identity: the SD-JWT form of an AERE hybrid identity is judged on its ML-DSA-65 half by default, the Ed25519 half only on explicit request, and every verdict says postQuantum (rule sdjwt.hybrid-half); pq-pki: the signature algorithm a certificate or a revocation list declares must be its issuer key's (ALG_KEY, CRL_ALG_KEY); agents: an equivocation proof requires the agent's ML-DSA-65 key; pq-gateway: the status names the path to the backend and hybrid-only refuses a plain-HTTP backend; conformance 241 rules, 631 vectors

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@@ -42,9 +42,9 @@ verdict (`vectori/payment-receipt/company-p1-28001.valid.json`).
## What is enrolled
`REGULI.json` is derived from the code (`node deriva-reguli.mjs --verifica`): 240 rules of 15 verifiers, 21 artifact kinds (since
2026-10-18: 239 when the Travel Rule and the compliance verifiers were enrolled, 240 with `identity.request` later that day; 213 rules of 13 verifiers and 17 kinds after the SD-JWT
verifiers earlier that day; 181 rules of 11 verifiers, 15 kinds before). By level: 188 rules are reported at `integrity`, 49 at
`REGULI.json` is derived from the code (`node deriva-reguli.mjs --verifica`): 241 rules of 15 verifiers, 21 artifact kinds (since
2026-10-19: 241 with `sdjwt.hybrid-half`, AIP-25 finding C1; 2026-10-18: 239 when the Travel Rule and the compliance verifiers were enrolled, 240 with `identity.request` later that day; 213 rules of 13 verifiers and 17 kinds after the SD-JWT
verifiers earlier that day; 181 rules of 11 verifiers, 15 kinds before). By level: 188 rules are reported at `integrity`, 50 at
`authenticity`, 3 at `anchoring` (one of them, `envelope.finality`, is reported at `anchoring` or at `finality` by the place that refused).
| artifact kind | judged by | rules |
@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ verifiers earlier that day; 181 rules of 11 verifiers, 15 kinds before). By leve
| `agent-ledger` (an agent's signed ledger under its policy) | `agents/agent-ledger.mjs` | 16: `agents.ledger-form`, `.policy`, `.other-policy`, `.session`, `.key`, `.identity`, `.anchor`, `.seq`, `.chain`, `.body`, `.signature`, `.hash`, `.time`, `.revocation`, `.approvals`, `.decision` |
| `identity-presentation` (a credential shown by its holder or by the last delegate of a chain, judged with what the verifier brings: its audience, its nonce, its clock, the issuers it trusts, the status lists and the revocations it was handed) | `identity/identity.mjs` | 38: `identity.form`, `.issuer-id`, `.holder-id`, `.credential-signature`, `.issuer-trusted`, `.credential-window`, `.status-list`, `.credential-revoked`, `.sd-distinct`, `.disclosure-readable`, `.disclosure-signed`, `.disclosure-once`, `.disclosure-plain`, `.claim-name`, `.binding-credential`, `.binding-disclosures`, `.binding-delegations`, `.presenter`, `.presentation-signature`, `.audience`, `.nonce`, `.freshness`, `.chain-length`, `.delegation-form`, `.delegation-ids`, `.delegation-from`, `.delegation-parent`, `.delegation-signature`, `.delegation-scope`, `.delegation-window`, `.delegation-depth`, `.delegation-narrows`, `.delegation-credential`, `.delegation-claims`, `.delegation-audience`, `.delegation-revoked`, `.unreadable`, `.request` (since 2026-10-18: the presentation commits to the request the verifier received, OpenID4VP `transaction_data`) |
