identity: the SD-JWT form of an AERE hybrid identity is judged on its ML-DSA-65 half by default, the Ed25519 half only on explicit request, and every verdict says postQuantum (rule sdjwt.hybrid-half); pq-pki: the signature algorithm a certificate or a revocation list declares must be its issuer key's (ALG_KEY, CRL_ALG_KEY); agents: an equivocation proof requires the agent's ML-DSA-65 key; pq-gateway: the status names the path to the backend and hybrid-only refuses a plain-HTTP backend; conformance 241 rules, 631 vectors
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@@ -42,9 +42,9 @@ verdict (`vectori/payment-receipt/company-p1-28001.valid.json`).
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## What is enrolled
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`REGULI.json` is derived from the code (`node deriva-reguli.mjs --verifica`): 240 rules of 15 verifiers, 21 artifact kinds (since
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2026-10-18: 239 when the Travel Rule and the compliance verifiers were enrolled, 240 with `identity.request` later that day; 213 rules of 13 verifiers and 17 kinds after the SD-JWT
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verifiers earlier that day; 181 rules of 11 verifiers, 15 kinds before). By level: 188 rules are reported at `integrity`, 49 at
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`REGULI.json` is derived from the code (`node deriva-reguli.mjs --verifica`): 241 rules of 15 verifiers, 21 artifact kinds (since
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2026-10-19: 241 with `sdjwt.hybrid-half`, AIP-25 finding C1; 2026-10-18: 239 when the Travel Rule and the compliance verifiers were enrolled, 240 with `identity.request` later that day; 213 rules of 13 verifiers and 17 kinds after the SD-JWT
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verifiers earlier that day; 181 rules of 11 verifiers, 15 kinds before). By level: 188 rules are reported at `integrity`, 50 at
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`authenticity`, 3 at `anchoring` (one of them, `envelope.finality`, is reported at `anchoring` or at `finality` by the place that refused).
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| artifact kind | judged by | rules |
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@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ verifiers earlier that day; 181 rules of 11 verifiers, 15 kinds before). By leve
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| `agent-ledger` (an agent's signed ledger under its policy) | `agents/agent-ledger.mjs` | 16: `agents.ledger-form`, `.policy`, `.other-policy`, `.session`, `.key`, `.identity`, `.anchor`, `.seq`, `.chain`, `.body`, `.signature`, `.hash`, `.time`, `.revocation`, `.approvals`, `.decision` |
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| `identity-presentation` (a credential shown by its holder or by the last delegate of a chain, judged with what the verifier brings: its audience, its nonce, its clock, the issuers it trusts, the status lists and the revocations it was handed) | `identity/identity.mjs` | 38: `identity.form`, `.issuer-id`, `.holder-id`, `.credential-signature`, `.issuer-trusted`, `.credential-window`, `.status-list`, `.credential-revoked`, `.sd-distinct`, `.disclosure-readable`, `.disclosure-signed`, `.disclosure-once`, `.disclosure-plain`, `.claim-name`, `.binding-credential`, `.binding-disclosures`, `.binding-delegations`, `.presenter`, `.presentation-signature`, `.audience`, `.nonce`, `.freshness`, `.chain-length`, `.delegation-form`, `.delegation-ids`, `.delegation-from`, `.delegation-parent`, `.delegation-signature`, `.delegation-scope`, `.delegation-window`, `.delegation-depth`, `.delegation-narrows`, `.delegation-credential`, `.delegation-claims`, `.delegation-audience`, `.delegation-revoked`, `.unreadable`, `.request` (since 2026-10-18: the presentation commits to the request the verifier received, OpenID4VP `transaction_data`) |
