device-identity: what a machine is, as a chain of signed statements checked offline (manufacturer credential, owners, firmware attestation, anchored on 28001; 175/175 with the AIP-23 verifier); conformance: the device-bundle vectors and the rules that cover them; control-plane console; README
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@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
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Every component beside this one ships its own verifier and its own way of saying no: the AIP-23 reference verifier prints four
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levels, the payment modules return `reasons`, the market judge `motive`, the dataset module `ok`, the audit log and the agents'
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ledger a refusal text, the identity verifier a list of labelled rows. This folder adds the one place that
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ledger a refusal text, the identity verifier and the device verifier a list of labelled rows. This folder adds the one place that
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says, in the same form for all of them, **this artifact passes or does not, at level N, for reason M**, and a set of vectors that any
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implementation, in any language, can be run against.
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@@ -24,14 +24,15 @@ are the ones those verifiers name, read from their code.
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| level | what it says |
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|---|---|
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| `integrity` | the artifact is what it says: its hashes bind its content, and the rules it declares (a policy, deadlines, a challenge window, Merkle paths, a payout) hold when recomputed from the evidence supplied |
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| `authenticity` | the signature the artifact carries verifies, with a key of the scheme declared, and the identity it names is the one derived from that key (an ML-DSA signature on an AIP-23 envelope, the ML-DSA-65 signature of an audit head, the ML-DSA-65 key and signatures of an agent's ledger; the hybrid Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65 signatures of a credential, of its presentation and of each delegation link, both halves required) |
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| `authenticity` | the signature the artifact carries verifies, with a key of the scheme declared, and the identity it names is the one derived from that key (an ML-DSA signature on an AIP-23 envelope, the ML-DSA-65 signature of an audit head, the ML-DSA-65 key and signatures of an agent's ledger; the hybrid Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65 signatures of a credential, of its presentation and of each delegation link, both halves required; the same hybrid signatures on a device's manufacture credential, firmware release, transfers, authorization and status records, and the ML-DSA-65 signature of the device on its attestation) |
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| `anchoring` | its `statementHash` (or, for a trust chain, the head of its ledger) is recorded in the notary contract, under a state root that a post-quantum anchor covers |
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| `finality` | that anchor's post-quantum certificate verifies. The finality is the one of the chain the artifact was notarized on |
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Each level is `PASSED`, `FAILED` or `NOT_MEASURED`, with the reason; a level nobody judged says why (`cause`). The verdict is
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`INVALID` when a level failed; `PARTIAL` when nothing failed but something the artifact **claims** was not measured (a notarization
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claim not checked because the run was offline, a signature scheme the verifier cannot check, a timeline that is not terminal, a
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presentation judged without the verifier's audience, nonce or trusted issuers, a credential whose status list was not read);
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presentation judged without the verifier's audience, nonce or trusted issuers, a credential whose status list was not read, a
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device bundle with a link missing or a registry nobody read);
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`VALID` otherwise, and only with integrity passed. A claim that was not checked is never `VALID`. `failed` is the sorted list of the
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rule ids that refused; the suite compares it as an exact set.
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@@ -41,8 +42,8 @@ verdict (`vectori/payment-receipt/company-p1-28001.valid.json`).
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## What is enrolled
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`REGULI.json` is derived from the code (`node deriva-reguli.mjs --verifica`): 134 rules of 10 verifiers, 14 artifact kinds. By level:
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111 rules are reported at `integrity`, 20 at `authenticity`, 3 at `anchoring` (one of them, `envelope.finality`, is reported at
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`REGULI.json` is derived from the code (`node deriva-reguli.mjs --verifica`): 181 rules of 11 verifiers, 15 artifact kinds. By level:
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142 rules are reported at `integrity`, 36 at `authenticity`, 3 at `anchoring` (one of them, `envelope.finality`, is reported at
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`anchoring` or at `finality` by the place that refused).
