names');
|
||||
else {
|
||||
Z = z;
|
||||
if (dev !== null) ok('authorization-device', 'authorization', 'authorization: for this device', Z.deviceId === dev /*PAZA:authorization-device*/, `an authorization of ${Z.deviceId}`);
|
||||
ok('authorization-owner', 'authorization', 'authorization: granted by the current owner', idDin(Z.owner.keys) === Z.owner.id && (owner === null || aceeasi(Z.owner, owner)) /*PAZA:authorization-owner*/, `granted by ${Z.owner.id}` + (owner ? `, the owner now is ${owner.id}` : ', an id not derived from its keys'));
|
||||
if (head !== null) ok('authorization-ownership', 'authorization', 'authorization: given under the current ownership head', Z.ownership === head /*PAZA:authorization-ownership*/, 'given under another ownership head (before a transfer, or for another chain)');
|
||||
ok('authorization-signature', 'authorization', 'authorization: signed by who granted it (Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65, both)', numai(A, LEGATURA) && verifica('authorization', Z, A.signature, Z.owner.keys) /*PAZA:authorization-signature*/, 'the hybrid signature does not verify');
|
||||
const nb = data(Z.notBefore, 'notBefore'), na = data(Z.notAfter, 'notAfter'), tq = Q ? data(Q.at, 'attestation at') : acum;
|
||||
ok('authorization-window', 'authorization', `authorization: valid at ${iso(acum)}` + (Q ? ' and when the device attested' : ''), nb - sk <= acum && acum <= na && nb - sk <= tq && tq <= na /*PAZA:authorization-window*/, `valid from ${Z.notBefore} until ${Z.notAfter}`);
|
||||
if (Q) ok('authorization-action', 'authorization', `authorization: allows ${Q.action}`, Z.actions.includes(Q.action) /*PAZA:authorization-action*/, `${Q.action} is not among the actions granted (${Z.actions.join(', ')})`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- 4. status: the registry the verifier read. Whose record counts:
|
||||
// the manufacturer's always, whatever ownership head the record names. Its retirement is never lifted.
|
||||
// the current owner's "retired" and "suspended" whatever ownership head the record names, and with none: the owner of now
|
||||
// can only harm itself by it. "active" only under the current ownership head. Its retirement holds
|
||||
// while it owns the device.
|
||||
// a previous owner's does not bind the owner of now. A seller can sign, AFTER the sale, a retirement dated before it, and
|
||||
// without a time witness the two cannot be told apart: if it bound, anyone who once owned a device
|
||||
// could disable it for ever. It is NAMED (status-prior-ownership) with the state that owner's records
|
||||
// say, and the verdict stands.
|
||||
// anybody else's ignored, and named (status-ignored).
|
||||
let stare = 'unknown'; const subFosti = new Map();
|
||||
if (dev !== null) {
|
||||
const vederi = new Map(); let retras = null, numarate = 0;
|
||||
const fosti = lantBun ? T.map((t) => t.statement.from) : []; // the giver of every transfer was the owner before it
|
||||
const devScris = idScris(dev); // the id of this device in its one text (a bundle that writes it in another form is refused by the rules above)
|
||||
for (const r of SR) {
|
||||
const s = r.statement;
|
||||
// WHICH device a record is about: the hex of a device id is compared like a digest, without regard to case (a registry tool may
|
||||
// have written it in upper case). A record that names ANOTHER device is not about this one and is passed over. A record whose
|
||||
// device id is not a device id at all (a space after it, another form) may have been meant for this device: see below.
|
||||
const idInreg = idScris(s.deviceId);
|
||||
if (idInreg !== null && idInreg !== devScris) continue;
|
||||
// The signer's id is derived from its keys HERE as well. The comparisons that follow (aceeasi) compare ids too, against
|
||||
// identities whose id a rule already derived (manufacturer-id, transfer-ids), so either of the two alone refuses a record
|
||||
// under an id its keys do not derive: defence in depth, and the negative control takes BOTH out to see the row go red.
|
||||
let semnat = false; try { semnat = idDin(s.by.keys) === s.by.id && verifica('status', s, r.signature, s.by.keys); } catch { semnat = false; } // a record with no signer throws here, and is not signed
|
||||
const rol = !semnat ? null : S !== null && aceeasi(s.by, S.issuer) ? 'manufacturer' : aceeasi(s.by, owner) ? 'owner' : fosti.some((x) => aceeasi(s.by, x)) ? 'previous' : null;
|
||||
if (rol === null) {
|
||||
// a manufacturer the verifier TRUSTS, other than the one of the credential shown, says something about this device key. It is not
|
||||
// applied (a manufacturer does not retire the devices of another), and it is not passed over: this verifier cannot judge by what
|
||||
// right it speaks about this key, so the verdict is not VALID.
|
||||
if (semnat && incredere !== null && incredere.includes(s.by.id)) nejudecat('status-other-manufacturer', 'status', 'status: a record of another trusted manufacturer', `${s.by.id}, a manufacturer the verifier trusts and not the one of the credential shown, signed a status record about this device: not applied, and not judged (the same key may carry another manufacture credential)`);
|
||||
else nejudecat('status-ignored', 'status', 'status: a record', `ignored: not a signed record of the manufacturer, of the current owner or of an owner before it (${ob(s.by) ? String(s.by.id) : 'no signer'})`);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
const aLui = (rol === 'manufacturer' || rol === 'owner'); // who may retire or suspend this device
|
||||
if (idInreg === null) { // signed by one of the three, and the device id written in it is not a device id
|
||||
if (aLui) nejudecat('status-unread', 'status', 'status: a record whose device id cannot be read', `a record signed by ${s.by.id} (the ${rol}) names a device id that is not a device id: it may be meant for this device, so the registry is not read as clean`);
|
||||
else nejudecat('status-ignored', 'status', 'status: a record', `ignored: a record of a previous owner (${s.by.id}) that names a device id that is not a device id`);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// signed by who may give it, and not readable here (another version, a state or a number this verifier does not know): it may be a
|
||||
// retirement, so the registry is NOT read as clean. Of a previous owner it would not be applied anyway: counted with its others.
|
||||
const citibil = s.v === VERSION && STATES.includes(s.state) && Number.isInteger(s.seq);
|
||||
if (rol === 'previous') { // gathered per signer: one row for each previous owner, whatever the number of its records
|
||||
const l = subFosti.get(s.by.id) || { citite: [], necitite: 0 }; if (citibil) l.citite.push({ state: s.state, seq: s.seq }); else l.necitite++; subFosti.set(s.by.id, l);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!citibil) { nejudecat('status-unread', 'status', 'status: a record of who may give it that cannot be read', `a record signed by ${s.by.id} (the ${rol}) is of a version, a state or a number this verifier does not read: what it says cannot be seen, so the registry is not read as clean`); continue; }
|
||||
if (rol === 'owner' && s.state === 'active' && s.ownership !== head) { nejudecat('status-ignored', 'status', 'status: an "active" record of the owner under another ownership head', `ignored: the owner's "active" (record ${s.seq}) is believed only under the current ownership head; its "suspended" and "retired" count under any`); continue; }
|
||||
let at = null, vu = null; try { at = data(s.at, 'status at'); vu = data(s.validUntil, 'status validUntil'); } catch { at = null; }
|
||||
if (at === null) { // a retirement or a suspension by who may give it is not undone by a time that cannot be read; an "active" is not believed
|
||||
if (s.state === 'active') { nejudecat('status-ignored', 'status', 'status: an "active" record whose time cannot be read', `ignored: record ${s.seq} of ${s.by.id} carries a time or a validity that is not a time`); continue; }
|
||||
at = -Infinity; vu = -Infinity;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (at > acum + sk) { nejudecat('status-future', 'status', `status: a record dated in the verifier's future (${s.by.id})`, `"${s.state}" (record ${s.seq}) is dated ${s.at}, more than ${clockSkewS} s ahead of the verifier's clock: not in effect yet, and not applied`); continue; }
|
||||
numarate++;
|
||||
if (s.state === 'retired') { if (retras === null || rol === 'manufacturer') retras = { by: s.by.id, at: String(s.at), rol }; continue; }
|
||||
const v = vederi.get(s.by.id);
|
||||
if (!v || s.seq > v.seq) vederi.set(s.by.id, { seq: s.seq, suspendat: s.state === 'suspended', pana: vu, by: s.by.id });
|
||||
else if (s.seq === v.seq) { v.suspendat = v.suspendat || s.state === 'suspended'; v.pana = Math.min(v.pana, vu); }
|
||||
}
|
||||
const susp = [...vederi.values()].find((v) => v.suspendat), proaspat = [...vederi.values()].some((v) => v.pana >= acum); // read only when nobody suspended: then every view left is an "active"
|
||||
if (numarate) {
|
||||
ok('status-retired', 'status', 'status: not retired', retras === null /*PAZA:status-retired*/, retras ? `retired by ${retras.by} at ${retras.at}; ` + (retras.rol === 'manufacturer' ? 'a retirement by the manufacturer is never lifted' : 'a retirement by the owner holds while it owns the device') : '');
|
||||
ok('status-suspended', 'status', 'status: not suspended', !susp /*PAZA:status-suspended*/, susp ? `suspended by ${susp.by} (its record ${susp.seq} is its latest)` : '');
|
||||
}
|
||||
stare = retras ? 'retired' : susp ? 'suspended' : proaspat ? 'active' : 'unknown';
|
||||
if (!retras && !susp && !proaspat) nejudecat('status-unread', 'status', 'status: registry', numarate ? `the status records given say "active" but none is current at ${iso(acum)}: read the registry again` : 'no status record of the manufacturer or of the current owner that can be applied was handed to the verifier; a suspension or a retirement it was not handed cannot be seen');
|
||||
}
|
||||
// what the records of each previous owner say: retired if any of them says so, else the state of its highest record (the stricter of
|
||||
// two with one number). ONE row per previous owner, with the number of its records. They do not bind the owner of now.
|
||||
const subAnteriori = [];
|
||||
for (const [id, l] of subFosti) {
|
||||
let spune = null;
|
||||
if (l.citite.length) { const m = Math.max(...l.citite.map((x) => x.seq));
|
||||
spune = l.citite.some((x) => x.state === 'retired') ? 'retired' : l.citite.some((x) => x.seq === m && x.state === 'suspended') ? 'suspended' : 'active';
|
||||
subAnteriori.push({ owner: id, state: spune, records: l.citite.length }); }
|
||||
nejudecat('status-prior-ownership', 'status', `status: ${l.citite.length + l.necitite} record(s) of a previous owner (${id})`,
|
||||
(spune ? `${l.citite.length} record(s) signed by an owner before the current one say "${spune}"` : 'signed by an owner before the current one') + (l.necitite ? `; ${l.necitite} of its records this verifier cannot read (version, state or number)` : '')
|
||||
+ ': they do not bind the owner of now. A record signed before the sale cannot be told from one signed after it and dated back without a time witness, which is not built here');
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- the witness: the attestation's envelope, and a reading of its notarization that the verifier made
|
||||
const E = b.anchor; let martor = null;
|
||||
if (E != null) {
|
||||
let plic = false; try { plic = E.kind === 'aere-proof-of-device-attestation' && E.statement.kind === 'aere-proof-of-device'
|
||||
&& hex0x(sha(Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(E.statement), 'utf8'))) === E.statementHash && (Q === null || (E.statement.deviceId === Q.deviceId && E.statement.attestationHash === attestationHash(X))); } catch { plic = false; }
|
||||
ok('witness-envelope', 'witness', 'witness: the envelope commits to this attestation', plic /*PAZA:witness-envelope*/, 'the envelope is not an aere-proof-of-device attestation whose hash reproduces and which names this device and the hash of this attestation');
|
||||
if (plic) {
|
||||
// the readings made for THIS envelope; of those, the ones whose time is a whole number of seconds (a time in milliseconds is not one:
|
||||
// taken for seconds it would lie thousands of years ahead and bound nothing)
|
||||
const pentruEl = AN.filter((a) => a.statementHash === E.statementHash), citiri = pentruEl.filter((a) => Number.isInteger(a.at) && a.at > 0 && a.at < 1e11);
|
||||
if (pentruEl.length > citiri.length) nejudecat('witness-unread', 'witness', 'witness: a reading that cannot be read', `${pentruEl.length - citiri.length} reading(s) handed for this envelope carry a time that is not a whole number of seconds since 1970 (milliseconds are not seconds): not used`);
|
||||
if (!citiri.length) { if (E.notarization != null && !pentruEl.length) nejudecat('witness-unread', 'witness', 'witness: notarization', 'the envelope claims a notarization that the verifier did not read on the chain (a claim is not a reading)'); }
|
||||
else if (Q) { const prima = citiri.reduce((x, y) => (y.at < x.at ? y : x)), cel = prima.at * 1000; martor = { at: prima.at, chainId: prima.chainId === undefined ? null : prima.chainId };
|
||||
ok('witness-time', 'witness', `witness: the attestation is not dated after its envelope was on the chain (${iso(cel)})`, data(Q.at, 'attestation at') <= cel + sk /*PAZA:witness-time*/, `the device dated its attestation ${Q.at}, and its envelope was already notarized at ${iso(cel)}`); }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
subject = { deviceId: dev, model: S ? S.claims.model : null, serial: S ? S.claims.serial : null, manufacturer: S ? S.issuer.id : null, owner: owner ? owner.id : null, transfers: T.length,
|
||||
firmware: R ? { version: R.version, sequence: R.sequence, digest: R.digest } : null, action: Q ? Q.action : null, state: stare,
|
||||
// what the records of owners BEFORE the current one say (named, not applied): [{ owner, state, records }]
|
||||
priorOwnership: subAnteriori,
|
||||
// the reading the verifier brought, with the chain it says it read: a time witnessed on a testnet is that testnet's
|
||||
witness: martor };
|
||||
return gata();
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
if (e instanceof Nedeclarata) throw e;
|
||||
if (!(false /*PAZA:unreadable*/)) ok('unreadable', 'bundle', 'bundle: readable', false, String(e instanceof Error ? e.message : e).slice(0, 200));
|
||||
return gata();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,487 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"v": 1,
|
||||
"kind": "aere-device-anchor-evidence",
|
||||
"network": "eip155:28001",
|
||||
"rpc": "https://testnet-rpc.aere.network",
|
||||
"measuredAt": "2026-10-05T16:23:38.543Z",
|
||||
"note": "testnet 28001: the finality is the testnet's. Every key that signed here was made for this run and discarded; the notarizations were paid by a testnet developer key that is not in this file.",
|
||||
"verifierBrought": {
|
||||
"trustedManufacturers": [
|
||||
"aere-id:1e33c3433fb4a7f90f9090c4ed49f589f46c9685"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"statusLists": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"statement": {
|
||||
"v": 1,
|
||||
"kind": "aere-status-list",
|
||||
"id": "https://manufacturer.example/status/1",
|
||||
"purpose": "revocation",
|
||||
"issuer": {
|
||||
"id": "aere-id:1e33c3433fb4a7f90f9090c4ed49f589f46c9685",
|
||||
"keys": {
|
||||
"alg": "ed25519+ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"ed25519": "MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAVg6Ji0hXQg+ZJKKDZ0Cs7BzErCL/hyda1nx64XcK6UA=",
|
||||
"mldsa65": "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"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"size": 131072,
|
||||
"encodedList": "H4sIAAAAAAACCu3BMQEAAADCoPVPbQwfoAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAIC3AYbSVKsAQAAA",
|
||||
"validFrom": "2026-10-05T15:22:52.401Z",
|
||||
"validUntil": "2026-10-06T16:22:52.401Z",
|
||||
"issuedAt": "2026-10-05T15:22:52.401Z"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"signature": {
|
||||
"alg": "ed25519+ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"ed25519": "0a+wDDS1E5lh8YRN7KvSXSwLiFGgyk1p+peITxQgUJxoeZEZW3IVGs65vnJDcuqiymVASn4jawDp8/qZWHHUBA==",
|
||||
"mldsa65": "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"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"firmwarePolicies": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"statement": {
|
||||
"v": 1,
|
||||
"kind": "aere-device-firmware-policy",
|
||||
"model": "AX-200",
|
||||
"minSequence": 2,
|
||||
"retracted": [],
|
||||
"issuer": {
|
||||
"id": "aere-id:1e33c3433fb4a7f90f9090c4ed49f589f46c9685",
|
||||
"keys": {
|
||||
"alg": "ed25519+ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"ed25519": "MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAVg6Ji0hXQg+ZJKKDZ0Cs7BzErCL/hyda1nx64XcK6UA=",
|
||||
"mldsa65": "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"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"validFrom": "2026-10-05T15:22:52.401Z",
|
||||
"validUntil": "2026-10-06T16:22:52.401Z",
|
||||
"issuedAt": "2026-10-05T15:22:52.401Z"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"signature": {
|
||||
"alg": "ed25519+ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"ed25519": "Zd7j0dMA+H+Vo9NwvFDepqa1bmlwLvCt2TTpMNpyjcCDho8hq3D6yPPgfDCKqBwmy19miGUj/mRe6U0N7Y3bDg==",
|
||||
"mldsa65": "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"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"statusRecords": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"statement": {
|
||||
"v": 1,
|
||||
"kind": "aere-device-status",
|
||||
"deviceId": "aere-device:b0289f9a4a1135e11ae553fcd3e260f82367ae16",
|
||||
"state": "active",
|
||||
"seq": 1,
|
||||
"ownership": "0x69fc39e3b5f1714ca63673a25886751f9781160b56b56eea052faa7043514fe0",
|
||||
"by": {
|
||||
"id": "aere-id:34d2dd0968354d3ddeed3132c8948a1a182ae64f",
|
||||
"keys": {
|
||||
"alg": "ed25519+ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"ed25519": "MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAQmj+tgqJBuAH9B1UxD+Dbu88aQuUinITyOJ5oMiLngA=",
|
||||
"mldsa65": "MIIHsjALBglghkgBZQMEAxIDggehAB+NQafGOkCZ5AaZmTbyOfntK7+4qdGnt+Fd9QWiKYaawoMlXShja2+GOG7RDzfHq8kyJewCd6TShLcNTgLQAe0RCIjw74BP5hZV6roWJ04Ula8kS6+49GTgqIaZAh13uilVdizDtQZPjhqtBhqreC+GQuuIC7VmuL+0x7Wnnj2+hnpAbYR6RsMBJC1Og2YJ+Pjalu83J0zj0B7ue8SdYY+19/gGQ7ecxnlCzn4o5VbTUkYGIfW7xOQnUh4wcLoqBLW6X89q/4am1WaF4QkIu1SDPzLpQLsJQYNdAeaLrXxOS1wzY906j9xYMi+j8sGOk8XtTyJtnBVmfL+UGD+7qlxccpqv2F2yGFBeeHFLKPqVZoZsOwoRKdNSSF+GPj6uzZ+Sw6PtKxqgnHdz+/HynvHn6J09oSs1Enjj8OBg/DgJG9dG/0wTrHNCL7X66sUasixKlY5/WVcmTSGUwHpyanV8IBDTX1g2VYjcpVQCs7B2bRyQNW194MWt20UWqipunxc9odoDLa+nEuI/bMyOaMuD3G7wZPtVBIsyMrpt/RRC6uw7vrqa1scNxf1b7r6GpaCGoTN1UViFAnET8RUhIU6eIjq0H8lZnfFqSMCm/oELj2aF6aYoOjeFVxJ+ypyMCY7WURMyi95tNuoaHezKwBCgi9Sh/vLKZsro47ZkQEdhDBNrAbe+M7BnUjDiIa1lEveH73j0Y+pRX7FnNhB9TrcxpzEfeSB9Cwg+8XZ1rUisyqU+X8Z6V/Y0z8+DU7/P8ZIofaswCsa+4/Xp7bsPCrbQeeIy00Wfr5jfOrC+Bnud2va+JeimxIi4qYMFr/DrqFUklEn81kdfRZYtnIcFf5+/egoHobVzrhOR2osxyryAfKqBP0uZKRvx0cOPlKq9DAjjw2PGv7517yxwPYiFVDe4i6RlM46CAFhaycD8QnVToskDtoYu4TZp/VyhMFLMpWD/rJJrqsZMNXFGihbQjOneKqqXF7zBeF/xUyYDSVRQtuXMcVn0WC+ACnACbSltPMREKoJns3ArZ2VRbxgVoRF2IxVUQjIxZkenAMX0XM4rCUWXrGNm5kwG8Q/Oiem0+IEjpVaq2aehZtxXmGFWY8Zccv9BesuTNwnzWhWEtNGPHXUBygl8Ayxm0PDva8CKeoZzDB+J8MDPqBKJDBYwpEgD19DPq5gCBW8NUzTm2nCCaWJ6MlkClynEZsVzQ52nNzaR3DxJYXh6bBQ+42IjqCfJwajTXcXzYYYtNCa5hdNOPK3qaNEBYVCjh/5ELUYWTLBZ0mFcVxMReh8ZDi+GE35pdn1IT+5Ug3HIC6jxmMdWGed9COvw4w3wZZIXqaTfFrfrNBqdgkIa+pA0o06r6TY/pnFiSCDTA0leC4jGh5k9wrxGs/rs9CXYRxIP2sNTjUjuSJ5ieAdpEheHHF3yjMcHg+G05gbJFAgnXyanX8GwXp4PVCT6FWRoiX9cMuXng92vM/MQ79HaDHiHAVSeaKQ/kP5eonBQ0Q4WsX+iO7qSY75SRCBmqg9+zQzeUQFkz/PLs7RFvrOxLbPUoNM49IPi6zfjz4I0UdeiCu2UkF/yJsGcAgPLRbUtDvIJopdWDZZzFr1YnUdui44hmThvj0U/67N8vtk2QeFecF7rbJQQaERFMz2o+vm3syzh9uvRz3YkiBjxg4pkGXwjdg0fTbAQTzNQlwkDLODrzR+NTL+KtzjdQtSLQgSKQlf6b6SNW2h8oFcNmeL/wmCJ1kTinSJol2xJ4QPl8ORpZH8wVdrBxhIuLHZAM2Fp4x5w2kUV2gyHxO1SqsFrtqzZjB5zvKLN6brnwTQkmAytihaPoYbygZkDzmHDgd4iUgA1IDU+NZjCw6Qzs23eCEeopmskgKI6ynC+WZSa3KCXbeKOqQIe4rmYow81y7tLDvhduJvNuZH5ZrWIpv8lTW/sOQ4Lef6VzicKMJaP4Qec0YEdAW+RHURlDzHsMjtT4pZqwscJYybdFpV1f9/7RcfHdwX5RM8C0EKHgCuG+4zcvBz9/G4MJAUWHpqx8QyftwzgdAf3l9Q56t+zynbpWHD8yJYBqAFCWroT/YcC5Hv0zil55lse2Qt9GRd2skYWlOkH5UKNBJQ42RG8KRjnyhVhukFnkTahZc67J6ymsrTSSjyfpoMyP7Ew5gwJd5Hl0dny9pbvsptnoyW1d0ZjVuiaeMcx2fcQJnJvVrqElmkb/SjITNXkv/N6xsha8qpUEFSEdMT90tSAyJXP+5rHeegejEI9JFdNQHEu2jWEYjmnMx5rTWoFbB76PTCvlmm0kNV5Utrt7o145N3a/Kt0wvm6FNbmN8z3QPe8MgL8Pieyr5Lz8KKThPV/GZXlqrVpOcstE9DkkJVOcjlC6/oVhhZWl2yjqwEj7HcDR7+AqjKGnyigpc+yZOXEIsfTHB3Lhkyn6EFyLfDY+2JUfUeqyrMgwjMesXx1fZqKR6SIMrpH0W4G5MueyzgcEMdqlIeIr6tOew+oLD59Aqrs6Y69puCibuV/bxXayCij2iMxAgxSMnkCSHVE9WDrKwjm13IcMhuqY1NSY5/PcAu6RFtltMmQFZMSRLYL2mEzZR6alFfERJWwnavh"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"at": "2026-10-05T16:12:52.401Z",
|
||||
"validUntil": "2026-10-06T16:22:52.401Z"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"signature": {
|
||||
"alg": "ed25519+ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"ed25519": "x5Ko0jtwRc8Atdo2yaVDq+/wIW3l7pS2nP1aD9F2dW9DMHdrsBVk/uPiwh8Ah+Iv8vpCB0YZcpfkoP9YMDuDDg==",
|
||||
"mldsa65": "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"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"nonce": "n-34f5b13d79e2c2f5",
|
||||
"audience": "https://gateway.example"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"honest": {
|
||||
"bundle": {
|
||||
"v": 1,
|
||||
"kind": "aere-device-bundle",
|
||||
"manufacture": {
|
||||
"statement": {
|
||||
"v": 1,
|
||||
"kind": "aere-credential",
|
||||
"id": "urn:uuid:d3db2755-d6ad-4dae-a76f-3704403d5d31",
|
||||
"type": "DeviceManufacture",
|
||||
"issuer": {
|
||||
"id": "aere-id:1e33c3433fb4a7f90f9090c4ed49f589f46c9685",
|
||||
"keys": {
|
||||
"alg": "ed25519+ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"ed25519": "MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAVg6Ji0hXQg+ZJKKDZ0Cs7BzErCL/hyda1nx64XcK6UA=",
|
||||
"mldsa65": "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"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"holder": {
|
||||
"id": "aere-id:1e33c3433fb4a7f90f9090c4ed49f589f46c9685",
|
||||
"keys": {
|
||||
"alg": "ed25519+ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"ed25519": "MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAVg6Ji0hXQg+ZJKKDZ0Cs7BzErCL/hyda1nx64XcK6UA=",
|
||||
"mldsa65": "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"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"claims": {
|
||||
"deviceId": "aere-device:b0289f9a4a1135e11ae553fcd3e260f82367ae16",
|
||||
"deviceKey": "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",
|
||||
"hardwareRoot": null,
|
||||
"model": "AX-200",
|
||||
"serial": "SN-28001"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"sd": [],
|
||||
"sdAlg": "sha-256",
|
||||
"issuedAt": "2026-09-05T16:22:52.401Z",
|
||||
"validFrom": "2026-09-05T16:22:52.401Z",
|
||||
"validUntil": "2036-10-02T16:22:52.401Z",
|
||||
"status": {
|
||||
"list": "https://manufacturer.example/status/1",
|
||||
"index": 7
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"signature": {
|
||||
"alg": "ed25519+ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"ed25519": "diVX0YlEvr5m1SNC7B3pxzwhAZDDYxgJFNdIYr5uy7WWAQ6KCbUS0O1EH3T+HfP69Hw4AXjLEJ9gAdYrY4A4Dg==",
|
||||