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| `device-bundle` (the chain of a device: the manufacturer's credential for the device key, a firmware release, the ownership transfers, the owner's authorization, the device's attestation and its AIP-23 envelope, judged with what the verifier brings: its clock, nonce and audience, the manufacturers it trusts, the recall lists, firmware policies and status records it read, its own reading of the notarized envelope) | `device-identity/device.mjs` | 47: `device.form`, `.manufacture-form`, `.manufacturer-id`, `.manufacture-holder`, `.manufacture-signature`, `.manufacturer-trusted`, `.manufacture-window`, `.manufacture-status-list`, `.manufacture-revoked`, `.device-key`, `.device-id`, `.firmware-form`, `.firmware-signer`, `.firmware-signature`, `.firmware-model`, `.firmware-retracted`, `.firmware-rollback`, `.firmware-software`, `.chain-length`, `.transfer-form`, `.transfer-device`, `.transfer-ids`, `.transfer-from`, `.transfer-prev`, `.transfer-signature`, `.transfer-time`, `.authorization-form`, `.authorization-device`, `.authorization-owner`, `.authorization-ownership`, `.authorization-signature`, `.authorization-window`, `.authorization-action`, `.status-retired`, `.status-suspended`, `.attestation-form`, `.attestation-key`, `.attestation-device`, `.attestation-signature`, `.audience`, `.nonce`, `.freshness`, `.attestation-firmware`, `.attestation-ownership`, `.witness-envelope`, `.witness-time`, `.unreadable` |
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| `sdjwt-presentation` (an SD-JWT of IETF RFC 9901, as issued or with its Key Binding JWT, judged with what the verifier brings: the issuer key it chose, a public JWK, never one taken from the token; its clock; its audience and nonce; the issuer and the explicit type it expects; whether it requires key binding and `exp`) | `identity/sdjwt.mjs` (enrolled 2026-10-18) | 23: `sdjwt.form`, `.alg`, `.typ`, `.crit`, `.key`, `.signature`, `.issuer`, `.sd-alg`, `.disclosure-form`, `.disclosure-twice`, `.digest-twice`, `.disclosure-name`, `.claim-conflict`, `.unreferenced`, `.time`, `.kb-context`, `.kb-required`, `.kb-cnf`, `.kb-claims`, `.kb-audience`, `.kb-nonce`, `.kb-freshness`, `.kb-sd-hash` |
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| `sdjwt-vc-presentation` (an SD-JWT VC of `draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc`, judged as the SD-JWT above plus the profile: the credential type the verifier expects, and the Token Status List it fetched for the `status` the credential names) | `identity/sdjwt-vc.mjs` (enrolled 2026-10-18) | 9 of its own, on top of the 23 of `sdjwt`: `sdjwtvc.vct-expected`, `.vct`, `.vct-mismatch`, `.disclosed-protected`, `.form`, `.status-list`, `.status-index`, `.status-revoked`, `.status-unjudged` |
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| `sdjwt-presentation` (an SD-JWT of IETF RFC 9901, as issued or with its Key Binding JWT, judged with what the verifier brings: the issuer key it chose, a public JWK, never one taken from the token; its clock; its audience and nonce; the issuer and the explicit type it expects; whether it requires key binding and `exp`) | `identity/sdjwt.mjs` (enrolled 2026-10-18) | 24: `sdjwt.form`, `.alg`, `.typ`, `.crit`, `.key`, `.hybrid-half` (since 2026-10-19), `.signature`, `.issuer`, `.sd-alg`, `.disclosure-form`, `.disclosure-twice`, `.digest-twice`, `.disclosure-name`, `.claim-conflict`, `.unreferenced`, `.time`, `.kb-context`, `.kb-required`, `.kb-cnf`, `.kb-claims`, `.kb-audience`, `.kb-nonce`, `.kb-freshness`, `.kb-sd-hash` |
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| `sdjwt-vc-presentation` (an SD-JWT VC of `draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc`, judged as the SD-JWT above plus the profile: the credential type the verifier expects, and the Token Status List it fetched for the `status` the credential names) | `identity/sdjwt-vc.mjs` (enrolled 2026-10-18) | 9 of its own, on top of the 24 of `sdjwt`: `sdjwtvc.vct-expected`, `.vct`, `.vct-mismatch`, `.disclosed-protected`, `.form`, `.status-list`, `.status-index`, `.status-revoked`, `.status-unjudged` |
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| `travel-rule-binding`, `travel-rule-message`, `travel-rule-receipt` (the Travel Rule between VASPs: the beneficiary's KEM key binding with its VASP presentation, judged by the originator with its id, its nonce, its clock, the registries it trusts and their status lists; the sealed IVMS101 message, judged by the beneficiary with its id, its own KEM key pair, which decrypts, its clock, its registries and lists and its replay store; the signed receipt, judged by the originator with the message it sent and the beneficiary it accepted) | `identity/travel-rule.mjs` (enrolled 2026-10-18) | 23: `travelrule.binding-form`, `.binding-id`, `.binding-signature`, `.binding-window`, `.vasp-presentation`, `.vasp-status`, `.vasp-identity`, `.vasp-claim`, `.message-form`, `.message-id`, `.message-signature`, `.message-recipient`, `.message-kem-keys`, `.message-freshness`, `.replay-store`, `.replay`, `.kem-alg`, `.kem-open`, `.ciphertext`, `.receipt-form`, `.receipt-from`, `.receipt-signature`, `.receipt-message` |