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| artifact kind | judged by | rules |
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@@ -57,9 +58,10 @@ verdict (`vectori/payment-receipt/company-p1-28001.valid.json`).
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| `audit-inclusion`, `audit-consistency` (RFC 9162 proofs over that log) | `verify-layer/jurnal-arbore.mjs` | 12: `audittree.proof-form`, `.head-form`, `.head-hash`, `.inclusion-index`, `.inclusion-entry`, `.inclusion-envelope`, `.inclusion-leaf`, `.inclusion-path`, `.inclusion-head`, `.consistency-start`, `.consistency-end`, `.consistency` |
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| `agent-ledger` (an agent's signed ledger under its policy) | `agents/agent-ledger.mjs` | 16: `agents.ledger-form`, `.policy`, `.other-policy`, `.session`, `.key`, `.identity`, `.anchor`, `.seq`, `.chain`, `.body`, `.signature`, `.hash`, `.time`, `.revocation`, `.approvals`, `.decision` |
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| `identity-presentation` (a credential shown by its holder or by the last delegate of a chain, judged with what the verifier brings: its audience, its nonce, its clock, the issuers it trusts, the status lists and the revocations it was handed) | `identity/identity.mjs` | 37: `identity.form`, `.issuer-id`, `.holder-id`, `.credential-signature`, `.issuer-trusted`, `.credential-window`, `.status-list`, `.credential-revoked`, `.sd-distinct`, `.disclosure-readable`, `.disclosure-signed`, `.disclosure-once`, `.disclosure-plain`, `.claim-name`, `.binding-credential`, `.binding-disclosures`, `.binding-delegations`, `.presenter`, `.presentation-signature`, `.audience`, `.nonce`, `.freshness`, `.chain-length`, `.delegation-form`, `.delegation-ids`, `.delegation-from`, `.delegation-parent`, `.delegation-signature`, `.delegation-scope`, `.delegation-window`, `.delegation-depth`, `.delegation-narrows`, `.delegation-credential`, `.delegation-claims`, `.delegation-audience`, `.delegation-revoked`, `.unreadable` |
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| `device-bundle` (the chain of a device: the manufacturer's credential for the device key, a firmware release, the ownership transfers, the owner's authorization, the device's attestation and its AIP-23 envelope, judged with what the verifier brings: its clock, nonce and audience, the manufacturers it trusts, the recall lists, firmware policies and status records it read, its own reading of the notarized envelope) | `device-identity/device.mjs` | 47: `device.form`, `.manufacture-form`, `.manufacturer-id`, `.manufacture-holder`, `.manufacture-signature`, `.manufacturer-trusted`, `.manufacture-window`, `.manufacture-status-list`, `.manufacture-revoked`, `.device-key`, `.device-id`, `.firmware-form`, `.firmware-signer`, `.firmware-signature`, `.firmware-model`, `.firmware-retracted`, `.firmware-rollback`, `.firmware-software`, `.chain-length`, `.transfer-form`, `.transfer-device`, `.transfer-ids`, `.transfer-from`, `.transfer-prev`, `.transfer-signature`, `.transfer-time`, `.authorization-form`, `.authorization-device`, `.authorization-owner`, `.authorization-ownership`, `.authorization-signature`, `.authorization-window`, `.authorization-action`, `.status-retired`, `.status-suspended`, `.attestation-form`, `.attestation-key`, `.attestation-device`, `.attestation-signature`, `.audience`, `.nonce`, `.freshness`, `.attestation-firmware`, `.attestation-ownership`, `.witness-envelope`, `.witness-time`, `.unreadable` |
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A module verifier exports the list of rules it can name (`REGULI`; its helper throws on any other) and marks its rules in one of two
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ways, both read by the derivation: a marker on every check of a rule (eight modules), or the rule named at every call of the
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ways, both read by the derivation: a marker on every check of a rule (nine modules), or the rule named at every call of the
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verifier's one refusal helper (`ai-trust`). The derivation requires declared == marked == mapped here. A rule added to a verifier and
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not mapped is a refusal of the derivation; a mapped rule without a vector is a refusal of the probe. For the reference verifier, a
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published program this suite does not edit, the rules are its level names, and each of the six places where its `finality` level
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@@ -70,15 +72,31 @@ vector may expect several. What it could not judge because the verifier did not
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the status list the credential names not handed or not current) leaves the verdict `PARTIAL`, never `VALID`; the cause is named
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`not-supplied` (added to the verdict form on 2026-10-05).