"mldsa65": "xchJfToQWGoD+zoK6uCNG6qpeFKApQY3SFu+/47nbS3t8vis2FecAEYls2L9HNXJ/rronREVkXAGlwTaDECdmn5CnF510S8BGXqi9XKs5y2aw48BBSno86Z62CWuQXq6zCzx/Rmy0HszbgTdEGQKH9Hdc4Aox+qNxgIW0dnpX8R3OI/wWL5FU0ThJAdhpGt1wQ7lcWQfAxgCVOl8+MoWU3Tcv/r0lYJdQMPljtbvrMt8SW0/M4ApFJCCNoor4wPd6QyG5XHiqKm0gpc83JXpZvx/JwRLTEck4YmBm22HZVJxp4EjOpI0K/VW4HBxsV9Lae+lReaqdR7xaMjk/TpulY4Vgk7P4t41yuPP5cPC1gbtK8Qw6GY1fvE+5G0qPlY/qAOTNvrx6divZUkCH2ZmPdr2MjtQwlYVoW7ayCtHHqZ8MPrgOqfZsuL0QKaCDX5dnTmUa3mhBmWXjkVAN3wEd3jiclB42ChtgYAynQTm8jgf76E8AC4QbT2WFyPIrqlf9m5+7YqlC/kVdXq2f302ebOkV8KCT9Gfpa1zEI/B2PvRrnlkye0BYm2C1QppnaQuoA/rBo6t7p3yfZJbMHeIWri3qgt1U+FA5oDbgKQI1xPxPSHd8z5cIkZ6qjVXmpMoo16iCXnJf4zetA4r4wv6hIM96L22pWTyZAEUQchnf7wwFbPaMy1qVMD3hV8q2nEB1C+tThz/oQXkzAxcUPoY2/AhqlPzEMtaeFWp67TXmbyw3D50OGQdHV1VWsSjDSu9UHlOGpWDek4klF9zC7u0ge6dmqnrQDyQxmc/w4zGPy9sdX9glLnEw5W1kN24XrQrO+qKbD27X/acdmkyKNrDq4DC8pd2+Wi4ACffpc9cbHEoEsHzDv2k41eBHOnkmAFXV5oZvhKeEmvJPjS4IsyPjL3/M88ZW8rqv1g3lw+LVJummqrS0Qo7NXZeMLoVGaD3pHWvtJ88gi3f1LYOb9/4JSBRxzUWLG7wqjCoAKFt5YOWseMFF3svCV66/xX2yG7I3lQKn1sH1kKYSXBjgB5wCZhefeUKMhsf74lDX9fYl2iPIELf258yex9qE61WKL+gius3Z9huUAv7Q5KZabeKyek0SKW1mmkyr8V6SoIBUS+IiKLBtzRp0ZELm4fzRjAGaabPQljhTMepR3fcDAErqmDBqAor5GdCveOa3FIAJj4qAMdgHMXXAx90HN78IvYRp2M1+CV8Nar+r99vBxmJV3amMDppD12cJ54rqQsfXxDv9v85qXPgPelBmOXFz3rKUgBQ1ytAptRvg9cX2NnDLgPL+LVDahXrDNQqD/pLVz6JbSjgvQUeTyDAqmokfWc9hHo+h2gtOO01NLn9k8MH+PNXfnh63mqKj+e8LFRgYZIFsml9wZDNIhITux9bwC6NIbToxC275NMqHusMJQLwApMuWvsjhj6Hz5FB9HOX1Kumg6o3+ksKdraT1z1EMUHAEKyKFaoXSfHF5LV9rNftrmDD0zAaMMTQe1Rm/eSGHOIYRuwgUSlKtI2FmskpG+qRIM8nTvKaFt7iRFx5y+nE+dryvUjC0H3J+fWOcVvYQQiHcmNOUbEZg9ugUkJHGFKnpP5Dzq87iP2Vthg41cE8+V5Iil1PPFOoR9Db3udCklHz/vJmh9OmrMQli21yErkEbjv+etuZF+Hgs1V5MlJwCnNj05ByJzkk9MCRTLA1575xnQZo5N4kvDAP5R4cikKr35K4oA2IHME29Kjo9GNy0CqUc9NStfYrD20xIAqrDcmq+iBwV2zkIOEA0iawfyduoPxKfnAXogA6uUWP4I5Rg7McE68xoiajLn6UdcSCsc1tyL22CLtoQAma+deQcXrgckmpPYjwzy7CgwckdVbJo0z1BeWdkZxbwbrn39hhAnBxpCwiK4MvTXm7b/6mK4t9gX8LrJ3qimkWKW3epiUfHxdzq9SVsW20Moq3Y7z5IX1vaP5O078NOhs6sH2OZZTxvwlfzuf0rjIwRA/r+PjoRaxziWO5ovPl8Eo4W55Vb6JAHut0RlUs58ZiEJ8K8eUZsjru/7OBZPQy2STXANu2K378bWHApvppZYsSrL7+MhHwIDZy3KwMYZ+P/4NQH28txGtHceA9ManAyjZfV8imRcm/K4o4GXH3aHnF99mh7K8sxAaCg22rkZ3pO1OGIkTXb/JD75kYOq5J0CssT3kv5n+wgWYmssVFyKPign0IROVl5e4JsWYdpcbqtiDWqGg2elGrMuZ0O6+JQPQTPo+AZTVaOFHC34opk4V6L6hxaNfVc3TW4RNiIGPIcC8tLKkWhahU9NCcXg1u7Ai4wB8NNxrzIndl4Z6AmIJ/Tf4J0vK8PEzWn12g5We2X/yxXWU9nCHdd5rfg3KsKEbUamj/5snEc4uAVd80f1eW8Z7wV1X8IInJhlfCrVllnCmwRv/IqGagId4IMr6X9RHmgHhxDDzbg946peETxzK84cWF/F5OXRyslWAvbt/7YFRuwBPQ3GjxWPlV+diFROMSoAbZg6HG8D/Oqp3uTiTHrf/LSl2GhKJba1zpq/UvRfoIQ38BBrHa2H4FNk6m/tC1q82JV8AebMJlXLRAXZCMKdaYo9TQgXjWGyt5dCzMkWORLVvCUuF+Uw4bEx3g1g+tXqa9wErN0Zz4pM6m49EfI3V+iCzpp6E+0TM7rchM7mEMVSDwWD0htvJo4VirvFFBmWl45zL1yoQL77fo3TlNOYRYyVpPKOwWq0qoJmdZcf8nTvXNmqp5muL/Bzm3GbN4+7MyIWfO0JAhxlCV2NnYxq9VyXE2gHEV9sa7LTXsuSoLTOB2pnPJQgkmyZ+GaLl+jAohS42pna9jkUayFvL8caEm7N/11KC6VPDdqsfRdVErWj0v8qInXSGM/wGfI+/bBVNPB1oPszNF5JethjpBq4Si6HPTFNVQvtKGIDiGmskjhmnM5PM63Rjm3XT5MI1fMebhixrFwvX/Yuf08bdu7fj45k9y1/nUduXXNICCnIFZivbdV42rZUpps6EJ6ysI8fF5ogL6K31U+nJE/b/DBRCQdNcvfbDPNt9ApvF/p4OETcb6Mj4Rp3u9TGySjcuRByYFCcxjgx69AwZBLV2pjrKwavUKKTHhzRejhdaPbZwoNscxBrHI/mwUUo9+1ClDB2iA4g94Bxx8nvYmDpC91FSB8QKUZ5+3qxmc0xec2zUw51U4rId03jmQ0xlGxBFsVy8eD8dNw3t5G4AUkqr4pUyLUV1ypgW1e/0hPFB0kXdjrCH2f9feXFKdbCb/hbmFp10dZotoqCR6KOdVH5ryUlRSAXtHG0whaxgr2CpVzebRp7QCOn9HRNtqNJLBj8xTiRDDkRU+Z0/iZISAfTem5fKvrOOGV4OSmfsSBSjJ+2wxVQ9LZ9cTcgjMkwAEyaSTD/GH8RogzhSXkS9Tv9Sv2J4tjsG29+GcNXxM5SIzbo3Cv7YxoiEuDKG7Xirx51m2Rd/nigQXtV0GPnRrW1S37l+SQ0vWzKnlhNPfwWttfBSpPZJE+uqk8SRSfF9r0pogWVlSSd8f+yszWLK36xbGXw+TpJHibRnfp4Cscse7Toj6/UXUhd4OwV+SqcmCDM2OUzAhOtaafiBr83+NSlHcAWXSsbfIy5pnBmJaa85tucdwkVIBdX573TUb7OXagsh6/jReS4wGh90KeM4ZGp5XKU0H/yKt3dLMDsCzBGpiM4jvIfl6Q1IxBSsDgsOFeA2FrVepQzJBK5qfGgGbLLqYDnRXluXiYkUWMC1lkWSPplhd5d5y/Ojvn8zRroFhVuQqtSnzw5nrw+Ki4u5noNW+DUGsk1I/uhusUxTyPAc2FvekqhAXtX4R3Phk5B0It/igFin5I7TFO2ZOGk0/tJ4UyMuf/cY1SVbnStpr74jTL68baDppoEuXu3R1zMMCAtb9oyRammckzsrIVc6h4GOYzSWuHI761Sb6S1gci6Lg8EjcFub9xtYikYYXI7N2xQA0iFrH2vuSxOHXVP67x6UNZ4YL9/i0aBsV53OfeJCkZOfGXpiw09SrLIppFyPYYEzoXwSAbLsi5g699kNt5sEP5cdKWeR/Dr3Xplezin9QHGSD9DH1Tin6EjVsSpUjj+hA4X4n3bKpItMwEhZAZwZupCZMVWmId4EXXPHy3YaOJL3SyQ2fFfIEwcTf3e/UyRTiU0CiZmAjpIGQeXnoIjEV6aoL88wZvai8xZN/M7i6hW6A/9PsYULJkygvt+MxCFCIezdnPwz/uS7XQYou3JigThnszsCTynTtx+JqkbKoJHETT0oHidWVk7JBqm+uemsafsoarizE01IRL9k614xL++1kz/gEKjpHlKK3CgwWHVFXe4C54wEVMURjeJqpvb4BGCElS1FZkJrAAxw3SNprlaCw4fkAAAAAAAAABxEbJSow"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"firmware": {
|
||||
"statement": {
|
||||
"v": 1,
|
||||
"kind": "aere-device-firmware",
|
||||
"model": "AX-200",
|
||||
"version": "2.0.0",
|
||||
"sequence": 2,
|
||||
"digest": "0x55b680a96d083969d58fe95b39dcf67d3ce6419b068db3906baa46bffd0940e4",
|
||||
"signer": {
|
||||
"id": "aere-id:1e33c3433fb4a7f90f9090c4ed49f589f46c9685",
|
||||
"keys": {
|
||||
"alg": "ed25519+ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"ed25519": "MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAVg6Ji0hXQg+ZJKKDZ0Cs7BzErCL/hyda1nx64XcK6UA=",
|
||||
"mldsa65": "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"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"issuedAt": "2026-09-30T16:22:52.401Z"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"signature": {
|
||||
"alg": "ed25519+ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"ed25519": "O8ORneg6Ir06AdiJ31lOBmv/3nVfaG2lC/E8DOXfEcJtd/qbsPqyQ7m5ejuY0XkuhC31pEgiYwYRqMWD3gcNCA==",
|
||||
"mldsa65": "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"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"transfers": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"statement": {
|
||||
"v": 1,
|
||||
"kind": "aere-device-transfer",
|
||||
"deviceId": "aere-device:b0289f9a4a1135e11ae553fcd3e260f82367ae16",
|
||||
"seq": 1,
|
||||
"prev": "0xfd04a004a721ef9018d586f81a76d556803bd0eab2d3ee2f0e6a76f5fe16d79d",
|
||||
"from": {
|
||||
"id": "aere-id:1e33c3433fb4a7f90f9090c4ed49f589f46c9685",
|
||||
"keys": {
|
||||
"alg": "ed25519+ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"ed25519": "MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAVg6Ji0hXQg+ZJKKDZ0Cs7BzErCL/hyda1nx64XcK6UA=",
|
||||
"mldsa65": "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"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"to": {
|
||||
"id": "aere-id:34d2dd0968354d3ddeed3132c8948a1a182ae64f",
|
||||
"keys": {
|
||||
"alg": "ed25519+ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"ed25519": "MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAQmj+tgqJBuAH9B1UxD+Dbu88aQuUinITyOJ5oMiLngA=",
|
||||
"mldsa65": "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"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"at": "2026-09-25T16:22:52.401Z"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"signature": {
|
||||
"alg": "ed25519+ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"ed25519": "BDvwp76m0vMVDpOD6wCVX3tKAM9ohlRJwd//zp4HY6qRdx/GI4gh4/7XbLzQaU4xJIU6Ju70UdwlwLgxz5PfAA==",
|
||||
"mldsa65": "8APRModQSfZPVET2qL5N+sMzOu05jYurOqlhnAHY8Ip/ktgwViTcJutqucqpa2ZHxXHeQA5tgoxeF3hJQCWWruiT5s8dE4f5gw1Ly8RPdYu4CDBNTA18cMGJO+wnA8uUSgM0ALsB9m8+iUIfMXlukxuQyd0q+RZv5Dkzqh5695jVL3ubrTEEzVwShxZyDfxCEBy/kMpB+L8a4jUzFjpBjV8jT/hox3D+4r3HLFMamc8a+19qgZUKvEd6WXxmVK/Xk46E9l7KFxMmunTsGVaHTke4VEp1r1o34iuVRY/HAQNwJtZjtxtARadv8cXO6Nqciz95+jX3q3KLaTBve+y6VOYnFE19bbyDkV3/aMjoEFRlSOnawENaCFWVdYRelmG+UJ+08bqQBcEHgKl4hzG6g+mmPdWJAxsPSt5wJZdNIF+Qvz9TO4Zn2AAP0vG+Wcc8oON9+Ct6D2LQN0KBMltGLy66GN/azjY0qKjsA4SGj+7ZQhE5fuMRergloAiFjUjIJ9BNocWTmBYfEKqXq8MYi+TWGH1yrRj1imIWcwJ1U4gGuSKdCjhbwY9pTNnJ2r4Y3gs4jb1UZmHsgv++oBXYMTDlF5U7CgWoXO/AA7UXgPMQWw8EykuFD44z8gzHajLPjJ9PhBk6Vs6P0mcBQte5LUcQVFZzdEu7piQ2GC2j+Bi1gFyAE3eo8CZb0orMvXulboxiQLzz0rOorcmRwfpUadcl8skk9DOB/bkZvOjL6y2I4+EAusUtlGfl9FsOwKFTUn1bSB2EOtdihWUpq/XmBoizRz7+mGorPlQLXnmb25bQEnVTR7Lsv9hq4jG87EY+AcbA0+aBG1i+EBwXt0in7+MatGx1bi+ubH9mZIEBfeTkARXHAsVGfbDtUcYVO28trXXNsArsnvrfvwijKtlUcP7LfV1B7n9FAX5hDi08LDVV3/2votbE1QPgXE1Y/I6IEjHG/yD4QgDeWV30lwPWrmK+ymO+jzff5xG76BubAEqV8tPwwXCzjGpcB9qBgFBJ66OahFHYLC2srJ4X/51zcGyNzZIMRCpgwOkqdQh1CocvR9f/1jIr2iXpUFeBuJfMTd/tY3pmaZfQ6SlS+yRwHaZ4OXtYXLnKe9O0WmdzIfIsdCxDmMScK4zWXsxeli9qsPT4K059rXdz81rmpV6rv5JIhGTY53/CjF9dcIVyZ7lqiH5xb3yw1iTwcf4Sxhm/GOmGgABAWPZ4fN1r85bxVj/XYWPvOiCQo20tKHViwnB+l4IzGPmw0oTeYtCfZ8LEGS7oncBrM17QBlRZGU7nG+kZJ8h0NOPQBGtnuMR0kxD3MmB1y7zN7dCh7qHjiaC3SOGlMvAkYfZKweHSW3/FcWZ78CslpnNhHarhV1rpqC8pO2otHJ6/dDQrVyLvh4T/mpcB+QQTaFSStpQ2cO4hQVRyLDXPwyenzt6+pB/PbcyPY3OrlG07KhT8HzikafgNCHiRevaAk6n7sJXtERNHi93qQXQ1Ig1LePTBBV0JRTFiA/iY4xYDrq8T3UHpZ6kC3LXBIKl9PzbCgDfZUaj68y5VZrPVOpQJ4okkrzMlJPRinkEUuRbooDg1MkVjs1L+2lbmDMv0PG9oo9bHYzCfcKqG+SLZdjTQ5gXh3oPzUbKGJYJB01f2JzoukDO5v/syI9pZ6iYUgYbw/XTyndgljm14Ku4sSw8rQTLwiQKGJV9B+3fzvFLnbYplkDB8xE69tjEbgwbptLF8I7LYm9/MUlZxUpLGaOS45ZQa+HKW6bDjYqh3gw2wYnDf6qJsqqc8Ian0uCUQ0PA3Y9to0QD0Ge5we+i6wBnoBCfy1E8eT9INal8OEG8Ol6Ybw0nDhlm2UZYJ2T+eQKGrk9xz0scYNk7I+npKGUHP7g+Thf9Po/UCg2jskbpKIv2BJFRsXQpJWmq26u636RTZJkYoyrQZoNGEbbAhbmG7uUVMkHc0Q4/mljsoOAhSJN82VWRa9yHcstxgJR9KN/WH+VFCLi3qwgMqOb8vG/O7oSBPda8xwXIkjXMXGLUN3LnwwUrHA/daLgcCDOXbIgons3i5gMZQoE+L8Ml/+TlUdZTi9HJe2R6GTL6XuRg191SWJVNqqP1CeGlE0nvNvVKSnLhmIqMNZ9qybaoHxdm3Ce0cjk0KrXi/215u7LaEbvOqH7N7UIlagtCQWifId54GVMJHIs+03yeHwUcrt4uUI3r5rjNZmg81OyibiEmQiWvAWCFxXBpxiMsHFDyCMCcnz/wHFFy49FNqMS3YS7eyV17h4ox4OZgxHcVJDU/ZQdkDxkcIyYlEkELx0fbbSX2UYAhEoIvFxzr+sSVnYgNcMQRK7U2IEldsJ7ck98HRNYUlIPIyY24XtczMAoV+iEQZQF32URkWXLX3ty1ZjzQOzHBa4nzXGOnGoVTOYIlccaVgN7ZS0iWoUaofPCs1bUz8hs7A4nleX9K0QongcLIvPK1oucyDcBi5Iq7hkVyj5id9mHgfGEnrCGdT68QfqCvFz7lRCqET+VMxRIESutt5/kI+8yF/alukpBlXtglVkbPObazbGP6WPEawCJgg1cU/KMl1ciUgK4HtgwYwYhqKATGr1/qE5MI+CvPCo/sQPbMPWCaauhaXBDuk4JTNgwr7CW83BvmYuxqWg1DGcwcdm8V9Uecpz6KLC594rGWAd6PLJrq+SBOxotJws40hMd8nL4VVxlETRfUDya8AQ8x3taZ9G2m1sKlLWLM9KQ9spoG+5xG23kqBQr3L7w9JnKU3yG+Ng1HZ/wNNOhcgcQcZLTVMMu0QPYk5l0sRxjh9IepnaKLudwTpqrRY8nUS+iz32v1hA/j4Yq8GjECC6s+sfCAZ1c78g24O+PAdBBSOIBHN+lGhK0elJtZm5Y3JwjfQbEJQg9WJoITBqSIEidsDN9X+4etAUpO/Bpr0M3GnQ1eNfRVRXjz7CV+NXedbUQ/3fw6e7zUx4KHhbOo77HFZdGV7sWsXvceMAV3HTEr8fo7KLqY772UCXauEQUkPYJyZc+0l8fOD1KWRfbXSARYg1gJ76hJFZPhEExtkuz1ESy764Ax9JZrAVgWov82r4c5cwjM6ed1kAK1IvYWbZ0d+eyUdTXT2MAEmdYfGk0lAtyvfiSzThqE0RST1ptGTJijVekZNPcwW92SQsb439HafaWLvx0JAMuVbRCL40EWCBH7xlK2nL4ykuW6iFfsHNh285Kx34+NLR8yZcTjmFBlfv2Xhnw5PaBkWYweLmzwuUxD7ZWzHwZydPTACuOtWtYEtfuP6uv2ERhgP7LqqszJZbY5INl1LPsES8qwm6V1NC/p1yyarYU1A58YDkMJ65LxLHB1DXEFYeHwnuFkhP298oKRTnM89mFqgH6x9wLxZTQ2EbIHOtZ8+RdsgeF5o+nSOdxdzG/0PSJaGrViqsr+RWnkhN70b3u2hC5aYeXQT9XtJ/yFb8pI6pK0rpulCmhsVTCbTEBIZlWD/jMF/5t9vdO6FjOyciSviG8PxZyfyHfR5eUSSvzuPnCA0cW4vSfUct2YniMQeDOfB5MWukbxo0p5u3TNdwqQXzNJ3VdxI/NZaX69MWvvGy30Ym7ux1PdO237g78JCKuKHgc0hkz6UXLyLcKzEhKeAWHz1MPMU8tPKENpYFt6TPeF7c6xNiKhCy4Kw5CJdXsBHDtfeSC2M1nKjBV50DnWx6GSdlimXggfOi1yISYL+U3F9mVhKU0CmCfy3hQ9gRjz74WzWC9ZXHBLTDP9nQYerGr6KrgxEJi/aVRiMwHcmWFcXF5lSlB0+cmOoVI3UsKj6Cp0Jb/i+Ft0jFh79yrTanph2sEq4pSMLP6F69jl9NMqiF9O+fCty7Yr2FqdDyt6a2a5s0hyHgQO4WRQCg+5XWi1NGKURXV0OENvZN7th2RgHg7b4UWSd0nE7j3LGjrhar/+KEX2XVxL8RHaImpsbHRvM+Xg3bq/it5wyu/rBzBIaTdhhRgbtvjP3Zi4iKRKHe9EEQbgggYc4qQKO9l6sa9NjsseY8Nwtenc/wTdKB6c2W1ukRiodPo+Y0r3U75fl3vScM3IPf81sZKXUQrsWrPSoATwPMfEazl0f+uIwQJM+ejXJRjdWUwTga963MyWc2hzO+nyWEvyk1lPCW/NZFj6n+CqeN+mbXTWmBAXj59xP9u8wf/42xIQnUQ4WbANziBcC6KwdSRdh/rjzUByfvyvbAkaT+ggL0pjxh/PgL9aV6VIZGfCiWPpzjukLfaXQ3STv7qx1rpkuNOKpN1a0C4l2m3n+4zxswYV+lpug/0/mbCeeN+nti+jcvruokpEAeUXzBgOcaggFRzUV6XIYLzpXeIfK/mmzury+7vZU5UiCngITWl5r5xwrRG10fIe12AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACA8RFBoj"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"authorization": {
|
||||
"statement": {
|
||||
"v": 1,
|
||||
"kind": "aere-device-authorization",
|
||||
"deviceId": "aere-device:b0289f9a4a1135e11ae553fcd3e260f82367ae16",
|
||||
"ownership": "0x69fc39e3b5f1714ca63673a25886751f9781160b56b56eea052faa7043514fe0",
|
||||
"owner": {
|
||||
"id": "aere-id:34d2dd0968354d3ddeed3132c8948a1a182ae64f",
|
||||
"keys": {
|
||||
"alg": "ed25519+ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"ed25519": "MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAQmj+tgqJBuAH9B1UxD+Dbu88aQuUinITyOJ5oMiLngA=",
|
||||
"mldsa65": "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"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"actions": [
|
||||
"telemetry.publish"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"notBefore": "2026-10-04T16:22:52.401Z",
|
||||
"notAfter": "2026-10-06T16:22:52.401Z",
|
||||
"issuedAt": "2026-10-04T16:22:52.401Z"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"signature": {
|
||||
"alg": "ed25519+ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"ed25519": "/GE6nOt2NiNsYfskXhA3ZuBCPRiiRxyDJLiTCbAc7CZgqU5MqjWvpM5pA8vGoQ6HpR4l2DAYbuXzspkwdNKlAQ==",
|
||||
"mldsa65": "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"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"attestation": {
|
||||
"statement": {
|
||||
"v": 1,
|
||||
"kind": "aere-device-attestation",
|
||||
"deviceId": "aere-device:b0289f9a4a1135e11ae553fcd3e260f82367ae16",
|
||||
"key": "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",
|
||||
"audience": "https://gateway.example",
|
||||
"nonce": "n-34f5b13d79e2c2f5",
|
||||
"at": "2026-10-05T16:22:52.425Z",
|
||||
"firmware": {
|
||||
"digest": "0x55b680a96d083969d58fe95b39dcf67d3ce6419b068db3906baa46bffd0940e4",
|
||||
"sequence": 2
|
||||
},
|
||||
"ownership": "0x69fc39e3b5f1714ca63673a25886751f9781160b56b56eea052faa7043514fe0",
|
||||
"action": "telemetry.publish",
|
||||
"hardwareRoot": null
|
||||
},
|
||||
"signature": {
|
||||
"alg": "ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"value": "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"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"anchor": {
|
||||
"v": 1,
|
||||
"kind": "aere-proof-of-device-attestation",
|
||||
"statement": {
|
||||
"v": 1,
|
||||
"kind": "aere-proof-of-device",
|
||||
"attestationHash": "0xfa4a9c6395c3c3a1146b7218a3a736027ef0c5111ff3d727c6ae70c5b53bb766",
|
||||
"publicKeyHash": "0x453a08c10290ecfd7a8e6086954e0723bdc5584725730317a25639473b61eb35",
|
||||
"deviceId": "aere-device:b0289f9a4a1135e11ae553fcd3e260f82367ae16",
|
||||
"posture": "firmware-sequence-2",
|
||||
"createdAt": "2026-10-05T16:22:52.425Z"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"statementHash": "0x2756a9c255659b7e84f6facccb4e06fcfe905c07446d4a3dd703bc3df4c99e02",
|
||||
"notarization": {
|
||||
"chainId": 28001,
|
||||
"notary": "0x70099E62735500AA2F85B60C518551a57B202d54",
|
||||
"firstSeen": 1791217376,
|
||||
"txHash": "0xe4bbbc556c903a813380e4372f63b05864f987cb0b21c06dea20a0344f7c4171",
|
||||
"block": 4876895
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"reading": {
|
||||
"v": 1,
|
||||
"kind": "aere-device-anchor-reading",
|
||||
"statementHash": "0x2756a9c255659b7e84f6facccb4e06fcfe905c07446d4a3dd703bc3df4c99e02",
|
||||
"at": 1791217376,
|
||||
"chainId": 28001,
|
||||
"witness": "AereNotary first-seen under a post-quantum certified anchor"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"postDated": {
|
||||
"bundle": {
|
||||
"v": 1,
|
||||
"kind": "aere-device-bundle",
|
||||
"manufacture": {
|
||||
"statement": {
|
||||
"v": 1,
|
||||
"kind": "aere-credential",
|
||||
"id": "urn:uuid:d3db2755-d6ad-4dae-a76f-3704403d5d31",
|
||||
"type": "DeviceManufacture",
|
||||
"issuer": {
|
||||
"id": "aere-id:1e33c3433fb4a7f90f9090c4ed49f589f46c9685",
|
||||
"keys": {
|
||||
"alg": "ed25519+ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"ed25519": "MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAVg6Ji0hXQg+ZJKKDZ0Cs7BzErCL/hyda1nx64XcK6UA=",
|
||||
"mldsa65": "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"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"holder": {
|
||||
"id": "aere-id:1e33c3433fb4a7f90f9090c4ed49f589f46c9685",
|
||||
"keys": {
|
||||
"alg": "ed25519+ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"ed25519": "MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAVg6Ji0hXQg+ZJKKDZ0Cs7BzErCL/hyda1nx64XcK6UA=",
|
||||
"mldsa65": "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"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"claims": {
|
||||
"deviceId": "aere-device:b0289f9a4a1135e11ae553fcd3e260f82367ae16",
|
||||
"deviceKey": "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",
|
||||
"hardwareRoot": null,
|
||||
"model": "AX-200",
|
||||
"serial": "SN-28001"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"sd": [],
|
||||
"sdAlg": "sha-256",
|
||||
"issuedAt": "2026-09-05T16:22:52.401Z",
|
||||
"validFrom": "2026-09-05T16:22:52.401Z",
|
||||
"validUntil": "2036-10-02T16:22:52.401Z",
|
||||
"status": {
|
||||
"list": "https://manufacturer.example/status/1",
|
||||
"index": 7
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"signature": {
|
||||
"alg": "ed25519+ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"ed25519": "diVX0YlEvr5m1SNC7B3pxzwhAZDDYxgJFNdIYr5uy7WWAQ6KCbUS0O1EH3T+HfP69Hw4AXjLEJ9gAdYrY4A4Dg==",
|
||||
"mldsa65": "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"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"firmware": {
|
||||
"statement": {
|
||||
"v": 1,
|
||||
"kind": "aere-device-firmware",
|
||||
"model": "AX-200",
|
||||
"version": "2.0.0",
|
||||
"sequence": 2,
|
||||
"digest": "0x55b680a96d083969d58fe95b39dcf67d3ce6419b068db3906baa46bffd0940e4",
|
||||
"signer": {
|
||||
"id": "aere-id:1e33c3433fb4a7f90f9090c4ed49f589f46c9685",
|
||||
"keys": {
|
||||
"alg": "ed25519+ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"ed25519": "MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAVg6Ji0hXQg+ZJKKDZ0Cs7BzErCL/hyda1nx64XcK6UA=",
|
||||
"mldsa65": "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"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"issuedAt": "2026-09-30T16:22:52.401Z"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"signature": {
|
||||
"alg": "ed25519+ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"ed25519": "O8ORneg6Ir06AdiJ31lOBmv/3nVfaG2lC/E8DOXfEcJtd/qbsPqyQ7m5ejuY0XkuhC31pEgiYwYRqMWD3gcNCA==",
|
||||
"mldsa65": "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"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"transfers": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"statement": {
|
||||
"v": 1,
|
||||
"kind": "aere-device-transfer",
|
||||
"deviceId": "aere-device:b0289f9a4a1135e11ae553fcd3e260f82367ae16",
|
||||
"seq": 1,
|
||||
"prev": "0xfd04a004a721ef9018d586f81a76d556803bd0eab2d3ee2f0e6a76f5fe16d79d",
|
||||
"from": {
|
||||
"id": "aere-id:1e33c3433fb4a7f90f9090c4ed49f589f46c9685",
|
||||
"keys": {
|
||||
"alg": "ed25519+ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"ed25519": "MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAVg6Ji0hXQg+ZJKKDZ0Cs7BzErCL/hyda1nx64XcK6UA=",
|
||||
"mldsa65": "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"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"to": {
|
||||
"id": "aere-id:34d2dd0968354d3ddeed3132c8948a1a182ae64f",
|
||||
"keys": {
|
||||
"alg": "ed25519+ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"ed25519": "MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAQmj+tgqJBuAH9B1UxD+Dbu88aQuUinITyOJ5oMiLngA=",
|
||||
"mldsa65": "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"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"at": "2026-09-25T16:22:52.401Z"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"signature": {
|
||||
"alg": "ed25519+ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"ed25519": "BDvwp76m0vMVDpOD6wCVX3tKAM9ohlRJwd//zp4HY6qRdx/GI4gh4/7XbLzQaU4xJIU6Ju70UdwlwLgxz5PfAA==",
|
||||
"mldsa65": "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"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"authorization": {
|
||||
"statement": {
|
||||
"v": 1,
|
||||
"kind": "aere-device-authorization",
|
||||
"deviceId": "aere-device:b0289f9a4a1135e11ae553fcd3e260f82367ae16",
|
||||
"ownership": "0x69fc39e3b5f1714ca63673a25886751f9781160b56b56eea052faa7043514fe0",
|
||||
"owner": {
|
||||
"id": "aere-id:34d2dd0968354d3ddeed3132c8948a1a182ae64f",
|
||||
"keys": {
|
||||
"alg": "ed25519+ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"ed25519": "MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAQmj+tgqJBuAH9B1UxD+Dbu88aQuUinITyOJ5oMiLngA=",
|
||||
"mldsa65": "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"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"actions": [
|
||||
"telemetry.publish"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"notBefore": "2026-10-04T16:22:52.401Z",
|
||||
"notAfter": "2026-10-06T16:22:52.401Z",
|
||||
"issuedAt": "2026-10-04T16:22:52.401Z"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"signature": {
|
||||
"alg": "ed25519+ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"ed25519": "/GE6nOt2NiNsYfskXhA3ZuBCPRiiRxyDJLiTCbAc7CZgqU5MqjWvpM5pA8vGoQ6HpR4l2DAYbuXzspkwdNKlAQ==",
|
||||
"mldsa65": "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"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"attestation": {
|
||||
"statement": {
|
||||
"v": 1,
|
||||
"kind": "aere-device-attestation",
|
||||
"deviceId": "aere-device:b0289f9a4a1135e11ae553fcd3e260f82367ae16",
|
||||
"key": "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",
|
||||
"audience": "https://gateway.example",
|
||||
"nonce": "n-34f5b13d79e2c2f5",
|
||||
"at": "2026-10-05T16:42:52.426Z",
|
||||
"firmware": {
|
||||
"digest": "0x55b680a96d083969d58fe95b39dcf67d3ce6419b068db3906baa46bffd0940e4",
|
||||
"sequence": 2
|
||||
},
|
||||
"ownership": "0x69fc39e3b5f1714ca63673a25886751f9781160b56b56eea052faa7043514fe0",
|
||||
"action": "telemetry.publish",
|
||||
"hardwareRoot": null
|
||||
},
|
||||
"signature": {
|
||||
"alg": "ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"value": "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"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"anchor": {
|
||||
"v": 1,
|
||||
"kind": "aere-proof-of-device-attestation",
|
||||
"statement": {
|
||||
"v": 1,
|
||||
"kind": "aere-proof-of-device",
|
||||
"attestationHash": "0xf56d634300add44d08614460c46ef81cc5de5c7ceae1161ee7e467f4dead6a7c",
|
||||
"publicKeyHash": "0x453a08c10290ecfd7a8e6086954e0723bdc5584725730317a25639473b61eb35",
|
||||
"deviceId": "aere-device:b0289f9a4a1135e11ae553fcd3e260f82367ae16",
|
||||
"posture": "firmware-sequence-2",
|
||||
"createdAt": "2026-10-05T16:42:52.426Z"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"statementHash": "0x03320f16015db66f6dcda7096328d6913ebb9bb0310fa2a8c8a87c029cca2c99",
|
||||
"notarization": {
|
||||
"chainId": 28001,
|
||||
"notary": "0x70099E62735500AA2F85B60C518551a57B202d54",
|
||||
"firstSeen": 1791217382,
|
||||
"txHash": "0x3ce273dd4466dce6ecc5315bde669dc9f8b11f0bbb170bcaf0065ed261d76275",
|
||||
"block": 4876906
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"reading": {
|
||||
"v": 1,
|
||||
"kind": "aere-device-anchor-reading",
|
||||
"statementHash": "0x03320f16015db66f6dcda7096328d6913ebb9bb0310fa2a8c8a87c029cca2c99",
|
||||
"at": 1791217382,
|
||||
"chainId": 28001,
|
||||
"witness": "AereNotary first-seen under a post-quantum certified anchor"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"verdicts": {
|
||||
"honestWithReading": "VALID",
|
||||
"honestWithoutReading": "PARTIAL",
|
||||
"postDatedWithoutChain": "VALID",
|
||||
"postDatedWithReading": [
|
||||
"INVALID",
|
||||
[
|
||||
"witness-time"
|
||||
]
|
||||
],
|
||||
"otherEnvelope": [
|
||||
"INVALID",
|
||||
[
|
||||
"witness-envelope"
|
||||
]
|
||||
],
|
||||
"otherReading": "PARTIAL"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"v": 1,
|
||||
"kind": "aere-proof-of-software-attestation",
|
||||
"statement": {
|
||||
"v": 1,
|
||||
"kind": "aere-proof-of-software",
|
||||
"tool": "aere-proof-of-software/1.5.0",
|
||||
"subject": {
|
||||
"name": "example-firmware-ax200",
|
||||
"version": "2.0.0"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"artifacts": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "firmware-2.0.0.bin",
|
||||
"sha256": "0x55b680a96d083969d58fe95b39dcf67d3ce6419b068db3906baa46bffd0940e4",
|
||||
"bytes": 2024
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"sbom": null,
|
||||
"source": null,
|
||||
"builder": {
|
||||
"platform": "win32/x64",
|
||||
"node": "v24.14.1"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"createdAt": "2026-10-05T22:43:54.396Z"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"statementHash": "0x76f250995badde206d6a7bd089dedc5f489824534fdda7f9d5e7352ea26f23e8",
|
||||
"signature": {
|
||||
"v": 1,
|
||||
"kind": "aere-hybrid-signature",
|
||||
"alg": "secp256k1+ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"hash": "sha256",
|
||||
"messageHash": "0x76f250995badde206d6a7bd089dedc5f489824534fdda7f9d5e7352ea26f23e8",
|
||||
"toSign": "0x4a20558f42f2500a0428e7f6586a382ab247752ef7b39119663f20d091ff8a7e",
|
||||
"classicalPublicKey": "0x03c339d65788a9bf44026939e5dffc758848228a920764992b60029557c399e837",
|
||||
"classicalSignature": "0xea969572836a39dac09f2cd731f670c5b951bb233a84b6fd854e9bd241796fe70906680e2667491665721e62ef40dbcd3a1481c2d574b89e87bedb940f731eff",
|
||||
"pqPublicKey": "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",
|
||||
"pqSignature": "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 truncated
|
||||
},
|
||||
"notarization": null
|
||||
}
|
||||
Binary file not shown.