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| `compliance-presentation` (a presentation of a credential judged against the verifier's compliance policy: the issuers it believes and the claims it requires, with the verifier's audience, nonce and clock, all required, and the status lists and revocations it holds) | `identity/conformitate.mjs` (enrolled 2026-10-18) | 3: `compliance.presentation`, `.status`, `.rule` |
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@@ -116,9 +116,9 @@ issuer and for its status at once.
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## The vectors
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`vectori/` holds 626 vectors (617 offline, 9 that read testnet 28001; 22 MB, since every device, identity and Travel Rule vector carries its ML-DSA-65 keys and signatures), listed with their digests in `vectori/INDEX.json`:
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`vectori/` holds 631 vectors (622 offline, 9 that read testnet 28001; 22 MB, since every device, identity and Travel Rule vector carries its ML-DSA-65 keys and signatures), listed with their digests in `vectori/INDEX.json`:
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envelope 67, payment-risk 11, payment-receipt 10, market-timeline 26, dataset 22, ai-trust-bundle 24, audit-log 19, audit-inclusion
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10, audit-consistency 4, agent-ledger 18, identity-presentation 69, device-bundle 194, sdjwt-presentation 54, sdjwt-vc-presentation 32, travel-rule-binding 19, travel-rule-message 26, travel-rule-receipt 9, compliance-presentation 12. By expected verdict: 87 `VALID`, 70 `PARTIAL`, 469 `INVALID`. None is typed by hand
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10, audit-consistency 4, agent-ledger 18, identity-presentation 69, device-bundle 194, sdjwt-presentation 59, sdjwt-vc-presentation 32, travel-rule-binding 19, travel-rule-message 26, travel-rule-receipt 9, compliance-presentation 12. By expected verdict: 89 `VALID`, 70 `PARTIAL`, 472 `INVALID`. None is typed by hand
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(`node genereaza-vectori.mjs --verifica` regenerates them and compares byte for byte):
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- the 17 AIP-23 kinds come from their producers on fixed inputs (the same envelopes as the published AIP-23 kind vectors; `secret-access`, the audit entry of the secrets service, since 2026-10-18); the audit
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@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ not JSON at all: a file that is not an envelope is refused at the form level, by
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the vectors show (`{ log, head?, signer? }` for an audit log, `{ ledger, policy }` for an agent's ledger, `{ bundle }` for a trust
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chain, `{ presentation, now, audience?, nonce?, trustedIssuers?, statusLists?, revocations?, maxAgeS? }` for a presentation of a
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credential, `{ bundle, now, nonce?, audience?, trustedManufacturers?, statusLists?, firmwarePolicies?, statusRecords?,
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softwareAttestation?, anchors?, maxAgeS? }` for a device bundle, `{ sdJwt, issuerKey, issuerAlg?, now, audience?, nonce?,
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softwareAttestation?, anchors?, maxAgeS? }` for a device bundle, `{ sdJwt, issuerKey, issuerAlg?, classicalHalf?, now, audience?, nonce?,
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expectedIssuer?, expectedTyp?, requireKeyBinding?, requireExp?, maxAgeS? }` for an SD-JWT presentation and the same plus
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`{ expectedVct, statusListJwt?, statusListKey?, statusListAlg?, requireStatus? }` for an SD-JWT VC, `{ binding, presentation,
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registries, originatorId, nonce, now, statusLists?, maxAgeS? }` for a Travel Rule binding (`originatorId` and `nonce` are the
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@@ -225,6 +225,29 @@ not implementations of this suite's contract).