| `device-bundle` (the chain of a device: the manufacturer's credential for the device key, a firmware release, the ownership transfers, the owner's authorization, the device's attestation and its AIP-23 envelope, judged with what the verifier brings: its clock, nonce and audience, the manufacturers it trusts, the recall lists, firmware policies and status records it read, its own reading of the notarized envelope) | `device-identity/device.mjs` | 47: `device.form`, `.manufacture-form`, `.manufacturer-id`, `.manufacture-holder`, `.manufacture-signature`, `.manufacturer-trusted`, `.manufacture-window`, `.manufacture-status-list`, `.manufacture-revoked`, `.device-key`, `.device-id`, `.firmware-form`, `.firmware-signer`, `.firmware-signature`, `.firmware-model`, `.firmware-retracted`, `.firmware-rollback`, `.firmware-software`, `.chain-length`, `.transfer-form`, `.transfer-device`, `.transfer-ids`, `.transfer-from`, `.transfer-prev`, `.transfer-signature`, `.transfer-time`, `.authorization-form`, `.authorization-device`, `.authorization-owner`, `.authorization-ownership`, `.authorization-signature`, `.authorization-window`, `.authorization-action`, `.status-retired`, `.status-suspended`, `.attestation-form`, `.attestation-key`, `.attestation-device`, `.attestation-signature`, `.audience`, `.nonce`, `.freshness`, `.attestation-firmware`, `.attestation-ownership`, `.witness-envelope`, `.witness-time`, `.unreadable` |
| `sdjwt-presentation` (an SD-JWT of IETF RFC 9901, as issued or with its Key Binding JWT, judged with what the verifier brings: the issuer key it chose, a public JWK, never one taken from the token; its clock; its audience and nonce; the issuer and the explicit type it expects; whether it requires key binding and `exp`) | `identity/sdjwt.mjs` (enrolled 2026-10-18) | 23: `sdjwt.form`, `.alg`, `.typ`, `.crit`, `.key`, `.signature`, `.issuer`, `.sd-alg`, `.disclosure-form`, `.disclosure-twice`, `.digest-twice`, `.disclosure-name`, `.claim-conflict`, `.unreferenced`, `.time`, `.kb-context`, `.kb-required`, `.kb-cnf`, `.kb-claims`, `.kb-audience`, `.kb-nonce`, `.kb-freshness`, `.kb-sd-hash` |
| `sdjwt-vc-presentation` (an SD-JWT VC of `draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc`, judged as the SD-JWT above plus the profile: the credential type the verifier expects, and the Token Status List it fetched for the `status` the credential names) | `identity/sdjwt-vc.mjs` (enrolled 2026-10-18) | 9 of its own, on top of the 23 of `sdjwt`: `sdjwtvc.vct-expected`, `.vct`, `.vct-mismatch`, `.disclosed-protected`, `.form`, `.status-list`, `.status-index`, `.status-revoked`, `.status-unjudged` |
| `sdjwt-presentation` (an SD-JWT of IETF RFC 9901, as issued or with its Key Binding JWT, judged with what the verifier brings: the issuer key it chose, a public JWK, never one taken from the token; its clock; its audience and nonce; the issuer and the explicit type it expects; whether it requires key binding and `exp`) | `identity/sdjwt.mjs` (enrolled 2026-10-18) | 24: `sdjwt.form`, `.alg`, `.typ`, `.crit`, `.key`, `.hybrid-half` (since 2026-10-19), `.signature`, `.issuer`, `.sd-alg`, `.disclosure-form`, `.disclosure-twice`, `.digest-twice`, `.disclosure-name`, `.claim-conflict`, `.unreferenced`, `.time`, `.kb-context`, `.kb-required`, `.kb-cnf`, `.kb-claims`, `.kb-audience`, `.kb-nonce`, `.kb-freshness`, `.kb-sd-hash` |
| `sdjwt-vc-presentation` (an SD-JWT VC of `draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc`, judged as the SD-JWT above plus the profile: the credential type the verifier expects, and the Token Status List it fetched for the `status` the credential names) | `identity/sdjwt-vc.mjs` (enrolled 2026-10-18) | 9 of its own, on top of the 24 of `sdjwt`: `sdjwtvc.vct-expected`, `.vct`, `.vct-mismatch`, `.disclosed-protected`, `.form`, `.status-list`, `.status-index`, `.status-revoked`, `.status-unjudged` |