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The device verifier (enrolled on 2026-10-05) works the same way. A link that is not in the bundle, the verifier's nonce, audience
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or trusted manufacturers not brought, a recall list, a firmware policy or the status registry not read, a recall list, a policy or
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a status record that is signed by who may give it and cannot be read, a notarization the envelope claims and the verifier did not
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read, a hardware root (which that verifier cannot judge): each leaves the verdict `PARTIAL`. The adapter refuses to run if the
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causes the module declares as keeping its verdict from `VALID` are not exactly the ones mapped here, and if the verdict of the
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suite is not the verdict of the module. The readings of a notarized envelope in these vectors are inputs (what a verifier would
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bring), not readings of a chain: the module's own probe reads testnet 28001.
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Four things the device verifier **names without changing its verdict**, and what a `VALID` then does and does not say: a status
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record of a **previous owner** (it does not bind the owner of now: a seller could date a retirement before the sale after it;
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the manufacturer's retirement is final, an owner's lasts as long as its ownership), a status record dated in the verifier's
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future, a status record of a stranger, a credential that names no recall list. The one verdict form has no field for them: the
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adapter writes them in the reason of the integrity level, and the vectors compare verdicts, rules and level states, not reasons.
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So `device-bundle/resold-after-retirement.valid` is `VALID` here, and a verifier that drops the naming still passes it; that the
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naming is there is measured by the device component's own probe, not by this suite.
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**Not enrolled**, counted in the same file: three verifiers of the identity component that sit beside the enrolled one or on top of
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it: SD-JWT (26 calls of its refusal helper), Travel Rule (20 places that add a reason) and compliance (3). Their refusals are texts,
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not rule ids. Their own probes and negative controls stay what checks them.
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## The vectors
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`vectori/` holds 273 vectors (264 offline, 9 that read testnet 28001), listed with their digests in `vectori/INDEX.json`:
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`vectori/` holds 422 vectors (413 offline, 9 that read testnet 28001; 16 MB, since every device and identity vector carries its ML-DSA-65 keys and signatures), listed with their digests in `vectori/INDEX.json`:
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envelope 64, payment-risk 11, payment-receipt 10, market-timeline 26, dataset 22, ai-trust-bundle 24, audit-log 19, audit-inclusion
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10, audit-consistency 4, agent-ledger 18, identity-presentation 65. By expected verdict: 45 `VALID`, 11 `PARTIAL`, 217 `INVALID`. None is typed by hand
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10, audit-consistency 4, agent-ledger 18, identity-presentation 65, device-bundle 149. By expected verdict: 59 `VALID`, 47 `PARTIAL`, 316 `INVALID`. None is typed by hand
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(`node genereaza-vectori.mjs --verifica` regenerates them and compares byte for byte):
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- the 16 AIP-23 kinds come from their producers on fixed inputs (the same envelopes as the published AIP-23 kind vectors); the audit
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@@ -93,27 +111,34 @@ envelope 64, payment-risk 11, payment-receipt 10, market-timeline 26, dataset 22
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written with a classical key; three trust chains of a fresh agent (allowed, refused by the policy, dated apart); the presentations of one identity credential
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(an issuer, a holder, a phone, a session key, a stranger and an impostor issuer: six hybrid key pairs), its status lists, its
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delegations and revocations, with the forged siblings that only a key holder can make (a statement changed and signed again by
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the issuer, the holder or a delegate) and one credential from an issuer whose "ML-DSA-65" key is an Ed25519 key; an envelope with
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the issuer, the holder or a delegate) and one credential from an issuer whose "ML-DSA-65" key is an Ed25519 key; the chain of one
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device (a manufacturer, two owners, a second identity the first owner sells to, a stranger, another manufacturer: six hybrid key
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pairs; the device key and a clone's key, ML-DSA-65), sold once, sold on, and bought back, its recall lists, firmware policies and
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status records, with the forged siblings that only a key holder can make and a device key that is an Ed25519 key (the firmware
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image and its Proof of Software attestation are the fixtures of the device component; `--proaspat --refa device` makes this one
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source anew when the producers of the device component change, and every other vector stays byte for byte); an envelope with
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random content that nobody notarized; a dataset of 16 records with random salts; and the transaction of the recorded receipt read
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from the chain (two read calls).
