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25 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Aere Network
c3ef72b82c TR on chain 2800 moved to block 24,148,752 (was 24,127,504, announced earlier the same day and never armed on any node): the fleet series could not finish 48 hours before the earlier height. verify-anchor.mjs (COMMIT_ROUND_BLOCK), run-node.sh and the runbooks carry the new aere.pq.commitRoundBlock 2026-10-21 20:46:21 +03:00
Aere Network
7e6dad4239 TR on chain 2800 from block 24,127,504: the post-quantum commit seal binds the consensus round and the anchor certificate takes the v3 form from that height; verify-anchor.mjs knows the height (COMMIT_ROUND_BLOCK), run-node.sh and the runbooks carry aere.pq.commitRoundBlock 2026-10-21 20:02:04 +03:00
Aere Network
3ff53e4c05 tools/verify-anchor.mjs: the certificate form is judged by height, as the clients do (v1 below V, v2 from V: 17,047,600 on 2800, 176,000 on 28001; v3 from H_r), and the v1/v2 certificate rows are decoded canonically (whole scalar values, known scheme tag, index in four bytes, non-empty signature, at most 64 rows in v2); a v1 height accepts Falcon-512 only. Before this change the tool took the form from the bytes below H_r and accused 20 of 20 healthy v1 anchors of testnet 28001 (175,360 to 175,968). Measured: chain 2800 201 of 201 anchors past V verified, testnet 28001 40 of 40 past V; same verdict as the previous tool on anchor 23,452,880 of chain 2800. 2026-10-19 06:54:55 +03:00
Aere Network
e01ba38e6f tools/verify-anchor.mjs: commit-round height of testnet 28001 is set (6157024); mainnet 2800 unchanged 2026-10-12 12:39:28 +03:00
Aere Network
8de1ab2184 tools/verify-anchor.mjs: a certificate in v3 form below the commit-round height is refused with AERE-PQ-V3-01 before any decoding (form on height first, as both clients do); an index wider than 31 bits and an element 6 that is not a list are named refusals; v1/v2 verdicts unchanged (20 anchors on chain 2800 and 20 on 28001, identical rows) 2026-10-10 23:38:49 +03:00
Aere Network
c05b2ba97b tools/verify-anchor.mjs: certificate form v3 (round-bound commit seal, AIP-22 erratum): dispatcher on the first element, refusal codes AERE-PQ-V3-01..08, validator set of the parent, 'PARENT DECIDED IN ROUND r' only at a QBFT quorum of verified members; v1/v2 verdicts unchanged (20/20 on chain 2800 and 28001 before and after) 2026-10-07 17:11:26 +03:00
Aere Network
88a87df694 tools: the on-chain pin proven under the certified state (mpt.mjs), shared by verify-anchor.mjs and verify-proof.mjs 
Copies of aerenew/verificator-falcon at 2026-10-02 (AIP-24 C4 (b)): slot 0 of every anchor contract is proven with eth_getProof
under the state root of the certified parent of the newest verified anchor; nothing is read at `latest` any more. mpt.mjs is the
Merkle-Patricia proof walker both tools import: it must sit next to them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-10-02 06:23:56 +03:00
Aere Network
725aeebb65 Anchor verifier: the two dated historical lapse windows of chain 2800 transcribed from the production client (not enforced at all, then a threshold of one), the fleet's threshold before 13,034,000, and index order required as in production 2026-10-01 20:28:51 +03:00
Aere Network
d56a120462 Anchor verifier: the validator set is read from the parent header the certificate seals (bound to its hash), with no 1000-block cache; distinct members counted once per scheme 2026-10-01 20:03:55 +03:00
Aere Network
1238760940 D-470 / AIP-22 erratum 2026-10-01: the verifier prints POST-QUANTUM CERTIFIED and says what a certificate proves (its signers sealed the block post-quantum, in some round) and what it does not (that the block was decided); SPEC and the anchor README qualified the same way 2026-10-01 17:09:27 +03:00
Aere Network
ea4ebcda5d AIP-22 stages 1 to 3 on chain 2800 in the node package; verifier no longer prints the stage-5 sentence on chain 2800 
README, SPEC, RUN-A-NODE, SECURITY, AUDITS and anchor/README now state the live rules: at least seven of
ten seals per scheme from block 20,715,632 (stage 1), Falcon-512 at every 32nd block and SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s
at every 128th from block 20,746,736 (stage 2), post-quantum validator ids in the header and in
qbft_getValidatorsByBlockNumber from block 20,836,228 (stage 3). Stages 4 and 5 are not active on chain 2800.

tools/verify-anchor.mjs: the FINALIZED line said on every chain that a header between anchors carries only
its proposer's seal, which is true only where AIP-22 stage 5 is active (testnet 28001). It now reports what
it measured: on chain 2800 headers between anchors carry the validators' classical ECDSA commit seals.
