agents: the negative control of the witness stops a plantation's probe at its failed row, same verdicts (2026-11-08); the cleanup proof of the control

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@@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ Measured on 2026-09-29 (Node.js 24.14.1, Windows):
| `node control-negativ-aprobare.mjs` | 28/28 (2026-10-19): each guard is removed in a copy, one at a time, and the named test must fail for that reason; a test that stops before its summary counts as a failure of the control |
| `node proba-martor-agenti.mjs` | 158/158 offline, measured 2026-10-19 after the sixth review of the hosted witness (two reviewers and two verifiers in each of the first two, a reviewer and a verifier in the third, the fourth and the fifth, and as the sixth a targeted verification of the fifth's repairs; 18 findings in the first, all confirmed; 15 confirmed and one rejected in the second; 5 confirmed in the third; 6 confirmed and one rejected in the fourth; 6 confirmed and one rejected in the fifth; 4 in the sixth, N1..N4, of which N4 is this table; until the sixth review this row said 138/138, "after the fourth"), with keys made at run time and a local notary mock named as such: two agents, successive heads, a head that skips, an older head and one that does not continue the last (409), equivocation at the same position and through `previous` caught and returned, one proof kept per agent and policy, the named refusals of a request (form, the ledger's content, signature, key, identity, session, integrity, time), the rate limits, checkpoints signed by the witness with inclusion and consistency proofs, a restart on the same state, a leaf line cut at the tail by a crash, any chain but 28001 refused before the key, receipts checked without the witness and as anchors (backdating caught with the anchor and not without it), the command line, the gateway's door with and without `AERE_AGENTS_WITNESS_PORT` (in the development repository; the gateway is not part of this copy, where those rows are information), the checkpoint `VALID` for the AIP-23 reference verifier (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF`; without it those rows are skipped by name and the exit code is 2); and a row for each finding (`9.R<n>`): a pinned witness and the receipt of a witness the agent runs itself, the full list of heads (`--witness-url`), the sharded log and the hourly cap, an equivocation on the "already seen" path, `--chain 2800x`, `submit` with nothing new, the vocabulary of the checkpoint kind, the cap on kept proofs, the paginated `GET .../heads`, a replay of the agent's public head, the limiters (IPv6 /64, key cap and cleanup) and the door's refusal of a browser `Origin`, short and failed writes, a damaged state refused at start, error codes instead of messages; and a row for each finding of the second review (`10.R2-<nn>`, with `10.P2-<nn>` the controls of the guards its repairs added): the list of heads signed by the witness (a hostile proxy that drops a head, one that changes only the unsigned fields, an impostor, an old page replayed), kept proofs tied to the shard of the head they contradict (a stranger who fills the cap no longer keeps out another agent's proof), the limiter at its key cap, a list with malformed elements, plain anchors and an empty anchors file under a pinned witness, the incremental Merkle tree against `merkleTree` and the heap of a state with one checkpoint per head, the rotation that waits for a notarization, a shard born whole and one repaired, the route to a frozen shard, the lock after a reboot, the exit codes of `receipt` and `verify-receipt`, the log budget read before the agent quota, `Retry-After` through the door, and the "root" half of the opening guard. Run on a copy with the files of before the first review and its probe, 22 of its 23 rows failed (the 23rd, `9.P11`, is the control of a guard the repair added, which the old code passed for another reason); run on a copy with the files of before the second review (cf56bcda6) and this probe, 21 of the 24 new rows fail, each on its scenario, and the other 3 (`10.R2-15` twice, `10.P2-13`) pass there too: the behaviour was already right, what was missing was a test that could turn red; and a row for each finding of the third review (`11.R3-<nn>`, with `11.P3-<nn>` the controls of its new guards): the rest of a shard removal interrupted by a stop (in any order, and a rest of the form before, left in place), the one proof of a session that lives longest, flags given without a value, the receipt of the last head the witness holds under `--witness-url` (and a pending one: exit 2), and the exit codes of `receipt` and `submit` on answers that are not the state of a head. Run on a copy with the files of c34b34f1b and this probe, 7 of the 8 new rows fail, each on its scenario, and the 122 rows of before pass; the 8th, `11.P3-04b`, gives the check of the list against the ledger a row of its own, which the receipt of the last head (R3-04) can no longer hide: it passes there too; and a row for each finding of the fourth review (`12.R4-<nn>`, `12.P4-<nn>`), on the rule of `--witness-url`: a receipt notarized late taken from the address (not measured, not FAILED), a proxy that breaks the answer for one held head (not measured, no exception), a receipt for EVERY held head (an intermediate one too), a held head whose signed predecessor is not in the ledger (FAILED), `submit` on a 200 or 202 that is not the state of the head sent, flags written `--flag=value`, mistyped or given twiceLine truncated