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An `INVALID` vector names its `base` and its `mutation`: **one operation** (set, remove or add at one JSON path) applied to the input
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of a vector that is not invalid, and it must be refused for exactly the rules in `expected.failed`, not merely refused: 159 of the
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217 are made this way. Where the rule sits under a hash or a signature, one place is not reachable (changing an amount under the
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of a vector that is not invalid, and it must be refused for exactly the rules in `expected.failed`, not merely refused: 209 of the
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316 are made this way. Where the rule sits under a hash or a signature, one place is not reachable (changing an amount under the
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instruction hash trips the binding first; a false decision in a ledger must still be signed by the agent; a disclosure the issuer never signed must still be signed for by
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the holder): the other 58 are made at
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the holder; an authorization by a previous owner must still be signed by that owner): the other 107 are made at
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the producer, the commitments above the change recomputed with the published formulas, and every path that moved is declared
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(`mutation.changed`). Nine vectors expect two rules: rules that guard the same field cannot be separated (a looser policy shown
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(`mutation.changed`). Eleven vectors expect more than one rule: rules that guard the same field cannot be separated (a looser policy shown
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under a receipt also makes the risk verdict not reproduce; a Proof of AI envelope that is changed is also no longer the one the
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ledger links; a delegation chain cut after it was signed for is also not presented by its last delegate).
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ledger links; a delegation chain cut after it was signed for is also not presented by its last delegate; a manufacture credential
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whose signature is changed is also no longer the link the first transfer names; a clone that claims the device's id with another
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key breaks both the id derivation and the match with the manufacturer's credential).
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## Run it
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```
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AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs from aere.network/tools, with verify-anchor.mjs, mpt.mjs, falcon512.mjs, registry-v3.mjs and package.json beside it and npm install done>
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node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs" # the published verifiers behind the one verdict form: 264 offline vectors
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node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs" # the published verifiers behind the one verdict form: 413 offline vectors
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node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs" --online # and the 9 that read testnet 28001 (nothing is sent)
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node conformance.mjs --impl "python3 implementare-integritate.py" # an independent implementation: 62 vectors, 211 reported NOT COVERED
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node conformance.mjs --impl "python3 implementare-integritate.py" # an independent implementation: 62 vectors, 360 reported NOT COVERED
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node conformance.mjs --impl "<your command>" # yours
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node implementare-aere.mjs <artifact.json> [--online] # one artifact { artifact, input }: its verdict
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```
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@@ -122,8 +147,9 @@ For the artifact `envelope` the input is `{ "envelope": <any JSON value> }`, or
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not JSON at all: a file that is not an envelope is refused at the form level, by name, like any other. The other inputs are the ones
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the vectors show (`{ log, head?, signer? }` for an audit log, `{ ledger, policy }` for an agent's ledger, `{ bundle }` for a trust
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chain, `{ presentation, now, audience?, nonce?, trustedIssuers?, statusLists?, revocations?, maxAgeS? }` for a presentation of a
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credential: `now`, the verifier's clock, is required, since a verdict on the clock of the machine that runs a vector would not
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reproduce).