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env node
|
||||
// mutanti-device.mjs: a SEARCH for conditions of the verifier that no row of the probe depends on. The plantings of the negative
|
||||
// control (plantari-device.mjs) are written by hand, each with the rows it must turn red; a list written by hand stays behind the
|
||||
// code. This derives its mutants from the code itself, with a parser, and runs the probe on each:
|
||||
// a && b, a || b -> a ; b (each side of every logical operator taken out)
|
||||
// a === b, a !== b -> true ; false (the comparison no longer decides)
|
||||
// a < b, <=, >, >= -> the edge moved (< to <=, <= to <, ...) ; true
|
||||
// x - sk, x + sk -> x (a tolerance removed)
|
||||
// a call that answers yes or no (aceeasi, numai, verifica, Number.isInteger, includes, test, some, every, ...) -> true ; false
|
||||
// A mutant is KILLED when a row of the probe goes red or the probe can no longer build its world; it SURVIVES when every row stays
|
||||
// green. A survivor is either a condition without a row (a row is missing) or a change that cannot be observed (declared in
|
||||
// ECHIVALENTI below, with the reason).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// WHAT IS SEARCHED: verifyDevice and everything it calls in device.mjs. NOT searched: the producers and the key files (PRODUCATORI
|
||||
// below: the functions that WRITE links). What a producer refuses to write is a convenience for its caller, not a guarantee to a
|
||||
// verifier, which must assume links written by other tools; rows D01 and D02 of the probe measure the refusals the README names.
|
||||
// The probe runs in its fast mode (--repede): the rows that start processes are not run, so the conditions of device-cli.mjs are
|
||||
// not searched either (the plantings written by hand cover the command line).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// node mutanti-device.mjs [--paralel N] [--doar <text in the mutant's description>] [--supravietuitori <json of an earlier run>] [--json <file>]
|
||||
// exit 0: no survivor outside ECHIVALENTI and every entry of ECHIVALENTI still names a survivor; 1: otherwise; 2: NEMASURAT
|
||||
// It needs the `acorn` parser, which is NOT a dependency of the verifier: AERE_ACORN=<directory of the acorn package>, or a copy
|
||||
// Node can resolve from here. Without it nothing is measured (exit 2).
|
||||
import fs from 'node:fs'; import os from 'node:os'; import path from 'node:path'; import { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'; import { createRequire } from 'node:module';
|
||||
|
||||
const AICI = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)); const NUME = path.basename(AICI); const M = 'device.mjs';
|
||||
const arg = (n) => { const i = process.argv.indexOf(n); return i >= 0 ? process.argv[i + 1] : null; };
|
||||
let acorn = null;
|
||||
for (const c of [process.env.AERE_ACORN, 'acorn'].filter(Boolean)) { try { acorn = createRequire(import.meta.url)(c); break; } catch { /* the next one */ } }
|
||||
if (!acorn || typeof acorn.parse !== 'function') { console.log('NEMASURAT: the acorn parser was not found (AERE_ACORN=<directory of the acorn package>); it is needed only by this search, not by the verifier'); process.exit(2); }
|
||||
|
||||
/** The top-level names of device.mjs that WRITE links or key files: their conditions are not searched (see the header). */
|
||||
export const PRODUCATORI = ['dinCheie', 'generateDeviceKey', 'exportDeviceKey', 'importDeviceKey', 'semneaza', 'cine', 'signLink', 'verifyLink', 'signAttestation', 'manufacture', 'releaseFirmware', 'firmwarePolicy',
|
||||
'ownershipHead', 'transferOwnership', 'authorize', 'statusRecord', 'attest', 'bundle', 'proofOfDevice', 'iso'];
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Survivors that are not missing rows: [text that the mutant's description contains (without its line number), why no row can see it].
|
||||
* Every entry must still name at least one survivor (an entry that names none is stale and fails the run), and a survivor that no
|
||||
* entry names fails it too.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export const ECHIVALENTI = [
|
||||
['REGULI.includes(rule) -> true', 'an assertion about the verifier itself: it fires only if the verifier names a rule it does not declare; rows A10 and E01 check from outside that every rule a row names is declared'],
|
||||
['NEJUDECATE.includes(cauza) -> true', 'the same assertion for the causes of not judging; row S25 checks from outside that every cause listed is declared'],
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
const SRC = fs.readFileSync(path.join(AICI, M), 'utf8'); const AST = acorn.parse(SRC, { ecmaVersion: 'latest', sourceType: 'module' });
|
||||
const linia = (poz) => SRC.slice(0, poz).split('\n').length; const text = (n) => SRC.slice(n.start, n.end);
|
||||
const scurt = (s) => (s.length > 70 ? s.slice(0, 67) + '...' : s).replace(/\s+/g, ' ');
|
||||
const DA_NU = new Set(['aceeasi', 'numai', 'verifica', 'verifyText', 'hibridCanonic', 'b64canonic', 'softwareCovers', 'ob', 'sir', 'statusBit', 'deFel', 'eBun']);
|
||||
const DA_NU_METODE = new Set(['isInteger', 'isArray', 'includes', 'test', 'some', 'every', 'has', 'isNaN']);
|
||||
const mutanti = []; let inAfara = 0, cauta = true;
|
||||
const adauga = (n, cu, ce) => { if (!cauta) { inAfara++; return; } const cheie = `${ce}: ${scurt(text(n))} -> ${scurt(cu)}`; mutanti.push({ start: n.start, end: n.end, cu, cheie, descriere: `${M}:${linia(n.start)} ${cheie}` }); };
|
||||
function mergi(n, parinte) {
|
||||
if (!n || typeof n.type !== 'string') return;
|
||||
if (n.type === 'LogicalExpression' && (n.operator === '&&' || n.operator === '||')) { adauga(n, '(' + text(n.left) + ')', `${n.operator} without its right side`); adauga(n, '(' + text(n.right) + ')', `${n.operator} without its left side`); }
|
||||
if (n.type === 'BinaryExpression') {
|
||||
const o = n.operator;
|
||||
if (o === '===' || o === '!==') { adauga(n, 'true', `${o} always true`); adauga(n, 'false', `${o} always false`); }
|
||||
const mutat = { '<': '<=', '<=': '<', '>': '>=', '>=': '>' }[o];
|
||||
if (mutat) { adauga(n, '(' + text(n.left) + ' ' + mutat + ' ' + text(n.right) + ')', `the edge of ${o} moved`); adauga(n, 'true', `${o} always true`); }
|
||||
if ((o === '+' || o === '-') && n.right.type === 'Identifier' && n.right.name === 'sk') adauga(n, '(' + text(n.left) + ')', 'the tolerance removed');
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (n.type === 'CallExpression') {
|
||||
const c = n.callee; const nume = c.type === 'Identifier' ? c.name : c.type === 'MemberExpression' && c.property.type === 'Identifier' ? '.' + c.property.name : null;
|
||||
if (nume && (DA_NU.has(nume) || (nume[0] === '.' && DA_NU_METODE.has(nume.slice(1)))) && !(parinte && parinte.type === 'ExpressionStatement')) { adauga(n, 'true', `${nume}() always yes`); adauga(n, 'false', `${nume}() always no`); }
|
||||
}
|
||||
for (const k of Object.keys(n)) { const v = n[k]; if (k === 'start' || k === 'end' || k === 'type') continue; if (Array.isArray(v)) v.forEach((x) => mergi(x, n)); else if (v && typeof v === 'object') mergi(v, n); }
|
||||
}
|
||||
// each top-level statement: searched unless every name it declares is a producer
|
||||
const numeDeclarate = (st) => { const d = st.type === 'ExportNamedDeclaration' && st.declaration ? st.declaration : st; return d.type === 'FunctionDeclaration' || d.type === 'ClassDeclaration' ? [d.id.name] : d.type === 'VariableDeclaration' ? d.declarations.map((x) => (x.id.type === 'Identifier' ? x.id.name : '?')) : []; };
|
||||
const vazute = new Set();
|
||||
for (const st of AST.body) { const nume = numeDeclarate(st); nume.forEach((x) => vazute.add(x)); cauta = !(nume.length > 0 && nume.every((x) => PRODUCATORI.includes(x))); mergi(st, null); }
|
||||
const lipsa = PRODUCATORI.filter((x) => !vazute.has(x));
|
||||
if (lipsa.length) { console.log(`NEMASURAT: PRODUCATORI names what ${M} no longer declares at its top level: ${lipsa.join(', ')}`); process.exit(2); }
|
||||
const doar = arg('--doar'); const dinRulare = arg('--supravietuitori') ? new Set(JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(arg('--supravietuitori'), 'utf8')).mutanti.filter((m) => m.ucis === null).map((m) => m.cheie || m.descriere.replace(/^\S+ /, ''))) : null;
|
||||
const alesi = mutanti.filter((m) => (!doar || m.descriere.includes(doar)) && (!dinRulare || dinRulare.has(m.cheie))); const filtrat = !!doar || !!dinRulare;
|
||||
console.log(`${mutanti.length} mutants derived from the verifier in ${M}; ${inAfara} more lie in the producers and the key files, which are NOT searched` + (filtrat ? `\nFILTERED (${doar ? '--doar ' + doar : '--supravietuitori'}): ${alesi.length} run; the others are not measured by this run` : ''));
|
||||
|
||||
// one copy per worker: this directory and the files it imports from its neighbours (as the negative control does); each mutant is
|
||||
// written over device.mjs of the worker's copy
|
||||
const T = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'aere-device-mutanti-'));
|
||||
function copie(nume) {
|
||||
const R = path.join(T, nume); const d = path.join(R, NUME); fs.mkdirSync(d, { recursive: true });
|
||||
for (const e of fs.readdirSync(AICI, { withFileTypes: true })) { if (e.isDirectory()) { if (e.name === 'fixturi' || e.name === 'dovezi-ancora-28001') fs.cpSync(path.join(AICI, e.name), path.join(d, e.name), { recursive: true }); } else if (/\.mjs$/.test(e.name)) fs.copyFileSync(path.join(AICI, e.name), path.join(d, e.name)); }
|
||||
const vecini = new Set(); for (const f of [M, 'device-cli.mjs', 'proba-device.mjs']) for (const m of fs.readFileSync(path.join(AICI, f), 'utf8').matchAll(/from '\.\.\/([^']+)'/g)) vecini.add(m[1]);
|
||||
for (const v of vecini) { const q = path.join(R, v); fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(q), { recursive: true }); fs.copyFileSync(path.join(AICI, '..', v), q); }
|
||||
return d;
|
||||
}
|
||||
const proba = (d) => new Promise((gata) => {
|
||||
const c = spawn(process.execPath, [path.join(d, 'proba-device.mjs'), '--repede', '--json'], { stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'] }); let out = '', err = ''; const t = setTimeout(() => c.kill(), 120000);
|
||||
c.stdout.on('data', (x) => { out += x; }); c.stderr.on('data', (x) => { err += x; });
|
||||
c.on('close', () => { clearTimeout(t); try { gata(JSON.parse(out.trim().split('\n').slice(-1)[0])); } catch { gata({ cazut: (err || out).trim().split('\n').slice(-1)[0].slice(0, 160) }); } });
|
||||
});
|
||||
let stare = 0;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const dMartor = copie('martor'); const martor = await proba(dMartor);
|
||||
if (martor.cazut || !Array.isArray(martor.rows) || martor.rosii) { console.log('NEMASURAT: the probe on the untouched copy is not green: ' + (martor.cazut || martor.rosii + ' red rows')); process.exit(2); }
|
||||
console.log(`the untouched copy: ${martor.verzi} rows green (fast mode)`);
|
||||
const n = Math.max(1, Number(arg('--paralel')) || Math.min(8, os.cpus().length)); const rez = new Array(alesi.length); let k = 0, facuti = 0;
|
||||
await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: Math.min(n, alesi.length) }, async (_, w) => { const d = copie('w' + w); while (k < alesi.length) { const i = k++; const m = alesi[i];
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(d, M), SRC.slice(0, m.start) + m.cu + SRC.slice(m.end)); const r = await proba(d);
|
||||
rez[i] = r.cazut ? { ucis: 'the probe could not run: ' + r.cazut } : r.rosii ? { ucis: r.rows.filter((x) => x.state === 'ROSU').map((x) => x.id) } : { ucis: null };
|
||||
if (++facuti % 100 === 0) console.error(` ... ${facuti} of ${alesi.length}`); } }));
|
||||
const supravietuitori = alesi.filter((m, i) => rez[i].ucis === null); const declarati = (m) => ECHIVALENTI.find(([t]) => m.cheie.includes(t));
|
||||
const nedeclarati = supravietuitori.filter((m) => !declarati(m)), invechite = filtrat ? [] : ECHIVALENTI.filter(([t]) => !supravietuitori.some((m) => m.cheie.includes(t)));
|
||||
const prinCadere = rez.filter((r) => typeof r.ucis === 'string').length;
|
||||
console.log(`\nKILLED ${alesi.length - supravietuitori.length} (${prinCadere} of them because the probe could no longer build its world), SURVIVED ${supravietuitori.length}: ${supravietuitori.length - nedeclarati.length} declared equivalent, ${nedeclarati.length} NOT declared`);
|
||||
for (const m of nedeclarati) console.log(' SURVIVES ' + m.descriere);
|
||||
for (const [t] of invechite) console.log(' STALE an entry of ECHIVALENTI names no survivor any more: ' + t);
|
||||
if (arg('--json')) fs.writeFileSync(arg('--json'), JSON.stringify({ mutanti: alesi.map((m, i) => ({ descriere: m.descriere, cheie: m.cheie, ucis: rez[i].ucis })) }, null, 1) + '\n');
|
||||
stare = nedeclarati.length || invechite.length ? 1 : filtrat ? 2 : 0;
|
||||
} finally { fs.rmSync(T, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
|
||||
process.exitCode = stare;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
|
||||
// plantari-device.mjs: the plantings of the negative control of the device verifier, as DATA, in one place. Two controls read them:
|
||||
// control-negativ-device.mjs (each planting must turn exactly its ROWS of the probe red) and the conformance suite's control of the
|
||||
// halves (its proba-conformance.mjs --control-negativ: the plantings it names must make exactly their VECTORS fail).
|
||||
// A planting is [what is taken out, file, pattern or [patterns], replacement or [replacements], the rows that must go red]; every
|
||||
// pattern must be in the file EXACTLY ONCE (a control whose pattern is gone is broken, and counts as a failure, not as a pass).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// What is planted here by hand: the defects of BEHAVIOUR (whose record counts, what lifts what, which of two holds, what is said and
|
||||
// what is passed in silence, the command line) and the conditions a search by mutation does not derive (a tolerance GIVEN to an
|
||||
// ending, two checks that guard one thing taken out together, an order turned round). The conditions of the verifier one at a time
|
||||
// (each side of every && and ||, every comparison, every edge of an interval, every tolerance, every yes-or-no call) are derived from
|
||||
// the code by mutanti-device.mjs, which needs no list.
|
||||
export const M = 'device.mjs', C = 'device-cli.mjs';
|
||||
// the rows a planting must turn red can be derived from the witness run: by the rule they expect, or by the verdict they require
|
||||
const cuRegula = (r) => (rows) => rows.filter((x) => x.expects.includes(r)).map((x) => x.id);
|
||||
// every row that requires a PARTIAL verdict: the rows of that kind, and the rows of other kinds that require one among other things
|
||||
const partiale = (rows) => [...rows.filter((x) => x.kind === 'partial').map((x) => x.id), 'D05', 'D08', 'D09', 'S24'];
|
||||
// every attack row that reaches the end of the verifier (a bundle refused for its form, or one that cannot be read, has no subject to return)
|
||||
const cuSubiect = (rows) => rows.filter((x) => x.kind === 'attack' && !x.expects.includes('form') && !x.expects.includes('unreadable')).map((x) => x.id);
|
||||
// the conditions of the windows, as they stand in the verifier
|
||||
const FER = 'nb - sk <= acum && acum <= na && nb - sk <= tq && tq <= na /*PAZA:authorization-window*/';
|
||||
const PRO = 'tq <= acum + sk && acum - tq <= maxAgeS * 1000 /*PAZA:freshness*/';
|
||||
const MW = 'vf - sk <= acum && acum <= vu /*PAZA:manufacture-window*/';
|
||||
const ACE = 'a.id === b.id && canonical(a.keys) === canonical(b.keys)';
|
||||
const DATA_ = "if (typeof s !== 'string' || !DATA.test(s) || Number.isNaN(Date.parse(s)))";
|
||||
const LISTA_A_LUI = "aceeasi(l.statement.issuer, S.issuer) && verifyText('status-list', canonical(l.statement), l.signature, S.issuer.keys)";
|
||||
const POLITICA_A_LUI = "&& aceeasi(q.issuer, R.signer) && verifica('firmware-policy', q, p.signature, R.signer.keys)";
|
||||
const CITIBIL = 'const citibil = s.v === VERSION && STATES.includes(s.state) && Number.isInteger(s.seq);';
|
||||
const VEDERE = 'if (!v || s.seq > v.seq) vederi.set(s.by.id,';
|
||||
const ROL = "S !== null && aceeasi(s.by, S.issuer) ? 'manufacturer' : aceeasi(s.by, owner) ? 'owner' : fosti.some((x) => aceeasi(s.by, x)) ? 'previous' : null;";
|
||||
const ALT_PRODUCATOR = "if (semnat && incredere !== null && incredere.includes(s.by.id)) nejudecat('status-other-manufacturer'";
|
||||
const LISTE_CLI = "o.statusLists = toate('--status-list').flatMap(elemente); o.firmwarePolicies = toate('--policy').flatMap(elemente); o.statusRecords = toate('--status').flatMap(elemente); o.anchors = toate('--reading').flatMap(elemente);";
|
||||
// [what is taken out, file, pattern (exactly once) or [pattern, pattern], replacement or [replacement, replacement], the rows that must go red]
|
||||
export const PLANTARI = [
|
||||
// ---- signatures and keys
|
||||
// D08 goes red with it: the evidence recorded on the testnet was signed with the purpose in the message, and no longer verifies without it
|
||||
['no purpose separation (one message whatever the purpose)', M, "return Buffer.from(DOMENIU + scop + '\\n' + text, 'utf8'); }", "return Buffer.from(text, 'utf8'); }", ['C39', 'D08']],
|
||||
['one half of the hybrid signature is enough', M, "Buffer.from(sig.ed25519, 'base64')) && crypto.verify(", "Buffer.from(sig.ed25519, 'base64')) || crypto.verify(", ['C38b', 'S16']],
|
||||
['the type of the device key is not checked', M, 'if (k.asymmetricKeyType !== ALG_DEVICE) throw', 'if (false) throw', ['C12', 'C13', 'C14', 'D02']],
|
||||
['the device key is accepted in any base64 text (its canonical form is not required)', M, "if (k.export({ type: 'spki', format: 'der' }).toString('base64') !== b64) throw", 'if (false) throw', ['F20', 'F21']],
|
||||
['a hybrid signature of a link is accepted in any base64 text', M, 'if (!hibridCanonic(sig)) return false;', 'if (false) return false;', ['F35']],
|
||||
['the attestation signature is accepted in any base64 text', M, 'b64canonic(X.signature.value) && crypto.verify(', "typeof X.signature.value === 'string' && crypto.verify(", ['F36']],
|
||||
['the manufacturer\'s signature is accepted in any base64 text', M, "hibridCanonic(M.signature) && verifyText('credential'", "verifyText('credential'", ['F37']],
|
||||
['identities are compared by their keys alone (the id half of the comparison taken out)', M, ACE, 'canonical(a.keys) === canonical(b.keys)', ['F23']],
|
||||
['identities are compared by their id alone (the keys half of the comparison taken out)', M, ACE, 'a.id === b.id', ['F24']],
|
||||
['the scheme a hybrid signature declares is not read', M, 'if (sig.alg !== ALG_HIBRID) return false;', 'if (false) return false;', ['H20']],
|
||||
['the scheme the attestation signature declares is not read', M, 'X.signature.alg === ALG_DEVICE && b64canonic(', 'b64canonic(', ['C16']],
|
||||
// a link is exactly { statement, signature }, a signature exactly its members
|
||||
['a member more in a hybrid signature object is accepted', M, 'if (!numai(sig, SEMN_HIBRID)) return false;', 'if (false) return false;', ['M01', 'M09']],
|
||||
['a member more beside the statement and the signature of the manufacture credential is accepted', M, 'numai(M, LEGATURA) && numai(M.signature, SEMN_HIBRID)', 'numai(M.signature, SEMN_HIBRID)', ['M03']],
|
||||
['a member more in the manufacturer\'s signature object is accepted', M, 'numai(M.signature, SEMN_HIBRID) && hibridCanonic(M.signature)', 'hibridCanonic(M.signature)', ['M04', 'RM12']],
|
||||
['a member more beside the statement and the signature of a release is accepted', M, "numai(F, LEGATURA) && verifica('firmware'", "verifica('firmware'", ['M05']],
|
||||
['a member more beside the statement and the signature of a transfer is accepted', M, "numai(T[i], LEGATURA) && verifica('transfer'", "verifica('transfer'", ['M02']],
|
||||
['a member more beside the statement and the signature of an authorization is accepted', M, "numai(A, LEGATURA) && verifica('authorization'", "verifica('authorization'", ['M06']],
|
||||
['a member more beside the statement and the signature of an attestation is accepted', M, 'numai(X, LEGATURA) && numai(X.signature, SEMN_DISPOZITIV)', 'numai(X.signature, SEMN_DISPOZITIV)', ['M07']],
|
||||
['a member more in the attestation\'s signature object is accepted', M, 'numai(X.signature, SEMN_DISPOZITIV) && X.signature.alg', 'X.signature.alg', ['M08']],
|
||||
// the form of a time: three conditions
|
||||
['a time in another form than RFC 3339 UTC is read (whatever a date parser understands)', M, DATA_, "if (typeof s !== 'string' || Number.isNaN(Date.parse(s)))", ['H21', 'H22']],
|
||||
['a time that has the form of a time and is not a date is read', M, DATA_, "if (typeof s !== 'string' || !DATA.test(s))", ['T23']],
|
||||
['a time that is not a text is read', M, DATA_, 'if (!DATA.test(s) || Number.isNaN(Date.parse(s)))', ['T22']],
|
||||
// ---- the manufacture credential
|
||||
['a manufacture credential that has not begun is accepted', M, MW, 'acum <= vu /*PAZA:manufacture-window*/', ['F01']],
|
||||
['an expired manufacture credential is accepted', M, MW, 'vf - sk <= acum /*PAZA:manufacture-window*/', ['C05', 'H13']],
|
||||
['the ending of a manufacture credential is given the tolerance', M, MW, 'vf - sk <= acum && acum <= vu + sk /*PAZA:manufacture-window*/', ['H13']],
|
||||
['the beginning of a manufacture credential is given no tolerance', M, MW, 'vf <= acum && acum <= vu /*PAZA:manufacture-window*/', ['H14', 'T02']],
|
||||
['claims under selective disclosure are accepted in a manufacture credential', M, ' && Array.isArray(s.sd) && s.sd.length === 0 && ob(s.claims)', ' && Array.isArray(s.sd) && ob(s.claims)', ['H07']],
|
||||
['a recall list of another manufacturer is believed', M, LISTA_A_LUI, "verifyText('status-list', canonical(l.statement), l.signature, l.statement.issuer.keys)", ['B05']],
|
||||
['a recall list is believed on the issuer it names (its signature is not checked)', M, LISTA_A_LUI, 'aceeasi(l.statement.issuer, S.issuer)', ['S17']],
|
||||
['a recall list signed with the manufacturer\'s keys is believed whatever issuer it names', M, LISTA_A_LUI, "verifyText('status-list', canonical(l.statement), l.signature, S.issuer.keys)", ['S18']],
|
||||
['a recall list under another id is read as the list the credential names', M, 'return l.statement.id === S.status.list && aceeasi(', 'return aceeasi(', ['H05', 'H06']],
|
||||
['the last current recall list decides (a recall is lifted by a clean list after it)', M, 'rev = statusBit(L, S.status.index) || rev; citite++;', 'rev = statusBit(L, S.status.index); citite++;', ['C07']],
|
||||
['an expired recall list is read as current', M, "inV = data(l.statement.validFrom, 'status validFrom') - sk <= acum && acum <= data(l.statement.validUntil, 'status validUntil');", 'inV = true;', ['B06', 'B06b', 'H19', 'T06']],
|
||||
['the ending of a recall list is given the tolerance', M, "acum <= data(l.statement.validUntil, 'status validUntil');", "acum <= data(l.statement.validUntil, 'status validUntil') + sk;", ['H19']],
|
||||
['a recall list whose validity is not a time is dropped in silence', M, 'if (inV === null) listeNecitite++; else if (inV) curente.push(l);', 'if (inV) curente.push(l);', ['B06b']],
|
||||
['a hardware root in the manufacture credential passes in silence', M, "if (S.claims.hardwareRoot != null) nejudecat('hardware-root'", "if (false) nejudecat('hardware-root'", ['B18']],
|
||||
// ---- firmware
|
||||
['the id of who signed a release is not derived from its keys', M, 'idDin(R.signer.keys) === R.signer.id && (S === null', '(S === null', ['F26']],
|
||||
['with two firmware policies the loosest floor holds', M, 'prag = Math.max(...curente', 'prag = Math.min(...curente', ['C22']],
|
||||
['a retraction is lifted by a policy that does not list it', M, 'const retras = curente.some((p) => p.statement.retracted.some(', 'const retras = curente.every((p) => p.statement.retracted.some(', ['C24', 'D09']],
|
||||
['a retraction written in upper case is not seen', M, 'const scris = (x) => String(x).toLowerCase();', 'const scris = (x) => String(x);', ['C24b']],
|
||||
['a firmware policy of a stranger is believed', M, POLITICA_A_LUI, "&& verifica('firmware-policy', q, p.signature, q.issuer.keys)", ['B08']],
|
||||
['a firmware policy is believed on the issuer it names (its signature is not checked)', M, POLITICA_A_LUI, '&& aceeasi(q.issuer, R.signer)', ['S19']],
|
||||
['a firmware policy signed with the manufacturer\'s keys is believed whatever issuer it names', M, POLITICA_A_LUI, "&& verifica('firmware-policy', q, p.signature, R.signer.keys)", ['S20']],
|
||||
['a firmware policy of another model is believed', M, 'return q.model === R.model && aceeasi(q.issuer, R.signer)', 'return aceeasi(q.issuer, R.signer)', ['F12']],
|
||||
['a firmware policy of a version this verifier does not read is dropped in silence', M, "if (q.v !== VERSION) { necitite.push('it is of a version this verifier does not read'); continue; }", 'if (q.v !== VERSION) continue;', ['F19c']],
|
||||
// the end of a policy's validity is no longer read: an expired policy counts, and a validity that is not a time is never looked at
|
||||
['an expired firmware policy is read as current', M, "inVigoare = data(q.validFrom, 'policy validFrom') - sk <= acum && acum <= data(q.validUntil, 'policy validUntil');", "inVigoare = data(q.validFrom, 'policy validFrom') - sk <= acum;", ['F13', 'F14', 'F19b', 'H18']],
|
||||
['the ending of a firmware policy is given the tolerance', M, "acum <= data(q.validUntil, 'policy validUntil');", "acum <= data(q.validUntil, 'policy validUntil') + sk;", ['H18']],
|
||||
['a firmware policy that has not begun is read as current', M, "inVigoare = data(q.validFrom, 'policy validFrom') - sk <= acum && acum <= data(q.validUntil, 'policy validUntil');", "inVigoare = acum <= data(q.validUntil, 'policy validUntil');", ['F15']],
|
||||
['a retracted entry that is not a digest is read as nothing retracted', M, "q.retracted.every((x) => typeof x === 'string' && DIGEST_SCRIS.test(x))", "q.retracted.every((x) => typeof x === 'string')", ['F16', 'F17', 'F18']],
|
||||
['a floor that is not a whole number is read as a floor', M, 'else if (!(Number.isInteger(q.minSequence) && q.minSequence >= 0)) necitite.push(', 'else if (false) necitite.push(', ['F19', 'H10']],
|
||||
['a negative floor is read as a floor', M, 'else if (!(Number.isInteger(q.minSequence) && q.minSequence >= 0)) necitite.push(', 'else if (!(Number.isInteger(q.minSequence))) necitite.push(', ['H10']],
|
||||
['a policy whose validity is not a time is dropped in silence', M, 'if (inVigoare === false) continue;', 'if (inVigoare !== true) continue;', ['F19b']],
|
||||
['a policy that cannot be read passes in silence', M, "if (necitite.length) nejudecat('firmware-policy-unread'", "if (false) nejudecat('firmware-policy-unread'", ['F16', 'F17', 'F18', 'F19', 'F19b', 'F19c', 'H10', 'S21', 'S22']],
|
||||
['the Proof of Software attestation is not required to list the image', M, ' && softwareCovers(softwareAttestation, R.digest) /*PAZA:firmware-software*/', ' /*PAZA:firmware-software*/', ['F28', 'H08', 'H09']],
|
||||
['the Proof of Software attestation is not required to be the one named', M, 'softwareAttestation.statementHash === R.softwareAttestationHash && softwareCovers(softwareAttestation, R.digest)', 'softwareCovers(softwareAttestation, R.digest)', ['C29']],
|
||||
['the Proof of Software attestation is not required to hash to its statementHash', M, "hex0x(sha(Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(att.statement), 'utf8'))) === att.statementHash", 'true', ['H09']],
|
||||
['an attestation of another kind is taken for a Proof of Software attestation', M, "att.statement.kind === 'aere-proof-of-software' && ", '', ['H08']],
|
||||
['a release is written over an attestation that does not cover its image', M, 'if (softwareAttestation != null && !softwareCovers(softwareAttestation, dg)) throw', 'if (false) throw', ['D02']],
|
||||
['a policy is written with a retracted entry that is not a digest', M, 'if (r.some((x) => !H32.test(x))) throw', 'if (false) throw', ['D02']],
|
||||
// ---- ownership
|
||||
['the id of who GIVES a transfer is not derived from its keys', M, 'idDin(D.from.keys) === D.from.id && idDin(D.to.keys) === D.to.id /*PAZA:transfer-ids*/', 'idDin(D.to.keys) === D.to.id /*PAZA:transfer-ids*/', ['F09']],
|
||||
['the id of who RECEIVES a transfer is not derived from its keys', M, 'idDin(D.from.keys) === D.from.id && idDin(D.to.keys) === D.to.id /*PAZA:transfer-ids*/', 'idDin(D.from.keys) === D.from.id /*PAZA:transfer-ids*/', ['C43']],
|
||||
['the position of a transfer is not required', M, 'D.seq === i + 1 && (head === null || D.prev === head) /*PAZA:transfer-prev*/', '(head === null || D.prev === head) /*PAZA:transfer-prev*/', ['F07']],
|
||||
['a transfer is not required to name the link before it', M, 'D.seq === i + 1 && (head === null || D.prev === head) /*PAZA:transfer-prev*/', 'D.seq === i + 1 /*PAZA:transfer-prev*/', ['F08']],
|
||||
['a transfer may be dated in the future', M, 't >= tInainte && t <= acum + sk /*PAZA:transfer-time*/', 't >= tInainte /*PAZA:transfer-time*/', ['C41']],
|
||||
['a transfer may be dated before the link before it', M, 't >= tInainte && t <= acum + sk /*PAZA:transfer-time*/', 't <= acum + sk /*PAZA:transfer-time*/', ['C40', 'H29']],
|
||||
['a transfer is required to come after the manufacture only, not after the transfer before it', M, 'tInainte = t; owner = D.to; head = linkHash(T[i]);', 'owner = D.to; head = linkHash(T[i]);', ['H29']],
|
||||
['a chain of exactly the most transfers that are read is refused', M, 'T.length <= MAX_TRANSFERS /*PAZA:chain-length*/', 'T.length < MAX_TRANSFERS /*PAZA:chain-length*/', ['H04']],
|
||||
['a chain broken at the form of a link keeps its owner and its head', M, 'if (!lantBun) { owner = null; head = null; }', 'if (false) { owner = null; head = null; }', ['H30']],
|
||||
// ---- authorization: the four conditions of its window, one at a time, then the two pairs, then an ending given the tolerance
|
||||
['the id of who grants an authorization is not derived from its keys', M, 'idDin(Z.owner.keys) === Z.owner.id && (owner === null', '(owner === null', ['F27']],
|
||||
['an authorization that has not begun on the verifier\'s clock is accepted', M, FER, 'acum <= na && nb - sk <= tq && tq <= na /*PAZA:authorization-window*/', ['F06']],
|
||||
['an authorization that ended on the verifier\'s clock is accepted', M, FER, 'nb - sk <= acum && nb - sk <= tq && tq <= na /*PAZA:authorization-window*/', ['F04']],
|
||||
['an authorization that had not begun when the device attested is accepted', M, FER, 'nb - sk <= acum && acum <= na && tq <= na /*PAZA:authorization-window*/', ['F03']],
|
||||
['an authorization that ends before the time of the attestation is accepted', M, FER, 'nb - sk <= acum && acum <= na && nb - sk <= tq /*PAZA:authorization-window*/', ['F05']],
|
||||
['the authorization is not judged at the time of the attestation at all', M, FER, 'nb - sk <= acum && acum <= na /*PAZA:authorization-window*/', ['F03', 'F05']],
|
||||
['the beginning of an authorization is not judged at all', M, FER, 'acum <= na && tq <= na /*PAZA:authorization-window*/', ['F02', 'F03', 'F06']],
|
||||
['the ending of an authorization is given the tolerance on the verifier\'s clock', M, FER, 'nb - sk <= acum && acum <= na + sk && nb - sk <= tq && tq <= na /*PAZA:authorization-window*/', ['F04']],
|
||||
['the ending of an authorization is given the tolerance at the time of the attestation', M, FER, 'nb - sk <= acum && acum <= na && nb - sk <= tq && tq <= na + sk /*PAZA:authorization-window*/', ['F05']],
|
||||
// ---- status: whose record counts
|
||||
['the manufacturer\'s retirement, and the owner\'s, are lifted like a suspension', M, "if (s.state === 'retired') { if (retras === null", "if (false) { if (retras === null", cuRegula('status-retired')],
|
||||
['the manufacturer\'s records stop counting once the device is sold', M, "S !== null && aceeasi(s.by, S.issuer) ? 'manufacturer'", "S !== null && aceeasi(s.by, S.issuer) && aceeasi(s.by, owner) ? 'manufacturer'", ['A08', 'A08b', 'C51', 'C52', 'C53', 'C53b', 'C55', 'D05', 'G09', 'G11', 'G12', 'H28', 'J01', 'J04', 'K07', 'S01', 'S03', 'S06', 'S09', 'T16']],
|
||||
['anyone can write a status record', M, "fosti.some((x) => aceeasi(s.by, x)) ? 'previous' : null;", "fosti.some((x) => aceeasi(s.by, x)) ? 'previous' : 'owner';", ['A06', 'J05', 'K01', 'K02', 'K03', 'K04', 'K05', 'K06', 'S25']],
|
||||
['a record of a PREVIOUS owner binds the owner of now', M, "aceeasi(s.by, x)) ? 'previous' : null;", "aceeasi(s.by, x)) ? 'owner' : null;", ['A07', 'D07', 'G06', 'G07', 'G08', 'G14', 'I10', 'J06']],
|
||||
['an owner that owned the device before is taken for a previous owner (the order of the roles turned round)', M, ROL, "S !== null && aceeasi(s.by, S.issuer) ? 'manufacturer' : fosti.some((x) => aceeasi(s.by, x)) ? 'previous' : aceeasi(s.by, owner) ? 'owner' : null;", ['A11', 'G03', 'G04', 'G05']],
|
||||
['the records of a previous owner pass in silence', M, "nejudecat('status-prior-ownership', 'status', `status: ${l.citite.length", "void ('status-prior-ownership', 'status', `status: ${l.citite.length", ['A07', 'D07', 'G06', 'G07', 'G08', 'G14', 'I10']],
|
||||
['what the records of a previous owner say is not reported', M, 'priorOwnership: subAnteriori,', 'priorOwnership: [],', ['A07', 'D07', 'G06', 'G07', 'G08', 'I10']],
|
||||
['what the records of a previous owner say is reported without their number', M, 'subAnteriori.push({ owner: id, state: spune, records: l.citite.length });', 'subAnteriori.push({ owner: id, state: spune, records: 1 });', ['A07', 'G08', 'I10']],
|
||||
['of a previous owner\'s records, "suspended" is said when any says so (not the highest)', M, "l.citite.some((x) => x.seq === m && x.state === 'suspended') ? 'suspended'", "l.citite.some((x) => x.state === 'suspended') ? 'suspended'", ['G08']],
|
||||
['of a previous owner\'s records, "retired" is said only when the highest says so', M, "l.citite.some((x) => x.state === 'retired') ? 'retired'", "l.citite.some((x) => x.seq === m && x.state === 'retired') ? 'retired'", ['G08']],
|
||||
// the defect this control did not see on 2026-10-05: a retirement of the owner of now under another head, or under none, was ignored
|
||||
['the owner\'s retirement and suspension count only under the current ownership head', M, "if (rol === 'owner' && s.state === 'active' && s.ownership !== head) {", "if (rol === 'owner' && s.ownership !== head) {", ['G01', 'G02', 'G03', 'G04']],
|
||||
['an "active" record of the owner is believed under any ownership head', M, "if (rol === 'owner' && s.state === 'active' && s.ownership !== head) {", 'if (false) {', ['G05']],
|
||||
['a record of who may give it that cannot be read is ignored (the registry is read as clean)', M, "if (!citibil) { nejudecat('status-unread', 'status', 'status: a record of who may give it that cannot be read'", "if (!citibil) { nejudecat('status-ignored', 'status', 'status: a record of who may give it that cannot be read'", ['G12', 'G13', 'H11', 'H12']],
|
||||
['a record of another version, or with a state the verifier does not know, is read as one of this version', M, CITIBIL, 'const citibil = true;', ['G12', 'G13', 'G14', 'H11', 'H12']],
|
||||
['a record whose number is not a whole number is read', M, CITIBIL, 'const citibil = s.v === VERSION && STATES.includes(s.state);', ['H11', 'H12']],
|
||||
['a record with a state this verifier does not know is read', M, CITIBIL, 'const citibil = s.v === VERSION && Number.isInteger(s.seq);', ['G13', 'G14']],
|
||||
['a record of another version is read', M, CITIBIL, 'const citibil = STATES.includes(s.state) && Number.isInteger(s.seq);', ['G12']],
|
||||
// which device a record is about
|
||||
['a record of another device is applied to this one', M, 'if (idInreg !== null && idInreg !== devScris) continue;', 'if (false) continue;', ['F22']],
|
||||
['the device id of a record is compared with regard to case', M, 'const DEV_SCRIS = /^aere-device:([0-9a-fA-F]{40})$/;', 'const DEV_SCRIS = /^aere-device:([0-9a-f]{40})$/;', ['J01', 'J02']],
|
||||
['a record whose device id is not a device id is passed over in silence', M, 'if (idInreg !== null && idInreg !== devScris) continue;', 'if (idInreg !== devScris) continue;', ['J03', 'J04', 'J05', 'J06', 'S06']],
|
||||
['a record of who may give it whose device id cannot be read is ignored (the registry is read as clean)', M, "if (aLui) nejudecat('status-unread', 'status', 'status: a record whose device id cannot be read'", "if (false) nejudecat('status-unread', 'status', 'status: a record whose device id cannot be read'", ['J03', 'J04', 'S06']],
|
||||
['a device id written as a one-element list is read as the id', M, "const m = typeof x === 'string' ? DEV_SCRIS.exec(x) : null;", 'const m = DEV_SCRIS.exec(x);', ['S06']],
|
||||
// TWO checks guard a record of the owner or of the manufacturer under an id its keys do not derive: the derivation in the status
|
||||
// loop, and the id half of every comparison of identities. Either alone refuses it (F25 stays green with one of them out), so they
|
||||
// are planted out together. The derivation ALONE is what keeps a stranger from speaking under the id of another trusted manufacturer.
