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SPEC 1.2.0 amended 2026-09-17: the four enforcement heights have passed (17,250,000 / 17,400,000 / 17,550,000 / 17,700,000, 5-8 September), hybrid keys live since 17,047,600; 'emission only' is dated history; LICENSING regenerated

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@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ the section 4(b) notice of changed files), and each keeps its original notice pe
<!-- GENERAT: lista de mai jos se rescrie de unealta de licentiere din depozitul de constructie --> <!-- GENERAT: lista de mai jos se rescrie de unealta de licentiere din depozitul de constructie -->
## anchor/: every file that carries someone else's copyright (generated 2026-09-12) ## anchor/: every file that carries someone else's copyright (generated 2026-09-17)
This list is **generated from the files this package actually ships**, not written by hand: the This list is **generated from the files this package actually ships**, not written by hand: the
previous hand-written table fell behind the tree on 2026-09-12 and seven upstream files went previous hand-written table fell behind the tree on 2026-09-12 and seven upstream files went
@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ repository, and the publisher refuses to ship a package whose list disagrees wit
You do not need that tool to check the list: every row below names a file in this package, and You do not need that tool to check the list: every row below names a file in this package, and
`grep -i copyright` on it shows the same line. `grep -i copyright` on it shows the same line.
Measured 2026-09-12 over `anchor/`: **179 files**. **90** carry someone Measured 2026-09-17 over `anchor/`: **179 files**. **90** carry someone
else's copyright alone, **45** carry a shared notice naming both upstream and us, and **11** name only else's copyright alone, **45** carry a shared notice naming both upstream and us, and **11** name only
`contributors to the AERE Network`; 33 carry no copyright line at all. `contributors to the AERE Network`; 33 carry no copyright line at all.
The first two groups are the table below. A shared notice is listed too: those are precisely the The first two groups are the table below. A shared notice is listed too: those are precisely the

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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Aere Network chain 2800: full protocol specification # Aere Network chain 2800: full protocol specification
Version: 1.2.0, written 2026-08-25, amended 2026-09-02 (section 2.6, D8, G11) and 2026-09-05 (sections 2.6 and 3.1: the message-layer arming heights, the v2 hybrid certificate, the anchor interval schedule). Scope: everything a third party needs to implement a client Version: 1.2.0, written 2026-08-25, amended 2026-09-02 (section 2.6, D8, G11), 2026-09-05 (sections 2.6 and 3.1: the message-layer arming heights, the v2 hybrid certificate, the anchor interval schedule) and 2026-09-17 (sections 2.6 and 3.1: the four enforcement heights have passed, hybrid keys are live; the "emission only" qualification is dated history). Scope: everything a third party needs to implement a client
that follows chain 2800 from block 0 to the live head and validates what the network validates, that follows chain 2800 from block 0 to the live head and validates what the network validates,
without reading Aere source code. It specifies the follower (validation) protocol completely; it without reading Aere source code. It specifies the follower (validation) protocol completely; it
describes seal production only where a follower must understand it to validate. describes seal production only where a follower must understand it to validate.
@ -360,11 +360,18 @@ its healing) and, since 2026-09-02, WITH the anchor armed as on 2800 (source:
`consensus-pqc/fullpq-activare-2026-08-28/`, `F-lib.sh`, `dovezi/`). The machine-checked model of `consensus-pqc/fullpq-activare-2026-08-28/`, `F-lib.sh`, `dovezi/`). The machine-checked model of
these rules is `aere-research/formal-consensus/pq_message_enforcement_smt.py` (section 7). these rules is `aere-research/formal-consensus/pq_message_enforcement_smt.py` (section 7).
**What this section does not claim.** Node-to-node authentication (RLPx) is ECDSA. The hybrid **What this section does not claim.** Node-to-node authentication (RLPx) is ECDSA. None of this is
(Falcon + SLH-DSA) certificate is implemented and tested but no hybrid keys exist on 2800. None of audited by a third party.
this is audited by a third party. Until the four `forkBlock` heights are set on the fleet, chain
2800's consensus is post-quantum in EMISSION only, and the defensible sentence remains the one in **Amended 2026-09-17 (state of the enforcement).** The four `forkBlock` heights were set uniformly
section 3.1. on every validator and all four have passed: 17,250,000 (commit, 2026-09-05), 17,400,000
(proposal, 2026-09-06), 17,550,000 (round-change, 2026-09-07) and 17,700,000 (prepare, 2026-09-08).
Since 17,700,000 every QBFT message on the hot path (proposal, prepare, commit, round-change) is
refused unless it carries a valid post-quantum seal, on both clients (the Nethermind validator
enforces since 2026-09-11). The hybrid (Falcon-512 + SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s) keys exist on 2800 and
every anchor certificate is v2 since block 17,047,600 (2026-09-04). Between 2026-09-01 and
2026-09-08 this paragraph read "post-quantum in EMISSION only"; that was true for those days and
is history now. What remains classical is named in section 3.1.
--- ---
@ -392,10 +399,14 @@ requires) (source: `anchor/README.md`, "Scope boundary"; `RUN-A-NODE.md`, the an
The defensible sentence, and the only form this document endorses: *every 32nd block does not The defensible sentence, and the only form this document endorses: *every 32nd block does not
finalize without a certificate of at least six valid Falcon-512 validator seals (of ten validators since 2026-09-11) under its finalize without a certificate of at least six valid Falcon-512 validator seals (of ten validators since 2026-09-11) under its
hash (three, before block 14,961,456; see the schedule and the historical windows)*. Blocks between hash (three, before block 14,961,456; see the schedule and the historical windows)*. Blocks between
anchors carry no Falcon seals and are finalized by ECDSA alone. Consensus (proposal, identity, anchors carry no Falcon seals in the header and their header is finalized by the ECDSA committed
transport, per-block finality) is classical secp256k1 ECDSA; the anchor is a binding, not a seals alone. *Amended 2026-09-17:* the consensus MESSAGES that produce every block (proposal,
replacement, and "post-quantum consensus" without this qualification overstates (source: prepare, commit, round-change) carry and require post-quantum seals since 2026-09-08 (section
`anchor/README.md`). None of this code has been audited by a third party (source: `anchor/README.md`, 2.6), so a forged classical validator key alone no longer opens a round, prepares or commits a
block on the live network; node identity and transport (RLPx) remain classical secp256k1 ECDSA,
and so does the per-block header artifact between anchors. The anchor is a binding, not a
replacement, and "post-quantum consensus" without these qualifications overstates (source:
`anchor/README.md`, section 2.6 as amended). None of this code has been audited by a third party (source: `anchor/README.md`,
"What is not proven here"). "What is not proven here").
The threat model is retroactive rewriting (the long-range / posterior-corruption attack), not The threat model is retroactive rewriting (the long-range / posterior-corruption attack), not