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credential, `{ bundle, now, nonce?, audience?, trustedManufacturers?, statusLists?, firmwarePolicies?, statusRecords?,
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softwareAttestation?, anchors?, maxAgeS? }` for a device bundle: `now`, the verifier's clock, is required for both, since a verdict
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on the clock of the machine that runs a vector would not reproduce).
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An implementation is a command that answers three calls with JSON on stdout: `--capabilities` (`{ artifacts, rules, online, batch }`:
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what it claims to judge), `<vector.json> [--online]` (the verdict above for the file's `{ artifact, input }`), and, if it says
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@@ -133,11 +159,11 @@ exact set of failed rules and the state of each of the four levels are the expec
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refusal. Without `--online` an implementation must not open a connection.
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`implementare-integritate.py` is the second implementation: Python, standard library only, written from the rules and not from the
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JavaScript. It claims 6 of the 134 rules (the form and the statement hash of an envelope; the form, the commitment, the salted field
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JavaScript. It claims 6 of the 181 rules (the form and the statement hash of an envelope; the form, the commitment, the salted field
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commitments and the RFC 9162 inclusion of a dataset record) and passes all 62 vectors it claims. It cannot check an ML-DSA signature
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or read a chain, says so in its capabilities, and the runner reports the rest as not covered: 211 vectors, among them every vector of
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the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger and the identity presentations. For those five verifiers the suite has one
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implementation, ours.
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or read a chain, says so in its capabilities, and the runner reports the rest as not covered: 360 vectors, among them every vector of
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the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger, the identity presentations and the device bundles. For those six verifiers the
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suite has one implementation, ours.
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## How the suite itself is checked
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@@ -145,27 +171,41 @@ Measured on 2026-10-05 (Node.js 24.14.1, Python 3.14.4, testnet 28001 read):
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- `node proba-conformance.mjs --online`: every row green, 11 in this copy (a twelfth, the comparison of the 16 kind envelopes with
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the published AIP-23 kind vectors, runs where their generator is, in the development repository: 12/12 there, and here it is
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printed as information). The rules and the vectors are what the code derives now; every rule has a vector that expects it (134 of
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134); every artifact kind has a valid vector (14); every invalid vector is its base with one operation (159) or one declared
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producer change (58); the published verifiers pass 273/273; the independent implementation passes all 62 it claims; and 16,280
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printed as information). The rules and the vectors are what the code derives now; every rule has a vector that expects it (181 of
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181); every artifact kind has a valid vector (15); every invalid vector is its base with one operation (209) or one declared
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producer change (107); the published verifiers pass 422/422; the independent implementation passes all 62 it claims; and 70,358
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malformed inputs (every path of every offline vector that is not invalid removed, or replaced by null, a string, a number, a list,
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an object) given to the module verifiers each got a verdict, none threw. That row covers the modules of eight verifiers; the
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an object) given to the module verifiers each got a verdict, none threw. That row covers the modules of nine verifiers; the
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trust chain verifier is not in it (each case would run the reference verifier several times). The reference verifier, a program,
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has a row of its own: 183 malformed envelope files (every path of a signed tree head and of a notarized envelope removed or
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replaced; files that hold null, a number, a string, true, a list, an empty object, text that is not JSON, nothing) are given to
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it, and each gets a verdict. That row contacts no public endpoint: the program goes to the chain whenever a file claims a
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notarization, so a file that still carries the claim is run against a closed local endpoint and its finality is not measured. Without `--online` the nine chain vectors are reported unmeasured and the exit code is 2.