|
||||
['DOUBLE: a status record under an id its keys do not derive is applied (the derivation in the status loop AND the id half of the comparison, both out)', M, ["idDin(s.by.keys) === s.by.id && verifica('status'", ACE], ["verifica('status'", 'canonical(a.keys) === canonical(b.keys)'], ['F23', 'F25', 'S07']],
|
||||
['a status record signed with any keys under the id of another trusted manufacturer is taken for that manufacturer\'s', M, "idDin(s.by.keys) === s.by.id && verifica('status'", "verifica('status'", ['S07']],
|
||||
['a record of another manufacturer the verifier trusts is passed over', M, ALT_PRODUCATOR, "if (false) nejudecat('status-other-manufacturer'", ['K01', 'K02']],
|
||||
['a signed record of any stranger keeps the verdict from VALID (whether the verifier trusts its signer is not read)', M, ALT_PRODUCATOR, "if (semnat && incredere !== null) nejudecat('status-other-manufacturer'", ['A06', 'H30', 'J05', 'K03', 'K05', 'K06']],
|
||||
['an unsigned record under the id of a trusted manufacturer keeps the verdict from VALID', M, ALT_PRODUCATOR, "if (incredere !== null && ob(s.by) && incredere.includes(s.by.id)) nejudecat('status-other-manufacturer'", ['S07', 'S08']],
|
||||
['a suspension is lifted by another signer\'s later record', M, "const v = vederi.get(s.by.id);\n if (!v || s.seq > v.seq) vederi.set(s.by.id,", "const v = vederi.get('x');\n if (!v || s.seq > v.seq) vederi.set('x',", ['C55']],
|
||||
['a suspension expires with its record', M, "suspendat: s.state === 'suspended', pana: vu", "suspendat: s.state === 'suspended' && vu >= acum, pana: vu", ['C57', 'S27']],
|
||||
['an expired "active" record is believed', M, '.some((v) => v.pana >= acum);', '.some(() => true);', ['B10', 'H15']],
|
||||
['the ending of an "active" record is given the tolerance', M, '.some((v) => v.pana >= acum);', '.some((v) => v.pana + sk >= acum);', ['H15']],
|
||||
['of two records with one number the laxer holds', M, "v.suspendat = v.suspendat || s.state === 'suspended';", "v.suspendat = v.suspendat && s.state === 'suspended';", ['C58', 'H02']],
|
||||
['the last record in the list holds, not the one with the highest number', M, VEDERE, 'if (!v || s.seq !== v.seq) vederi.set(s.by.id,', ['H01', 'H03']],
|
||||
['of two records with one number the last in the list holds', M, VEDERE, 'if (!v || s.seq >= v.seq) vederi.set(s.by.id,', ['H02']],
|
||||
['the record with the lowest number holds (a later record changes nothing)', M, VEDERE, 'if (!v || s.seq < v.seq) vederi.set(s.by.id,', ['A05', 'A11', 'C56', 'G02', 'G03', 'H01', 'H03']],
|
||||
['a record dated in the future is applied', M, "if (at > acum + sk) { nejudecat('status-future'", "if (false) { nejudecat('status-future'", ['A08', 'A08b']],
|
||||
['a record dated in the future is skipped in silence', M, "{ nejudecat('status-future', 'status',", "{ void ('status-future', 'status',", ['A08', 'A08b']],
|
||||
['a record dated just ahead of the verifier\'s clock is given no tolerance', M, "if (at > acum + sk) { nejudecat('status-future'", "if (at > acum) { nejudecat('status-future'", ['G11', 'T16']],
|
||||
['a retirement whose date cannot be read is dropped', M, 'at = -Infinity; vu = -Infinity;', 'continue;', ['G09']],
|
||||
['an "active" record whose time cannot be read is not said to be ignored', M, "if (s.state === 'active') { nejudecat('status-ignored', 'status', 'status: an \"active\" record whose time cannot be read'", "if (false) { nejudecat('status-ignored', 'status', 'status: an \"active\" record whose time cannot be read'", ['G10', 'H22']],
|
||||
['when the owner and the manufacturer both retired it, the first in the list is named (not the one that is final)', M, "if (retras === null || rol === 'manufacturer') retras =", 'if (retras === null) retras =', ['H28']],
|
||||
['an owner\'s status record is written with no ownership head (the old default)', M, "} else if (ownership == null) throw new Error('aere-device: a status record of anyone but the manufacturer", "} else if (false) throw new Error('aere-device: a status record of anyone but the manufacturer", ['D02']],
|
||||
['anybody signs a status record as the manufacturer', M, ' || !aceeasi(cine(by), m.statement.issuer)) throw', ') throw', ['D02']],
|
||||
// ---- what the verifier is handed: its shape, and how much of it is judged
|
||||
['what is handed beyond the bound on how many are judged is dropped in silence', M, 'if (lista.length > max) nejudecat(cauza, link,', 'if (false) nejudecat(cauza, link,', ['I08', 'I11', 'I12', 'I13']],
|
||||
['no bound on how many of the things handed are judged', M, 'const judecate = lista.slice(0, max), bune = judecate.filter(eBun);', 'const judecate = lista, bune = judecate.filter(eBun);', ['I08', 'I11', 'I12', 'I13']],
|
||||
['what is handed in another shape (a list inside the list, a registry object, a file of another kind) is dropped in silence', M, 'if (bune.length < judecate.length) nejudecat(cauza, link,', 'if (false) nejudecat(cauza, link,', ['D09', 'I01', 'I02', 'I03', 'I04', 'I05', 'I06', 'I07', 'S26']],
|
||||
// ---- the attestation
|
||||
['the clone check compares the device id alone (the key half taken out)', M, 'Q.deviceId === S.claims.deviceId && Q.key === S.claims.deviceKey /*PAZA:attestation-device*/', 'Q.deviceId === S.claims.deviceId /*PAZA:attestation-device*/', ['C18']],
|
||||
['the clone check compares the key alone (the device id half taken out)', M, 'Q.deviceId === S.claims.deviceId && Q.key === S.claims.deviceKey /*PAZA:attestation-device*/', 'Q.key === S.claims.deviceKey /*PAZA:attestation-device*/', ['S14']],
|
||||
// the defect found on 2026-10-05: an attestation dated in the future was accepted up to the allowed age
|
||||
['an attestation dated in the future is accepted up to the allowed age', M, PRO, 'Math.abs(acum - tq) <= maxAgeS * 1000 /*PAZA:freshness*/', ['F32', 'F34']],
|
||||
['an attestation dated in the future is accepted, however far', M, PRO, 'acum - tq <= maxAgeS * 1000 /*PAZA:freshness*/', ['C62', 'F32', 'F34']],
|
||||
['an old attestation is accepted, however old', M, PRO, 'tq <= acum + sk /*PAZA:freshness*/', ['C61', 'H16']],
|
||||
['an attestation older than the allowed age is given the tolerance', M, PRO, 'tq <= acum + sk && acum - tq <= maxAgeS * 1000 + sk /*PAZA:freshness*/', ['H16']],
|
||||
// without the tolerance an attestation dated ahead is refused by freshness as well: the rows that need such an attestation no longer fail for their rule alone
|
||||
['an attestation dated ahead is given no tolerance', M, PRO, 'tq <= acum && acum - tq <= maxAgeS * 1000 /*PAZA:freshness*/', ['F05', 'F06', 'F33', 'T13']],
|
||||
['the sequence the device attests is not compared with the release', M, 'Q.firmware.digest === R.digest && Q.firmware.sequence === R.sequence /*PAZA:attestation-firmware*/', 'Q.firmware.digest === R.digest /*PAZA:attestation-firmware*/', ['F10']],
|
||||
['the digest the device attests is not compared with the release', M, 'Q.firmware.digest === R.digest && Q.firmware.sequence === R.sequence /*PAZA:attestation-firmware*/', 'Q.firmware.sequence === R.sequence /*PAZA:attestation-firmware*/', ['F11']],
|
||||
['a hardware root in the attestation passes in silence', M, "if (q.hardwareRoot != null) nejudecat('hardware-root'", "if (false) nejudecat('hardware-root'", ['B17']],
|
||||
// ---- the witness
|
||||
['the envelope is not bound to this attestation (its hash)', M, ' && E.statement.attestationHash === attestationHash(X)', '', ['C69', 'D08']],
|
||||
['the envelope is not bound to this device (its id)', M, '(E.statement.deviceId === Q.deviceId && E.statement.attestationHash === attestationHash(X))', '(E.statement.attestationHash === attestationHash(X))', ['F29']],
|
||||
['the envelope is not required to hash to its statementHash', M, "&& hex0x(sha(Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(E.statement), 'utf8'))) === E.statementHash && (Q === null", '&& (Q === null', ['C70']],
|
||||
['an envelope of another kind is taken for the envelope of a device attestation', M, "E.kind === 'aere-proof-of-device-attestation' && ", '', ['H25']],
|
||||
['an envelope whose statement is of another kind is taken for one of a device', M, " && E.statement.kind === 'aere-proof-of-device'", '', ['H26']],
|
||||
['a claim of notarization passes for a reading', M, "if (E.notarization != null && !pentruEl.length) nejudecat('witness-unread'", "if (false) nejudecat('witness-unread'", ['C66', 'D08']],
|
||||
['a reading of another envelope is taken for this one', M, 'AN.filter((a) => a.statementHash === E.statementHash)', 'AN.filter(() => true)', ['C71', 'D08']],
|
||||
['a reading whose time is in milliseconds is taken for one in seconds', M, '&& a.at > 0 && a.at < 1e11)', '&& a.at > 0)', ['C71b', 'S28', 'T19']],
|
||||
['a reading whose time is not a whole number is used', M, 'citiri = pentruEl.filter((a) => Number.isInteger(a.at) && a.at > 0 && a.at < 1e11)', 'citiri = pentruEl.filter((a) => a.at > 0 && a.at < 1e11)', ['H27', 'T19']],
|
||||
['a reading that cannot be read passes in silence', M, "if (pentruEl.length > citiri.length) nejudecat('witness-unread'", "if (false) nejudecat('witness-unread'", ['C71b', 'H27', 'S28', 'T19']],
|
||||
['of two readings the latest is the bound', M, 'citiri.reduce((x, y) => (y.at < x.at ? y : x))', 'citiri.reduce((x, y) => (y.at > x.at ? y : x))', ['H23', 'H24']],
|
||||
// ---- the bundle, the verdict, the verifier's configuration, the key files
|
||||
['a bundle of another version is read', M, '&& b.v === VERSION && (b.transfers === undefined', '&& (b.transfers === undefined', ['F30']],
|
||||
['transfers that are not a list are read', M, ' && (b.transfers === undefined || Array.isArray(b.transfers))) /*PAZA:form*/', ') /*PAZA:form*/', ['F31']],
|
||||
['what was not brought or read does not keep the verdict from VALID', M, 'export const PARTIALE = NEJUDECATE.filter((c) => !NOTATE.includes(c));', 'export const PARTIALE = [];', partiale],
|
||||
['the subject is returned also when a rule refused', M, 'subject: rules.length ? null : subject };', 'subject };', cuSubiect],
|
||||
['a link with a refused rule is reported PASSED', M, "a.some((r) => r.pass === false) ? 'FAILED' :", "a.some((r) => r.pass === false) ? 'PASSED' :", ['A09']],
|
||||
['the verifier takes a clock tolerance however large', M, 'if (!Number.isInteger(clockSkewS) || clockSkewS < 0 || clockSkewS > 600) throw', 'if (!Number.isInteger(clockSkewS) || clockSkewS < 0) throw', ['C76', 'T24']],
|
||||
['a trusted manufacturer that is neither an id nor keys is taken as it is', M, "if (!AERE_ID.test(String(id))) throw new Error('verifyDevice: a trusted manufacturer", "if (false) throw new Error('verifyDevice: a trusted manufacturer", ['T24']],
|
||||
['a key file with somebody else\'s public half is accepted', M, 'if (d.publicKey !== j.publicKey || d.deviceId !== j.deviceId) throw', 'if (false) throw', ['D01']],
|
||||
['the private half of a device key is enumerable', M, "Object.defineProperty(d, 'privat', { value: priv, enumerable: false });", "Object.defineProperty(d, 'privat', { value: priv, enumerable: true });", ['D01']],
|
||||
// ---- text made visible
|
||||
['visible(): a backslash is not doubled (a visible form can be forged)', M, 'if (n === 0x5c) out +=', 'if (false) out +=', ['V01']],
|
||||
['visible(): the C1 control characters are sent as they are', M, '[0x7f, 0x9f]', '[0x7f, 0x7f]', ['D10', 'V01']],
|
||||
['visible(): the line and paragraph separators are sent as they are', M, '[0x2028, 0x202e]', '[0x202a, 0x202e]', ['D10', 'V01']],
|
||||
// ---- the command line
|
||||
['the command line exits 0 whatever the verdict', C, "return r.verdict === 'VALID' ? 0 : r.verdict === 'INVALID' ? 1 : 2;", 'return 0;', ['D05', 'D07', 'D09', 'D10']],
|
||||
['the command line does not say what is named beside the verdict', C, 'if (notate.length) spune(', 'if (false) spune(', ['D07']],
|
||||
['the command line does not say what the records of a previous owner say', C, 'for (const p of (r.subject && r.subject.priorOwnership) || []) spune(', 'for (const p of []) spune(', ['D07']],
|
||||
['the command line hands a file that holds a list as ONE thing (it is not read element by element)', C, LISTE_CLI, "o.statusLists = toate('--status-list').map(citeste); o.firmwarePolicies = toate('--policy').map(citeste); o.statusRecords = toate('--status').map(citeste); o.anchors = toate('--reading').map(citeste);", ['D09']],
|
||||
['the command line does not open a registry object { records: [...] }', C, " : x && typeof x === 'object' && Array.isArray(x.records) && x.statement === undefined ? netezeste(x.records, adancime + 1) : [x]);", ' : [x]);', ['D09']],
|
||||
['the command line prints text from a bundle as it came (control characters reach the terminal)', C, 'const spune = (text) => { console.log(D.visible(text)); };', 'const spune = (text) => { console.log(text); };', ['D10']],
|
||||
['the command line passes its JSON through visible() (it is no longer the bundle\'s text)', C, "if (rest.includes('--json')) console.log(JSON.stringify(r, null, 1));", "if (rest.includes('--json')) spune(JSON.stringify(r, null, 1));", ['D05', 'D07', 'D09', 'D10b']],
|
||||
['an input that cannot be read exits with the code of a PARTIAL verdict', C, 'const COD_FOLOSIRE = 3, COD_CADERE = 4;', 'const COD_FOLOSIRE = 2, COD_CADERE = 4;', ['D11']],
|
||||
['a clock that is not a time exits as an unexpected failure, not as an input that cannot be read', C, 'if (/^verifyDevice: /.test(String(e && e.message))) throw new Folosire(e.message);', 'if (false) throw new Folosire(e.message);', ['D11']],
|
||||
];
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env node
|
||||
// proba-device-ancora-testnet.mjs: the chain as the witness of a device attestation, END TO END on the public testnet 28001.
|
||||
// The AIP-23 envelope of a real attestation is notarized on AereNotary with a testnet developer key, the published AIP-23 reference
|
||||
// verifier reads it back under a post-quantum certified anchor, and that reading (made by the verifier, not handed by the device)
|
||||
// bounds the attestation's time: an attestation dated AFTER its envelope was already on the chain is caught.
|
||||
// Refuses any chain but 28001 (it reads eth_chainId). The developer key is read from the file named in AERE_TESTNET_KEY_FILE, in
|
||||
// process, and is never printed. Two transactions are sent, both `notarize(bytes32)`; nothing else.
|
||||
// Writes the evidence (the bundles, the notarized envelopes, the readings, the verdicts; no private key) in dovezi-ancora-28001/.
|
||||
// AERE_TESTNET_KEY_FILE=<file> AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs> node proba-device-ancora-testnet.mjs [--rpc URL]
|
||||
// Exit 0 = every row as required; 1 = a red row; 2 = NEMASURAT (no key, no verifier, the chain is not 28001, no certified anchor came)
|
||||
import fs from 'node:fs'; import path from 'node:path'; import crypto from 'node:crypto'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
|
||||
import * as ID from '../identity/identity.mjs';
|
||||
import { buildProof } from '../proof-kinds/proof-kinds.mjs';
|
||||
import { notarizeEnvelope, NOTARI } from '../agents/agent-ancora.mjs';
|
||||
import { incarcaEthers } from '../agents/x402/wallet.mjs';
|
||||
import * as D from './device.mjs';
|
||||
import { citesteAncora } from './device-cli.mjs';
|
||||
|
||||
const AICI = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
|
||||
const argv = process.argv.slice(2); const RPC = argv.includes('--rpc') ? argv[argv.indexOf('--rpc') + 1] : 'https://testnet-rpc.aere.network';
|
||||
const kf = process.env.AERE_TESTNET_KEY_FILE;
|
||||
const DEV_VERIFY = path.resolve(AICI, '..', '..', 'verificator-falcon', 'verify-proof.mjs');
|
||||
const VERIFY = process.env.AERE_VERIFY_PROOF || (fs.existsSync(DEV_VERIFY) ? DEV_VERIFY : '');
|
||||
if (!kf || !fs.existsSync(kf)) { console.log('NEMASURAT: AERE_TESTNET_KEY_FILE does not name a file with a funded testnet key'); process.exit(2); }
|
||||
if (!VERIFY || !fs.existsSync(VERIFY)) { console.log('NEMASURAT: the AIP-23 reference verifier is missing (AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs>)'); process.exit(2); }
|
||||
let ethers; try { ethers = incarcaEthers(); } catch (e) { console.log('NEMASURAT: ' + e.message); process.exit(2); }
|
||||
const chainId = Number((await new ethers.JsonRpcProvider(RPC).getNetwork()).chainId);
|
||||
if (chainId !== 28001) { console.log(`NEMASURAT: ${RPC} serves chain ${chainId}, not 28001`); process.exit(2); }
|
||||
|
||||
let ok = 0, rau = 0; const cer = (c, ce, d = '') => { console.log(` ${c ? 'OK ' : 'RAU'} ${ce}${c || !d ? '' : ' -- ' + d}`); if (c) ok++; else rau++; };
|
||||
const ZI = 86400000, acum = Date.now(); const iso = (t) => new Date(t).toISOString();
|
||||
const [mfr, op] = [ID.generateKeys(), ID.generateKeys()]; const dev = D.generateDeviceKey();
|
||||
const LID = 'https://manufacturer.example/status/1', AUD = 'https://gateway.example', NONCE = 'n-' + crypto.randomBytes(8).toString('hex');
|
||||
const cred = D.manufacture({ manufacturer: mfr, deviceKey: dev.publicKey, model: 'AX-200', serial: 'SN-28001', validFrom: iso(acum - 30 * ZI), validUntil: iso(acum + 3650 * ZI), status: { list: LID, index: 7 }, now: new Date(acum - 30 * ZI) });
|
||||
const fw = D.releaseFirmware({ signer: mfr, model: 'AX-200', version: '2.0.0', sequence: 2, image: fs.readFileSync(path.join(AICI, 'fixturi', 'firmware-2.0.0.bin')), now: new Date(acum - 5 * ZI) });
|
||||
const t1 = D.transferOwnership({ from: mfr, to: op.public, manufacture: cred, now: new Date(acum - 10 * ZI) }); const cap = D.ownershipHead(cred, [t1]);
|
||||
const aut = D.authorize({ owner: op, deviceId: dev.deviceId, ownership: cap, actions: ['telemetry.publish'], notBefore: iso(acum - ZI), notAfter: iso(acum + ZI), now: new Date(acum - ZI) });
|
||||
const adus = { trustedManufacturers: [mfr.id], statusLists: [ID.createStatusList({ issuer: mfr, id: LID, validFrom: iso(acum - 3600000), validUntil: iso(acum + ZI), now: new Date(acum - 3600000) })],
|
||||
firmwarePolicies: [D.firmwarePolicy({ manufacturer: mfr, model: 'AX-200', minSequence: 2, validFrom: iso(acum - 3600000), validUntil: iso(acum + ZI), now: new Date(acum - 3600000) })],
|
||||
statusRecords: [D.statusRecord({ by: op, deviceId: dev.deviceId, state: 'active', seq: 1, ownership: cap, validUntil: iso(acum + ZI), now: new Date(acum - 600000) })], nonce: NONCE, audience: AUD };
|
||||
const atesta = (cand) => D.attest({ device: dev, nonce: NONCE, audience: AUD, firmware: fw, ownership: cap, action: 'telemetry.publish', now: new Date(cand) });
|
||||
const pachet = (x, anchor) => D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, firmware: fw, transfers: [t1], authorization: aut, attestation: x, anchor });
|
||||
const noteaza = (x) => notarizeEnvelope({ envelope: D.proofOfDevice(x, buildProof), kind: 'aere-proof-of-device', rpc: RPC, keyFile: kf, ethers });
|
||||
async function citeste(env) { // the reading needs the next post-quantum certified anchor to cover the notarization: wait up to six minutes
|
||||
const start = Date.now(); let r = null;
|
||||
while (Date.now() - start < 360000) { r = await citesteAncora(env, { verifyProof: VERIFY, rpc: RPC, chain: 28001 }); if (r.stare !== 'NEMASURAT') break; await new Promise((g) => setTimeout(g, 20000)); }
|
||||
return { ...r, secunde: Math.round((Date.now() - start) / 1000) };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// the honest attestation, made now; and one the device dated twenty minutes in the future (a wrong or lying clock)
|
||||
const X1 = atesta(Date.now()), X2 = atesta(Date.now() + 20 * 60000);
|
||||
const n1 = await noteaza(X1);
|
||||
cer(n1.ok && n1.envelope.notarization.chainId === 28001 && n1.envelope.notarization.notary === NOTARI[28001], `1. the envelope of an attestation notarized on 28001${n1.ok ? `: firstSeen ${n1.envelope.notarization.firstSeen}, block ${n1.envelope.notarization.block}` : ''}`, n1.motiv);
|
||||
const n2 = await noteaza(X2);
|
||||
cer(n2.ok, `1. the envelope of the post-dated attestation notarized on 28001${n2.ok ? `: firstSeen ${n2.envelope.notarization.firstSeen}` : ''}`, n2.motiv);
|
||||
if (!n1.ok || !n2.ok) { console.log(`\ndevice-ancora-testnet: ${ok}/${ok + rau} as required`); process.exit(1); }
|
||||
const r1 = await citeste(n1.envelope), r2 = await citeste(n2.envelope);
|
||||
if (r1.stare === 'NEMASURAT' || r2.stare === 'NEMASURAT') { console.log('NEMASURAT: no post-quantum certified anchor covered the notarization in six minutes: ' + (r1.motiv || r2.motiv)); process.exit(2); }
|
||||
cer(r1.stare === 'PASSED' && r2.stare === 'PASSED', `2. the published AIP-23 verifier reads both envelopes under a post-quantum certified anchor (after ${r1.secunde} s and ${r2.secunde} s)`, r1.motiv || r2.motiv);
|
||||
cer(r1.reading && r1.reading.at === n1.envelope.notarization.firstSeen && r1.reading.statementHash === n1.envelope.statementHash, '2. the certified first-seen time is the firstSeen read from the contract, for the hash of this envelope');
|
||||
const acumV = iso(Date.now());
|
||||
const v1 = D.verifyDevice(pachet(X1, n1.envelope), { ...adus, now: X1.statement.at, anchors: [r1.reading] });
|
||||
cer(v1.verdict === 'VALID' && v1.links.witness === 'PASSED', '3. the device bundle with its notarized envelope and the verifier\'s reading: VALID, the witness link PASSED', `${v1.verdict} [${v1.rules}] [${v1.unjudged}]`);
|
||||
const v1f = D.verifyDevice(pachet(X1, n1.envelope), { ...adus, now: X1.statement.at });
|
||||
cer(v1f.verdict === 'PARTIAL' && v1f.unjudged.includes('witness-unread'), '3. THE WITNESS OF THE MEASURE: the same bundle without the reading is PARTIAL (a notarization claimed is not a notarization read)', `${v1f.verdict} [${v1f.unjudged}]`);
|
||||
// the post-dated attestation, judged by a verifier whose clock is at the time the device wrote (an audit made later, or a verifier fooled about the time)
|
||||
const v2f = D.verifyDevice(pachet(X2, D.proofOfDevice(X2, buildProof)), { ...adus, now: X2.statement.at });
|
||||
cer(v2f.verdict === 'VALID', '4. THE WITNESS OF THE MEASURE: without the chain, the post-dated attestation passes on a clock set to the time it claims', `${v2f.verdict} [${v2f.rules}]`);
|
||||
const v2 = D.verifyDevice(pachet(X2, n2.envelope), { ...adus, now: X2.statement.at, anchors: [r2.reading] });
|
||||
cer(v2.verdict === 'INVALID' && v2.rules.join() === 'witness-time', '4. with the chain\'s reading, the post-dated attestation is caught: its envelope was on the chain before the time it claims', `${v2.verdict} [${v2.rules}]`);
|
||||
const v3 = D.verifyDevice(pachet(X2, n1.envelope), { ...adus, now: X2.statement.at, anchors: [r1.reading] });
|
||||
cer(v3.verdict === 'INVALID' && v3.rules.join() === 'witness-envelope', '5. the notarized envelope of ANOTHER attestation does not witness this one', `${v3.verdict} [${v3.rules}]`);
|
||||
const v4 = D.verifyDevice(pachet(X1, n1.envelope), { ...adus, now: X1.statement.at, anchors: [r2.reading] });
|
||||
cer(v4.verdict === 'PARTIAL' && v4.unjudged.includes('witness-unread'), '5. a reading of another envelope is not a reading of this one: PARTIAL', `${v4.verdict} [${v4.unjudged}]`);
|
||||
|
||||
const DOV = path.join(AICI, 'dovezi-ancora-28001'); fs.mkdirSync(DOV, { recursive: true });
|
||||
const zi = new Date().toISOString().replace(/[:.]/g, '-').slice(0, 19);
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(DOV, `ancora-dispozitiv-${zi}.json`), JSON.stringify({ v: 1, kind: 'aere-device-anchor-evidence', network: 'eip155:28001', rpc: RPC, measuredAt: acumV,
|
||||
note: 'testnet 28001: the finality is the testnet\'s. Every key that signed here was made for this run and discarded; the notarizations were paid by a testnet developer key that is not in this file.',
|
||||
verifierBrought: adus, honest: { bundle: pachet(X1, n1.envelope), reading: r1.reading }, postDated: { bundle: pachet(X2, n2.envelope), reading: r2.reading },
|
||||
verdicts: { honestWithReading: v1.verdict, honestWithoutReading: v1f.verdict, postDatedWithoutChain: v2f.verdict, postDatedWithReading: [v2.verdict, v2.rules], otherEnvelope: [v3.verdict, v3.rules], otherReading: v4.verdict } }, null, 1) + '\n');
|
||||
console.log(`\ndevice-ancora-testnet: ${ok}/${ok + rau} as required (evidence in dovezi-ancora-28001/ancora-dispozitiv-${zi}.json)`);
|
||||
process.exitCode = rau ? 1 : 0;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,697 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env node
|
||||
// proba-device.mjs: the probe of AERE Device Identity. Every key here is made at the start of the run and discarded at its end.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// node proba-device.mjs the rows below; exit 0 all as required, 1 a row is not, 2 only skipped rows (NEMASURAT)
|
||||
// node proba-device.mjs --json the same, one JSON object on the last line: { rows: [{ id, title, state, expects, kind }] }
|
||||
// (kind: valid, partial, attack: the verdict the row requires; check: another kind of row)
|
||||
//
|
||||
// A row of kind ATAC requires the verdict INVALID and the EXACT set of rules that refused (`expects`): refused for another reason is
|
||||
// a red row. A row PARTIAL requires that nothing refused and the EXACT set of causes that keep the verdict from VALID. The negative
|
||||
// control (control-negativ-device.mjs) reads `expects`: with one rule planted out of a copy, the rows that expect that rule, and
|
||||
// only they, must go red.
|
||||
// The AIP-23 envelope rows need the reference verifier: AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs> (published at aere.network/tools).
|
||||
import fs from 'node:fs'; import os from 'node:os'; import path from 'node:path'; import crypto from 'node:crypto'; import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
|
||||
import * as ID from '../identity/identity.mjs';
|
||||
import { buildProof } from '../proof-kinds/proof-kinds.mjs';
|
||||
import * as D from './device.mjs';
|
||||
|
||||
const AICI = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
|
||||
const DEV_VERIFY = path.resolve(AICI, '..', '..', 'verificator-falcon', 'verify-proof.mjs');
|
||||
const VERIFY = process.env.AERE_VERIFY_PROOF || (fs.existsSync(DEV_VERIFY) ? DEV_VERIFY : '');
|
||||
const JSON_OUT = process.argv.includes('--json');
|
||||
// --repede: without the rows that start processes (the command line, the reference verifier) and without the damaged bundles. For a
|
||||
// search that runs the probe hundreds of times (mutanti-device.mjs); it is NOT a measurement of those rows, and it never exits 0.