Checked on both chains on 2026-10-01: chain 2800, 4/4 anchors verified, ECDSA branch printed; testnet 28001,
2/2 anchors and 20/20 proposer seals verified, stage-5 branch printed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-10-01 13:27:11 +03:00
Aere Network
9fd694b888 AIP-22 stage 2 on chain 2800: from block 20,746,736 a Falcon-512 anchor certificate every 32 blocks and the SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s layer every 128 (schemeSchedule falcon-512/32+slh-dsa-sha2-128s/128) 2026-09-29 21:09:36 +03:00
Aere Network
1779ac8a8b AIP-22 stage 1 on chain 2800: anchor certificate threshold K=7, the QBFT quorum of ten validators, from block 20,715,632 2026-09-29 16:07:49 +03:00
Aere Network
54ab30407c verify-anchor.mjs: ANCHOR_REPORT=<file> writes the most recent verified anchor and the parent hash its seals signed, as JSON, for tools that build on it (nothing printed changes) 2026-09-27 06:36:36 +03:00
Aere Network
75b2872e13 verify-anchor.mjs: early refusals stop without process.exit() (on Windows it returned 127 instead of 1 after a network request); any other uncaught error still fails the run 2026-09-27 05:32:06 +03:00
Aere Network
0b36247051 verify-anchor.mjs: step 6 admits a re-proposed block sealed by its round's proposer (AIP-22 section 5 as corrected 2026-09-25, now running on testnet 28001); builder rule, round bound and canonical round on every header; exit code set, not process.exit 2026-09-27 05:14:52 +03:00
Aere Network
4250738290 verify-anchor: FINALIZED (post-quantum) summary line; probes proba-pe-lant/control-negativ repaired upstream, 2026-09-26 2026-09-26 16:20:11 +03:00
Aere Network
0f6ec82fa1 verify-anchor.mjs: step 6, the proposer's Falcon-512 seal on every recent header (AIP-22 stage 5), verified against the v3 registry key of its index and bound to the coinbase; proven on testnet 28001 with two planted forgeries rejected 2026-09-24 23:01:51 +03:00
Aere Network
ab90cc5b06 verify-anchor: a certificate is a NON-EMPTY item 6 (AIP-22 stage 5 headers carry an empty certificate slot between anchors) 2026-09-24 00:03:31 +03:00
Aere Network
a94c0f2686 verify-anchor: from KEYS_FROM the OK line names the registry v3 epoch whose keys verified the seals, not the key manifest 2026-09-23 18:35:06 +03:00
Aere Network
089dc9803c verify-anchor.mjs: AIP-22 stage 3b read path, inert until an index marks it - from KEYS_FROM (or the v3 epoch whose index entry carries keysFrom) the key and the id of a seal's index come from the v3 epoch in force at the parent, as both clients read them; the ECDSA link of an id is inherited across epochs that omit it, and an id linked again drops its older address. Without keysFrom anywhere nothing changes: chain 2800 5/5, testnet 28001 5/5 re-run on 2026-09-23. 2026-09-23 16:05:24 +03:00
Aere Network
944dc0bba6 tools: verify-anchor.mjs discovers registry v3 epochs (AIP-22 stage 3, formatVersion 3 entries of the same manifest index) and verifies each in full with registry-v3.mjs (every proof of possession, every ECDSA link, the rotation chain, the Merkle registry hash), then requires every v3 row to carry exactly the Falcon-512 key, SLH-DSA key and address of the key manifest that signs at its height; the identity height is the first epoch's bindHeight, IDENTITY_BLOCK=none disables it as a negative control. Adds tools/registry-v3.mjs and tools/falcon512.mjs, which verify-anchor.mjs imports and the package did not carry. Checked 2026-09-23: testnet 28001 20/20 with its published v3 epoch (registry hash 0xd19eef4a..., identity from 3,080,010); chain 2800 20/20 unchanged; a byte-altered epoch and an epoch whose SLH-DSA key differs from the signing manifest both refused with the reason. 2026-09-23 15:33:49 +03:00
Aere Network
79e5dafd53 verify-anchor.mjs: per-scheme anchor intervals (AIP-22 stage 2: SCHEME_SCHEDULE entries like falcon-512/32+slh-dsa-sha2-128s/128; a scheme off its own grid at an anchor is surplus, verified but not required) and post-quantum validator identity (AIP-22 stage 3: IDENTITY_BLOCK + REGISTRY_V3 translate the validator set to ids from H_id); testnet 28001 default gains the stage-2 step 3070656. Proven 2026-09-23 12:07Z on 28001: 11 of 11 anchors after 3,070,656 accepted (3 hybrid on the 128 grid, 8 Falcon-only at 32), and the pre-stage-2 schedule refuses exactly the 8 Falcon-only; 20 of 20 on chain 2800 unchanged. 2026-09-23 15:08:45 +03:00
Aere Network
b8e9bdf971 verify-anchor.mjs: the testnet 28001 default seal-threshold schedule gains the AIP-22 stage-1 rehearsal step 2988864:4 (the per-scheme minimum becomes the QBFT quorum, 4 of 5); chain 2800 unchanged, and any value is still overridable via MIN_SEALS_SCHEDULE 2026-09-23 02:51:21 +03:00
Aere Network
665b86365e O-017: the anchor verifier ships in tools/, the Bouncy Castle licence is cited at its real path, two operator-repository scripts are declared as unpublished 2026-09-10 15:38:34 +03:00