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Runda 11 a reviziei prozei (2026-10-28): anchor/README (treapta 5, clientul 2), tools/verify-proof.mjs (prefixul de integritate), vectors/SURSE.md in engleza, declaratia de citari

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Aere Network 2026-10-29 00:25:55 +02:00
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3
CITATIONS-UNRESOLVED.md
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@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Paths that DO resolve are written relative to a side-by-side checkout of the Aer
repositories, so they begin with a repository name, for example
`aere-contracts/contracts/pqc/AereCryptoRegistry.sol`.
Unresolvable distinct paths in this repository: **23**.
Unresolvable distinct paths in this repository: **22** (23 when measured on 2026-10-21; on 2026-10-28 `vectors/SURSE.md` was translated into English and no longer cites an internal tool, so its entry was removed).
- `admission-params.json` cited in: aere-node/validator/README.md
- `aere-candidacy.json` cited in: aere-node/RUN-A-NODE.md, aere-node/validator/README.md
@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ Unresolvable distinct paths in this repository: **23**.
- `registry-v3-20836228.json` cited in: aere-node/validator/README.md
- `RESULT.txt` cited in: aere-node/SPEC.md
- `scripts/deschise/antetul-osaka-e-al-lantului.sh` cited in: aere-node/SPEC.md
- `scripts/poarta-secrete.cjs` cited in: aere-node/vectors/SURSE.md
- `static-nodes.json` cited in: aere-node/README.md, aere-node/validator/README.md
- `strategie/VERIFICARE-FORMALA-2026-08-24.md` cited in: aere-node/SPEC.md
- `testnet-public/CITESTE-MA.md` cited in: aere-node/SPEC.md

2
anchor/README.md
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@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ proposal without a valid Falcon seal from its own proposer does not open a round
its own domain over (chainId, height, round, digest), so an honest proposal seal cannot be replayed
as a vote nor a vote seal as a proposal - both directions are tested. The ROUND-CHANGE message
carries its own seal since 2026-08-31 (its embedded justifications are coupled to PREPARE
enforcement). What remains classical on chain 2800: node-level devp2p authentication, the ECDSA commit seals that every header still carries until AIP-22 stage 5, the ECDSA commit seal that a commit carries besides its post-quantum seal, and the ECDSA envelope that every consensus message still carries on the wire, whose form both clients judge but which, since block 24,300,000 (AIP-22 stage 4), no longer names its author (this sentence corrected on 2026-10-28: it did not name the envelope; AIP-22, note of 2026-10-27 under section 5). The validators are named in
enforcement). What remains classical on chain 2800: node-level devp2p authentication, the ECDSA commit seals that every header still carries until AIP-22 stage 5, the ECDSA commit seal that a commit carries besides its post-quantum seal, and the ECDSA envelope that every consensus message still carries on the wire, whose form both clients judge and which, since block 24,300,000 (AIP-22 stage 4), no longer names its author on the Besu-derived validators (this sentence corrected on 2026-10-28: it did not name the envelope; AIP-22, note of 2026-10-27 under section 5). The validators are named in
consensus by the post-quantum ids of AIP-22 since block 20,836,228 (stage 3, 2026-09-30); that code is in this directory.
(Corrected 2026-10-22: until that date this sentence also listed validator identity as classical and said that the
post-quantum identity was unarmed on chain 2800 and ran only on testnet 28001.)

6
tools/verify-proof.mjs
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@ -109,7 +109,11 @@ export function local(env, notJson = null) {
const text = String(JSON.stringify(st));
const h = '0x' + crypto.createHash('sha256').update(Buffer.from(text, 'utf8')).digest('hex');
const ok = h === sh.toLowerCase();
out.push(level('integrity', ok ? 'PASSED' : 'FAILED', ok ? `sha256(statement) == statementHash (${h.slice(0, 18)}..)` : `sha256(statement) is ${h.slice(0, 18)}.., not the statementHash ${sh.slice(0, 18)}..`));
// on a refusal the two values shown must visibly differ: the prefix runs to the first differing hex digit (a hash changed in its last
// digit printed as two identical 16-digit prefixes until 2026-10-28)
let d = 2; while (d < h.length && h[d] === sh.toLowerCase()[d]) d++;
const n = Math.max(18, d + 1), cut = (x) => x.slice(0, n) + (n < x.length ? '..' : '');
out.push(level('integrity', ok ? 'PASSED' : 'FAILED', ok ? `sha256(statement) == statementHash (${h.slice(0, 18)}..)` : `sha256(statement) is ${cut(h)}, not the statementHash ${cut(sh)}`));
return { out, text: ok ? text : null };
}