|
||||
const REPEDE = process.argv.includes('--repede');
|
||||
const randuri = [];
|
||||
const spune = (s) => { if (!JSON_OUT) console.log(s); };
|
||||
const rand = (id, title, state, detail = '', expects = [], kind = 'check') => { randuri.push({ id, title, state, expects, kind }); spune(` [${state.padEnd(9)}] ${id} ${title}${state === 'VERDE' || !detail ? '' : ' -- ' + detail}`); };
|
||||
const cer = (id, title, cond, detail = '', expects = []) => rand(id, title, cond ? 'VERDE' : 'ROSU', detail, expects);
|
||||
const clona = (x) => JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(x));
|
||||
const la = (a) => [...a].sort().join(',');
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------- the world: a manufacturer, two owners, a second identity, a stranger, a device, a clone
|
||||
const T0 = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) * 1000 - 3600000, ZI = 86400;
|
||||
const at = (s) => new Date(T0 + s * 1000).toISOString(), cand = (s) => new Date(T0 + s * 1000);
|
||||
const [mfr, op, cumparator, strain, altMfr, aDoua] = Array.from({ length: 6 }, () => ID.generateKeys());
|
||||
const dev = D.generateDeviceKey(), clonaDev = D.generateDeviceKey();
|
||||
const LID = 'https://manufacturer.example/status/1', AUD = 'https://gateway.example', NONCE = 'n-' + crypto.randomBytes(8).toString('hex');
|
||||
const IMG1 = Buffer.from('firmware image 1.0.0 (probe)'), IMG2 = fs.readFileSync(path.join(AICI, 'fixturi', 'firmware-2.0.0.bin'));
|
||||
const POS = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(AICI, 'fixturi', 'atestare-firmware.json'), 'utf8'));
|
||||
|
||||
const face = (o = {}) => D.manufacture({ manufacturer: mfr, deviceKey: dev.publicKey, model: 'AX-200', serial: 'SN-0001', validFrom: at(-30 * ZI), validUntil: at(3650 * ZI), status: { list: LID, index: 7 }, now: cand(-30 * ZI), ...o });
|
||||
const cred = face(), credAlt = face({ deviceKey: clonaDev.publicKey, serial: 'SN-0002', status: { list: LID, index: 8 } }); // credAlt: ANOTHER device of the same manufacturer
|
||||
const lista = (o = {}) => ID.createStatusList({ issuer: mfr, id: LID, validFrom: at(-3600), validUntil: at(ZI), now: cand(-3600), ...o });
|
||||
const fw1 = D.releaseFirmware({ signer: mfr, model: 'AX-200', version: '1.0.0', sequence: 1, image: IMG1, now: cand(-20 * ZI) });
|
||||
const fw2 = D.releaseFirmware({ signer: mfr, model: 'AX-200', version: '2.0.0', sequence: 2, image: IMG2, now: cand(-5 * ZI) });
|
||||
const fw2pos = D.releaseFirmware({ signer: mfr, model: 'AX-200', version: '2.0.0', sequence: 2, image: IMG2, softwareAttestation: POS, now: cand(-5 * ZI) });
|
||||
const politica = (o = {}) => D.firmwarePolicy({ manufacturer: mfr, model: 'AX-200', minSequence: 1, validFrom: at(-3600), validUntil: at(ZI), now: cand(-3600), ...o });
|
||||
const t1 = D.transferOwnership({ from: mfr, to: op.public, manufacture: cred, now: cand(-10 * ZI) });
|
||||
const t2 = D.transferOwnership({ from: op, to: cumparator.public, manufacture: cred, transfers: [t1], now: cand(-2 * ZI) });
|
||||
const cap0 = D.ownershipHead(cred), cap1 = D.ownershipHead(cred, [t1]), cap2 = D.ownershipHead(cred, [t1, t2]);
|
||||
const ACT = ['door.unlock', 'telemetry.publish'];
|
||||
const aut = (owner, cap, o = {}) => D.authorize({ owner, deviceId: dev.deviceId, ownership: cap, actions: ACT, notBefore: at(-ZI), notAfter: at(ZI), now: cand(-ZI), ...o });
|
||||
// a status record: the manufacturer signs as the manufacturer of the credential (no ownership head), anybody else under the head given
|
||||
const stare = (by, state, seq, cap, o = {}) => D.statusRecord({ by, state, seq, validUntil: at(ZI), now: cand(-600), ...(by === mfr ? { manufacture: cred } : { deviceId: dev.deviceId, ownership: cap }), ...o });
|
||||
const atest = (o = {}) => D.attest({ device: dev, nonce: NONCE, audience: AUD, firmware: fw2, ownership: cap1, action: 'telemetry.publish', now: cand(60), ...o });
|
||||
const A1 = aut(op, cap1), X1 = atest(), activ = stare(op, 'active', 1, cap1);
|
||||
const B = (o = {}) => D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, firmware: fw2, transfers: [t1], authorization: A1, attestation: X1, ...o });
|
||||
const O = (o = {}) => ({ now: at(65), nonce: NONCE, audience: AUD, trustedManufacturers: [mfr.id], statusLists: [lista()], firmwarePolicies: [politica()], statusRecords: [activ], ...o });
|
||||
// forged siblings that only a key holder can make: a statement changed and signed again with the published formulas
|
||||
const reSemn = (scop, link, k, f) => { const st = clona(link.statement); f(st); return { statement: st, signature: D.signLink(scop, st, k) }; };
|
||||
const reCred = (c, k, f) => { const st = clona(c.statement); f(st); return { statement: st, signature: ID.signText('credential', ID.canonical(st), k) }; };
|
||||
const reAtest = (x, d, f) => { const st = clona(x.statement); f(st); return { statement: st, signature: D.signAttestation(st, d) }; };
|
||||
const fals = 'aere-id:' + '11'.repeat(20); // an id that no key here derives
|
||||
// the same bytes in ANOTHER base64 text: the unused bits of the last character changed where there is padding, else a padding character added
|
||||
const AB = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/';
|
||||
const altText = (s) => { const p = s.indexOf('='); if (p < 0) return s + '='; const c = AB.indexOf(s[p - 1]); return s.slice(0, p - 1) + AB[c ^ 1] + s.slice(p); };
|
||||
const aceiasiOcteti = (a, b) => a !== b && Buffer.from(a, 'base64').equals(Buffer.from(b, 'base64'));
|
||||
// sold on: the owner transfers the device to a second identity (a buyer, or another key of its own: nothing in the chain tells them apart)
|
||||
const tx = D.transferOwnership({ from: op, to: aDoua.public, manufacture: cred, transfers: [t1], now: cand(-300) }), capx = D.ownershipHead(cred, [t1, tx]);
|
||||
const Bx = () => D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, firmware: fw2, transfers: [t1, tx], authorization: aut(aDoua, capx, { now: cand(-200), notBefore: at(-200) }), attestation: atest({ ownership: capx }) });
|
||||
const activX = stare(aDoua, 'active', 1, capx, { now: cand(-100) });
|
||||
// sold, and bought back: the first owner owns the device again, under a third head
|
||||
const t3 = D.transferOwnership({ from: cumparator, to: op.public, manufacture: cred, transfers: [t1, t2], now: cand(-ZI) }), cap3 = D.ownershipHead(cred, [t1, t2, t3]);
|
||||
const B3 = () => D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, firmware: fw2, transfers: [t1, t2, t3], authorization: aut(op, cap3, { now: cand(-3600), notBefore: at(-3600) }), attestation: atest({ ownership: cap3 }) });
|
||||
const numit = (r, cauza, text = '') => r.unjudged.includes(cauza) && r.rows.some((x) => x.unjudged === cauza && x.pass === null && x.detail.includes(text));
|
||||
|
||||
const judeca = (b, o) => D.verifyDevice(b, o);
|
||||
function valid(id, title, b, o, extra = () => true) { const r = judeca(b, o); const neP = r.unjudged.filter((c) => D.PARTIALE.includes(c)); rand(id, title, r.verdict === 'VALID' && !r.rules.length && !neP.length && extra(r) ? 'VERDE' : 'ROSU', `${r.verdict} [${r.rules}] unjudged [${r.unjudged}]`, [], 'valid'); return r; }
|
||||
function partial(id, title, b, o, cauze, extra = () => true) { const r = judeca(b, o); const neP = r.unjudged.filter((c) => D.PARTIALE.includes(c)); rand(id, title, r.verdict === 'PARTIAL' && r.valid && la(neP) === la(cauze) && extra(r) ? 'VERDE' : 'ROSU', `${r.verdict} [${r.rules}] causes [${neP}], required [${cauze}]`, [], 'partial'); return r; }
|
||||
function atac(id, title, b, o, reguli, extra = () => true) { const r = judeca(b, o); rand(id, 'ATAC: ' + title, r.verdict === 'INVALID' && la(r.rules) === la(reguli) && r.subject === null && extra(r) ? 'VERDE' : 'ROSU', `${r.verdict} [${r.rules}], required exactly [${reguli}]`, reguli, 'attack'); return r; }
|
||||
|
||||
// ================================================================ A. the honest paths
|
||||
spune('A. the honest paths');
|
||||
valid('A01', 'a device made by a trusted manufacturer, sold once, authorized by its owner, attesting now with the verifier\'s nonce: VALID', B(), O(),
|
||||
(r) => r.subject.deviceId === dev.deviceId && r.subject.owner === op.id && r.subject.manufacturer === mfr.id && r.subject.firmware.sequence === 2 && r.subject.action === 'telemetry.publish' && r.subject.state === 'active' && Object.entries(r.links).every(([l, s]) => s === (l === 'witness' ? 'ABSENT' : 'PASSED')));
|
||||
valid('A02', 'never sold: the manufacturer is the owner and authorizes the device itself', D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, firmware: fw2, authorization: aut(mfr, cap0), attestation: atest({ ownership: cap0 }) }), O({ statusRecords: [stare(mfr, 'active', 1, null)] }), (r) => r.subject.owner === mfr.id && r.subject.transfers === 0);
|
||||
valid('A03', 'sold twice: the second buyer authorizes, the device names the head after the second transfer', D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, firmware: fw2, transfers: [t1, t2], authorization: aut(cumparator, cap2), attestation: atest({ ownership: cap2 }) }), O({ statusRecords: [stare(cumparator, 'active', 1, cap2)] }), (r) => r.subject.owner === cumparator.id);
|
||||
valid('A04', 'the release names a Proof of Software attestation of its image, and the verifier is handed it', B({ firmware: fw2pos }), O({ softwareAttestation: POS }));
|
||||
valid('A05', 'a suspension lifted by the one who suspended: the owner\'s later record says active', B(), O({ statusRecords: [stare(op, 'suspended', 1, cap1), stare(op, 'active', 2, cap1)] }));
|
||||
valid('A06', 'a status record of a stranger ("retired") is ignored, and said so', B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, stare(strain, 'retired', 9, cap1)] }), (r) => numit(r, 'status-ignored') && !r.unjudged.includes('status-prior-ownership') && r.subject.priorOwnership.length === 0);
|
||||
valid('A07', 'THE SELLER SIGNS A RETIREMENT, one dated before the sale and one under the buyer\'s head: neither binds the buyer (it cannot disable what it sold), and both are NAMED with the state they say', D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, firmware: fw2, transfers: [t1, t2], authorization: aut(cumparator, cap2), attestation: atest({ ownership: cap2 }) }),
|
||||
O({ statusRecords: [stare(cumparator, 'active', 1, cap2), stare(op, 'retired', 5, cap1, { now: cand(-3 * ZI) }), stare(op, 'retired', 6, cap2)] }),
|
||||
(r) => numit(r, 'status-prior-ownership', '"retired"') && !r.unjudged.includes('status-ignored') && la(r.subject.priorOwnership.map((p) => `${p.owner} ${p.state} ${p.records}`)) === `${op.id} retired 2` && r.subject.state === 'active' && r.subject.owner === cumparator.id);
|
||||
valid('A08', 'a retirement dated three hours in the verifier\'s future is not in effect yet, and it is NAMED (not skipped in silence)', B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, stare(mfr, 'retired', 1, null, { now: cand(3 * 3600), validUntil: at(ZI) })] }), (r) => numit(r, 'status-future', '"retired"'));
|
||||
valid('A08b', 'a retirement of the manufacturer dated 120 s ahead (its clock runs fast, beyond the tolerance of 60 s): not in effect yet, and named', B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, stare(mfr, 'retired', 1, null, { now: cand(65 + 120) })] }), (r) => numit(r, 'status-future', '"retired"'));
|
||||
{ const r = judeca(B({ firmware: fw1, attestation: atest({ nonce: 'old', firmware: fw1 }), authorization: aut(mfr, cap1) }), O({ firmwarePolicies: [politica({ minSequence: 2 })] }));
|
||||
cer('A09', 'the verifier does not stop at the first refusal: three unrelated faults, three rules named, and the links that hold still PASSED', r.verdict === 'INVALID' && la(r.rules) === 'authorization-owner,firmware-rollback,nonce' && r.links.manufacture === 'PASSED' && r.links.ownership === 'PASSED' && r.links.firmware === 'FAILED', `[${r.rules}] ${JSON.stringify(r.links)}`, ['authorization-owner', 'firmware-rollback', 'nonce']); }
|
||||
valid('A11', 'sold, and bought back: the owner lifts, under its current head, the suspension it signed under its FIRST ownership (a later record of its own)', B3(), O({ statusRecords: [stare(op, 'suspended', 7, cap1), stare(op, 'active', 8, cap3)] }), (r) => r.subject.state === 'active' && r.subject.transfers === 3);
|
||||
valid('A12', 'sold on to a second identity, with no status record of the owner before it in the registry: VALID, and nothing is named', Bx(), O({ statusRecords: [activX] }), (r) => r.subject.owner === aDoua.id && r.subject.priorOwnership.length === 0 && !r.unjudged.includes('status-prior-ownership'));
|
||||
{ const r = judeca(B(), O()); const fara = r.rows.filter((x) => x.pass === false || (x.pass !== null && !x.rule && x.link !== 'ownership'));
|
||||
cer('A10', 'every judged row names its rule; every rule named is declared; nothing private is in the verdict', !fara.length && r.rows.every((x) => !x.rule || D.REGULI.includes(x.rule)) && !/private|privat/.test(JSON.stringify(r))); }
|
||||
|
||||
// ================================================================ B. what was not brought: PARTIAL, by name, never VALID
|
||||
spune('B. what the verifier was not handed leaves the verdict PARTIAL');
|
||||
partial('B01', 'no nonce given: an old attestation could be replayed', B(), O({ nonce: null }), ['nonce']);
|
||||
partial('B02', 'no audience given: an attestation made for another verifier would be accepted', B(), O({ audience: null }), ['audience']);
|
||||
partial('B03', 'no trusted manufacturer named: anyone can sign a manufacture credential', B(), O({ trustedManufacturers: null }), ['manufacturer-trust']);
|
||||
partial('B04', 'the manufacturer\'s recall list was not handed', B(), O({ statusLists: [] }), ['manufacture-status-unread']);
|
||||
partial('B05', 'a recall list with the same id signed by ANOTHER manufacturer is not the manufacturer\'s list', B(), O({ statusLists: [ID.createStatusList({ issuer: altMfr, id: LID, revoked: [7], validFrom: at(-3600), validUntil: at(ZI), now: cand(-3600) })] }), ['manufacture-status-unread']);
|
||||
partial('B06', 'an expired recall list is not read as "not recalled"', B(), O({ statusLists: [lista({ validFrom: at(-3 * ZI), validUntil: at(-ZI), now: cand(-3 * ZI) })] }), ['manufacture-status-unread']);
|
||||
partial('B06b', 'a recall list signed by the manufacturer whose validity is not a time (it recalls the device), beside a clean current one: it cannot be placed in time, and is not read as "not recalled"', B(),
|
||||
O({ statusLists: [lista(), (() => { const st = clona(lista({ revoked: [7] }).statement); st.validUntil = 'next year'; return { statement: st, signature: ID.signText('status-list', ID.canonical(st), mfr) }; })()] }), ['manufacture-status-unread'], (r) => numit(r, 'manufacture-status-unread', 'not a time'));
|
||||
partial('B07', 'no firmware policy handed: a retracted or outdated firmware cannot be seen', B(), O({ firmwarePolicies: [] }), ['firmware-policy-unread']);
|
||||
partial('B08', 'a firmware policy signed by a stranger is not the manufacturer\'s policy', B(), O({ firmwarePolicies: [D.firmwarePolicy({ manufacturer: strain, model: 'AX-200', minSequence: 0, validFrom: at(-3600), validUntil: at(ZI), now: cand(-3600) })] }), ['firmware-policy-unread']);
|
||||
partial('B09', 'REVOCATION NOT READ: the status registry was not handed, so the verdict is not VALID', B(), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['status-unread'], (r) => r.subject.state === 'unknown');
|
||||
partial('B10', 'the only "active" record has expired: read the registry again', B(), O({ statusRecords: [stare(op, 'active', 1, cap1, { now: cand(-3 * ZI), validUntil: at(-ZI) })] }), ['status-unread']);
|
||||
partial('B11', 'the release names a Proof of Software attestation that was not handed', B({ firmware: fw2pos }), O(), ['software-unread']);
|
||||
partial('B12', 'no attestation in the bundle: nothing was said by the device now', D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, firmware: fw2, transfers: [t1], authorization: A1 }), O(), ['attestation-missing'], (r) => r.links.attestation === 'NOT_SUPPLIED');
|
||||
partial('B13', 'no authorization in the bundle', D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, firmware: fw2, transfers: [t1], attestation: X1 }), O(), ['authorization-missing']);
|
||||
partial('B14', 'no firmware release in the bundle: the attested digest names nothing a manufacturer signed', D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, transfers: [t1], authorization: A1, attestation: X1 }), O(), ['firmware-missing']);
|
||||
partial('B15', 'no manufacture credential: the attestation alone is a key speaking for itself', D.bundle({ attestation: X1 }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['authorization-missing', 'firmware-missing', 'manufacture-missing', 'status-unread']);
|
||||
partial('B16', 'transfers without a manufacture credential have nothing to start from', D.bundle({ firmware: fw2, transfers: [t1], authorization: A1, attestation: X1 }), O(), ['manufacture-missing', 'ownership-unrooted']);
|
||||
partial('B17', 'an attestation that carries a hardware root: this verifier does not judge one, and says so', B({ attestation: reAtest(X1, dev, (st) => { st.hardwareRoot = { type: 'tpm2-quote', evidence: 'AAAA' }; }) }), O(), ['hardware-root']);
|
||||
partial('B18', 'a manufacture credential that carries a hardware root (an endorsement of K): not judged either', D.bundle({ manufacture: reCred(cred, mfr, (st) => { st.claims.hardwareRoot = { type: 'ek-certificate', evidence: 'AAAA' }; }) }), O({ statusRecords: [stare(mfr, 'active', 1, null)] }),
|
||||
['attestation-missing', 'authorization-missing', 'firmware-missing', 'hardware-root']);
|
||||
|
||||
// ================================================================ C. the attacks, each refused for its named rule
|
||||
spune('C. manufacturer');
|
||||
{ const impostor = D.manufacture({ manufacturer: altMfr, deviceKey: clonaDev.publicKey, model: 'AX-200', serial: 'SN-0001', validFrom: at(-30 * ZI), validUntil: at(3650 * ZI), now: cand(-30 * ZI) });
|
||||
atac('C01', 'a manufacturer WITHOUT THE RIGHT: its own keys, its own id, not among those the verifier trusts', D.bundle({ manufacture: impostor }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['manufacturer-trusted']);
|
||||
atac('C02', 'an impostor writes the trusted manufacturer\'s id beside its own keys', D.bundle({ manufacture: reCred(impostor, altMfr, (st) => { st.issuer.id = mfr.id; st.holder.id = mfr.id; }) }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['manufacturer-id']); }
|
||||
atac('C03', 'the model edited after the manufacturer signed', D.bundle({ manufacture: (() => { const c = clona(cred); c.statement.claims.model = 'AX-900'; return c; })() }), O(), ['manufacture-signature']);
|
||||
atac('C04', 'the ML-DSA-65 half of the manufacturer\'s signature removed: the classical half alone is not a signature here', D.bundle({ manufacture: (() => { const c = clona(cred); delete c.signature.mldsa65; return c; })() }), O(), ['manufacture-signature']);
|
||||
atac('C05', 'the manufacture credential expired', D.bundle({ manufacture: D.manufacture({ manufacturer: mfr, deviceKey: dev.publicKey, model: 'AX-200', serial: 'SN-0001', validFrom: at(-30 * ZI), validUntil: at(-ZI), now: cand(-30 * ZI) }) }), O(), ['manufacture-window']);
|
||||
atac('C06', 'RECALL: the manufacturer\'s current status list has the bit of this device set', B(), O({ statusLists: [lista({ revoked: [7] })] }), ['manufacture-revoked']);
|
||||
atac('C07', 'two current lists of the manufacturer, one recalls: a recall is not lifted by another list', B(), O({ statusLists: [lista({ revoked: [7] }), lista()] }), ['manufacture-revoked']);
|
||||
atac('C08', 'the manufacturer signed a status list that does not decompress', B(), O({ statusLists: [(() => { const st = clona(lista().statement); st.encodedList = Buffer.from('not gzip').toString('base64url'); return { statement: st, signature: ID.signText('status-list', ID.canonical(st), mfr) }; })()] }), ['manufacture-status-list']);
|
||||
atac('C09', 'a credential of another type passed as a manufacture credential', D.bundle({ manufacture: reCred(cred, mfr, (st) => { st.type = 'ExampleMembership'; }) }), O(), ['manufacture-form']);
|
||||
atac('C10', 'the manufacturer issues the credential to somebody else as holder (ownership without a signed transfer)', D.bundle({ manufacture: reCred(cred, mfr, (st) => { st.holder = { id: op.id, keys: op.public }; }) }), O(), ['manufacture-holder']);
|
||||
atac('C11', 'the manufacturer signs a device id that the device key does not derive', D.bundle({ manufacture: reCred(cred, mfr, (st) => { st.claims.deviceId = clonaDev.deviceId; }) }), O(), ['device-id']);
|
||||
|
||||
spune('C. a classical key under a post-quantum name');
|
||||
{ const ed = crypto.generateKeyPairSync('ed25519'); const spki = ed.publicKey.export({ type: 'spki', format: 'der' }).toString('base64'); const idClasic = 'aere-device:' + crypto.createHash('sha256').update(Buffer.from(spki, 'base64')).digest('hex').slice(0, 40);
|
||||
const credClasic = reCred(cred, mfr, (st) => { st.claims.deviceKey = spki; st.claims.deviceId = idClasic; });
|
||||
atac('C12', 'the manufacturer certifies an Ed25519 key as the device key (the id is the hash of that key)', D.bundle({ manufacture: credClasic }), O(), ['device-key']);
|
||||
const st = clona(X1.statement); st.key = spki; st.deviceId = idClasic; st.ownership = D.ownershipHead(credClasic);
|
||||
const sig = { alg: 'ml-dsa-65', value: crypto.sign(null, Buffer.from('aere-device/v1/attestation\n' + ID.canonical(st), 'utf8'), ed.privateKey).toString('base64') };
|
||||
atac('C13', 'and the "device" attests with that Ed25519 key, the signature declared ml-dsa-65', D.bundle({ manufacture: credClasic, attestation: { statement: st, signature: sig } }), O(), ['attestation-key', 'device-key']);
|
||||
atac('C14', 'the attestation alone with an Ed25519 key under the ML-DSA-65 name (no manufacture credential to contradict it)', D.bundle({ attestation: { statement: st, signature: sig } }), O(), ['attestation-key']);
|
||||
const a = crypto.generateKeyPairSync('ed25519'), b = crypto.generateKeyPairSync('ed25519'); const sp = (k) => k.publicKey.export({ type: 'spki', format: 'der' }).toString('base64');
|
||||
const pub = { alg: ID.ALG, ed25519: sp(a), mldsa65: sp(b) }; const idp = 'aere-id:' + crypto.createHash('sha256').update(Buffer.from(ID.canonical(pub), 'utf8')).digest('hex').slice(0, 40);
|
||||
const s2 = clona(cred.statement); s2.issuer = { id: idp, keys: pub }; s2.holder = { id: idp, keys: pub }; delete s2.status; const m = Buffer.from('aere-identity/v1/credential\n' + ID.canonical(s2), 'utf8');
|
||||
atac('C15', 'a manufacturer whose "ML-DSA-65" key is an Ed25519 key, both halves of the signature Ed25519', D.bundle({ manufacture: { statement: s2, signature: { alg: ID.ALG, ed25519: crypto.sign(null, m, a.privateKey).toString('base64'), mldsa65: crypto.sign(null, m, b.privateKey).toString('base64') } } }), O({ trustedManufacturers: [idp], statusRecords: [] }), ['manufacture-signature', 'manufacturer-id']);
|
||||
atac('C16', 'the attestation\'s signature declares another scheme', B({ attestation: { statement: X1.statement, signature: { ...X1.signature, alg: 'ed25519' } } }), O(), ['attestation-signature']); }
|
||||
|
||||
spune('C. a cloned device');
|
||||
atac('C17', 'A CLONE WITH ANOTHER KEY: its own key and the id of that key, behind the real device\'s manufacture credential', B({ attestation: D.attest({ device: clonaDev, nonce: NONCE, audience: AUD, firmware: fw2, ownership: cap1, action: 'telemetry.publish', now: cand(60) }) }), O(), ['attestation-device']);
|
||||
atac('C18', 'a clone with another key that claims the real device\'s id', B({ attestation: reAtest(X1, clonaDev, (st) => { st.key = clonaDev.publicKey; }) }), O(), ['attestation-device', 'attestation-key']);
|
||||
atac('C19', 'a clone that keeps the real key in the statement and signs with its own', B({ attestation: { statement: X1.statement, signature: D.signAttestation(X1.statement, clonaDev) } }), O(), ['attestation-signature']);
|
||||
atac('C20', 'the attested action edited after the device signed', B({ attestation: (() => { const x = clona(X1); x.statement.action = 'door.unlock'; return x; })() }), O(), ['attestation-signature']);
|
||||
|
||||
spune('C. firmware');
|
||||
atac('C21', 'FIRMWARE ROLLED BACK: a genuine older release (sequence 1) below the floor the manufacturer set (2)', B({ firmware: fw1, attestation: atest({ firmware: fw1 }) }), O({ firmwarePolicies: [politica({ minSequence: 2 })] }), ['firmware-rollback']);
|
||||
atac('C22', 'two current policies, a loose one and a strict one: the strict one holds', B({ firmware: fw1, attestation: atest({ firmware: fw1 }) }), O({ firmwarePolicies: [politica({ minSequence: 2 }), politica({ minSequence: 0 })] }), ['firmware-rollback']);
|
||||
atac('C23', 'the manufacturer retracted this very release (its digest is in the policy)', B(), O({ firmwarePolicies: [politica({ retracted: [fw2.statement.digest] })] }), ['firmware-retracted']);
|
||||
atac('C24', 'a retraction is not lifted by another current policy that does not list it', B(), O({ firmwarePolicies: [politica(), politica({ retracted: [fw2.statement.digest] })] }), ['firmware-retracted']);
|
||||
atac('C24b', 'the manufacturer\'s own tooling wrote the retracted digest in upper case: it is the same digest', B(), O({ firmwarePolicies: [reSemn('firmware-policy', politica(), mfr, (st) => { st.retracted = ['0x' + fw2.statement.digest.slice(2).toUpperCase()]; })] }), ['firmware-retracted']);
|
||||
atac('C25', 'the bundle shows the new release, the device says it runs the old digest', B({ attestation: atest({ firmware: fw1 }) }), O(), ['attestation-firmware']);
|
||||
atac('C26', 'a release signed by somebody who is not the manufacturer of the device', B({ firmware: D.releaseFirmware({ signer: strain, model: 'AX-200', version: '2.0.0', sequence: 2, image: IMG2 }) }), O({ firmwarePolicies: [] }), ['firmware-signer'], (r) => r.unjudged.includes('firmware-policy-unread'));
|
||||
atac('C27', 'the version label edited after the release was signed', B({ firmware: (() => { const f = clona(fw2); f.statement.version = '9.9.9'; return f; })() }), O(), ['firmware-signature']);
|
||||
atac('C28', 'a genuine release of the manufacturer for ANOTHER model', (() => { const f = D.releaseFirmware({ signer: mfr, model: 'BX-1', version: '2.0.0', sequence: 2, image: IMG2 }); return B({ firmware: f, attestation: atest({ firmware: f }) }); })(), O({ firmwarePolicies: [D.firmwarePolicy({ manufacturer: mfr, model: 'BX-1', validFrom: at(-3600), validUntil: at(ZI), now: cand(-3600) })] }), ['firmware-model']);
|
||||
atac('C29', 'the Proof of Software attestation handed is not the one the release names', B({ firmware: fw2pos }), O({ softwareAttestation: (() => { const p = clona(POS); p.statement.subject.version = '2.0.1'; p.statementHash = '0x' + crypto.createHash('sha256').update(JSON.stringify(p.statement)).digest('hex'); return p; })() }), ['firmware-software']);
|
||||
atac('C30', 'a release whose sequence is not a number', B({ firmware: reSemn('firmware', fw2, mfr, (st) => { st.sequence = '2'; }) }), O(), ['firmware-form']);
|
||||
|
||||
spune('C. ownership and authorization');
|
||||
atac('C31', 'THE PREVIOUS OWNER STILL SIGNS: after selling, it grants an authorization under the current head', D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, firmware: fw2, transfers: [t1, t2], authorization: aut(op, cap2), attestation: atest({ ownership: cap2 }) }), O({ statusRecords: [stare(cumparator, 'active', 1, cap2)] }), ['authorization-owner']);
|
||||
atac('C32', 'the previous owner\'s authorization from BEFORE the sale, shown after it', D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, firmware: fw2, transfers: [t1, t2], authorization: A1, attestation: atest({ ownership: cap2 }) }), O({ statusRecords: [stare(cumparator, 'active', 1, cap2)] }), ['authorization-owner', 'authorization-ownership']);
|
||||
atac('C33', 'the current owner\'s authorization given under an older head', B({ authorization: aut(op, cap0) }), O(), ['authorization-ownership']);
|
||||
atac('C34', 'the previous owner sells the device a second time', B({ transfers: [t1, reSemn('transfer', t2, mfr, (st) => { st.from = { id: mfr.id, keys: mfr.public }; })], authorization: null, attestation: null }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['transfer-from']);
|
||||
atac('C35', 'the device still names the ownership head of before the sale', D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, firmware: fw2, transfers: [t1, t2], authorization: aut(cumparator, cap2), attestation: X1 }), O({ statusRecords: [stare(cumparator, 'active', 1, cap2)] }), ['attestation-ownership']);
|
||||
atac('C36', 'the first transfer taken out of the chain', B({ transfers: [t2], authorization: null, attestation: null }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['transfer-from', 'transfer-prev']);
|
||||
atac('C37', 'a transfer signed by a stranger in the owner\'s name', D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, transfers: [{ statement: t1.statement, signature: D.signLink('transfer', t1.statement, strain) }] }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['transfer-signature']);
|
||||
atac('C38', 'the ML-DSA-65 half of a transfer signature removed', D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, transfers: [(() => { const t = clona(t1); delete t.signature.mldsa65; return t; })()] }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['transfer-signature']);
|
||||
atac('C38b', 'the ML-DSA-65 half of a transfer signature replaced by a stranger\'s (the Ed25519 half is the owner\'s): one half is not enough', D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, transfers: [{ statement: t1.statement, signature: { ...t1.signature, mldsa65: D.signLink('transfer', t1.statement, strain).mldsa65 } }] }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['transfer-signature']);
|
||||
atac('C39', 'PURPOSE SEPARATION: the owner\'s signature made for another purpose (status) shown as the signature of an authorization', B({ authorization: { statement: A1.statement, signature: D.signLink('status', A1.statement, op) } }), O(), ['authorization-signature']);
|
||||
atac('C40', 'a transfer dated before the device was made', (() => { const t = reSemn('transfer', t1, mfr, (st) => { st.at = at(-400 * ZI); }); const c = D.ownershipHead(cred, [t]); return D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, firmware: fw2, transfers: [t], authorization: aut(op, c), attestation: atest({ ownership: c }) }); })(), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['transfer-time'], (r) => r.unjudged.includes('status-unread'));
|
||||
atac('C41', 'a transfer dated in the future', (() => { const t = reSemn('transfer', t1, mfr, (st) => { st.at = at(30 * ZI); }); return D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, transfers: [t] }); })(), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['transfer-time']);
|
||||
atac('C42', 'a transfer of ANOTHER device spliced into the chain', D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, transfers: [reSemn('transfer', t1, mfr, (st) => { st.deviceId = clonaDev.deviceId; })] }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['transfer-device']);
|
||||
atac('C43', 'a transfer whose recipient id is not derived from the recipient keys', D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, transfers: [reSemn('transfer', t1, mfr, (st) => { st.to.id = 'aere-id:' + '11'.repeat(20); })] }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['transfer-ids']);
|
||||
atac('C44', 'a link of another kind in the chain', D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, transfers: [reSemn('transfer', t1, mfr, (st) => { st.kind = 'aere-device-transfer-v0'; })] }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['transfer-form']);
|
||||
{ let l = [], de = mfr; const chei = [op, cumparator]; for (let i = 0; i < 65; i++) { const catre = chei[i % 2]; l.push(D.transferOwnership({ from: de, to: catre.public, manufacture: cred, transfers: l, now: cand(-10 * ZI + i) })); de = catre; }
|
||||
atac('C45', 'a chain of 65 transfers', D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, transfers: l }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['chain-length']); }
|
||||
atac('C46', 'the device asks for an action its owner did not grant', B({ authorization: aut(op, cap1, { actions: ['door.unlock'] }) }), O(), ['authorization-action']);
|
||||
atac('C47', 'the authorization expired an hour before', B({ authorization: aut(op, cap1, { notBefore: at(-2 * ZI), notAfter: at(-3600) }) }), O(), ['authorization-window']);
|
||||
atac('C48', 'an authorization of ANOTHER device, by the same owner', B({ authorization: D.authorize({ owner: op, deviceId: clonaDev.deviceId, ownership: cap1, actions: ACT, notBefore: at(-ZI), notAfter: at(ZI), now: cand(-ZI) }) }), O(), ['authorization-device']);
|
||||
atac('C49', 'an authorization whose action list is not in its normal form', B({ authorization: reSemn('authorization', A1, op, (st) => { st.actions = ['telemetry.publish', 'door.unlock']; }) }), O(), ['authorization-form']);
|
||||
atac('C50', 'the granted actions widened after the owner signed', B({ authorization: (() => { const a = clona(A1); a.statement.actions = ['door.unlock', 'firmware.install', 'telemetry.publish']; return a; })() }), O(), ['authorization-signature']);
|
||||
|
||||
spune('C. status: a revocation that is read has effect');
|
||||
atac('C51', 'REVOCATION IGNORED? no: the manufacturer retired the device, and the registry was read', B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, stare(mfr, 'retired', 1, null)] }), ['status-retired']);
|
||||
atac('C52', 'the manufacturer\'s retirement is never lifted: the owner\'s later "active" does not undo it', B(), O({ statusRecords: [stare(mfr, 'retired', 1, null), stare(op, 'active', 9, cap1)] }), ['status-retired']);
|
||||
atac('C53', 'nor does the manufacturer\'s own later "active" undo its retirement', B(), O({ statusRecords: [stare(mfr, 'retired', 1, null), stare(mfr, 'active', 2, null)] }), ['status-retired']);
|
||||
atac('C53b', 'nor does a SALE undo the manufacturer\'s retirement: the device retired by its manufacturer, sold on, the new owner says active', Bx(), O({ statusRecords: [stare(mfr, 'retired', 1, null), activX] }), ['status-retired']);
|
||||
atac('C54', 'the owner retired the device', B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, stare(op, 'retired', 2, cap1)] }), ['status-retired']);
|
||||
atac('C54b', 'the owner\'s retirement holds while it owns the device: its own later "active" does not undo it', B(), O({ statusRecords: [stare(op, 'retired', 2, cap1), stare(op, 'active', 9, cap1)] }), ['status-retired']);
|
||||
atac('C55', 'the manufacturer suspended the device; the owner\'s "active" does not lift a suspension it did not make', B(), O({ statusRecords: [stare(mfr, 'suspended', 1, null), stare(op, 'active', 9, cap1)] }), ['status-suspended']);
|
||||
atac('C56', 'the owner suspended the device (its latest record)', B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, stare(op, 'suspended', 2, cap1)] }), ['status-suspended']);
|
||||
atac('C57', 'a suspension does not expire: its record is past validUntil and still holds', B(), O({ statusRecords: [stare(op, 'suspended', 2, cap1, { now: cand(-3 * ZI), validUntil: at(-ZI) })] }), ['status-suspended']);
|
||||
atac('C58', 'two records of one signer with the same number, one says suspended: the stricter holds', B(), O({ statusRecords: [stare(op, 'active', 3, cap1), stare(op, 'suspended', 3, cap1)] }), ['status-suspended']);
|
||||
|
||||
spune('G. status and ownership: whose record counts, and for how long');
|
||||
// a record of the owner that names no ownership head: the producer refuses to write one, so it is signed by hand with the published formula
|
||||
const faraCap = (rec, k) => reSemn('status', rec, k, (st) => { st.ownership = null; });
|
||||
atac('G01', 'THE OWNER OF NOW RETIRES THE DEVICE in a record that names NO ownership head, beside its own current "active": it is the owner\'s record all the same', B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, faraCap(stare(op, 'retired', 2, cap1), op)] }), ['status-retired']);
|
||||
atac('G02', 'the owner of now suspends the device in a record that names no ownership head', B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, faraCap(stare(op, 'suspended', 2, cap1), op)] }), ['status-suspended']);
|
||||
atac('G03', 'sold, and bought back: the suspension the owner signed under its FIRST ownership holds now that it owns the device again (it can only harm itself)', B3(), O({ statusRecords: [stare(op, 'active', 1, cap3), stare(op, 'suspended', 7, cap1)] }), ['status-suspended']);
|
||||
atac('G04', 'sold, and bought back: the retirement the owner signed under its first ownership holds as well', B3(), O({ statusRecords: [stare(op, 'active', 1, cap3), stare(op, 'retired', 2, cap1)] }), ['status-retired']);
|
||||
partial('G05', 'sold, and bought back: the only record is the owner\'s "active" of its FIRST ownership: it is not believed under another head, and said so', B3(), O({ statusRecords: [stare(op, 'active', 1, cap1)] }), ['status-unread'], (r) => numit(r, 'status-ignored', 'only under the current ownership head') && r.subject.state === 'unknown');
|
||||
valid('G06', 'RETIREMENT, THEN A SALE: the owner retired the device and transferred it to a second identity, which says active under the new head. The retirement does not bind the new owner, and it is NAMED with the state it says (the whole registry was read)', Bx(), O({ statusRecords: [stare(op, 'retired', 1, cap1, { now: cand(-900) }), activX] }),
|
||||
(r) => numit(r, 'status-prior-ownership', '"retired"') && la(r.subject.priorOwnership.map((p) => `${p.owner} ${p.state} ${p.records}`)) === `${op.id} retired 1` && r.subject.state === 'active' && r.subject.owner === aDoua.id && r.links.status === 'PASSED');
|
||||
valid('G07', 'SUSPENSION, THEN A SALE: the same, the state named is "suspended"', Bx(), O({ statusRecords: [stare(op, 'suspended', 1, cap1, { now: cand(-900) }), activX] }),
|
||||
(r) => numit(r, 'status-prior-ownership', '"suspended"') && la(r.subject.priorOwnership.map((p) => `${p.owner} ${p.state} ${p.records}`)) === `${op.id} suspended 1` && r.subject.state === 'active');
|
||||
valid('G08', 'what a previous owner\'s records say: retired if any says so, else the state of its highest record', Bx(), O({ statusRecords: [activX, stare(op, 'suspended', 2, cap1), stare(op, 'active', 3, cap1)] }), (r) => numit(r, 'status-prior-ownership') && la(r.subject.priorOwnership.map((p) => `${p.state} ${p.records}`)) === 'active 2'
|
||||
&& judeca(Bx(), O({ statusRecords: [activX, stare(op, 'retired', 1, cap1), stare(op, 'active', 9, cap1)] })).subject.priorOwnership[0].state === 'retired'
|
||||
&& judeca(Bx(), O({ statusRecords: [activX, stare(op, 'active', 4, cap1), stare(op, 'suspended', 4, cap1)] })).subject.priorOwnership[0].state === 'suspended');
|
||||
atac('G09', 'a retirement of the manufacturer whose date is not a time is applied all the same (who may retire said "retired")', B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, reSemn('status', stare(mfr, 'retired', 1, null), mfr, (st) => { st.at = 'yesterday'; })] }), ['status-retired']);
|
||||
partial('G10', 'the only record is an "active" of the owner whose validity is not a time: it is not believed', B(), O({ statusRecords: [reSemn('status', activ, op, (st) => { st.validUntil = 'next year'; })] }), ['status-unread'], (r) => numit(r, 'status-ignored', 'not a time'));
|
||||
atac('G11', 'a retirement dated 30 s ahead of the verifier\'s clock is inside the tolerance: in effect', B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, stare(mfr, 'retired', 1, null, { now: cand(95) })] }), ['status-retired']);
|
||||
partial('G12', 'a record signed by the MANUFACTURER in a version this verifier does not read (it says retired), beside the owner\'s current "active": the registry is not read as clean', B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, reSemn('status', stare(mfr, 'retired', 1, null), mfr, (st) => { st.v = 2; })] }), ['status-unread'], (r) => numit(r, 'status-unread', 'cannot be seen') && r.subject.state === 'active');
|
||||
partial('G13', 'a record of the OWNER with a state this verifier does not know, beside its current "active"', B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, reSemn('status', stare(op, 'retired', 2, cap1), op, (st) => { st.state = 'destroyed'; })] }), ['status-unread'], (r) => numit(r, 'status-unread', 'cannot be seen'));
|
||||
valid('G14', 'a record of a PREVIOUS owner that this verifier cannot read does not bind the owner of now either: named, nothing is said about its state', Bx(), O({ statusRecords: [activX, reSemn('status', stare(op, 'retired', 1, cap1), op, (st) => { st.state = 'destroyed'; })] }), (r) => numit(r, 'status-prior-ownership', 'cannot read') && r.subject.priorOwnership.length === 0 && !r.unjudged.includes('status-unread'));
|
||||
|
||||
spune('C. the attestation: replay, staleness, another verifier');
|
||||
atac('C59', 'AN ATTESTATION REPLAYED WITH AN OLD NONCE: the verifier gave a new one', B(), O({ nonce: 'n-' + crypto.randomBytes(8).toString('hex') }), ['nonce']);
|
||||
atac('C60', 'an attestation made for one verifier shown to another', B(), O({ audience: 'https://another-gateway.example' }), ['audience']);
|
||||
atac('C61', 'an hour-old attestation', B(), O({ now: at(3725) }), ['freshness']);
|
||||
atac('C62', 'an attestation dated ten minutes in the verifier\'s future', B({ attestation: atest({ now: cand(665) }) }), O(), ['freshness']);
|
||||
atac('C63', 'a file of another kind where the attestation should be', B({ attestation: reAtest(X1, dev, (st) => { st.kind = 'aere-device-status'; }) }), O(), ['attestation-form']);
|
||||
|
||||
spune('C. the witness (a reading of the notarized envelope that the verifier made)');
|
||||
const PLIC = D.proofOfDevice(X1, buildProof);
|
||||
cer('C64', 'the AIP-23 envelope of an attestation commits to it: kind device, the device id, the hash of the signed attestation, the hash of K', PLIC.kind === 'aere-proof-of-device-attestation' && PLIC.statement.deviceId === dev.deviceId && PLIC.statement.attestationHash === D.attestationHash(X1) && PLIC.statement.createdAt === X1.statement.at && !JSON.stringify(PLIC).includes(NONCE));
|
||||
{ const citire = (dt) => [{ statementHash: PLIC.statementHash, at: Math.floor((T0 + 60000) / 1000) + dt, chainId: 28001 }];
|
||||
valid('C65', 'an envelope nobody notarized claims nothing: VALID, the witness link PASSED on the commitment alone', B({ anchor: PLIC }), O(), (r) => r.links.witness === 'PASSED');
|
||||
partial('C66', 'the envelope CLAIMS a notarization and the verifier read nothing on the chain: a claim is not a reading', B({ anchor: { ...PLIC, notarization: { chainId: 28001, firstSeen: 1 } } }), O(), ['witness-unread']);
|
||||
valid('C67', 'with the verifier\'s own reading (the envelope was on the chain 40 s after the attestation): VALID', B({ anchor: { ...PLIC, notarization: { chainId: 28001, firstSeen: 1 } } }), O({ anchors: citire(40) }), (r) => r.subject.witness && r.subject.witness.chainId === 28001 && r.subject.witness.at === citire(40)[0].at);
|
||||
atac('C68', 'the device dated its attestation AFTER the moment its envelope was already on the chain', B({ anchor: PLIC }), O({ anchors: citire(-600) }), ['witness-time']);
|
||||
atac('C69', 'the envelope of ANOTHER attestation attached to this one', B({ anchor: D.proofOfDevice(atest({ now: cand(61) }), buildProof) }), O(), ['witness-envelope']);
|
||||
atac('C70', 'the envelope edited after its hash', B({ anchor: (() => { const e = clona(PLIC); e.statement.posture = 'firmware-sequence-9'; return e; })() }), O(), ['witness-envelope']);
|
||||
valid('C71', 'a reading of another envelope is not a reading of this one (ignored)', B({ anchor: PLIC }), O({ anchors: [{ statementHash: '0x' + '22'.repeat(32), at: 1 }] }));
|
||||
partial('C71b', 'a reading of this envelope whose time is in MILLISECONDS is not a reading (taken for seconds it would lie thousands of years ahead and bound nothing): not used, and said', B({ anchor: PLIC }), O({ anchors: [{ statementHash: PLIC.statementHash, at: T0 + 100000, chainId: 28001 }] }), ['witness-unread'], (r) => numit(r, 'witness-unread', 'milliseconds') && r.subject.witness === null && r.rows.filter((x) => x.unjudged === 'witness-unread').length === 1); }
|
||||
|
||||
// ================================================================ F. the halves: a check made of several conditions has a row for each
|
||||
// Each row here differs from an honest bundle in ONE condition of a compound check, so that the condition, taken out alone, turns
|
||||
// exactly that row red (the negative control plants each of them out).
