identity: the SD-JWT form of an AERE hybrid identity is judged on its ML-DSA-65 half by default, the Ed25519 half only on explicit request, and every verdict says postQuantum (rule sdjwt.hybrid-half); pq-pki: the signature algorithm a certificate or a revocation list declares must be its issuer key's (ALG_KEY, CRL_ALG_KEY); agents: an equivocation proof requires the agent's ML-DSA-65 key; pq-gateway: the status names the path to the backend and hybrid-only refuses a plain-HTTP backend; conformance 241 rules, 631 vectors
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@@ -48,12 +48,13 @@ A Node TLS server loads the key in process, without ever writing it in clear: `t
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- **Revocation**, for each issuer in the chain: among that issuer's lists that verify under its key and are not dated in the future, **the one with the newest `thisUpdate` is used** (ties broken by the larger `crlNumber`); the order of the input does not matter. That list must be current (`CRL_STALE` after `nextUpdate`), and a listed serial is `REVOKED`. `requireCrl` makes a missing list `CRL_MISSING`. A list whose signature does not verify is `CRL_SIGNATURE`.
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- **CRL extensions**: `authorityKeyIdentifier` and `crlNumber` are understood; `issuingDistributionPoint` and `deltaCRLIndicator` are refused however they are marked, and so is any other critical extension of the list or of an entry (`certificateIssuer` of an indirect list, for instance): verdict `CRL_EXT`, naming the extension. Non-critical unknown extensions (a `reasonCode` on an entry, for instance) are ignored.
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- **End entity**: not a CA, `digitalSignature`, the extended key usage of the purpose, and the host name or IPv4 address in the subject alternative name.
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- **The declared algorithm is the issuer key's** (since 2026-10-19; AIP-25, finding C3): the signature algorithm a certificate declares must be the algorithm of its issuer's public key, and a trusted root's must be that of its own key (verdict `ALG_KEY`); a revocation list that verifies under its issuer's key but declares another algorithm is `CRL_ALG_KEY` (RFC 5280 Sections 4.1.2.3 and 5.1.2.2; RFC 9881). Until then a certificate declaring `id-ml-dsa-87`, signed with an ML-DSA-44 key, passed: the signature was verified with whatever key the issuer has, so a policy that reads the declared algorithm was misled. OpenSSL 3.5 refuses the same cases (`unable to get local issuer certificate`, `CRL signature failure`), measured in `test/proba.mjs`.
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Every refusal carries a code: `SIGNATURE`, `UNTRUSTED`, `ROOT`, `EXPIRED`, `NOT_YET_VALID`, `NOT_CA`, `KEY_USAGE`, `PATH_LEN`, `EKU`, `SPKI`, `REVOKED`, `CRL_MISSING`, `CRL_SIGNATURE`, `CRL_STALE`, `CRL_EXT`, `LEAF_IS_CA`, `HOSTNAME`, `CRITICAL_EXT`, `ALG`, `ALG_MISMATCH`, `ALG_PARAMS`, `VERSION`, `EXT_DUP`, `DER`. The DER parser is strict: no indefinite lengths, no non-minimal lengths, no trailing bytes, no non-canonical integers or object identifiers; object identifiers with a multi-byte first subidentifier (`2.999` is `06 02 88 37`) encode and decode as OpenSSL does.
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Every refusal carries a code: `SIGNATURE`, `UNTRUSTED`, `ROOT`, `EXPIRED`, `NOT_YET_VALID`, `NOT_CA`, `KEY_USAGE`, `PATH_LEN`, `EKU`, `SPKI`, `REVOKED`, `CRL_MISSING`, `CRL_SIGNATURE`, `CRL_STALE`, `CRL_EXT`, `CRL_ALG_KEY`, `ALG_KEY`, `LEAF_IS_CA`, `HOSTNAME`, `CRITICAL_EXT`, `ALG`, `ALG_MISMATCH`, `ALG_PARAMS`, `VERSION`, `EXT_DUP`, `DER`. The DER parser is strict: no indefinite lengths, no non-minimal lengths, no trailing bytes, no non-canonical integers or object identifiers; object identifiers with a multi-byte first subidentifier (`2.999` is `06 02 88 37`) encode and decode as OpenSSL does.
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## How it is proven
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`node test/proba.mjs` (27 probes, about 25 s) compares every verdict with a foreign implementation, the OpenSSL 3.5 command line in `-x509_strict` mode: the valid chain, revocation, the newest of several lists (both orders), lists made by `openssl ca -gencrl` (plain, with a revoked entry and a reason code, with a critical issuing distribution point, with an unknown critical extension), a delta list (OpenSSL refuses it only with `-extended_crl`), a changed byte, another root, expiry and not-yet-valid, a path-length violation, a non-CA issuer (a chain made by OpenSSL), host and IP names, purpose on the leaf and on authorities (`unsuitable certificate purpose` at depth 1), a renewed root (both anchors in one `CAfile`), malformed public keys (`decode error`), an unknown critical extension (made by OpenSSL), object identifier bytes (`asn1parse -genstr`). It also reads and verifies certificates made by OpenSSL, runs the real TLS handshake, measures the cost of a passphrase guess, exercises the passphrase policy, and drives the command line end to end. `node test/control-negativ.mjs` (about 3 minutes, four plantings in parallel) breaks each check in a copy of the code (22 plantings, at least one per finding of the review) and requires the named probe to turn red, the original to stay byte-identical, and the untouched suite to stay green; the number of probes is taken from the untouched run, not written down.
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`node test/proba.mjs` (28 probes, about 25 s) compares every verdict with a foreign implementation, the OpenSSL 3.5 command line in `-x509_strict` mode: the valid chain, revocation, the newest of several lists (both orders), lists made by `openssl ca -gencrl` (plain, with a revoked entry and a reason code, with a critical issuing distribution point, with an unknown critical extension), a delta list (OpenSSL refuses it only with `-extended_crl`), a changed byte, another root, expiry and not-yet-valid, a path-length violation, a non-CA issuer (a chain made by OpenSSL), host and IP names, purpose on the leaf and on authorities (`unsuitable certificate purpose` at depth 1), a renewed root (both anchors in one `CAfile`), malformed public keys (`decode error`), an unknown critical extension (made by OpenSSL), object identifier bytes (`asn1parse -genstr`). It also reads and verifies certificates made by OpenSSL, runs the real TLS handshake, measures the cost of a passphrase guess, exercises the passphrase policy, and drives the command line end to end. `node test/control-negativ.mjs` (about 3 minutes, four plantings in parallel) breaks each check in a copy of the code (26 plantings, at least one per finding of the review and four for C3) and requires the named probe to turn red, the original to stay byte-identical, and the untouched suite to stay green; the number of probes is taken from the untouched run, not written down.
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## What it does not do, and where it differs from OpenSSL
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