| `node proba-martor-agenti.mjs --testnet` | 75/75 on the public testnet 28001, measured 2026-10-19 at 05:35 UTC with the version BEFORE the adversarial review (the 70 offline rows of that version plus 5): a fresh test key funded from the faucet, a checkpoint notarized on AereNotary (block 6,828,096), the receipt `VALID` for the AIP-23 reference verifier with the witness's signature and the post-quantum finality `PASSED` (51 s after the notarization), `verify --anchors receipt.json` on the live chain: the honest ledger 0, the backdated one 1. Evidence in `dovezi-martor-agenti-28001/` (no private key). **The versions after the first and the second review were not run on the testnet** (not measured: the faucet allows one claim per 24 h, and it was cooling down); their testnet rows also pin the witness (`--witness`), with the receipt that pinning now requires. Without a funded key and a faucet that answers, the testnet rows are skipped by name (exit 2) |
| `node control-negativ-martor-agenti.mjs` | 131/131 plantations red on their row and 3/3 neutral ones green (2026-10-19, after the sixth review; 1,102 s with 12 plantations at a time, the default; after the fourth review, with 112 plantations, ~475 s with 12 and ~747 s with 4, `AERE_CONTROL_PARALEL=4`; the B2 runner gives this test 1650 s since the sixth review, 1.5 x the measurement on an idle laptop, after the 1200 s of before stopped a green control at 1,212 s inside the suite while another workload held the processor (the arithmetic is in `probele-b2.sh`); until the sixth review this row said 112/112 "after the fourth", and the fifth's 123 plantations and 3 neutral ones were not written here): every one of the 99 guard markers (`PAZA-MARTOR`) of the witness, the service and, since the second review, the command line (`agent-cli.mjs`) has a plantation that removes it, and a coverage gate counts a marker without one as a failure of the control (with its own check: one plantation taken out, the gate names its marker); the guards the repairs added (the per-agent quota after "already seen", the "already seen" exit after the predecessor check, the write to the last byte and the cut-back, the paging, the /64 key and the key cleanup, the error codes, the command line's pinned witnesses, `--chain` and an unanswering `--witness-url`, the vocabulary in `proof-kinds/`, the door's `Origin` refusal) are planted too. Each removal is made in a copy, and the named row must fail; a pattern not found once, or a test that stops before its summary, counts as a failure of the control. The guards of the second review are planted too (the signed page: its form, integrity, signature, age and count, and reading it instead of the unsigned fields; the list signed by another witness than the pinned one; proofs tied to the shard of the head they contradict and the cap derived from the shards; the limiter dropping its oldest key; a malformed list; plain anchors and no receipt under a pinned witness; the rotation and the opening that keep an unnotarized shard; the shard born whole and the link repaired; the route to a kept shard; the lock across a reboot and a reused process id; the exit codes; the budget read before the quota; `Retry-After` through the door), and the opening guard is split into its size and its root, each with its row. So are those of the third (the rename before a shard is deleted and the removal of a rest at the opening; the newer proof taking the place of the older; a flag without a value, in both command lines; the receipt of the last head under `--witness-url`; the exit codes of `receipt` and `submit`), and those of the fourth (every held head with its receipt, the receipt of a head required, its id read without an exception, a receipt taken from the address judged as testimony both ways, `submit` on the main path, unknown and repeated flags in both command lines, the choice between two proofs at the opening, and the two halves of the rest of a removal, each with its row). Those of the fifth review are planted too (the order of the classes in the verdict, an early exit on the way, the class of each receipt both ways, the old copy, the types, the wait on a 429), with three NEUTRAL plantations that reverse the order in which the evidence comes and require the whole probe to stay green; and those of the sixth (a receipt without `--rpc` as a not-measured piece, planted both ways: the early exit of before and the guard removed; `receipt` writing only a verified receipt of the head asked, with its id, its ledger and its pinned witness each planted; the types on the "nothing new" path of `submit`). After the first review the control planted 64 guards over 45 markers and did not look at `agent-cli.mjs`; until the first review it planted 24, which covered 20 of the 34 markers of then |