|
||||
spune('F. the halves of the compound checks, one row each');
|
||||
atac('F01', 'the manufacture credential is not valid yet: it starts tomorrow', D.bundle({ manufacture: face({ validFrom: at(ZI) }) }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['manufacture-window']);
|
||||
atac('F02', 'the authorization begins in an hour', B({ authorization: aut(op, cap1, { notBefore: at(3600) }) }), O(), ['authorization-window']);
|
||||
atac('F03', 'the authorization was not in force yet when the device attested: it begins 63 s after the attestation (on the verifier\'s clock, with its tolerance, it has begun)', B({ authorization: aut(op, cap1, { notBefore: at(123) }) }), O(), ['authorization-window']);
|
||||
atac('F04', 'the authorization ended between the attestation and the verification', B({ authorization: aut(op, cap1, { notAfter: at(62) }) }), O(), ['authorization-window']);
|
||||
atac('F05', 'the authorization ends before the time the device wrote in its attestation (dated 35 s ahead, inside the tolerance)', B({ authorization: aut(op, cap1, { notAfter: at(66) }), attestation: atest({ now: cand(100) }) }), O(), ['authorization-window']);
|
||||
atac('F06', 'the authorization begins after the verifier\'s clock and its tolerance; the attestation is dated later still', B({ authorization: aut(op, cap1, { notBefore: at(135) }), attestation: atest({ now: cand(100) }) }), O(), ['authorization-window']);
|
||||
atac('F07', 'a transfer that carries position 7 at position 1 (the hash of the link before it is right)', D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, transfers: [reSemn('transfer', t1, mfr, (st) => { st.seq = 7; })] }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['transfer-prev']);
|
||||
atac('F08', 'a transfer at the right position that names another link before it', D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, transfers: [reSemn('transfer', t1, mfr, (st) => { st.prev = '0x' + '33'.repeat(32); })] }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['transfer-prev']);
|
||||
atac('F09', 'a chain with no manufacture credential beside it: the GIVER of the first transfer carries an id its keys do not derive', D.bundle({ transfers: [reSemn('transfer', t1, mfr, (st) => { st.from.id = fals; })] }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['transfer-ids']);
|
||||
atac('F10', 'the device attests the digest of the release shown under another sequence number (9)', B({ attestation: atest({ firmware: { digest: fw2.statement.digest, sequence: 9 } }) }), O(), ['attestation-firmware']);
|
||||
atac('F11', 'the device attests the sequence number of the release shown with another digest', B({ attestation: atest({ firmware: { digest: fw1.statement.digest, sequence: 2 } }) }), O(), ['attestation-firmware']);
|
||||
partial('F12', 'the only firmware policy handed is the manufacturer\'s policy for ANOTHER model', B(), O({ firmwarePolicies: [D.firmwarePolicy({ manufacturer: mfr, model: 'BX-1', minSequence: 0, validFrom: at(-3600), validUntil: at(ZI), now: cand(-3600) })] }), ['firmware-policy-unread']);
|
||||
partial('F13', 'the only firmware policy handed has expired', B(), O({ firmwarePolicies: [politica({ validFrom: at(-7200), validUntil: at(-10), now: cand(-7200) })] }), ['firmware-policy-unread']);
|
||||
valid('F14', 'an expired policy with a higher floor beside a current one: the current one is the policy of now', B({ firmware: fw1, attestation: atest({ firmware: fw1 }) }), O({ firmwarePolicies: [politica(), politica({ minSequence: 2, validFrom: at(-7200), validUntil: at(-10), now: cand(-7200) })] }));
|
||||
partial('F15', 'the only firmware policy handed is not in force yet: it starts tomorrow', B(), O({ firmwarePolicies: [politica({ validFrom: at(ZI), validUntil: at(2 * ZI) })] }), ['firmware-policy-unread']);
|
||||
{ const faraPrefix = reSemn('firmware-policy', politica(), mfr, (st) => { st.retracted = [fw2.statement.digest.slice(2)]; }); // signed by the manufacturer's own tooling, by hand: the producer refuses to write it
|
||||
partial('F16', 'A SIGNED POLICY WHOSE RETRACTED ENTRY IS NOT A DIGEST (the 64 hex digits of this release, without 0x) is not read as a policy that retracts nothing', B(), O({ firmwarePolicies: [faraPrefix] }), ['firmware-policy-unread'], (r) => numit(r, 'firmware-policy-unread', 'not a digest'));
|
||||
partial('F17', 'the same policy beside a clean current one: still not read as clean', B(), O({ firmwarePolicies: [politica(), faraPrefix] }), ['firmware-policy-unread'], (r) => numit(r, 'firmware-policy-unread', 'not a digest') && r.rows.some((x) => x.rule === 'firmware-retracted' && x.pass === true));
|
||||
atac('F18', 'a policy that cannot be read does not hide what a readable one refuses: the floor of the readable policy holds', B({ firmware: fw1, attestation: atest({ firmware: fw1 }) }), O({ firmwarePolicies: [politica({ minSequence: 2 }), faraPrefix] }), ['firmware-rollback'], (r) => numit(r, 'firmware-policy-unread', 'not a digest')); }
|
||||
partial('F19', 'a signed policy whose floor is not a whole number, beside a clean one', B(), O({ firmwarePolicies: [politica(), reSemn('firmware-policy', politica(), mfr, (st) => { st.minSequence = '1'; })] }), ['firmware-policy-unread'], (r) => numit(r, 'firmware-policy-unread', 'not a whole number'));
|
||||
partial('F19b', 'a signed policy whose validity is not a time, beside a clean one', B(), O({ firmwarePolicies: [politica(), reSemn('firmware-policy', politica(), mfr, (st) => { st.validUntil = 'next week'; })] }), ['firmware-policy-unread'], (r) => numit(r, 'firmware-policy-unread', 'not a time'));
|
||||
partial('F19c', 'a signed policy of a version this verifier does not read (it retracts this release), beside a clean one', B(), O({ firmwarePolicies: [politica(), reSemn('firmware-policy', politica({ retracted: [fw2.statement.digest] }), mfr, (st) => { st.v = 2; })] }), ['firmware-policy-unread'], (r) => numit(r, 'firmware-policy-unread', 'version'));
|
||||
atac('F20', 'the manufacturer certifies the device key written in ANOTHER base64 text (a padding character added): one key has one text', D.bundle({ manufacture: reCred(cred, mfr, (st) => { st.claims.deviceKey = dev.publicKey + '='; }) }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['device-key'], () => aceiasiOcteti(dev.publicKey + '=', dev.publicKey));
|
||||
atac('F21', 'the attestation carries the device key in another base64 text', D.bundle({ attestation: reAtest(X1, dev, (st) => { st.key = dev.publicKey + '='; }) }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['attestation-key']);
|
||||
valid('F22', 'the registry also holds the manufacturer\'s retirement of ANOTHER device: it does not concern this one', B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, D.statusRecord({ by: mfr, manufacture: credAlt, state: 'retired', seq: 1, validUntil: at(ZI), now: cand(-600) })] }), (r) => !r.unjudged.includes('status-ignored') && r.subject.state === 'active');
|
||||
atac('F23', 'the manufacture credential names as holder ANOTHER ID beside the manufacturer\'s own keys', D.bundle({ manufacture: reCred(cred, mfr, (st) => { st.holder = { id: fals, keys: mfr.public }; }) }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['manufacture-holder']);
|
||||
atac('F24', 'the manufacture credential names as holder the manufacturer\'s id beside OTHER keys', D.bundle({ manufacture: reCred(cred, mfr, (st) => { st.holder = { id: mfr.id, keys: op.public }; }) }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['manufacture-holder']);
|
||||
valid('F25', 'a "retired" record signed with the owner\'s keys under an id those keys do not derive is not the owner\'s record: ignored, and said so', B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, reSemn('status', stare(op, 'retired', 9, cap1), op, (st) => { st.by.id = fals; })] }), (r) => numit(r, 'status-ignored') && r.subject.state === 'active');
|
||||
atac('F26', 'a release with no manufacture credential beside it, whose signer carries an id its keys do not derive', D.bundle({ firmware: reSemn('firmware', fw2, mfr, (st) => { st.signer.id = fals; }) }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['firmware-signer']);
|
||||
atac('F27', 'an authorization with no chain beside it, whose owner carries an id its keys do not derive', D.bundle({ authorization: reSemn('authorization', A1, op, (st) => { st.owner.id = fals; }), attestation: X1 }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['authorization-owner']);
|
||||
atac('F28', 'the Proof of Software attestation handed IS the one the release names, and it does not list the image of that release', (() => { const f = reSemn('firmware', fw1, mfr, (st) => { st.softwareAttestationHash = POS.statementHash; }); return B({ firmware: f, attestation: atest({ firmware: f }) }); })(), O({ softwareAttestation: POS }), ['firmware-software']);
|
||||
atac('F29', 'a forged envelope: the hash of this attestation under ANOTHER device id, its statementHash recomputed', B({ anchor: (() => { const e = clona(PLIC); e.statement.deviceId = clonaDev.deviceId; e.statementHash = '0x' + crypto.createHash('sha256').update(JSON.stringify(e.statement)).digest('hex'); return e; })() }), O(), ['witness-envelope']);
|
||||
atac('F30', 'a bundle of another version', { ...B(), v: 2 }, O(), ['form']);
|
||||
atac('F31', 'a bundle whose transfers are not a list', { ...B(), transfers: 'x' }, O(), ['form']);
|
||||
atac('F32', 'AN ATTESTATION DATED 120 s AHEAD of the verifier\'s clock: beyond its tolerance of 60 s, well inside the allowed age of 300 s', B({ attestation: atest({ now: cand(185) }) }), O(), ['freshness']);
|
||||
valid('F33', 'an attestation dated 30 s ahead of the verifier\'s clock is inside the tolerance (a clock that runs fast)', B({ attestation: atest({ now: cand(95) }) }), O());
|
||||
atac('F34', 'with the verifier\'s tolerance set to zero, an attestation dated 5 s ahead is refused', B({ attestation: atest({ now: cand(70) }) }), O({ clockSkewS: 0 }), ['freshness']);
|
||||
{ const alt = altText(t1.signature.ed25519);
|
||||
atac('F35', 'a transfer whose Ed25519 signature is the same bytes in ANOTHER base64 text (the unused bits of its last character changed)', D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, transfers: [{ statement: t1.statement, signature: { ...t1.signature, ed25519: alt } }] }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['transfer-signature'], () => aceiasiOcteti(alt, t1.signature.ed25519)); }
|
||||
{ const alt = altText(X1.signature.value);
|
||||
atac('F36', 'the attestation signature is the same bytes in another base64 text', B({ attestation: { statement: X1.statement, signature: { ...X1.signature, value: alt } } }), O(), ['attestation-signature'], () => aceiasiOcteti(alt, X1.signature.value)); }
|
||||
{ const alt = altText(cred.signature.mldsa65);
|
||||
atac('F37', 'the manufacturer\'s signature is the same bytes in another base64 text', D.bundle({ manufacture: { statement: cred.statement, signature: { ...cred.signature, mldsa65: alt } } }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['manufacture-signature'], () => aceiasiOcteti(alt, cred.signature.mldsa65)); }
|
||||
|
||||
// ================================================================ H. more conditions of the compound checks (a second adversarial review, 2026-10-05)
|
||||
// A status record signed by hand with the published formula: who holds the keys can write any form (the producer refuses most of these)
|
||||
const stMana = (by, state, seq, cap, peste = {}) => { const statement = { v: 1, kind: 'aere-device-status', deviceId: dev.deviceId, state, seq, ownership: cap, by: { id: by.id, keys: by.public }, at: at(-600), validUntil: at(ZI), ...peste }; return { statement, signature: D.signLink('status', statement, by) }; };
|
||||
const hashPlic = (st) => '0x' + crypto.createHash('sha256').update(JSON.stringify(st)).digest('hex');
|
||||
spune('H. the order of a list, the edges of the intervals, the form of a time');
|
||||
atac('H01', 'the registry lists [suspended 5, active 3]: the record with the HIGHEST number holds, not the last one in the list', B(), O({ statusRecords: [stare(op, 'suspended', 5, cap1), stare(op, 'active', 3, cap1)] }), ['status-suspended']);
|
||||
atac('H02', 'the registry lists [suspended 5, active 5]: of two with one number the stricter holds, whichever comes last', B(), O({ statusRecords: [stare(op, 'suspended', 5, cap1), stare(op, 'active', 5, cap1)] }), ['status-suspended']);
|
||||
valid('H03', 'the registry lists [active 6, suspended 5]: the later record of the signer lifts its suspension, whatever the order of the list', B(), O({ statusRecords: [stare(op, 'active', 6, cap1), stare(op, 'suspended', 5, cap1)] }));
|
||||
{ let l = []; const ids = [mfr, op]; for (let i = 0; i < D.MAX_TRANSFERS; i++) l = [...l, D.transferOwnership({ from: ids[i % 2], to: ids[(i + 1) % 2].public, manufacture: cred, transfers: l, now: cand(-10 * ZI + i) })];
|
||||
const cap = D.ownershipHead(cred, l), own = ids[D.MAX_TRANSFERS % 2];
|
||||
valid('H04', `a chain of exactly ${D.MAX_TRANSFERS} transfers, the most that is read, is read`, D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, firmware: fw2, transfers: l, authorization: aut(own, cap), attestation: atest({ ownership: cap }) }), O({ statusRecords: [stare(own, 'active', 1, cap)] }), (r) => r.subject.transfers === D.MAX_TRANSFERS && r.subject.owner === own.id); }
|
||||
{ const LID2 = 'https://manufacturer.example/status/2';
|
||||
partial('H05', 'the only recall list handed is the manufacturer\'s own, current and clean, under ANOTHER id than the one the credential names', B(), O({ statusLists: [lista({ id: LID2 })] }), ['manufacture-status-unread']);
|
||||
valid('H06', 'beside the list the credential names, another list of the manufacturer whose bit 7 is set: it is the bit of another list, not a recall of this device', B(), O({ statusLists: [lista(), lista({ id: LID2, revoked: [7] })] })); }
|
||||
atac('H07', 'a manufacture credential with a claim under selective disclosure (a digest in `sd`), signed by the manufacturer: every claim of a device is in the clear', D.bundle({ manufacture: reCred(cred, mfr, (st) => { st.sd = ['x']; }) }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['manufacture-form']);
|
||||
{ const alt = clona(POS); alt.statement.kind = 'aere-proof-of-something-else'; alt.statementHash = hashPlic(alt.statement);
|
||||
const fwAlt = reSemn('firmware', fw2pos, mfr, (st) => { st.softwareAttestationHash = alt.statementHash; });
|
||||
atac('H08', 'the release names, by its hash, an attestation that is not a Proof of Software attestation, and that one is handed', B({ firmware: fwAlt, attestation: atest({ firmware: fwAlt }) }), O({ softwareAttestation: alt }), ['firmware-software']);
|
||||
const editat = clona(POS); editat.statement.subject.version = '2.0.1';
|
||||
atac('H09', 'the Proof of Software attestation handed carries the hash the release names, and its statement was edited: it no longer hashes to it', B({ firmware: fw2pos }), O({ softwareAttestation: editat }), ['firmware-software']); }
|
||||
partial('H10', 'a signed policy with a NEGATIVE floor (-1), the only one handed: not read as a floor', B(), O({ firmwarePolicies: [reSemn('firmware-policy', politica(), mfr, (st) => { st.minSequence = -1; })] }), ['firmware-policy-unread'], (r) => numit(r, 'firmware-policy-unread', 'not a whole number'));
|
||||
partial('H11', 'the only record is an "active" of the owner whose number is not whole (1.5)', B(), O({ statusRecords: [stMana(op, 'active', 1.5, cap1)] }), ['status-unread'], (r) => numit(r, 'status-unread', 'a number this verifier does not read'));
|
||||
partial('H12', 'a current "active" and a "suspended" of the owner whose number is written as text ("7"): it cannot be placed in order, and is not passed over', B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, stMana(op, 'suspended', '7', cap1)] }), ['status-unread'], (r) => numit(r, 'status-unread', 'a number this verifier does not read'));
|
||||
atac('H13', 'the manufacture credential expired 30 s before the verifier\'s clock: an ending has no tolerance', D.bundle({ manufacture: face({ validUntil: at(35) }) }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['manufacture-window']);
|
||||
{ const c = face({ validFrom: at(95) }), t = D.transferOwnership({ from: mfr, to: op.public, manufacture: c, now: cand(-10 * ZI) }), cap = D.ownershipHead(c, [t]);
|
||||
valid('H14', 'the manufacture credential begins 30 s after the verifier\'s clock: a beginning has the tolerance', D.bundle({ manufacture: c, firmware: fw2, transfers: [t], authorization: aut(op, cap), attestation: atest({ ownership: cap }) }), O({ statusRecords: [stare(op, 'active', 1, cap)] })); }
|
||||
partial('H15', 'the only "active" expired 30 s before the verifier\'s clock', B(), O({ statusRecords: [stare(op, 'active', 1, cap1, { validUntil: at(35) })] }), ['status-unread']);
|
||||
atac('H16', 'an attestation made 330 s before the verifier\'s clock (30 s past the allowed age of 300 s)', B(), O({ now: at(390) }), ['freshness']);
|
||||
valid('H17', 'an attestation made exactly 300 s before the verifier\'s clock is at the edge of the allowed age, inside it', B(), O({ now: at(360) }));
|
||||
partial('H18', 'the only firmware policy expired 30 s before the verifier\'s clock', B(), O({ firmwarePolicies: [politica({ validUntil: at(35) })] }), ['firmware-policy-unread']);
|
||||
partial('H19', 'the only recall list expired 30 s before the verifier\'s clock', B(), O({ statusLists: [lista({ validUntil: at(35) })] }), ['manufacture-status-unread']);
|
||||
atac('H20', 'an authorization whose signature (the right bytes) declares another scheme ("rsa-pss")', B({ authorization: { statement: A1.statement, signature: { ...A1.signature, alg: 'rsa-pss' } } }), O(), ['authorization-signature']);
|
||||
atac('H21', 'an authorization signed by the owner whose end is written without a time zone (a parser would read it as local time): not an RFC 3339 UTC time', B({ authorization: reSemn('authorization', A1, op, (st) => { st.notAfter = at(ZI).replace(/[.][0-9]+Z$/, ''); }) }), O(), ['unreadable']);
|
||||
partial('H22', 'the only record is an "active" of the owner whose validity is written with a zone offset (+03:00): not believed', B(), O({ statusRecords: [stMana(op, 'active', 1, cap1, { validUntil: at(ZI).replace(/[.][0-9]+Z$/, '+03:00') })] }), ['status-unread'], (r) => numit(r, 'status-ignored', 'not a time'));
|
||||
{ const sec = Math.floor((T0 + 60000) / 1000), ci = (dt, at2 = (x) => x) => ({ statementHash: PLIC.statementHash, at: at2(sec + dt), chainId: 28001 });
|
||||
atac('H23', 'two readings of the same envelope, one 600 s BEFORE the date of the attestation and one 40 s after it: the earliest reading is the bound', B({ anchor: PLIC }), O({ anchors: [ci(-600), ci(40)] }), ['witness-time']);
|
||||
atac('H24', 'the same two readings in the other order', B({ anchor: PLIC }), O({ anchors: [ci(40), ci(-600)] }), ['witness-time']);
|
||||
atac('H25', 'the envelope carries the kind of another envelope (a Proof of AI attestation), the rest untouched', B({ anchor: { ...PLIC, kind: 'aere-proof-of-ai-attestation' } }), O(), ['witness-envelope']);
|
||||
atac('H26', 'the statement of the envelope is of another kind, its hash recomputed', B({ anchor: (() => { const e = clona(PLIC); e.statement.kind = 'aere-proof-of-ai'; e.statementHash = hashPlic(e.statement); return e; })() }), O(), ['witness-envelope']);
|
||||
partial('H27', 'a reading whose time is written as text, 600 s before the date of the attestation: it is not a reading (as a number it would refuse the attestation)', B({ anchor: PLIC }), O({ anchors: [ci(-600, String)] }), ['witness-unread']); }
|
||||
{ const r = judeca(B(), O({ statusRecords: [stare(op, 'retired', 2, cap1), stare(mfr, 'retired', 1, null)] }));
|
||||
cer('H28', 'retired by its owner (first in the list) and by its manufacturer: the row names the retirement that is final, the manufacturer\'s', r.verdict === 'INVALID' && la(r.rules) === 'status-retired' && r.rows.some((x) => x.rule === 'status-retired' && x.pass === false && x.detail.includes(mfr.id) && x.detail.includes('never lifted')), `[${r.rules}] ${(r.rows.find((x) => x.rule === 'status-retired') || {}).detail}`, ['status-retired']); }
|
||||
atac('H29', 'the second transfer is dated before the first (and after the device was made): each transfer comes after the one before it', D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, transfers: [t1, reSemn('transfer', t2, op, (st) => { st.at = at(-11 * ZI); })] }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['transfer-time']);
|
||||
atac('H30', 'a chain broken at the form of its second link keeps no owner and no head: the first owner\'s record is nobody\'s record then', B({ transfers: [t1, reSemn('transfer', t2, op, (st) => { st.kind = 'aere-device-transfer-v0'; })] }), O(), ['transfer-form'], (r) => r.unjudged.includes('status-unread') && r.unjudged.includes('status-ignored'));
|
||||
|
||||
// ================================================================ I. what is handed in another shape, or in too great a number, is named
|
||||
spune('I. what the verifier was handed in another shape is not passed over');
|
||||
{ const retr = stare(op, 'retired', 2, cap1), spus = (r, c) => numit(r, c, 'nothing in them was read'), polCurata = politica(), listaCurata = lista();
|
||||
partial('I01', 'the registry handed as [active, [retired]] (a list inside the list): the retirement was not read, and the verdict is not VALID', B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, [retr]] }), ['status-unread'], (r) => spus(r, 'status-unread') && r.subject.state === 'active');
|
||||
partial('I02', 'the registry handed as [active, { records: [retired] }] (a registry object as an element)', B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, { records: [retr] }] }), ['status-unread'], (r) => spus(r, 'status-unread'));
|
||||
partial('I03', 'the policies handed as [clean, [one that retracts this release]]', B(), O({ firmwarePolicies: [politica(), [politica({ retracted: [fw2.statement.digest] })]] }), ['firmware-policy-unread'], (r) => spus(r, 'firmware-policy-unread'));
|
||||
partial('I04', 'the recall lists handed as [clean, [one that recalls this device]]', B(), O({ statusLists: [lista(), [lista({ revoked: [7] })]] }), ['manufacture-status-unread'], (r) => spus(r, 'manufacture-status-unread'));
|
||||
partial('I05', 'the readings handed as [[a reading 600 s before the date of the attestation]]', B({ anchor: PLIC }), O({ anchors: [[{ statementHash: PLIC.statementHash, at: Math.floor((T0 + 60000) / 1000) - 600 }]] }), ['witness-unread'], (r) => spus(r, 'witness-unread'));
|
||||
partial('I06', 'the registry holds null, a number, a string, an empty object and an object without a statement beside a current "active": five things that are not status records', B(), O({ statusRecords: [null, 5, 'x', {}, { statement: null }, activ] }), ['status-unread'], (r) => numit(r, 'status-unread', '5 of the 6'));
|
||||
partial('I07', 'a firmware policy handed where a status record is expected: a file of another kind is not passed over', B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, politica()] }), ['status-unread'], (r) => spus(r, 'status-unread'));
|
||||
partial('I08', `${D.MAX_STATUS_RECORDS + 1} status records handed, the retirement last: the first ${D.MAX_STATUS_RECORDS} are judged, the rest is said not to have been read`, B(), O({ statusRecords: [...Array.from({ length: D.MAX_STATUS_RECORDS }, () => activ), retr] }), ['status-unread'], (r) => numit(r, 'status-unread', `the first ${D.MAX_STATUS_RECORDS} are judged`));
|
||||
atac('I09', `exactly ${D.MAX_STATUS_RECORDS} status records handed, the retirement last: all are judged`, B(), O({ statusRecords: [...Array.from({ length: D.MAX_STATUS_RECORDS - 1 }, () => activ), retr] }), ['status-retired'], (r) => !r.rows.some((x) => x.name.includes('than are judged')));
|
||||
{ const unul = stare(op, 'retired', 1, cap1, { now: cand(-900) }); const r = judeca(Bx(), O({ statusRecords: [activX, ...Array.from({ length: 300 }, () => unul)] }));
|
||||
cer('I10', '300 copies of one record of a previous owner: ONE row names them, with their number', r.verdict === 'VALID' && r.rows.filter((x) => x.unjudged === 'status-prior-ownership').length === 1 && numit(r, 'status-prior-ownership', '300 record(s)') && la(r.subject.priorOwnership.map((p) => `${p.state} ${p.records}`)) === 'retired 300' && r.rows.length < 60, `${r.verdict}, ${r.rows.length} rows`); }
|
||||
partial('I11', `${D.MAX_FIRMWARE_POLICIES + 1} firmware policies handed, the one that retracts this release last`, B(), O({ firmwarePolicies: [...Array.from({ length: D.MAX_FIRMWARE_POLICIES }, () => polCurata), politica({ retracted: [fw2.statement.digest] })] }), ['firmware-policy-unread'], (r) => numit(r, 'firmware-policy-unread', `the first ${D.MAX_FIRMWARE_POLICIES} are judged`));
|
||||
partial('I12', `${D.MAX_STATUS_LISTS + 1} recall lists handed, the one that recalls this device last`, B(), O({ statusLists: [...Array.from({ length: D.MAX_STATUS_LISTS }, () => listaCurata), lista({ revoked: [7] })] }), ['manufacture-status-unread'], (r) => numit(r, 'manufacture-status-unread', `the first ${D.MAX_STATUS_LISTS} are judged`));
|
||||
partial('I13', `${D.MAX_READINGS + 1} readings handed, the one that refuses the attestation last`, B({ anchor: PLIC }), O({ anchors: [...Array.from({ length: D.MAX_READINGS }, () => ({ statementHash: PLIC.statementHash, at: Math.floor((T0 + 60000) / 1000) + 40 })), { statementHash: PLIC.statementHash, at: Math.floor((T0 + 60000) / 1000) - 600 }] }), ['witness-unread'], (r) => numit(r, 'witness-unread', `the first ${D.MAX_READINGS} are judged`)); }
|
||||
|
||||
// ================================================================ J. the device id a status record names
|
||||
spune('J. the device id in a status record is compared like a digest');
|
||||
{ const SUS = dev.deviceId.replace(/[0-9a-f]{40}$/, (h) => h.toUpperCase());
|
||||
atac('J01', 'THE MANUFACTURER\'S RETIREMENT names the device id with its hex in UPPER CASE (its tooling writes it so): it is this device', B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, stMana(mfr, 'retired', 1, null, { deviceId: SUS })] }), ['status-retired'], () => SUS !== dev.deviceId && SUS.toLowerCase() === dev.deviceId);
|
||||
valid('J02', 'the only record is the owner\'s "active" with the id in upper case: it is this device\'s record', B(), O({ statusRecords: [stMana(op, 'active', 1, cap1, { deviceId: SUS })] }), (r) => r.subject.state === 'active');
|
||||
partial('J03', 'THE OWNER\'S RETIREMENT names the device id with a space after it: not a device id, and it may be meant for this device', B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, stMana(op, 'retired', 2, cap1, { deviceId: dev.deviceId + ' ' })] }), ['status-unread'], (r) => numit(r, 'status-unread', 'not a device id'));
|
||||
partial('J04', 'a record of the manufacturer whose device id is a number', B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, stMana(mfr, 'retired', 1, null, { deviceId: 7 })] }), ['status-unread'], (r) => numit(r, 'status-unread', 'not a device id'));
|
||||
valid('J05', 'a stranger\'s record whose device id is not a device id: ignored, and said so', B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, stMana(strain, 'retired', 1, null, { deviceId: dev.deviceId + ' ' })] }), (r) => numit(r, 'status-ignored'));
|
||||
valid('J06', 'a previous owner\'s record whose device id is not a device id: ignored, and said so', Bx(), O({ statusRecords: [activX, stMana(op, 'retired', 1, cap1, { deviceId: 'x' })] }), (r) => numit(r, 'status-ignored', 'previous owner') && r.subject.priorOwnership.length === 0); }
|
||||
|
||||
// ================================================================ K. another trusted manufacturer, and the chain that is shown
|
||||
spune('K. another trusted manufacturer; a chain shown shorter than it is');
|
||||
{ const cred2 = D.manufacture({ manufacturer: altMfr, deviceKey: dev.publicKey, model: 'AX-200', serial: 'SN-0001', validFrom: at(-ZI), validUntil: at(3650 * ZI), now: cand(-ZI) });
|
||||
const fwB = D.releaseFirmware({ signer: altMfr, model: 'AX-200', version: '2.0.0', sequence: 2, image: IMG2, now: cand(-3600) }), polB = D.firmwarePolicy({ manufacturer: altMfr, model: 'AX-200', minSequence: 1, validFrom: at(-3600), validUntil: at(ZI), now: cand(-3600) });
|
||||
const capB = D.ownershipHead(cred2), activB = D.statusRecord({ by: altMfr, manufacture: cred2, state: 'active', seq: 1, validUntil: at(ZI), now: cand(-600) });
|
||||
const bB = D.bundle({ manufacture: cred2, firmware: fwB, authorization: D.authorize({ owner: altMfr, deviceId: dev.deviceId, ownership: capB, actions: ACT, notBefore: at(-1800), notAfter: at(ZI), now: cand(-1800) }), attestation: D.attest({ device: dev, nonce: NONCE, audience: AUD, firmware: fwB, ownership: capB, action: 'telemetry.publish', now: cand(60) }) });
|
||||
const retrasA = stare(mfr, 'retired', 1, null, { now: cand(-2 * ZI) });
|
||||
partial('K01', 'THE SAME KEY CERTIFIED BY A SECOND MANUFACTURER after the first retired the device, and the verifier trusts both: the first one\'s retirement is not applied to another manufacturer\'s device, and the verdict is not VALID', bB, O({ trustedManufacturers: [mfr.id, altMfr.id], firmwarePolicies: [polB], statusRecords: [retrasA, activB] }), ['status-other-manufacturer'], (r) => numit(r, 'status-other-manufacturer', mfr.id) && r.subject.manufacturer === altMfr.id);
|
||||
partial('K02', 'the other trusted manufacturer says "active" about this key: not VALID either (it speaks about a key this verifier knows under another credential)', bB, O({ trustedManufacturers: [mfr.id, altMfr.id], firmwarePolicies: [polB], statusRecords: [stare(mfr, 'active', 1, null), activB] }), ['status-other-manufacturer']);
|
||||
valid('K03', 'the same record from a manufacturer the verifier does NOT trust is a stranger\'s record: ignored, and said so', bB, O({ trustedManufacturers: [altMfr.id], firmwarePolicies: [polB], statusRecords: [retrasA, activB] }), (r) => numit(r, 'status-ignored') && !r.unjudged.includes('status-other-manufacturer'));
|
||||
partial('K04', 'no trusted manufacturer named at all: the other manufacturer\'s record is a stranger\'s, and the manufacturer itself is not judged', bB, O({ trustedManufacturers: null, firmwarePolicies: [polB], statusRecords: [retrasA, activB] }), ['manufacturer-trust'], (r) => numit(r, 'status-ignored')); }
|
||||
// The verifier judges the chain it is SHOWN. The true chain here is manufacturer -> owner -> buyer, and the buyer retired the device.