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- `node proba-conformance.mjs --control-negativ --online`: 134 of 134 rules. Each rule is planted out of its verifier, one at a time, in
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- `node proba-conformance.mjs --control-negativ --online`: 263 rows green: 181 of 181 rules, 76 of 76 conditions of the device
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verifier, six controls of the instruments. Each rule is planted out of its verifier, one at a time, in
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a copy (every check that carries its marker made true at run time; for `ai-trust`, its refusal helper made to drop the refusals of
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that rule; for the reference verifier, the level made to pass); the suite is run against the planted verifier; the vectors that
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expect the rule, **and only they**, must fail, and none may break. Then six controls of the instruments: an implementation that
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calls everything valid fails every vector that is not plainly valid (232 of the 264 offline vectors); the coverage gate goes red when one rule's vector
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expect the rule, **and only they**, must fail, and none may break. A rule taken out whole says nothing about each condition of
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a check made of several: every vector of the rule fails, whichever condition it was written for. So, for the device verifier,
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the conditions are then planted out **one at a time**: 76 of 76. The plantings are those of that verifier's own negative control,
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read from its `plantari-device.mjs` and not typed again here (a credential that has not begun, each condition of the
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authorization window, the position of a transfer, the id of who gives one, the sequence and the digest the device attests, the
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model, the validity and the version of a policy, a date ahead of the verifier's clock, a signature in another base64 text, whose
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status record counts, and so on); under each, exactly the vectors written for that condition must fail (82 vectors in all). Of
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the 88 plantings that control makes in the verifier, 11 are reached by no vector and are not in this list: four are of the
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producers and two of the key files, which a vector does not exercise; four are of what the verifier names without changing its
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verdict, which the verdict form does not carry; and one empties the list of causes that keep a verdict from `VALID`, under which
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the adapter refuses to run at all (every device vector breaks, none passes). One more, the purpose separation of signatures,
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fails 123 of the 149 device vectors at once and is not a condition of one check. The other verifiers have no such list: for them
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the control shows that each **rule** is load-bearing, and `--pe-loc` below measures their checks. Then six controls of the
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instruments: an implementation that
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calls everything valid fails every vector that is not plainly valid (381 of the 413 offline vectors); the coverage gate goes red when one rule's vector
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is taken away; a rule added to a verifier and not mapped is refused by the derivation; a judge that throws again turns the
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malformed-input row red; a reference verifier that throws again turns the malformed-envelope row red; no planted copy is left
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behind.
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- `node proba-conformance.mjs --pe-loc` is a measurement, not a gate: each of the 162 marked checks of the module verifiers
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planted out alone (the trust chain verifier has no per-check markers and is not in this count). For 127 of them a vector
|
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then fails (all 40 checks of the identity verifier among them). The others are checks whose vector trips a second check of the same rule at the same time, so removing one alone
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- `node proba-conformance.mjs --pe-loc` is a measurement, not a gate: each of the 209 marked checks of the module verifiers
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planted out alone (the trust chain verifier has no per-check markers and is not in this count). For 174 of them a vector
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then fails (all 40 checks of the identity verifier and all 47 of the device verifier among them). The others are checks whose vector trips a second check of the same rule at the same time, so removing one alone
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changes nothing (the three checks of `market.replay`, the three of `agents.anchor`, the run and neighbour checks of
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`dataset.completeness`), or checks no vector reaches (a dispute timed out before the arbitration timeout; five of the six checks
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of `agents.time`). The control above shows that each **rule** is load-bearing, not each of its checks.
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@@ -207,11 +247,11 @@ On 2026-10-05, while the identity verifier was being enrolled, one more, fixed t
|
||||
## What it is not, and what is not measured
|
||||
|
||||
- **Not a certification, not an audit, not a mark.** Passing says that an implementation agrees with the published verifiers on these
|
||||
273 inputs. It does not say either of them is correct, and no third party has reviewed the verifiers, the vectors or this suite.
|
||||
422 inputs. It does not say either of them is correct, and no third party has reviewed the verifiers, the vectors or this suite.
|
||||
- **The vectors and the verifiers have the same authors.** The expected verdicts were written by the people who wrote the verifiers.
|
||||
The second implementation is independent in code and language, not in authorship, and it covers 6 rules of 134; the other
|
||||
128 rules, among them every rule of the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger and the identity verifier, are judged
|
||||
here by one implementation.
