verify-layer: signed heads. keygen makes the operator's ML-DSA-65 head key; attest-head --sign-key signs the head statement in the form the AIP-23 reference verifier checks at its signature level (outside the statement, so the statementHash and its notarization are unchanged); verify-log --attested --signer requires the expected key, and without it says who signed and that no expected signer was compared. A signature says who vouches for the head, not when and not that the history is true. Tests 44/44 with the reference verifier (39 run and 5 skipped without it); negative control 9/9 here.

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Aere Network committed 2026-09-29 22:58:20 +03:00
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@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ command of the verification layer, which needs `ethers`.
| [`pq-kms/`](pq-kms/) | a transit-style key management service where every key is hybrid: X25519 + ML-KEM-768 for encryption, Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65 for signatures (both halves required); versions, rotation, rewrap, data keys, a chained audit log; the root key from the environment or sealed by an HSM through PKCS#11 |
| [`pq-pki/`](pq-pki/) | a private certificate authority for ML-DSA (X.509 v3, RFC 9881): root and issuing CAs, leaf certificates, revocation lists, and a strict chain verifier compared against OpenSSL |
| [`crypto-inventory/`](crypto-inventory/) | a cryptographic inventory of source code (JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Java, Go, PEM blocks, dependency manifests): every use classified by its exposure to a quantum computer, with a migration target, written as a CycloneDX 1.6 CBOM; nothing from the scanned tree is executed, and its cost stays linear on input built to be slow |
| [`verify-layer/`](verify-layer/) | an audit-log sidecar for any deployment: entries are AIP-23 envelopes in a hash chain, the runtime adapter records every running Docker or Kubernetes container without any secret value, and the head of the chain can be notarized on Aere Network for post-quantum finality; it says plainly what that proves (the history before a published head) and what it does not (that the host told the truth) |
| [`verify-layer/`](verify-layer/) | an audit-log sidecar for any deployment: entries are AIP-23 envelopes in a hash chain, the runtime adapter records every running Docker or Kubernetes container without any secret value, and the head of the chain can be signed by the operator (ML-DSA-65) and notarized on Aere Network for post-quantum finality; it says plainly what that proves (the history before a published head) and what it does not (that the host told the truth) |
| [`proof-kinds/`](proof-kinds/) | the AIP-23 envelope builder the verification layer uses: fourteen proof kinds, one envelope format, digests instead of raw content |
| [`readiness/`](readiness/) | the post-quantum readiness scanner of a public hostname: real TLS handshakes (hybrid only, hybrid preferred, TLS 1.2), HSTS, the certificate; no connection to an address not proven public; a rate limit per client that X-Forwarded-For cannot bypass |
| [`control-plane/`](control-plane/) | from findings to a finished migration: a prioritized plan from the inventory and the scanner, its execution through the gateway, KMS and PKI with consent per action and a measured proof afterwards, recipes for the servers the products do not touch and a rescan that judges them, a compliance report against NIST IR 8547, the EU roadmap and optionally CNSA 2.0, and a console that checks it all again |
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ test, counts as a failure of the control. Results measured on 2026-09-29 (Node.j
| pq-kms | 62/62 (`node test/proba.mjs`); HSM root on SoftHSM2 + OpenSC 20/20 (`test/proba-hsm.mjs`, Linux); sealed-file trust rules 7/7 (`test/proba-hsm-incredere.mjs`) | 16/16 (`node test/control-negativ.mjs`); sealed-file rules 2/2 in this repository (`test/control-negativ-hsm-incredere.mjs`) |
| pq-pki | 27/27 (`node test/proba.mjs`), each verdict compared with OpenSSL 3.5 | 22/22 (`node test/control-negativ.mjs`) |
| crypto-inventory | 37/37 (`node test/proba.mjs`); cost on hostile input 8/8 linear (`node test/proba-timp.mjs`) | 18/18 (`node test/control-negativ.mjs`); cost 3/3 in this repository (`node test/control-negativ-timp.mjs`; its fourth case compares with version 0.1.0 from the development history and is skipped here) |
| verify-layer | 34/34 with the AIP-23 reference verifier (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs from aere-node> node proba-sidecar.mjs`); without it 30 run, 4 are reported as skipped and the exit code is 2 | 6/6 in this repository (`node control-negativ-sidecar.mjs`; its seventh case compares with the version from the development history and is skipped here) |
| verify-layer | 44/44 with the AIP-23 reference verifier (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs from aere-node> node proba-sidecar.mjs`); without it 39 run, 5 are reported as skipped and the exit code is 2 | 9/9 in this repository (`node control-negativ-sidecar.mjs`; its tenth case compares with the version from the development history and is skipped here) |
| proof-kinds | 24/24 with the same verifier (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-proof-kinds.mjs`) | six negative controls inside the test |
| readiness | 6/6 (`node proba-adrese-private.mjs`: the private-address rules, and a local listener no scan may touch) | the rate limit and the queue bound are tested where the service runs, not here (its README says so) |
| control-plane | planner 30/30, command line 9/9, execution 30/30 on real products started locally, remediation 33/33 on real TLS servers, compliance report 27/27 (with the AIP-23 verifier), console 8/8 | remediation 7/7, compliance report 3/3 in this repository |