The remaining hot-path gap, stated precisely because the imprecise version oversells: with
PREPARE enforcement armed, an ECDSA-breaking adversary cannot finalize anything, since
"prepared" needs a full quorum of PREPAREs. What forged proposals could still do is OPEN
rounds and waste them. With proposal enforcement armed, a proposal without a valid Falcon
seal from its own proposer does not open a round.
Same pattern as the PREPARE layer, deliberately: an optional fifth payload element that
leaves the unsealed encoding byte-identical to upstream; a third, separate emission gate;
enforcement self-wired in the payload validator so no refactor can drop it silently; its
own domain over (chainId, height, round, digest), tested in both directions so an honest
offer seal cannot be replayed as a vote nor a vote seal as an offer.
Nothing is armed anywhere: the properties are unset, and unset means never. The armed-
layers table in the README says so, and says what stays classical: the ROUND-CHANGE
message itself and node-level devp2p authentication.
1,042 tests, 0 failures, counted from the XML. The enforcement's negative control ran at
5 of 5: four planted defects each turned the suite red, the untouched source stayed green.
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