|
||||
// Whoever holds a copy of K (a software key) and the older documents shows a shorter chain: the earlier owner then looks like the owner
|
||||
// of now, and the buyer's retirement is a stranger's record. These rows MEASURE that limit (README, "What it is not").
|
||||
{ const retrasCump = stare(cumparator, 'retired', 1, cap2);
|
||||
valid('K05', 'LIMIT, MEASURED: the chain shown one transfer short (the sale to the buyer hidden), with the earlier owner\'s authorization and "active" still current: VALID, and the buyer\'s retirement is only named as a stranger\'s', B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, retrasCump] }), (r) => numit(r, 'status-ignored', cumparator.id) && r.subject.owner === op.id && r.subject.state === 'active');
|
||||
valid('K06', 'LIMIT, MEASURED: no transfer shown at all, with the manufacturer\'s own authorization and "active" still current: VALID, and the first owner\'s retirement is only named as a stranger\'s', D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, firmware: fw2, authorization: aut(mfr, cap0), attestation: atest({ ownership: cap0 }) }), O({ statusRecords: [stare(mfr, 'active', 1, null), stare(op, 'retired', 1, cap1)] }), (r) => numit(r, 'status-ignored', op.id) && r.subject.owner === mfr.id && r.subject.transfers === 0);
|
||||
atac('K07', 'what holds also for a chain shown shorter: the MANUFACTURER\'s retirement', B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, retrasCump, stare(mfr, 'retired', 1, null)] }), ['status-retired']);
|
||||
atac('K08', 'and the recall of the manufacture credential by its manufacturer', D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, firmware: fw2, authorization: aut(mfr, cap0), attestation: atest({ ownership: cap0 }) }), O({ statusLists: [lista({ revoked: [7] })], statusRecords: [stare(mfr, 'active', 1, null)] }), ['manufacture-revoked']); }
|
||||
|
||||
// ================================================================ M. a link is exactly { statement, signature }
|
||||
spune('M. a member more in a link or in its signature is another text of it, and is refused');
|
||||
{ const cuSemn = (l, k, v) => ({ statement: l.statement, signature: { ...l.signature, [k]: v } }), cuMembru = (l, k, v) => ({ ...l, [k]: v });
|
||||
const peLant = (t) => { const cap = D.ownershipHead(cred, [t]); return [D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, firmware: fw2, transfers: [t], authorization: aut(op, cap), attestation: atest({ ownership: cap }) }), O({ statusRecords: [stare(op, 'active', 1, cap)] }), cap]; };
|
||||
{ const [b, o, cap] = peLant(cuSemn(t1, 'note', 'x')); atac('M01', 'the same transfer (the same statement, the same signature bytes) with a member more in its signature object, and everything after it built on the hash of that text: one link would have two hashes', b, o, ['transfer-signature'], () => cap !== cap1); }
|
||||
{ const [b, o, cap] = peLant(cuMembru(t1, 'comment', 'y')); atac('M02', 'the same transfer with a member more beside { statement, signature }', b, o, ['transfer-signature'], () => cap !== cap1); }
|
||||
atac('M03', 'the manufacture credential with a member more beside { statement, signature }', D.bundle({ manufacture: cuMembru(cred, 'comment', 'y') }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['manufacture-signature']);
|
||||
atac('M04', 'the manufacture credential with a member more in its signature object', D.bundle({ manufacture: cuSemn(cred, 'note', 'x') }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['manufacture-signature']);
|
||||
atac('M05', 'the firmware release with a member more beside { statement, signature }', B({ firmware: cuMembru(fw2, 'comment', 'y') }), O(), ['firmware-signature']);
|
||||
atac('M06', 'the authorization with a member more beside { statement, signature }', B({ authorization: cuMembru(A1, 'comment', 'y') }), O(), ['authorization-signature']);
|
||||
atac('M07', 'the attestation with a member more beside { statement, signature }', B({ attestation: cuMembru(X1, 'comment', 'y') }), O(), ['attestation-signature']);
|
||||
atac('M08', 'the attestation with a member more in its signature object', B({ attestation: cuSemn(X1, 'note', 'x') }), O(), ['attestation-signature']);
|
||||
partial('M09', 'a status record with a member more in its signature object is not a signed record: the only "active" is not believed', B(), O({ statusRecords: [cuSemn(activ, 'note', 'x')] }), ['status-unread'], (r) => numit(r, 'status-ignored')); }
|
||||
|
||||
// ================================================================ V. text from a bundle, made visible
|
||||
{ const C = (...n) => String.fromCodePoint(...n);
|
||||
const ascunse = [0x00, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0d, 0x1b, 0x1f, 0x7f, 0x80, 0x9b, 0x9f, 0x200e, 0x200f, 0x2028, 0x2029, 0x202a, 0x202e, 0x2066, 0x2069, 0xfeff], lasate = [0x20, 0x7e, 0xa0, 0xe9, 0x200d, 0x2027, 0x202f, 0x2065, 0x206a, 0xfefe, 0x1f600];
|
||||
const totAscuns = ascunse.every((n) => { const v = D.visible('a' + C(n) + 'b'); return v === 'a' + (n < 256 ? '\\x' + n.toString(16).padStart(2, '0') : '\\u' + n.toString(16).padStart(4, '0')) + 'b'; });
|
||||
const totLasat = lasate.every((n) => D.visible('a' + C(n) + 'b') === 'a' + C(n) + 'b');
|
||||
cer('V01', `visible(): each of ${ascunse.length} control characters (the edges of C0, DEL, C1, the marks of direction, the line and paragraph separators, the bidirectional controls, the byte order mark) becomes its visible form, each of ${lasate.length} neighbours of those ranges is left as it is, and a backslash is doubled so that the form cannot be forged`,
|
||||
totAscuns && totLasat && D.visible('a\\x1b') === 'a\\\\x1b' && D.visible('plain text, 100%') === 'plain text, 100%' && D.visible(7) === '7'); }
|
||||
|
||||
// ================================================================ R. the form of each link, one field at a time (after a search for conditions without a row, 2026-10-06)
|
||||
// Each row replaces ONE field of a link by values of the wrong form and has the link signed again by its signer with the published
|
||||
// formulas: only the form check stands between such a link and a verdict. Every value must be refused for exactly the form rule.
|
||||
spune('R. the form of each link, one field at a time, each signed again by its signer');
|
||||
const pune = (st, cale, v) => { let o = st; for (const k of cale.slice(0, -1)) o = o[k]; const k = cale[cale.length - 1]; if (v === undefined) delete o[k]; else o[k] = v; };
|
||||
const scurtV = (v) => (v === undefined ? 'removed' : JSON.stringify(v).length > 22 ? JSON.stringify(v).slice(0, 19) + '...' : JSON.stringify(v));
|
||||
const LUNG = 'M'.repeat(257);
|
||||
function forme(prefix, regula, ce, construieste, cazuri) {
|
||||
cazuri.forEach(([camp, cale, valori], i) => { const rele = [];
|
||||
for (const v of valori) { const [b, o] = construieste((st) => pune(st, cale, v)); const r = judeca(b, o); if (!(r.verdict === 'INVALID' && la(r.rules) === regula && r.subject === null)) rele.push(`${scurtV(v)}: ${r.verdict} [${r.rules}]`); }
|
||||
rand(`${prefix}${String(i + 1).padStart(2, '0')}`, `ATAC: ${ce}: ${camp} (${valori.map(scurtV).join(', ')})`, rele.length ? 'ROSU' : 'VERDE', rele.join('; '), [regula], 'attack'); });
|
||||
}
|
||||
// the statement itself, or the whole link, replaced (nothing to sign again)
|
||||
function intreg(id, regula, ce, construieste, valori) { const rele = [];
|
||||
for (const v of valori) { const [b, o] = construieste(v); const r = judeca(b, o); if (!(r.verdict === 'INVALID' && la(r.rules) === regula && r.subject === null)) rele.push(`${scurtV(v)}: ${r.verdict} [${r.rules}]`); }
|
||||
rand(id, `ATAC: ${ce} (${valori.map(scurtV).join(', ')})`, rele.length ? 'ROSU' : 'VERDE', rele.join('; '), [regula], 'attack'); }
|
||||
const numaiM = (m) => [D.bundle({ manufacture: m }), O({ statusRecords: [] })];
|
||||
intreg('RM00', 'manufacture-form', 'the statement of the manufacture credential is not an object', (v) => numaiM({ statement: v, signature: cred.signature }), [null, 'x', 7, []]);
|
||||
forme('RM', 'manufacture-form', 'the manufacture credential', (f) => numaiM(reCred(cred, mfr, f)), [
|
||||
['its kind', ['kind'], ['aere-credential-v2', undefined]], ['its version', ['v'], [2, '1', undefined]],
|
||||
['the issuer is not an object', ['issuer'], [null, 'x', []]], ['the holder is not an object', ['holder'], [null, 'x', []]],
|
||||
['the list of claims under selective disclosure is not a list', ['sd'], [null, 'x', {}]], ['the claims are not an object', ['claims'], [null, 'x', []]],
|
||||
['the device id claim is not a text', ['claims', 'deviceId'], ['', 7, undefined]], ['the model is not a text of 1 to 256 characters', ['claims', 'model'], ['', 7, ['AX-200'], LUNG]],
|
||||
['the serial is not a text of 1 to 256 characters', ['claims', 'serial'], ['', 7, LUNG]], ['the device key is not a text', ['claims', 'deviceKey'], [7, null, undefined]]]);
|
||||
{ const r = judeca(...numaiM(reCred(cred, mfr, (st) => { st.claims.model = 'M'.repeat(256); })));
|
||||
cer('RM11', 'a model of exactly 256 characters, the longest that is read, is read (nothing refuses the credential)', r.valid && r.rules.length === 0 && r.subject.model.length === 256, `${r.verdict} [${r.rules}]`); }
|
||||
intreg('RM12', 'manufacture-signature', 'the signature of the manufacture credential is not an object', (v) => numaiM({ statement: cred.statement, signature: v }), [null, 7, 'x', []]);
|
||||
intreg('RM13', 'manufacture-signature', 'a half of the manufacturer\'s signature is not a text', (v) => numaiM({ statement: cred.statement, signature: { ...cred.signature, ed25519: v } }), [7, null, ['x']]);
|
||||
|
||||
const cuF = (fw) => [B({ firmware: fw }), O()];
|
||||
intreg('RF00', 'firmware-form', 'the statement of the release is not an object', (v) => cuF({ statement: v, signature: fw2.signature }), [null, 'x', 7, []]);
|
||||
forme('RF', 'firmware-form', 'the firmware release', (f) => cuF(reSemn('firmware', fw2, mfr, f)), [
|
||||
['its kind', ['kind'], ['aere-device-firmware-v0', undefined]], ['its version', ['v'], [2, '1']],
|
||||
['the model is not a text of 1 to 256 characters', ['model'], ['', 7, ['AX-200'], LUNG]], ['the version label is not a text of 1 to 256 characters', ['version'], ['', 7, LUNG]],
|
||||
['the sequence is not a whole number from 0 up', ['sequence'], ['2', 1.5, -1, null]], ['the digest is not 0x and 64 hex digits in lower case', ['digest'], [7, 'abc', '0x' + 'AB'.repeat(32), [fw2.statement.digest], undefined]],
|
||||
['the signer is not an object', ['signer'], [null, 'x', []]], ['the hash of the Proof of Software attestation is not a hash', ['softwareAttestationHash'], [7, 'abc', null, [POS.statementHash]]]]);
|
||||
{ const fw0 = D.releaseFirmware({ signer: mfr, model: 'AX-200', version: '0.9.0', sequence: 0, image: IMG1, now: cand(-25 * ZI) });
|
||||
valid('RF09', 'a release with sequence 0 under a policy whose floor is 0: zero is a sequence and a floor like any other', B({ firmware: fw0, attestation: atest({ firmware: fw0 }) }), O({ firmwarePolicies: [politica({ minSequence: 0 })] }), (r) => r.subject.firmware.sequence === 0); }
|
||||
intreg('RF10', 'firmware-signature', 'the signature of the release is absent or is not an object', (v) => cuF({ statement: fw2.statement, signature: v }), [null, 7, 'x', []]);
|
||||
|
||||
const cuT = (t) => [D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, transfers: [t] }), O({ statusRecords: [] })];
|
||||
intreg('RT00', 'transfer-form', 'the transfer, or its statement, is not an object', cuT, [null, 'x', 7, { statement: null, signature: t1.signature }, { statement: 'x', signature: t1.signature }]);
|
||||
forme('RT', 'transfer-form', 'a transfer', (f) => cuT(reSemn('transfer', t1, mfr, f)), [
|
||||
['its kind', ['kind'], [undefined]], ['its version', ['v'], [2, '1']], ['the device id is not a text', ['deviceId'], [7, null]], ['its position is not a whole number', ['seq'], ['1', 1.5, null]],
|
||||
['the hash of the link before is not a text', ['prev'], [7, null]], ['who gives it is not an object', ['from'], [null, 'x', []]], ['who receives it is not an object', ['to'], [null, 'x', []]]]);
|
||||
intreg('RT08', 'transfer-signature', 'the signature of a transfer is absent or is not an object', (v) => cuT({ statement: t1.statement, signature: v }), [null, 7, 'x', []]);
|
||||
|
||||
const cuX = (x) => [B({ attestation: x }), O()];
|
||||
intreg('RA00', 'attestation-form', 'the statement of the attestation is not an object', (v) => cuX({ statement: v, signature: X1.signature }), [null, 'x', 7, []]);
|
||||
forme('RA', 'attestation-form', 'the attestation', (f) => cuX(reAtest(X1, dev, f)), [
|
||||
['its kind', ['kind'], ['aere-device-attestation-v0', undefined]], ['its version', ['v'], [2, '1']], ['the device id is not a text', ['deviceId'], [7, null]], ['the key is not a text', ['key'], [7, null]],
|
||||
['the nonce is not a text of 1 to 256 characters', ['nonce'], ['', 7, LUNG]], ['the audience is not a text of 1 to 256 characters', ['audience'], ['', 7, LUNG]], ['its time is not a text', ['at'], [7, null]],
|
||||
['the firmware it names is not an object', ['firmware'], [null, 'x', []]], ['the digest it attests is not 0x and 64 hex digits', ['firmware', 'digest'], [7, 'abc', [fw2.statement.digest]]], ['the sequence it attests is not a whole number', ['firmware', 'sequence'], ['2', 1.5]],
|
||||
['the ownership head is not 0x and 64 hex digits', ['ownership'], [7, 'abc', [cap1]]], ['the action is not an action name', ['action'], [7, '', 'Door Unlock', ['telemetry.publish']]]]);
|
||||
intreg('RA13', 'attestation-form', 'the signature of the attestation is not an object', (v) => cuX({ statement: X1.statement, signature: v }), [null, 7, 'x', []]);
|
||||
|
||||
const cuZ = (a) => [B({ authorization: a }), O()];
|
||||
intreg('RZ00', 'authorization-form', 'the statement of the authorization is not an object', (v) => cuZ({ statement: v, signature: A1.signature }), [null, 'x', 7, []]);
|
||||
forme('RZ', 'authorization-form', 'the authorization', (f) => cuZ(reSemn('authorization', A1, op, f)), [
|
||||
['its kind', ['kind'], ['aere-device-authorization-v0', undefined]], ['its version', ['v'], [2, '1']], ['the device id is not a text', ['deviceId'], [7, null]], ['the ownership head is not a text', ['ownership'], [7, null]],
|
||||
['the owner is not an object', ['owner'], [null, 'x', []]],
|
||||
['the actions are not a non-empty list of action names, sorted, each once', ['actions'], ['x', [], [7], ['Door Unlock'], [['telemetry.publish']], ['telemetry.publish', 'door.unlock'], ['door.unlock', 'door.unlock', 'telemetry.publish']]]]);
|
||||
intreg('RZ07', 'authorization-signature', 'the signature of the authorization is absent or is not an object', (v) => cuZ({ statement: A1.statement, signature: v }), [null, 7, 'x', []]);
|
||||
{ const b = D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, firmware: fw2, authorization: aut(mfr, cap0), attestation: atest({ ownership: cap0 }) }); delete b.transfers;
|
||||
valid('RB01', 'a bundle with no `transfers` member at all is a device never transferred (the same verdict as with an empty list)', b, O({ statusRecords: [stare(mfr, 'active', 1, null)] }), (r) => r.subject.transfers === 0 && r.subject.owner === mfr.id); }
|
||||
|
||||
// ================================================================ T. the edge of every interval, and every tolerance
|
||||
spune('T. the edges of the intervals: an ending includes its last instant, a beginning has the tolerance and no more');
|
||||
const primit = (id, title, b, o, extra = () => true) => { const r = judeca(b, o); cer(id, title, r.valid && r.rules.length === 0 && extra(r), `${r.verdict} [${r.rules}]`); return r; };
|
||||
primit('T01', 'the manufacture credential is valid until exactly the verifier\'s clock: its last instant is inside', ...numaiM(face({ validUntil: at(65) })));
|
||||
primit('T02', 'the manufacture credential begins exactly 60 s after the verifier\'s clock: the edge of the tolerance is inside', ...numaiM(face({ validFrom: at(125) })));
|
||||
valid('T03', 'the recall list is valid until exactly the verifier\'s clock: read as current', B(), O({ statusLists: [lista({ validUntil: at(65) })] }));
|
||||
valid('T04', 'the recall list begins 30 s after the verifier\'s clock (a beginning has the tolerance): read as current', B(), O({ statusLists: [lista({ validFrom: at(95) })] }));
|
||||
valid('T05', 'the recall list begins exactly 60 s after the verifier\'s clock: the edge of the tolerance is inside', B(), O({ statusLists: [lista({ validFrom: at(125) })] }));
|
||||
partial('T06', 'the only recall list handed begins tomorrow: it says nothing about now', B(), O({ statusLists: [lista({ validFrom: at(ZI), validUntil: at(2 * ZI) })] }), ['manufacture-status-unread']);
|
||||
valid('T07', 'the firmware policy is valid until exactly the verifier\'s clock: read as current', B(), O({ firmwarePolicies: [politica({ validUntil: at(65) })] }));
|
||||
valid('T08', 'the firmware policy begins 30 s after the verifier\'s clock: read as current', B(), O({ firmwarePolicies: [politica({ validFrom: at(95) })] }));
|
||||
valid('T09', 'the firmware policy begins exactly 60 s after the verifier\'s clock: the edge of the tolerance is inside', B(), O({ firmwarePolicies: [politica({ validFrom: at(125) })] }));
|
||||
primit('T10', 'a transfer dated exactly 60 s before the manufacture credential was issued (two clocks that differ by the tolerance): accepted', ...cuT(D.transferOwnership({ from: mfr, to: op.public, manufacture: cred, now: cand(-30 * ZI - 60) })));
|
||||
primit('T11', 'a transfer dated exactly 60 s after the verifier\'s clock: the edge of the tolerance is inside', ...cuT(D.transferOwnership({ from: mfr, to: op.public, manufacture: cred, now: cand(125) })));
|
||||
{ const ta = D.transferOwnership({ from: mfr, to: op.public, manufacture: cred, now: cand(-10 * ZI) }), tb = D.transferOwnership({ from: op, to: cumparator.public, manufacture: cred, transfers: [ta], now: cand(-10 * ZI) });
|
||||
primit('T12', 'two transfers dated the same instant: the second is not before the first', D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, transfers: [ta, tb] }), O({ statusRecords: [] })); }
|
||||
valid('T13', 'an attestation dated exactly 60 s after the verifier\'s clock: the edge of the tolerance is inside', B({ attestation: atest({ now: cand(125) }) }), O());
|
||||
valid('T14', 'the authorization ends exactly at the verifier\'s clock, which is also the time of the attestation: its last instant is inside, on both clocks', B({ authorization: aut(op, cap1, { notAfter: at(60) }) }), O({ now: at(60) }));
|
||||
valid('T15', 'the authorization begins exactly 60 s after the verifier\'s clock and 60 s after the time of the attestation: the edge of the tolerance is inside, on both clocks', B({ authorization: aut(op, cap1, { notBefore: at(125) }), attestation: atest({ now: cand(65) }) }), O());
|
||||
atac('T16', 'a retirement of the manufacturer dated exactly 60 s after the verifier\'s clock is in effect (the edge of the tolerance is inside)', B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, stare(mfr, 'retired', 1, null, { now: cand(125) })] }), ['status-retired']);
|
||||
valid('T17', 'the only "active" is valid until exactly the verifier\'s clock: current', B(), O({ statusRecords: [stare(op, 'active', 1, cap1, { validUntil: at(65) })] }), (r) => r.subject.state === 'active');
|
||||
{ const sec = Math.floor((T0 + 60000) / 1000), ci = (o) => ({ statementHash: PLIC.statementHash, chainId: 28001, ...o });
|
||||
valid('T18', 'the attestation is dated exactly 60 s after the moment its envelope was read on the chain: the edge of the tolerance is inside', B({ anchor: PLIC }), O({ anchors: [ci({ at: sec - 60 })] }), (r) => r.subject.witness.at === sec - 60);
|
||||
{ const rele = []; for (const t of [0, -5, 1e11, 1.5]) { const r = judeca(B({ anchor: PLIC }), O({ anchors: [ci({ at: t })] })); if (!(r.verdict === 'PARTIAL' && la(r.unjudged.filter((c) => D.PARTIALE.includes(c))) === 'witness-unread' && r.subject.witness === null)) rele.push(`${t}: ${r.verdict} [${r.rules}] [${r.unjudged}]`); }
|
||||
rand('T19', 'a reading whose time is 0, negative, 100000000000 or not whole is not a reading: not used, and said (each PARTIAL, witness-unread)', rele.length ? 'ROSU' : 'VERDE', rele.join('; '), [], 'partial'); }
|
||||
valid('T20', 'two readings of one instant from two chains: the first in the list is the witness', B({ anchor: PLIC }), O({ anchors: [ci({ at: sec + 40 }), ci({ at: sec + 40, chainId: 7 })] }), (r) => r.subject.witness.chainId === 28001);
|
||||
valid('T21', 'a reading that names no chain: the witness says null, not a chain', B({ anchor: PLIC }), O({ anchors: [{ statementHash: PLIC.statementHash, at: sec + 40 }] }), (r) => r.subject.witness.chainId === null && r.subject.witness.at === sec + 40); }
|
||||
atac('T22', 'the manufacturer signed a validity written as a one-element list that holds a time: not a time', ...numaiM(reCred(cred, mfr, (st) => { st.validUntil = [at(3650 * ZI)]; })), ['unreadable']);
|
||||
atac('T23', 'the manufacturer signed a validity that has the form of a time and is not a date (month 13): not a time', ...numaiM(reCred(cred, mfr, (st) => { st.validUntil = '2036-13-01T00:00:00Z'; })), ['unreadable']);
|
||||
{ const arunca = (o) => { try { D.verifyDevice(B(), O(o)); return null; } catch (e) { return String(e.message); } };
|
||||
const refuzate = [{ clockSkewS: 601 }, { clockSkewS: -1 }, { clockSkewS: 1.5 }, { clockSkewS: '60' }, { maxAgeS: 0 }, { maxAgeS: 1.5 }, { maxAgeS: '300' }, { trustedManufacturers: 'x' }, { trustedManufacturers: ['nobody'] }, { trustedManufacturers: [{ ed25519: 'x' }] }, { trustedManufacturers: [[mfr.id]] }, { statusRecords: 'x' }, { anchors: null }, { now: 'not a time' }];
|
||||
const rele = refuzate.filter((o) => !/^verifyDevice: /.test(String(arunca(o)))).map((o) => JSON.stringify(o)), primite = [{ clockSkewS: 600 }, { clockSkewS: 0 }, { maxAgeS: 1 }].filter((o) => arunca(o) !== null).map((o) => JSON.stringify(o));
|
||||
cer('T24', `the verifier's own configuration: ${refuzate.length} values that cannot be read each throw "verifyDevice: ..." (a tolerance of 601 s, negative, not whole or a text; an age of 0, not whole or a text; trusted manufacturers that are not a list, not ids, not keys; lists that are not lists; a clock that is not a time), and the edges are accepted (a tolerance of 600 s and of 0 s, an age of 1 s)`, !rele.length && !primite.length, `not refused: ${rele.join(' ')}; not accepted: ${primite.join(' ')}`); }
|
||||
valid('T25', 'the verifier names the manufacturer it trusts by its public keys, not by its id', B(), O({ trustedManufacturers: [mfr.public] }));
|
||||
|
||||
// ================================================================ S. what the search for conditions without a row found (2026-10-06)
|
||||
spune('S. conditions that had no row');
|
||||
atac('S01', 'the only record is the manufacturer\'s retirement: the registry WAS read, and is not said to be unread', B(), O({ statusRecords: [stare(mfr, 'retired', 1, null)] }), ['status-retired'], (r) => !r.unjudged.includes('status-unread'));
|
||||
atac('S02', 'the only record is the owner\'s suspension: the registry was read, and is not said to be unread', B(), O({ statusRecords: [stare(op, 'suspended', 1, cap1)] }), ['status-suspended'], (r) => !r.unjudged.includes('status-unread'));
|
||||
{ const r = judeca(B(), O({ statusRecords: [stare(mfr, 'retired', 1, null), stare(op, 'retired', 2, cap1)] }));
|
||||
cer('S03', 'retired by its manufacturer (first in the list) and by its owner: the row still names the retirement that is final, the manufacturer\'s', r.verdict === 'INVALID' && la(r.rules) === 'status-retired' && r.rows.some((x) => x.rule === 'status-retired' && x.pass === false && x.detail.includes(mfr.id) && x.detail.includes('never lifted')), `[${r.rules}] ${(r.rows.find((x) => x.rule === 'status-retired') || {}).detail}`, ['status-retired']); }
|
||||
{ const r = judeca(B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, stare(op, 'retired', 2, cap1)] }));
|
||||
cer('S04', 'retired by its owner alone: the row names the owner and says how long that retirement holds (while it owns the device), not that it is final', r.verdict === 'INVALID' && la(r.rules) === 'status-retired' && r.rows.some((x) => x.rule === 'status-retired' && x.pass === false && x.detail.includes(op.id) && x.detail.includes('holds while it owns the device') && !x.detail.includes('never lifted')), `[${r.rules}] ${(r.rows.find((x) => x.rule === 'status-retired') || {}).detail}`, ['status-retired']); }
|
||||
{ const faraSemnatar = clona(stare(op, 'retired', 2, cap1)); delete faraSemnatar.statement.by;
|
||||
valid('S05', 'a status record with no signer at all (the member `by` is absent): ignored, and said so', B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, faraSemnatar] }), (r) => numit(r, 'status-ignored', 'no signer')); }
|
||||
partial('S06', 'a record of the manufacturer whose device id is a one-element list that holds the id: not a device id, and it may be meant for this device', B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, stMana(mfr, 'retired', 1, null, { deviceId: [dev.deviceId] })] }), ['status-unread'], (r) => numit(r, 'status-unread', 'not a device id'));
|
||||
{ const subAlt = (() => { const statement = { v: 1, kind: 'aere-device-status', deviceId: dev.deviceId, state: 'retired', seq: 1, ownership: null, by: { id: altMfr.id, keys: strain.public }, at: at(-600), validUntil: at(ZI) }; return { statement, signature: D.signLink('status', statement, strain) }; })();
|
||||
valid('S07', 'a stranger signs with its own keys under the id of ANOTHER manufacturer the verifier trusts: the id is not the id of those keys, so it is a stranger\'s record (ignored), not a trusted manufacturer\'s', B(), O({ trustedManufacturers: [mfr.id, altMfr.id], statusRecords: [activ, subAlt] }), (r) => numit(r, 'status-ignored') && !r.unjudged.includes('status-other-manufacturer'));
|
||||
const editat = clona(stMana(altMfr, 'active', 1, null)); editat.statement.state = 'retired';
|
||||
valid('S08', 'a record of another trusted manufacturer edited after it was signed is not its record: ignored, and said so', B(), O({ trustedManufacturers: [mfr.id, altMfr.id], statusRecords: [activ, editat] }), (r) => numit(r, 'status-ignored') && !r.unjudged.includes('status-other-manufacturer')); }
|
||||
atac('S09', 'no attestation in the bundle, and the manufacturer retired the device: the registry is judged for the device the manufacturer made', D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, firmware: fw2, transfers: [t1], authorization: A1 }), O({ statusRecords: [activ, stare(mfr, 'retired', 1, null)] }), ['status-retired']);
|
||||
partial('S10', 'an authorization alone, with no chain and no attestation beside it: there is no device to judge it or the registry against, and nothing is refused', D.bundle({ authorization: A1 }), O(), ['attestation-missing', 'firmware-missing', 'manufacture-missing']);
|
||||
partial('S11', 'a firmware release alone: the registry handed is about no device this bundle names, and is not said to be unread', D.bundle({ firmware: fw2 }), O(), ['attestation-missing', 'authorization-missing', 'manufacture-missing']);
|
||||
atac('S12', 'an authorization and an attestation with no chain beside them: the authorization is of ANOTHER device than the one that attests', D.bundle({ authorization: D.authorize({ owner: op, deviceId: clonaDev.deviceId, ownership: cap1, actions: ACT, notBefore: at(-ZI), notAfter: at(ZI), now: cand(-ZI) }), attestation: X1 }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['authorization-device']);
|
||||
atac('S13', 'a clone with its own key behind the real device\'s credential: the registry is still read for the device the manufacturer made (its "active" is seen)', B({ attestation: D.attest({ device: clonaDev, nonce: NONCE, audience: AUD, firmware: fw2, ownership: cap1, action: 'telemetry.publish', now: cand(60) }) }), O(), ['attestation-device'], (r) => !r.unjudged.includes('status-unread'));
|
||||
atac('S14', 'the real device signs, with its own key, an attestation under ANOTHER device id', B({ attestation: reAtest(X1, dev, (st) => { st.deviceId = clonaDev.deviceId; }) }), O(), ['attestation-device', 'attestation-key']);
|
||||
partial('S15', 'an envelope with no attestation in the bundle: the envelope is judged for itself (its hash), there is nothing to bind it to', D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, firmware: fw2, transfers: [t1], authorization: A1, anchor: PLIC }), O(), ['attestation-missing'], (r) => r.links.witness === 'PASSED');
|
||||
atac('S16', 'the Ed25519 half of a transfer signature replaced by a stranger\'s (the ML-DSA-65 half is the owner\'s): the post-quantum half alone is not enough either', D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, transfers: [{ statement: t1.statement, signature: { ...t1.signature, ed25519: D.signLink('transfer', t1.statement, strain).ed25519 } }] }), O({ statusRecords: [] }), ['transfer-signature']);
|
||||
{ const editata = clona(lista()); editata.statement.validUntil = at(2 * ZI);
|
||||
partial('S17', 'the only recall list is the manufacturer\'s list edited after it was signed (its validity extended): no longer the manufacturer\'s list', B(), O({ statusLists: [editata] }), ['manufacture-status-unread']);
|
||||
const altEmitent = (() => { const st = clona(lista().statement); st.issuer = { id: altMfr.id, keys: altMfr.public }; return { statement: st, signature: ID.signText('status-list', ID.canonical(st), mfr) }; })();
|
||||
partial('S18', 'the only recall list is signed with the manufacturer\'s keys and names ANOTHER issuer: by its own statement it is not the manufacturer\'s list', B(), O({ statusLists: [altEmitent] }), ['manufacture-status-unread']); }
|
||||
{ const editata = clona(politica()); editata.statement.minSequence = 0;
|
||||
