Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Liviu
820ae134f7 Carry the Apache 4(b) and 4(d) notices the anchor was missing
Caught by our own licence gate the minute the anchor went up, which is the only
reason this is a same-day correction rather than something a reader finds first.

Two separate requirements, both real:

- section 4(b): the twenty upstream files this overlay modifies must carry a
  prominent notice that we changed them. They did not. They do now, placed after
  the upstream copyright header rather than over it, because 4(c) requires that
  header to survive untouched. It does: eighteen still read "Copyright ConsenSys
  AG.", two "Copyright contributors to Besu."

- section 4(d): NOTICE must carry the attribution notices of the work this
  derives from. It named Hyperledger Besu only, while the files themselves carry
  three distinct notices. All three are now reproduced. Naming one of three was a
  smaller truth than the files tell.

The patch is regenerated from the corrected files and re-verified end to end, not
assumed: git apply --check and git apply both 0 on a pristine d2032017 checkout,
the resulting tree byte-identical to anchor/ (75 files compared, 0 differences),
and 605 tests with 0 failures across consensus:common and consensus:qbft.
2026-08-12 02:28:48 +03:00
Liviu
50290b47c8 Deliver the anchor as a patch as well as files
This repository argues, in its own README, that a patch against a named upstream
commit is the honest way to publish a contribution to a million-line project: the
diff is the contribution, the reader fetches the rest from upstream, and a patch
fails loudly when upstream moves while a whole file overwrites in silence.

The anchor was published as whole files only, which contradicted that argument.
It is now both: patches/0003 to apply, anchor/ to read.

Verified on a pristine d2032017 checkout rather than assumed:
- git apply --check and git apply both returned 0
- the resulting tree is byte-identical to anchor/: 75 files compared, 0 differences
- :consensus:common:test and :consensus:qbft:test returned 605 tests, 0 failures,
  the same count class by class as the same tree built from the files

The README also said "no build file changes are required" in a place that now
reads as if it covered all three patches. It covered the first two. Patch 0003
changes one build file by one line, and that line is named.
2026-08-12 02:08:38 +03:00
Liviu
56a02656aa Add the post-quantum certificate anchor for QBFT
This is the code that puts a post-quantum validator certificate under the block
hash. It is the thing this project exists to do, and it is published so that the
claim can be checked rather than believed.

What it is. In QBFT the block hash is computed over a re-encoding of the decoded
extraData with the seals removed, so anything the decoder does not know about is
dropped before hashing. Appending a certificate as a new element gives you a
certificate that is stored, gossiped, and entirely absent from the hash. The
design that works instead puts a 32-byte digest of the certificate into
vanityData, which is already under keccak. anchor/README.md sets out the four
designs that died before this one and why.

Scope, stated in the README and repeated here because it matters: consensus on
chain 2800 is classical secp256k1 ECDSA. This binds a post-quantum certificate to
the block hash. It does not make consensus post-quantum and is never described as
such.

What is here: the anchor, the validation rules, the wiring, and the tests,
including the negative controls. Applied to upstream d2032017bb, the pinned base
named in anchor/BASE.txt. One build file changes, by one line, and the README says
which and why. No cryptography is implemented here; Falcon verification calls
Bouncy Castle.

What is not here: no keys, no fleet configuration, and nothing about what is armed
on any running network.

Measured before publishing, on upstream d2032017bb with this overlay applied:
consensus:common and consensus:qbft, 605 tests, 0 failures, identical to the same
tree before this work, class by class.

Three things were found while preparing it, and all three are fixed here:
- the code spoke Romanian in 134 comment lines and 43 strings, 37 of them on
  production paths, which is to say in the messages a node prints when it refuses
  to start. An auditor given the code to check the guards could not read the
  guards.
- ten test classes carried internal issue numbers in their names. They now say
  what they test.
- the suite was green partly by ordering luck. One class cleared its system
  properties but not the configuration PqAnchorProducer remembers, so it left the
  anchor armed for whichever class ran next. Renaming the classes changed the
  order and four tests began failing on a guard that was firing correctly. Fixed
  where it leaks, with the negative control measured: remove the line and the
  pair goes red, restore it and it goes green.
2026-08-12 01:43:58 +03:00