verify-layer: signed heads. keygen makes the operator's ML-DSA-65 head key; attest-head --sign-key signs the head statement in the form the AIP-23 reference verifier checks at its signature level (outside the statement, so the statementHash and its notarization are unchanged); verify-log --attested --signer requires the expected key, and without it says who signed and that no expected signer was compared. A signature says who vouches for the head, not when and not that the history is true. Tests 44/44 with the reference verifier (39 run and 5 skipped without it); negative control 9/9 here.

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@@ -22,8 +22,14 @@ Node.js 24, no dependencies; `notarize-head` alone needs `ethers` (`npm install`
proof of `firstSeen[statementHash]`). `verify-log --attested <head.json>` requires that today's log **continues** that head:
the same first `count` entries, the entry `count - 1` hashing to the attested head. A rewritten or shortened history fails.
So: publish heads often (every deployment, or on a timer), and judge a log against the latest head you hold from outside the
host, never on its own.
- **A head can be signed (2026-09-29).** `keygen` makes an ML-DSA-65 key for the operator; `attest-head --sign-key` signs the
head statement in the form the AIP-23 reference verifier checks at its `signature` level; `verify-log --attested head.json
--signer head.pub.pem` then requires that the head was signed by that key. A signature says **who** vouches for the head, not
**when** (the notarization says when) and not that the history is true: whoever holds the key can sign the head of a rewritten
history, and without `--signer` a head signed by anyone passes, which the output says.
So: publish heads often (every deployment, or on a timer), sign them with the operator's key, and judge a log against the latest
head you hold from outside the host, with the signer you expect, never on its own.
## Commands
@@ -31,8 +37,9 @@ host, never on its own.
node sidecar.mjs record --kind deployment --name <name> --version <v> --content-file <file> [--host h] [--log p] [--at T]
node sidecar.mjs record --kind proof --proof-file <envelope.json> # any AIP-23 envelope, after checking its form and hash
node sidecar.mjs scan --source docker|kubernetes --input <export.json> [--host h] [--log p]
node sidecar.mjs verify-log --log p [--attested head.json] # 0 intact (and continues the head), 1 broken or not continued
node sidecar.mjs attest-head --log p [--host h] [--out head.json] # the head of the chain as an aere-audit-head envelope
node sidecar.mjs verify-log --log p [--attested head.json [--signer head.pub.pem]] # 0 intact (and continues the head), 1 broken or not continued
node sidecar.mjs attest-head --log p [--host h] [--out head.json] [--sign-key head.key.pem] # the head as an aere-audit-head envelope
node sidecar.mjs keygen --out <dir> # the operator's ML-DSA-65 head key (head.key.pem 0600, head.pub.pem)
node sidecar.mjs notarize-head --head head.json --rpc <url> --key-file <file> [--notary 0x..] [--out notarized.json]
node sidecar.mjs bundle --log p [--out bundle.json] # {host, count, head, chainOk, entries[]} for a console
@@ -80,26 +87,28 @@ post-quantum` under a certified anchor of the testnet, and `VALID`.
## Tests
node proba-sidecar.mjs # 34 checks
node proba-sidecar.mjs # 44 checks
node control-negativ-sidecar.mjs # puts each guard back to its absent form and requires the named check to fail
`proba-sidecar.mjs` records runtime, deployment and envelope entries; checks that a modified entry breaks the chain at its
seq, a changed hash is caught, and nothing is appended to a broken chain; that a chain **rebuilt from genesis** passes
`verify-log` alone (the stated limit) but fails against the attested head, as do a shortened log and a modified attestation,
while a log that only grew passes; that two writers appending 150 entries each at the same time leave an intact chain of 300;
while a log that only grew passes; that a signed head passes the verifier's signature level and `--signer`, while a head
signed by another key, an unsigned head with `--signer`, and a damaged signature are refused; that two writers appending 150 entries each at the same time leave an intact chain of 300;
that a line that is not JSON is reported as broken at its seq; that the Docker and Kubernetes adapters record only running
containers and no secret value; and that every envelope is `VALID` for the AIP-23 reference verifier. The verifier is looked
for at `AERE_VERIFY_PROOF` (for example `verify-proof.mjs` from the `aere-node` repository, after `npm install` there); without
it, the four checks that need it are reported as skipped and the exit code is 2, not 0.
it, the five checks that need it are reported as skipped and the exit code is 2, not 0.
`control-negativ-sidecar.mjs` measured 7 of 7 on 2026-09-29: the version before the review (taken from the development
history, skipped where that history is absent) and six plantings, each disabling one guard (the writer lock, the head
comparison, the length check, the attestation hash check, the handling of an unreadable line, the digest check of `--attested`).
`control-negativ-sidecar.mjs` measured 10 of 10 on 2026-09-29: the version before the review (taken from the development
history, skipped where that history is absent) and nine plantings, each disabling one guard (the writer lock, the head
comparison, the length check, the attestation hash check, the handling of an unreadable line, the digest check of `--attested`,
the head signature check, the comparison with `--signer`, the refusal of an unsigned head when `--signer` is given).
`proba-notarizare-testnet.mjs --key-file <testnet key>` repeats the on-chain run above (9 checks, it needs a funded testnet key).
## What it is not (yet)
It does not report to a live console over the network, and it has no per-cloud adapters that read deployments from the AWS,
Azure or GCP APIs with credentials: the runtime adapter above, without credentials, is the first one. It does not sign entries
with a host key, so it cannot tell two hosts apart by itself; the host name in an entry is also a declaration. No third party
Azure or GCP APIs with credentials: the runtime adapter above, without credentials, is the first one. It signs heads, not
each entry, and the host name in an entry is still a declaration. No third party
has reviewed it.