| `travel-rule-binding`, `travel-rule-message`, `travel-rule-receipt` (the Travel Rule between VASPs: the beneficiary's KEM key binding with its VASP presentation, judged by the originator with its id, its nonce, its clock, the registries it trusts and their status lists; the sealed IVMS101 message, judged by the beneficiary with its id, its own KEM key pair, which decrypts, its clock, its registries and lists and its replay store; the signed receipt, judged by the originator with the message it sent and the beneficiary it accepted) | `identity/travel-rule.mjs` (enrolled 2026-10-18) | 23: `travelrule.binding-form`, `.binding-id`, `.binding-signature`, `.binding-window`, `.vasp-presentation`, `.vasp-status`, `.vasp-identity`, `.vasp-claim`, `.message-form`, `.message-id`, `.message-signature`, `.message-recipient`, `.message-kem-keys`, `.message-freshness`, `.replay-store`, `.replay`, `.kem-alg`, `.kem-open`, `.ciphertext`, `.receipt-form`, `.receipt-from`, `.receipt-signature`, `.receipt-message` |
| `compliance-presentation` (a presentation of a credential judged against the verifier's compliance policy: the issuers it believes and the claims it requires, with the verifier's audience, nonce and clock, all required, and the status lists and revocations it holds) | `identity/conformitate.mjs` (enrolled 2026-10-18) | 3: `compliance.presentation`, `.status`, `.rule` |
@@ -116,9 +116,9 @@ issuer and for its status at once.
## The vectors
`vectori/` holds 626 vectors (617 offline, 9 that read testnet 28001; 22 MB, since every device, identity and Travel Rule vector carries its ML-DSA-65 keys and signatures), listed with their digests in `vectori/INDEX.json`:
`vectori/` holds 631 vectors (622 offline, 9 that read testnet 28001; 22 MB, since every device, identity and Travel Rule vector carries its ML-DSA-65 keys and signatures), listed with their digests in `vectori/INDEX.json`:
envelope 67, payment-risk 11, payment-receipt 10, market-timeline 26, dataset 22, ai-trust-bundle 24, audit-log 19, audit-inclusion
10, audit-consistency 4, agent-ledger 18, identity-presentation 69, device-bundle 194, sdjwt-presentation 54, sdjwt-vc-presentation 32, travel-rule-binding 19, travel-rule-message 26, travel-rule-receipt 9, compliance-presentation 12. By expected verdict: 87 `VALID`, 70 `PARTIAL`, 469 `INVALID`. None is typed by hand
10, audit-consistency 4, agent-ledger 18, identity-presentation 69, device-bundle 194, sdjwt-presentation 59, sdjwt-vc-presentation 32, travel-rule-binding 19, travel-rule-message 26, travel-rule-receipt 9, compliance-presentation 12. By expected verdict: 89 `VALID`, 70 `PARTIAL`, 472 `INVALID`. None is typed by hand
(`node genereaza-vectori.mjs --verifica` regenerates them and compares byte for byte):
- the 17 AIP-23 kinds come from their producers on fixed inputs (the same envelopes as the published AIP-23 kind vectors; `secret-access`, the audit entry of the secrets service, since 2026-10-18); the audit
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ not JSON at all: a file that is not an envelope is refused at the form level, by
the vectors show (`{ log, head?, signer? }` for an audit log, `{ ledger, policy }` for an agent's ledger, `{ bundle }` for a trust
chain, `{ presentation, now, audience?, nonce?, trustedIssuers?, statusLists?, revocations?, maxAgeS? }` for a presentation of a
credential, `{ bundle, now, nonce?, audience?, trustedManufacturers?, statusLists?, firmwarePolicies?, statusRecords?,
softwareAttestation?, anchors?, maxAgeS? }` for a device bundle, `{ sdJwt, issuerKey, issuerAlg?, now, audience?, nonce?,
softwareAttestation?, anchors?, maxAgeS? }` for a device bundle, `{ sdJwt, issuerKey, issuerAlg?, classicalHalf?, now, audience?, nonce?,
expectedIssuer?, expectedTyp?, requireKeyBinding?, requireExp?, maxAgeS? }` for an SD-JWT presentation and the same plus
`{ expectedVct, statusListJwt?, statusListKey?, statusListAlg?, requireStatus? }` for an SD-JWT VC, `{ binding, presentation,
registries, originatorId, nonce, now, statusLists?, maxAgeS? }` for a Travel Rule binding (`originatorId` and `nonce` are the
@@ -225,6 +225,29 @@ not implementations of this suite's contract).