partial('S19', 'the only firmware policy is the manufacturer\'s policy edited after it was signed (its floor lowered): no longer the manufacturer\'s policy', B(), O({ firmwarePolicies: [editata] }), ['firmware-policy-unread']);
|
||||
partial('S20', 'the only firmware policy is signed with the manufacturer\'s keys and names ANOTHER issuer', B(), O({ firmwarePolicies: [reSemn('firmware-policy', politica(), mfr, (st) => { st.issuer = { id: altMfr.id, keys: altMfr.public }; })] }), ['firmware-policy-unread']);
|
||||
partial('S21', 'a signed policy whose retracted member is not a list: it cannot be read, and that is said (the bundle is not called unreadable)', B(), O({ firmwarePolicies: [reSemn('firmware-policy', politica(), mfr, (st) => { st.retracted = 'x'; })] }), ['firmware-policy-unread'], (r) => numit(r, 'firmware-policy-unread', 'not a digest'));
|
||||
partial('S22', 'a signed policy whose retracted entry is a one-element list that holds a digest: not a digest', B(), O({ firmwarePolicies: [reSemn('firmware-policy', politica(), mfr, (st) => { st.retracted = [[fw1.statement.digest]]; })] }), ['firmware-policy-unread']);
|
||||
valid('S23', 'the current policy retracts ANOTHER release: this one is not retracted', B(), O({ firmwarePolicies: [politica({ retracted: [fw1.statement.digest] })] })); }
|
||||
{ const r = judeca(D.bundle({ manufacture: cred }), O({ statusRecords: [] })), r2 = judeca(D.bundle({ attestation: X1 }), O({ statusRecords: [] })), r1 = judeca(B(), O());
|
||||
const nt = (x) => x.rows.filter((y) => y.name.includes('never transferred')).length;
|
||||
cer('S24', 'what `links` says of each link: PASSED where rows were judged, NOT_SUPPLIED where the link is missing from the bundle, NOT_JUDGED where the registry was not read, ABSENT where there is nothing; and the row "never transferred" is there only for a device with a credential and no transfer',
|
||||
JSON.stringify(r.links) === JSON.stringify({ manufacture: 'PASSED', firmware: 'NOT_SUPPLIED', ownership: 'PASSED', authorization: 'NOT_SUPPLIED', status: 'NOT_JUDGED', attestation: 'NOT_SUPPLIED', witness: 'ABSENT' }) && nt(r) === 1
|
||||
&& r2.links.ownership === 'ABSENT' && r2.links.manufacture === 'NOT_SUPPLIED' && r2.links.attestation === 'PASSED' && nt(r2) === 0 && nt(r1) === 0 && r1.links.ownership === 'PASSED', JSON.stringify(r.links) + ' ' + JSON.stringify(r2.links)); }
|
||||
{ const r = judeca(B(), O({ statusRecords: [activ, stare(strain, 'retired', 9, cap1)] })), r3 = judeca(D.bundle({ manufacture: cred, firmware: fw2, transfers: [t1, t2], authorization: aut(cumparator, cap2), attestation: atest({ ownership: cap2 }) }), O({ statusRecords: [stare(cumparator, 'active', 1, cap2)] }));
|
||||
const num = (x, t) => x.rows.filter((y) => y.name.includes(t)).length;
|
||||
cer('S25', 'every cause in `unjudged` is a declared cause (nothing else is listed there); and the rows of a chain say who gave each transfer: the manufacturer the first, the owner before the second', r.unjudged.length > 0 && r.unjudged.every((c) => D.NEJUDECATE.includes(c))
|
||||
&& num(r3, 'transfer 1/2: given by the manufacturer') === 1 && num(r3, 'transfer 2/2: given by the owner before') === 1, `[${r.unjudged}]`); }
|
||||
atac('S27', 'the only record is the owner\'s suspension, and that record has expired: a suspension does not expire, and the registry is not said to be unread', B(), O({ statusRecords: [stare(op, 'suspended', 1, cap1, { now: cand(-3 * ZI), validUntil: at(-ZI) })] }), ['status-suspended'], (r) => !r.unjudged.includes('status-unread'));
|
||||
partial('S28', 'the envelope claims a notarization and the only reading handed for it is in milliseconds: ONE row says that reading cannot be read (the claim is not said twice)', B({ anchor: { ...PLIC, notarization: { chainId: 28001, firstSeen: 1 } } }), O({ anchors: [{ statementHash: PLIC.statementHash, at: T0 + 100000, chainId: 28001 }] }), ['witness-unread'], (r) => r.rows.filter((x) => x.unjudged === 'witness-unread').length === 1 && numit(r, 'witness-unread', 'milliseconds'));
|
||||
{ let refuz = 0; for (const scop of ['credential', 'status-list', 'x', '']) { try { D.signLink(scop, A1.statement, op); } catch { refuz++; } }
|
||||
cer('S29', 'the signing formula refuses a purpose that is not one of the six of this module (a signature of this module cannot be made for the purposes of another), and the verifying formula answers no for one', refuz === 4 && D.verifyLink('x', A1.statement, A1.signature, op.public) === false && D.verifyLink('authorization', A1.statement, A1.signature, op.public) === true); }
|
||||
partial('S26', 'the readings handed hold null and an object that names no envelope: two things that are not readings, and that is said', B(), O({ anchors: [null, { at: 5 }] }), ['witness-unread'], (r) => numit(r, 'witness-unread', '2 of the 2'));
|
||||
|
||||
spune('C. malformed input is refused by name, never thrown at the reader');
|
||||
atac('C72', 'the bundle is the JSON value null', null, O(), ['form']);
|
||||
atac('C73', 'a file of another kind', { v: 1, kind: 'aere-presentation' }, O(), ['form']);
|
||||
atac('C74', 'the manufacturer signed a credential whose validity is not a time', D.bundle({ manufacture: reCred(cred, mfr, (st) => { st.validUntil = 'next year'; }) }), O(), ['unreadable']);
|
||||
if (!REPEDE) { let aruncate = 0, cazuri = 0; const b0 = B({ anchor: PLIC }); const cai = (x, p = []) => (x !== null && typeof x === 'object' ? [p, ...Object.keys(x).flatMap((k) => cai(x[k], [...p, Array.isArray(x) ? Number(k) : k]))] : [p]).filter((q) => q.length);
|
||||
for (const p of cai(b0)) for (const v of ['remove', null, 'x', 7, [], {}]) { const c = clona(b0); let o = c; for (const k of p.slice(0, -1)) o = o[k]; const k = p[p.length - 1]; if (v === 'remove') { if (Array.isArray(o)) o.splice(k, 1); else delete o[k]; } else o[k] = clona(v);
|
||||
cazuri++; try { const r = D.verifyDevice(c, O({ anchors: [{ statementHash: PLIC.statementHash, at: Math.floor(T0 / 1000) + 100 }] })); if (!['VALID', 'PARTIAL', 'INVALID'].includes(r.verdict)) aruncate++; } catch { aruncate++; } }
|
||||
cer('C75', `${cazuri} damaged bundles (every path removed or replaced by null, a string, a number, a list, an object): each got a verdict, none threw`, cazuri > 800 && aruncate === 0, aruncate + ' thrown'); }
|
||||
{ let a = 0; for (const o of [{ trustedManufacturers: 'x' }, { statusRecords: null }, { clockSkewS: 9999 }, { now: 'not a time' }]) { try { D.verifyDevice(B(), O(o)); } catch { a++; } }
|
||||
cer('C76', 'a configuration of the VERIFIER that cannot be read throws (it is the verifier\'s mistake, not an invalid bundle)', a === 4); }
|
||||
|
||||
// ================================================================ D. keys, producers, the envelope under the reference verifier, the command line
|
||||
spune('D. keys, producers, the envelope, the command line');
|
||||
{ const f = D.exportDeviceKey(dev), k2 = D.importDeviceKey(clona(f)); let refuz = 0; try { D.importDeviceKey({ ...clona(f), publicKey: clonaDev.publicKey, deviceId: clonaDev.deviceId }); } catch { refuz++; }
|
||||
cer('D01', 'a device key file round-trips, the private half is not enumerable, and a file with somebody else\'s public half is refused', k2.deviceId === dev.deviceId && !JSON.stringify(dev).includes(f.private) && Object.keys(dev).join() === 'deviceId,publicKey' && refuz === 1); }
|
||||
{ let n = 0; const incearca = (f) => { try { f(); } catch { n++; } };
|
||||
incearca(() => D.attest({ device: dev, nonce: '', audience: AUD, firmware: fw2, ownership: cap1, action: 'telemetry.publish' }));
|
||||
incearca(() => D.releaseFirmware({ signer: mfr, model: 'AX-200', version: '2.0.0', sequence: 2, image: IMG1, softwareAttestation: POS }));
|
||||
incearca(() => D.authorize({ owner: op, deviceId: dev.deviceId, ownership: cap1, actions: ['Door Unlock'], notAfter: at(ZI) }));
|
||||
incearca(() => D.statusRecord({ by: op, deviceId: dev.deviceId, ownership: cap1, state: 'destroyed', seq: 1, validUntil: at(ZI) }));
|
||||
incearca(() => D.deviceIdOf(crypto.generateKeyPairSync('ed25519').publicKey.export({ type: 'spki', format: 'der' }).toString('base64')));
|
||||
incearca(() => D.statusRecord({ by: op, deviceId: dev.deviceId, state: 'retired', seq: 1, validUntil: at(ZI) })); // an owner's record with no ownership head: there is no default
|
||||
incearca(() => D.statusRecord({ by: op, manufacture: cred, state: 'retired', seq: 1, validUntil: at(ZI) })); // an owner signing as the manufacturer
|
||||
incearca(() => D.firmwarePolicy({ manufacturer: mfr, model: 'AX-200', retracted: [fw2.statement.digest.slice(2)], validUntil: at(ZI) })); // a retracted entry that is not a digest
|
||||
const bune = [D.statusRecord({ by: op, deviceId: dev.deviceId, ownership: cap1, state: 'retired', seq: 1, validUntil: at(ZI) }).statement.ownership === cap1, D.statusRecord({ by: mfr, manufacture: cred, state: 'retired', seq: 1, validUntil: at(ZI) }).statement.ownership === null];
|
||||
cer('D02', 'the producers refuse to write what the verifier would refuse or not apply (no nonce, an attestation that does not cover the image, an action that is not a name, an unknown state, a classical device key, an owner\'s status record with no ownership head, an owner signing as the manufacturer, a retracted entry that is not a digest), and write the two status records they should', n === 8 && bune.every(Boolean), n + ' refusals'); }
|
||||
cer('D03', 'the Proof of Software fixture is an attestation of the firmware fixture (its statement hashes to its statementHash and lists the image digest)', D.softwareCovers(POS, fw2.statement.digest) && !D.softwareCovers(POS, fw1.statement.digest));
|
||||
if (REPEDE) { /* not run */ } else if (!VERIFY || !fs.existsSync(VERIFY)) rand('D04', 'the AIP-23 reference verifier judges the device envelope (AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs>)', 'NEMASURAT', 'the reference verifier is not here');
|
||||
else { const T = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'aere-device-')); try {
|
||||
const f = path.join(T, 'e.json'); fs.writeFileSync(f, JSON.stringify(PLIC)); const r = spawnSync(process.execPath, [VERIFY, f, '--json'], { encoding: 'utf8' }); let j = null; try { j = JSON.parse(r.stdout); } catch { /* no verdict */ }
|
||||
const e2 = clona(PLIC); e2.statement.deviceId = clonaDev.deviceId; fs.writeFileSync(f, JSON.stringify(e2)); const r2 = spawnSync(process.execPath, [VERIFY, f, '--json'], { encoding: 'utf8' }); let j2 = null; try { j2 = JSON.parse(r2.stdout); } catch { /* no verdict */ }
|
||||
const niv = (x, n) => ((x && x.levels) || []).find((l) => l.level === n) || {};
|
||||
cer('D04', 'the AIP-23 reference verifier judges the device envelope: integrity PASSED; the same envelope with the device id edited: integrity FAILED', niv(j, 'integrity').state === 'PASSED' && niv(j2, 'integrity').state === 'FAILED' && j2.verdict === 'INVALID', (r.stderr || '').slice(0, 120));
|
||||
} finally { fs.rmSync(T, { recursive: true, force: true }); } }
|
||||
if (!REPEDE) { // the command line, through files and processes only
|
||||
const T = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'aere-device-cli-')); const cli = (...a) => spawnSync(process.execPath, [path.join(AICI, 'device-cli.mjs'), ...a], { cwd: T, encoding: 'utf8' });
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const pasi = [['new-identity', '--out', 'mfr.keys.json'], ['new-identity', '--out', 'owner.keys.json'], ['new-device', '--out', 'dev.key.json'],
|
||||
['manufacture', '--manufacturer', 'mfr.keys.json', '--device', 'dev.key.json', '--model', 'AX-200', '--serial', 'SN-7', '--days', '3650', '--out', 'manufacture.json'],
|
||||
['release', '--signer', 'mfr.keys.json', '--model', 'AX-200', '--version', '2.0.0', '--sequence', '2', '--image', path.join(AICI, 'fixturi', 'firmware-2.0.0.bin'), '--out', 'fw.json'],
|
||||
['policy', '--manufacturer', 'mfr.keys.json', '--model', 'AX-200', '--min-sequence', '2', '--hours', '24', '--out', 'policy.json'],
|
||||
['transfer', '--from', 'mfr.keys.json', '--to', 'owner.keys.json', '--manufacture', 'manufacture.json', '--out', 't1.json'],
|
||||
['authorize', '--owner', 'owner.keys.json', '--manufacture', 'manufacture.json', '--transfer', 't1.json', '--action', 'telemetry.publish', '--hours', '24', '--out', 'auth.json'],
|
||||
['status', '--by', 'owner.keys.json', '--manufacture', 'manufacture.json', '--transfer', 't1.json', '--state', 'active', '--seq', '1', '--hours', '24', '--out', 'status.json'],
|
||||
['attest', '--device', 'dev.key.json', '--nonce', 'n-123', '--audience', 'https://gateway.example', '--firmware', 'fw.json', '--manufacture', 'manufacture.json', '--transfer', 't1.json', '--action', 'telemetry.publish', '--out', 'att.json'],
|
||||
['bundle', '--manufacture', 'manufacture.json', '--firmware', 'fw.json', '--transfer', 't1.json', '--authorization', 'auth.json', '--attestation', 'att.json', '--out', 'bundle.json'],
|
||||
['envelope', '--attestation', 'att.json', '--out', 'envelope.json']];
|
||||
let rau = ''; for (const p of pasi) { const r = cli(...p); if (r.status !== 0) { rau = p[0] + ': ' + (r.stderr || r.stdout).trim().split('\n').slice(-1)[0]; break; } }
|
||||
const mid = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(T, 'mfr.keys.json'), 'utf8')).id;
|
||||
const comun = ['verify', '--bundle', 'bundle.json', '--audience', 'https://gateway.example', '--trust', mid, '--policy', 'policy.json', '--status', 'status.json', '--json'];
|
||||
const v = cli(...comun, '--nonce', 'n-123'), v2 = cli(...comun), v3 = cli(...comun, '--nonce', 'n-999'); const j = (r) => { try { return JSON.parse(r.stdout); } catch { return {}; } };
|
||||
const retras = cli('status', '--by', 'mfr.keys.json', '--manufacture', 'manufacture.json', '--state', 'retired', '--seq', '1', '--hours', '24', '--out', 'retired.json'); const v4 = cli(...comun, '--nonce', 'n-123', '--status', 'retired.json');
|
||||
cer('D05', 'device-cli.mjs, through files and processes only: twelve commands build a bundle; verify exits 0 VALID, 2 PARTIAL without the nonce, 1 INVALID [nonce] with another nonce, 1 INVALID [status-retired] once the manufacturer\'s retirement is read',
|
||||
!rau && v.status === 0 && j(v).verdict === 'VALID' && v2.status === 2 && j(v2).verdict === 'PARTIAL' && v3.status === 1 && la(j(v3).rules || []) === 'nonce' && retras.status === 0 && v4.status === 1 && la(j(v4).rules || []) === 'status-retired',
|
||||
rau || `exits ${v.status} ${v2.status} ${v3.status} ${v4.status}: ${(v.stderr || '').trim().split('\n').slice(-1)[0]}`, ['nonce', 'status-retired']);
|
||||
const fk = fs.readFileSync(path.join(T, 'dev.key.json'), 'utf8'); const iesiri = ['manufacture.json', 'fw.json', 'policy.json', 't1.json', 'auth.json', 'status.json', 'att.json', 'bundle.json', 'envelope.json'].map((f) => fs.readFileSync(path.join(T, f), 'utf8')).join('');
|
||||
cer('D06', 'no private key leaves a key file: none of the nine files the commands wrote carries a private half', !iesiri.includes(JSON.parse(fk).private) && !/"private"/.test(iesiri));
|
||||
// the owner retires the device (refused while it owns it), then sells it to a second identity: the retirement is NAMED by the command line, in words, and the verdict stands
|
||||
const pasi2 = [['status', '--by', 'owner.keys.json', '--manufacture', 'manufacture.json', '--transfer', 't1.json', '--state', 'retired', '--seq', '2', '--hours', '24', '--out', 'retired-owner.json'],
|
||||
['new-identity', '--out', 'owner2.keys.json'], ['transfer', '--from', 'owner.keys.json', '--to', 'owner2.keys.json', '--manufacture', 'manufacture.json', '--transfer', 't1.json', '--out', 't2.json'],
|
||||
['authorize', '--owner', 'owner2.keys.json', '--manufacture', 'manufacture.json', '--transfer', 't1.json', '--transfer', 't2.json', '--action', 'telemetry.publish', '--hours', '24', '--out', 'auth2.json'],
|
||||
['status', '--by', 'owner2.keys.json', '--manufacture', 'manufacture.json', '--transfer', 't1.json', '--transfer', 't2.json', '--state', 'active', '--seq', '1', '--hours', '24', '--out', 'status2.json'],
|
||||
['attest', '--device', 'dev.key.json', '--nonce', 'n-456', '--audience', 'https://gateway.example', '--firmware', 'fw.json', '--manufacture', 'manufacture.json', '--transfer', 't1.json', '--transfer', 't2.json', '--action', 'telemetry.publish', '--out', 'att2.json'],
|
||||
['bundle', '--manufacture', 'manufacture.json', '--firmware', 'fw.json', '--transfer', 't1.json', '--transfer', 't2.json', '--authorization', 'auth2.json', '--attestation', 'att2.json', '--out', 'bundle2.json']];
|
||||
let rau2 = ''; for (const p of pasi2) { const r = cli(...p); if (r.status !== 0) { rau2 = p[0] + ': ' + (r.stderr || r.stdout).trim().split('\n').slice(-1)[0]; break; } }
|
||||
const v5 = cli(...comun, '--nonce', 'n-123', '--status', 'retired-owner.json'); // before the sale: the owner's own retirement
|
||||
const dupa = ['verify', '--bundle', 'bundle2.json', '--audience', 'https://gateway.example', '--trust', mid, '--policy', 'policy.json', '--nonce', 'n-456', '--status', 'status2.json', '--status', 'retired-owner.json'];
|
||||
const v6 = cli(...dupa), v6j = cli(...dupa, '--json'); const oid = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(T, 'owner.keys.json'), 'utf8')).id; const s6 = j(v6j).subject || {};
|
||||
cer('D07', 'device-cli.mjs: the owner\'s retirement is INVALID [status-retired] while it owns the device; after it sells the device, verify exits 0 VALID and SAYS, on a line of its own, that a previous owner\'s record was read and what it says',
|
||||
!rau2 && v5.status === 1 && la(j(v5).rules || []) === 'status-retired' && v6.status === 0 && /^VALID$/m.test(v6.stdout) && /^noted, the verdict stands: (.*, )?status-prior-ownership$/m.test(v6.stdout) && v6.stdout.includes(`a previous owner (${oid}) signed 1 status record(s) that say: retired`)
|
||||
&& v6j.status === 0 && (j(v6j).unjudged || []).includes('status-prior-ownership') && la((s6.priorOwnership || []).map((p) => `${p.owner} ${p.state}`)) === `${oid} retired`,
|
||||
rau2 || `exits ${v5.status} ${v6.status} ${v6j.status}: ${(v6.stderr || v6.stdout || '').trim().split('\n').slice(-2).join(' | ')}`, ['status-retired']);
|
||||
// ---- a file that holds a list: every element is handed over (the same two records in two files, in one list, in a registry object)
|
||||
const citJ = (f) => JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(T, f), 'utf8')), scrJ = (f, o) => fs.writeFileSync(path.join(T, f), typeof o === 'string' ? o : JSON.stringify(o));
|
||||
const activF = citJ('status.json'), retrasF = citJ('retired-owner.json'), baza9 = comun.filter((x, i) => !(x === '--status' || comun[i - 1] === '--status')); // `comun` without its own --status
|
||||
scrJ('registru.json', [activF, retrasF]); scrJ('registru-obiect.json', { records: [activF, retrasF] }); scrJ('registru-adanc.json', [activF, [{ records: [[retrasF]] }]]); scrJ('registru-alta-forma.json', { items: [activF, retrasF] });
|
||||
const ver = (...a) => { const r = cli(...baza9, '--nonce', 'n-123', ...a); return [r.status, la(j(r).rules || []), la((j(r).unjudged || []).filter((c) => D.PARTIALE.includes(c)))].join(' '); };
|
||||
const doua = ver('--status', 'status.json', '--status', 'retired-owner.json'), lista9 = ver('--status', 'registru.json'), obiect9 = ver('--status', 'registru-obiect.json'), adanc9 = ver('--status', 'registru-adanc.json'), alta9 = ver('--status', 'status.json', '--status', 'registru-alta-forma.json');
|
||||
const polRetrage = cli('policy', '--manufacturer', 'mfr.keys.json', '--model', 'AX-200', '--min-sequence', '2', '--retract', citJ('fw.json').statement.digest, '--hours', '24', '--out', 'policy-retrage.json'); scrJ('politici.json', [citJ('policy.json'), citJ('policy-retrage.json')]);
|
||||
const baza9p = baza9.filter((x, i) => !(x === '--policy' || baza9[i - 1] === '--policy')), pol9 = cli(...baza9p, '--nonce', 'n-123', '--status', 'status.json', '--policy', 'politici.json');
|
||||
cer('D09', 'device-cli.mjs: a file that holds a LIST is read element by element. The owner\'s "active" and its retirement in two files, in one list, in { records: [...] } and nested deeper: INVALID [status-retired] each time (exit 1). In an object of a form that is not read ({ items: [...] }): PARTIAL status-unread (exit 2), never VALID. Two policies in one list, one retracting the release: INVALID [firmware-retracted]',
|
||||
doua === '1 status-retired ' && lista9 === doua && obiect9 === doua && adanc9 === doua && alta9 === '2 status-unread' && polRetrage.status === 0 && pol9.status === 1 && la(j(pol9).rules || []) === 'firmware-retracted',
|
||||
`two files [${doua}] list [${lista9}] object [${obiect9}] nested [${adanc9}] other form [${alta9}] policies ${pol9.status} [${(j(pol9).rules || [])}]`, ['firmware-retracted', 'status-retired']);
|
||||
// ---- what a bundle wrote is not sent to the terminal: the BYTES of stdout are read, not its text
|
||||
{ const E = String.fromCharCode(27), NL = String.fromCharCode(10);
|
||||
const atacator = ID.generateKeys(), dz = D.generateDeviceKey(), acum = Date.now(), iso2 = (ms) => new Date(acum + ms).toISOString();
|
||||
// the attacker makes its own chain (its own manufacturer, which the verifier does not trust): the model clears the screen, homes the cursor, writes a false answer, then conceals what follows
|
||||
const MODEL = 'AX-200' + E + '[2J' + E + '[Hok every link of the chain' + NL + NL + 'VALID' + NL + E + '[8m';
|
||||
const credZ = D.manufacture({ manufacturer: atacator, deviceKey: dz.publicKey, model: MODEL, serial: 'SN-1', validFrom: iso2(-86400000), validUntil: iso2(86400000 * 365), now: new Date(acum - 86400000) });
|
||||
const fwZ = D.releaseFirmware({ signer: atacator, model: MODEL, version: '1', sequence: 1, image: Buffer.from('x'), now: new Date(acum - 3600000) }), capZ = D.ownershipHead(credZ);
|
||||
scrJ('rau.json', D.bundle({ manufacture: credZ, firmware: fwZ, authorization: D.authorize({ owner: atacator, deviceId: dz.deviceId, ownership: capZ, actions: ['door.unlock'], notBefore: iso2(-3600000), notAfter: iso2(3600000), now: new Date(acum - 3600000) }),
|
||||
attestation: D.attest({ device: dz, nonce: 'n-1', audience: 'https://gateway.example', firmware: fwZ, ownership: capZ, action: 'door.unlock', now: new Date(acum - 1000) }) }));
|
||||
// and a status record nobody signed whose signer id carries new lines, a false verdict line, a C1 control and a line separator
|
||||
scrJ('rau-stare.json', { statement: { v: 1, kind: 'aere-device-status', deviceId: activF.statement.deviceId, state: 'retired', seq: 1, ownership: null, by: { id: 'x)' + NL + NL + 'INVALID (refused by: status-retired)' + NL + E + '[8m' + String.fromCharCode(0x9b) + '2J' + String.fromCharCode(0x2028) + 'VALID' }, at: iso2(-600000), validUntil: iso2(86400000) }, signature: {} });
|
||||
const brut = (...a) => spawnSync(process.execPath, [path.join(AICI, 'device-cli.mjs'), ...a], { cwd: T }); // no encoding: stdout is a Buffer
|
||||
const r1 = brut('verify', '--bundle', 'rau.json', '--nonce', 'n-1', '--audience', 'https://gateway.example', '--trust', mid), r2 = brut(...comun.filter((x) => x !== '--json'), '--nonce', 'n-123', '--status', 'rau-stare.json');
|
||||
const curat = (buf) => { for (let i = 0; i < buf.length; i++) { const o = buf[i]; if ((o < 0x20 && o !== 0x0a) || o === 0x7f) return false; if (o === 0xc2 && buf[i + 1] >= 0x80 && buf[i + 1] <= 0x9f) return false; if (o === 0xe2 && buf[i + 1] === 0x80 && (buf[i + 2] === 0xa8 || buf[i + 2] === 0xa9)) return false; } return true; };
|
||||
const verdicte = (buf) => buf.toString('utf8').split(NL).filter((l) => /^(VALID|INVALID|PARTIAL)( |$)/.test(l)), t1b = r1.stdout.toString('utf8'), t2b = r2.stdout.toString('utf8');
|
||||
cer('D10', 'device-cli.mjs: text a bundle or a registry file wrote is SHOWN, never sent to the terminal. Read as bytes, the output of verify holds no control byte but the line feeds the command itself writes (no ESC, no C1, no line separator), exactly one verdict line, and the hostile text in its visible form: for a manufacture model that clears the screen and writes "VALID" (the verdict stays INVALID, exit 1) and for an unsigned status record whose signer id writes a line "INVALID (...)" (the verdict stays VALID, exit 0)',
|
||||
r1.status === 1 && r2.status === 0 && curat(r1.stdout) && curat(r2.stdout) && la(verdicte(r1.stdout)) === 'INVALID (refused by: manufacturer-trusted)' && la(verdicte(r2.stdout)) === 'VALID' && t1b.includes('AX-200\\x1b[2J\\x1b[Hok') && t1b.includes('\\x0a\\x0aVALID\\x0a\\x1b[8m') && t2b.includes('(x)\\x0a\\x0aINVALID (refused by: status-retired)\\x0a\\x1b[8m\\x9b2J\\u2028VALID)'),
|
||||
`exits ${r1.status} ${r2.status}; clean ${curat(r1.stdout)} ${curat(r2.stdout)}; verdict lines [${verdicte(r1.stdout)}] [${verdicte(r2.stdout)}]`, ['manufacturer-trusted']);
|
||||
const rj = spawnSync(process.execPath, [path.join(AICI, 'device-cli.mjs'), 'verify', '--bundle', 'rau.json', '--nonce', 'n-1', '--audience', 'https://gateway.example', '--trust', mid, '--json'], { cwd: T }); let pj = null; try { pj = JSON.parse(rj.stdout.toString('utf8')); } catch { /* not JSON */ }
|
||||
cer('D10b', 'and --json stays JSON: it parses, its strings carry the model exactly as the bundle wrote it (escaped by JSON), and no ESC byte is in the output', pj !== null && pj.verdict === 'INVALID' && JSON.stringify(pj).includes('[2J') && pj.rows.some((x) => x.name.includes(MODEL)) && !rj.stdout.includes(27), '', ['manufacturer-trusted']); }
|
||||
// ---- an input that cannot be read has an exit code of its own: 0, 1 and 2 are verdicts and nothing else
|
||||
{ scrJ('stricat.json', '{ not json'); const faraVerdict = (r) => !/^(VALID|INVALID|PARTIAL)/m.test(r.stdout) && !/"verdict"/.test(r.stdout);
|
||||
const lipsa = cli(...comun, '--nonce', 'n-123', '--status', 'lipsa.json'), stricat = cli(...comun, '--nonce', 'n-123', '--status', 'stricat.json'), ceas = cli('verify', '--bundle', 'bundle.json', '--now', 'not-a-time', '--status', 'status.json'), fara = cli('verify'), alta = cli('no-such-command');
|
||||
const prod = cli('status', '--by', 'owner.keys.json', '--manufacture', 'manufacture.json', '--transfer', 't1.json', '--state', 'destroyed', '--seq', '1', '--hours', '24', '--out', 'x.json');
|
||||
cer('D11', 'device-cli.mjs: 0, 1 and 2 are verdicts only. A status file that is missing, one that is not JSON, a clock that is not a time, a missing --bundle and an unknown command each exit 3 with no verdict printed; a command other than verify that fails (a state that does not exist) exits 1 and writes no file',
|
||||
[lipsa, stricat, ceas, fara, alta].every((r) => r.status === 3 && faraVerdict(r) && /device-cli: /.test(r.stderr)) && prod.status === 1 && !fs.existsSync(path.join(T, 'x.json')), `exits ${[lipsa, stricat, ceas, fara, alta, prod].map((r) => r.status)}`); }
|
||||
} finally { fs.rmSync(T, { recursive: true, force: true }); } }
|
||||
|
||||
{ // the evidence recorded on testnet 28001 (proba-device-ancora-testnet.mjs: two envelopes notarized there, each read back by the published
|
||||
// reference verifier under a post-quantum certified anchor), judged AGAIN, offline, by the verifier as it is now: the bundles, what
|
||||
// the verifier brought and its two readings are in the file; the six verdicts must be the ones recorded. Nothing is sent or read.
|
||||
const dir = path.join(AICI, 'dovezi-ancora-28001'); const f = fs.existsSync(dir) ? fs.readdirSync(dir).filter((x) => /^ancora-dispozitiv-.*\.json$/.test(x)).sort() : [];
|
||||
const titlu = 'the bundles and the readings recorded on testnet 28001, judged again offline by the verifier of now, give the six verdicts recorded (VALID with the reading, PARTIAL without it, a post-dated attestation caught by the reading, another envelope and another reading refused)';
|
||||
if (!f.length) rand('D08', titlu, 'NEMASURAT', 'no evidence file in dovezi-ancora-28001/', ['witness-envelope', 'witness-time']);
|
||||
else { const rele = [];
|
||||
for (const n of f) { const E = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(dir, n), 'utf8')); const H = E.honest, P = E.postDated, t1e = H.bundle.attestation.statement.at, t2e = P.bundle.attestation.statement.at;
|
||||
const j = (b, now, anchors) => { const r = D.verifyDevice(b, { ...E.verifierBrought, now, ...(anchors ? { anchors } : {}) }); return r.verdict === 'INVALID' ? [r.verdict, r.rules] : r.verdict; };
|
||||
const acum = { honestWithReading: j(H.bundle, t1e, [H.reading]), honestWithoutReading: j(H.bundle, t1e), postDatedWithoutChain: j({ ...P.bundle, anchor: D.proofOfDevice(P.bundle.attestation, buildProof) }, t2e),
|
||||
postDatedWithReading: j(P.bundle, t2e, [P.reading]), otherEnvelope: j({ ...P.bundle, anchor: H.bundle.anchor }, t2e, [H.reading]), otherReading: j(H.bundle, t1e, [P.reading]) };
|
||||
if (JSON.stringify(acum) !== JSON.stringify(E.verdicts) || E.network !== 'eip155:28001') rele.push(n + ': now ' + JSON.stringify(acum)); }
|
||||
cer('D08', titlu + ` (${f.length} evidence file(s))`, !rele.length, rele.join(' | '), ['witness-envelope', 'witness-time']); } }
|
||||
|
||||
// ================================================================ E. every rule has a row
|
||||
{ const acoperite = new Set(randuri.flatMap((r) => r.expects)); const fara = D.REGULI.filter((r) => !acoperite.has(r));
|
||||
cer('E01', `every rule the verifier can name (${D.REGULI.length}) is expected by at least one attack row`, !fara.length, 'without a row: ' + fara.join(', ')); }
|
||||
|
||||
const verzi = randuri.filter((r) => r.state === 'VERDE').length, rosii = randuri.filter((r) => r.state === 'ROSU').length, nem = randuri.length - verzi - rosii;
|
||||
spune(`\ndevice identity: ${verzi} VERDE, ${rosii} ROSU, ${nem} NEMASURAT (of ${randuri.length} rows)` + (REPEDE ? ' -- FAST MODE: the command line, the reference verifier and the damaged bundles were NOT run' : ''));
|
||||
if (JSON_OUT) console.log(JSON.stringify({ rows: randuri, verzi, rosii, nemasurat: nem, fast: REPEDE }));
|
||||
process.exitCode = rosii ? 1 : nem || REPEDE ? 2 : 0;
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user