identity: the SD-JWT form of an AERE hybrid identity is judged on its ML-DSA-65 half by default, the Ed25519 half only on explicit request, and every verdict says postQuantum (rule sdjwt.hybrid-half); pq-pki: the signature algorithm a certificate or a revocation list declares must be its issuer key's (ALG_KEY, CRL_ALG_KEY); agents: an equivocation proof requires the agent's ML-DSA-65 key; pq-gateway: the status names the path to the backend and hybrid-only refuses a plain-HTTP backend; conformance 241 rules, 631 vectors

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Aere Network committed 2026-10-19 05:19:21 +03:00
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@@ -24,8 +24,11 @@ It does **not**:
`classical`. Clients must support ML-DSA signatures (OpenSSL 3.5 does; many browsers do not yet).
- **Protect the hop from the gateway to your upstream** when `UPSTREAM` is `http://`. That hop is plain HTTP. Keep it
on a trusted network (same host, same private network, loopback) or use an `https://` upstream. When the upstream is
`https://`, the gateway also prefers X25519MLKEM768 on that hop, but it makes no claim about which group was used
there.
`https://`, the gateway prefers X25519MLKEM768 on that hop and accepts TLS 1.2 (`AERE_PQGW_UPSTREAM_MODE=hybrid-preferred`,
the default), or offers only X25519MLKEM768 over TLS 1.3 (`hybrid-only`: an upstream without it gets `502`). Since
2026-10-19 (AIP-25, finding C8) the status endpoint reports that hop: its mode, minimum version, the groups offered,
whether a hybrid exchange is guaranteed, and the handshakes counted by protocol and group; until then it reported only
the scheme.
- **Speak HTTP/2 or HTTP/3.** The gateway advertises only `http/1.1` over ALPN. A client that offers `h2` and
`http/1.1` gets `http/1.1`.
- **Report the negotiated group per connection in `hybrid-preferred` mode.** The Node.js TLS server API does not expose
@@ -101,6 +104,7 @@ Environment variables take precedence over the optional JSON file named by `AERE
| `AERE_PQGW_KEY` | `key` | required | PEM private key; must match the leaf certificate or the gateway refuses to start |
| `AERE_PQGW_UPSTREAM` | `upstream` | required | `http://host:port[/base]` or `https://host:port[/base]`; no credentials, query or fragment |
| `AERE_PQGW_UPSTREAM_CA` | `upstreamCa` | system CAs | PEM CA bundle for an `https://` upstream with a private CA |
| `AERE_PQGW_UPSTREAM_MODE` | `upstreamMode` | `hybrid-preferred` | the hop to an `https://` upstream: `hybrid-preferred` (X25519MLKEM768 first, then X25519 and P-256; TLS 1.2 accepted) or `hybrid-only` (X25519MLKEM768 over TLS 1.3 only; refused with an `http://` upstream). Since 2026-10-19 |
| `AERE_PQGW_LISTEN` | `listen` | `:8443` | `host:port`, `[ipv6]:port`, or `:port` for all interfaces |
| `AERE_PQGW_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS` | `connectTimeoutMs` | `5000` | time to connect to the upstream (TCP, plus TLS for https) |
| `AERE_PQGW_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS` | `requestTimeoutMs` | `60000` | time for the upstream to start its response after the request was fully sent |
@@ -146,7 +150,14 @@ nothing secret: no private key and no file paths. It returns:
- `negotiatedGroupPerConnection`: states that the negotiated group is not reported per connection, and why
- `certificate`: SHA-256 fingerprint, subject and expiry of the served certificate; `authentication` (`post-quantum`,
`mixed`, `classical`) and `chain`, each served certificate with its public key and signature algorithm
- `upstream`: only the scheme and whether that hop is encrypted (not the address)
- `upstream` (never the address): `scheme` and `encrypted`; for `https` also, since 2026-10-19, `mode`, `minTlsVersion`,
`groupsOffered`, `groupPreference`, `guarantee` (`hybridKeyExchangeOnEveryConnection` true only with `UPSTREAM_MODE`
`hybrid-only`, with its `basis`), `handshakes` (each new TLS connection to the upstream counted as `<protocol> <group>`,
for example `TLSv1.3 X25519MLKEM768` or `TLSv1.3 X25519`), `postQuantumHandshakes`, `classicalHandshakes` and
`handshakeGroupBasis`: here the gateway is the client, so it reads its own handshakes, but Node names X25519 and P-256 and
names no hybrid group, so a TLS 1.3 handshake whose group it does not name is counted as X25519MLKEM768, the only other
group offered (the tests check this against the group read from the wire). For `http` the guarantee says the hop is not
encrypted at all.
- `runtime`: Node.js and OpenSSL versions
- `counters`: `connectionsAccepted`, `handshakesRefused` by reason (`no shared group`, `unsupported protocol`,
`no shared cipher`, `no shared signature algorithm` (a client that offers no ML-DSA signature algorithm