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## How the suite itself is checked
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Measured on 2026-10-19 (UTC), after the SD-JWT verifier gained the rule `hybrid-half` (AIP-25 finding C1, D-535: with the keys of an
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AERE hybrid identity the ML-DSA-65 half is judged by default and the Ed25519 half only when the verifier asks for it, `classicalHalf`;
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until then the Ed25519 half was the default, so a token signed with it alone verified against the whole hybrid identity). Five vectors
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were derived from the existing fresh source `sdjwt` (no fresh source was remade; the issuer's two public JWKs give its AERE public keys,
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since the SPKI of a key is canonical): two VALID (the ML-DSA-65 credential against the hybrid keys; the Ed25519 credential with
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`classicalHalf`) and three INVALID by `sdjwt.hybrid-half` (the Ed25519 credential with nothing asked; `issuerAlg` EdDSA named without
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asking; `classicalHalf` removed). The other SD-JWT and SD-JWT VC vectors changed only in `exercises`, which now lists
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`sdjwt.hybrid-half`, and one title; their tokens judged with a plain Ed25519 JWK stay VALID (there is no post-quantum half to lose),
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and the verdict of the verifier says `postQuantum: false` for them. On Node.js 24.14.1, offline, with the served reference verifier:
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`node proba-conformance.mjs` gives 12 rows green, 0 red, 1 not measured (the 9 vectors that read testnet 28001). 241 rules of 15
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verifiers, 631 vectors (`LA ZI`), every rule has a vector (241 of 241), every INVALID vector (472) is its base with one operation
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(306) or one declared producer change (166), the published verifiers pass 622 of 622 offline vectors, the independent Python
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implementation passes the 65 it claims and reports the other 566 not covered, 101,947 malformed inputs each got a verdict.
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`node proba-conformance.mjs --control-negativ --doar sdjwt` (offline) gives 39 rows green, 0 red, 2 not measured (the rules
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and device halves left out by `--doar`): 33 of 33 SD-JWT and SD-JWT VC rules proven load-bearing, `sdjwt.hybrid-half` among them
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(planted out, exactly its 3 vectors fail). Not run after the change: `--online`, and `--control-negativ` over the rules of the other verifiers.
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Run online later the same night (01:54-02:13 UTC), with the reference verifier as served at aere.network/tools (fetched and installed
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in an empty folder) and testnet 28001 read: `node proba-conformance.mjs --online` gives 12 rows green, 0 red; the published verifiers
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pass 631 of 631 vectors, the independent Python implementation passes the 65 it claims and reports the other 566 not covered, 101,947
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malformed inputs and 183 malformed envelope files each got a verdict. `node proba-conformance.mjs --control-negativ --online` gives 323
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rows green, 0 red: 241 of 241 rules proven load-bearing through their vectors; the other 82 rows are the conditions of the device
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verifier and the controls of the instruments.
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Measured on 2026-10-18 (UTC), in the evening, after the identity verifier gained the rule `request` (a presentation committed to the
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request the verifier received; the adversarial review of the secrets service) and its four vectors were derived from a new fresh
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source (`identityRequest`; every other fresh source kept, so no other vector's input moved; the 65 earlier identity vectors changed
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