| `node control-negativ-martor-agenti.mjs` | 131/131 plantations red on their row and 3/3 neutral ones green (2026-10-19, after the sixth review; 1,102 s with 12 plantations at a time, the default; after the fourth review, with 112 plantations, ~475 s with 12 and ~747 s with 4, `AERE_CONTROL_PARALEL=4`; the B2 runner gives this test 1650 s since the sixth review, 1.5 x the measurement on an idle laptop, after the 1200 s of before stopped a green control at 1,212 s inside the suite while another workload held the processor (the arithmetic is in `probele-b2.sh`); until the sixth review this row said 112/112 "after the fourth", and the fifth's 123 plantations and 3 neutral ones were not written here): every one of the 99 guard markers (`PAZA-MARTOR`) of the witness, the service and, since the second review, the command line (`agent-cli.mjs`) has a plantation that removes it, and a coverage gate counts a marker without one as a failure of the control (with its own check: one plantation taken out, the gate names its marker); the guards the repairs added (the per-agent quota after "already seen", the "already seen" exit after the predecessor check, the write to the last byte and the cut-back, the paging, the /64 key and the key cleanup, the error codes, the command line's pinned witnesses, `--chain` and an unanswering `--witness-url`, the vocabulary in `proof-kinds/`, the door's `Origin` refusal) are planted too. Each removal is made in a copy, and the named row must fail; a pattern not found once, or a test that stops before its summary on its own (not stopped at its named row, below), counts as a failure of the control. The guards of the second review are planted too (the signed page: its form, integrity, signature, age and count, and reading it instead of the unsigned fields; the list signed by another witness than the pinned one; proofs tied to the shard of the head they contradict and the cap derived from the shards; the limiter dropping its oldest key; a malformed list; plain anchors and no receipt under a pinned witness; the rotation and the opening that keep an unnotarized shard; the shard born whole and the link repaired; the route to a kept shard; the lock across a reboot and a reused process id; the exit codes; the budget read before the quota; `Retry-After` through the door), and the opening guard is split into its size and its root, each with its row. So are those of the third (the rename before a shard is deleted and the removal of a rest at the opening; the newer proof taking the place of the older; a flag without a value, in both command lines; the receipt of the last head under `--witness-url`; the exit codes of `receipt` and `submit`), and those of the fourth (every held head with its receipt, the receipt of a head required, its id read without an exception, a receipt taken from the address judged as testimony both ways, `submit` on the main path, unknown and repeated flags in both command lines, the choice between two proofs at the opening, and the two halves of the rest of a removal, each with its row). Those of the fifth review are planted too (the order of the classes in the verdict, an early exit on the way, the class of each receipt both ways, the old copy, the types, the wait on a 429), with three NEUTRAL plantations that reverse the order in which the evidence comes and require the whole probe to stay green; and those of the sixth (a receipt without `--rpc` as a not-measured piece, planted both ways: the early exit of before and the guard removed; `receipt` writing only a verified receipt of the head asked, with its id, its ledger and its pinned witness each planted; the types on the "nothing new" path of `submit`). After the first review the control planted 64 guards over 45 markers and did not look at `agent-cli.mjs`; until the first review it planted 24, which covered 20 of the 34 markers of then. Since 2026-11-08 the probe of a plantation is stopped as soon as its named row has been printed, whole, as failed: the probe prints each row as it judges it, so the rest of the run cannot change that verdict. The witness, the three neutral plantations and any plantation whose row stays green still run to the summary, and `AERE_CONTROL_RULARE_INTREAGA=1` brings back the old form. Measured on an idle laptop in the same hour: 705 s with the stop (131 of the 134 jobs stopped at their row), 2,029 s without it, with the same verdict on every row. `control-negativ-martor-agenti-oprire-dovada.sh` shows the stop on two real plantations, its negative control (`AERE_CONTROL_TINTA_FALSA=1` asks each plantation for a row that does not exist: nothing stops, and both come out as a fallen control) and the old form (`AERE_CONTROL_DOAR` runs only the named plantations) |
| `bash ../../cloud-gateway/proba-desfasoara-martor-agenti.sh` (development repository) | 12/12 (2026-10-19): the rollback functions and the laboratory copy of the deployer, extracted from its host script and run on the laptop with `systemctl` replaced: a reinstall that fails before step 5 leaves the live service and its unit untouched, one that fails after it puts the old unit back and restarts the service, a first install that fails is removed, the laboratory is beside the state (not under `/root`) and removed on the way back, a laboratory copy of a real state opens with the same leaves; and as negative control the rollback of before the review (it stopped the live service and deleted its unit) and five plantations, each red on its scenario |
The data format is version 2 (2026-09-29). Code comments, test names and most internal names are in Romanian; messages, data and