|
||||
The second implementation is independent in code and language, not in authorship, and it covers 6 rules of 181; the other
|
||||
175 rules, among them every rule of the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger, the identity verifier and the device
|
||||
verifier, are judged here by one implementation.
|
||||
- **Finality is the chain's.** The level says that the post-quantum certificate of the covering anchor verified on the chain where the
|
||||
artifact was notarized. Every notarized vector here is on chain 28001, a testnet; nothing in this suite ran on mainnet.
|
||||
- **Five of the six finality refusals have no vector.** The reference verifier can refuse at its finality level in six places; the
|
||||
@@ -240,7 +280,16 @@ On 2026-10-05, while the identity verifier was being enrolled, one more, fixed t
|
||||
attributed to the giver of the link or to the holder is ignored; a credential that names no status list cannot be revoked by
|
||||
its issuer and is still `VALID`. Every time in these vectors is the statement of a key holder: no vector notarizes a credential
|
||||
or a delegation. Nothing here says who an issuer is in the world.
|
||||
- **What a damaged artifact can still pass.** Of the 16,280 malformed inputs, 2,071 were still accepted, at 111 distinct paths: parts a
|
||||
- **A device verdict is the verifier's too, and the device key is a software key.** A bundle is judged on the clock, the nonce, the
|
||||
audience, the trusted manufacturers, the recall lists, the firmware policies, the status records and the readings in the vector
|
||||
input. `VALID` says that every link was brought and that what was read revokes nothing, not that nothing was withheld. No vector,
|
||||
and nothing in the device verifier, checks a hardware root: a device key is a key in software, and an attestation says what the
|
||||
holder of that key claims to run. A Proof of Software attestation handed with a bundle is checked for being the one the release
|
||||
names and for listing the image digest; its own signature is not verified there. An owner's retirement of a device does not
|
||||
survive a sale: after a transfer it is named and not applied (the manufacturer's is final). A retirement by an owner that holds
|
||||
across a sale needs a witness of when it and the transfer were signed, which is not built; every time in a transfer, an
|
||||
authorization and a status record of these vectors is the statement of the key holder that signed it.
|
||||
- **What a damaged artifact can still pass.** Of the 70,358 malformed inputs, 3,889 were still accepted, at 192 distinct paths (81 of them in device bundles: a status record that decided nothing, such as a suspension already lifted, a stranger's record, a record not in effect yet or one of a previous owner; a recall list or a firmware policy that could not be read and stood beside a clean one, which damaged is no longer signed by the manufacturer and counts like one that was not handed; the envelope and its notarization claim, which are optional; and the signature of a Proof of Software attestation, which the device verifier does not read): parts a
|
||||
verifier treats as optional (the transaction facts of a receipt, the envelope of a timeline, the head of an audit log), a policy
|
||||
field removed that falls back to its default, a log or a ledger without its last entry (still a valid shorter one), a revocation that was not in effect (damaged, it is
|
||||
ignored as before), and fields no rule reads
|
||||
@@ -251,7 +300,7 @@ On 2026-10-05, while the identity verifier was being enrolled, one more, fixed t
|
||||
not read them; the statement carries its own `kind`, which is under the hash. (This file used to quote 526 malformed envelopes,
|
||||
a figure of 2026-10-03 from a run whose script was not kept; the row above replaces it.)
|
||||
- **Not part of AIP-23.** The rule ids, the four levels and the verdict form are this suite's reading of the published verifiers;
|
||||
AIP-23 defines the envelope. Of the identity verifiers published beside these, the presentation verifier is enrolled; SD-JWT,
|
||||
AIP-23 defines the envelope. The device verifier is enrolled. Of the identity verifiers published beside these, the presentation verifier is enrolled; SD-JWT,
|
||||
Travel Rule and compliance are not.
|
||||
- **The Python implementation** writes numbers the way JavaScript does only for integers and plain decimals, and sorts keys by code
|
||||
point (JavaScript's order for keys in the Basic Multilingual Plane).
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user