## How the suite itself is checked
Measured on 2026-10-19 (UTC), after the SD-JWT verifier gained the rule `hybrid-half` (AIP-25 finding C1, D-535: with the keys of an
AERE hybrid identity the ML-DSA-65 half is judged by default and the Ed25519 half only when the verifier asks for it, `classicalHalf`;
until then the Ed25519 half was the default, so a token signed with it alone verified against the whole hybrid identity). Five vectors
were derived from the existing fresh source `sdjwt` (no fresh source was remade; the issuer's two public JWKs give its AERE public keys,
since the SPKI of a key is canonical): two VALID (the ML-DSA-65 credential against the hybrid keys; the Ed25519 credential with
`classicalHalf`) and three INVALID by `sdjwt.hybrid-half` (the Ed25519 credential with nothing asked; `issuerAlg` EdDSA named without
asking; `classicalHalf` removed). The other SD-JWT and SD-JWT VC vectors changed only in `exercises`, which now lists
`sdjwt.hybrid-half`, and one title; their tokens judged with a plain Ed25519 JWK stay VALID (there is no post-quantum half to lose),
and the verdict of the verifier says `postQuantum: false` for them. On Node.js 24.14.1, offline, with the served reference verifier:
`node proba-conformance.mjs` gives 12 rows green, 0 red, 1 not measured (the 9 vectors that read testnet 28001). 241 rules of 15
verifiers, 631 vectors (`LA ZI`), every rule has a vector (241 of 241), every INVALID vector (472) is its base with one operation
(306) or one declared producer change (166), the published verifiers pass 622 of 622 offline vectors, the independent Python
implementation passes the 65 it claims and reports the other 566 not covered, 101,947 malformed inputs each got a verdict.
`node proba-conformance.mjs --control-negativ --doar sdjwt` (offline) gives 39 rows green, 0 red, 2 not measured (the rules
and device halves left out by `--doar`): 33 of 33 SD-JWT and SD-JWT VC rules proven load-bearing, `sdjwt.hybrid-half` among them
(planted out, exactly its 3 vectors fail). Not run after the change: `--online`, and `--control-negativ` over the rules of the other verifiers.
Run online later the same night (01:54-02:13 UTC), with the reference verifier as served at aere.network/tools (fetched and installed
in an empty folder) and testnet 28001 read: `node proba-conformance.mjs --online` gives 12 rows green, 0 red; the published verifiers
pass 631 of 631 vectors, the independent Python implementation passes the 65 it claims and reports the other 566 not covered, 101,947
malformed inputs and 183 malformed envelope files each got a verdict. `node proba-conformance.mjs --control-negativ --online` gives 323
rows green, 0 red: 241 of 241 rules proven load-bearing through their vectors; the other 82 rows are the conditions of the device
verifier and the controls of the instruments.
Measured on 2026-10-18 (UTC), in the evening, after the identity verifier gained the rule `request` (a presentation committed to the
request the verifier received; the adversarial review of the secrets service) and its four vectors were derived from a new fresh
source (`identityRequest`; every other fresh source kept, so no other vector's input moved; the 65 earlier identity vectors changed