22
vectors/SURSE.md
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@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
# SURSE: de unde vin vectorii de proba din acest director
# SOURCES: where the test vectors in this directory come from
Act de provenienta cerut de poarta de secrete (`scripts/poarta-secrete.cjs`, clasa COD TERT): fiecare fisier
de aici e o fixtura PUBLICATA de NIST sau de echipa de referinta a schemei, copiata in pachet ca sa poata fi
rulata de oricine impotriva precompilelor vii (`scripts/verify-live-precompiles.mjs`). Cheile publice si
semnaturile din ele sunt ale vectorilor de proba, nu ale nimanui de la Aere Network. Provenienta de mai jos
e citita din campul `katSource` al fiecarui fisier, scris 2026-09-02.
Statement of provenance. Every file here is a fixture PUBLISHED by NIST or by the reference team of
the scheme, copied into the package so that anyone can run it against the live precompiles
(`scripts/verify-live-precompiles.mjs`). The public keys and signatures in these files belong to the
test vectors, not to anyone at Aere Network. The provenance below is read from the `katSource` field
of each file, written on 2026-09-02.
| fisier | schema | sursa declarata in fisier | sha256 (16) |
| file | scheme | source declared in the file | sha256 (first 16 hex digits) |
|---|---|---|---|
| `falcon1024_kat0.json` | NIST Falcon-1024 (round-3), official KAT vector 0 and 1 | falcon1024-KAT.rsp (Falcon round-3 NIST submission) | `5f430ea31548fde0` |
| `falcon512_kat0.json` | NIST Falcon-512 (round-3), KAT oficial | fisierul nu poarta camp `katSource`; `README.md` (randul "official NIST Falcon KAT vector 0 for both parameter sets") il declara vectorul KAT 0 al trimiterii Falcon round-3, ca si perechea lui `falcon1024_kat0.json` | `5011efbb97f68027` |
| `mldsa44-acvp-tg8.json` | ML-DSA-44 (Dilithium2), FIPS 204 | NIST ACVP ML-DSA-sigVer-FIPS204 test vectors | github.com/usnistgov/ACVP-Server | gen-val/json-files/ML-DSA-sigVer-FIPS204 | `d9850650abdf446c` |
| `sphincs-sha2-128s-acvp-tg31.json` | SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s (SPHINCS+-SHA2-128s-simple), FIPS 205 | NIST ACVP SLH-DSA-sigVer-FIPS205 test vectors | github.com/usnistgov/ACVP-Server | gen-val/json-files/SLH-DSA-sigVer-FIPS205 | `943811677f3a2549` |
| `falcon1024_kat0.json` | NIST Falcon-1024 (round 3), official KAT vectors 0 and 1 | falcon1024-KAT.rsp (Falcon round-3 NIST submission) | `5f430ea31548fde0` |
| `falcon512_kat0.json` | NIST Falcon-512 (round 3), official KAT | the file carries no `katSource` field; `README.md` (the line "official NIST Falcon KAT vector 0 for both parameter sets") declares it KAT vector 0 of the Falcon round-3 submission, like its pair `falcon1024_kat0.json` | `5011efbb97f68027` |
| `mldsa44-acvp-tg8.json` | ML-DSA-44 (Dilithium2), FIPS 204 | NIST ACVP ML-DSA-sigVer-FIPS204 test vectors, github.com/usnistgov/ACVP-Server, gen-val/json-files/ML-DSA-sigVer-FIPS204 | `d9850650abdf446c` |
| `sphincs-sha2-128s-acvp-tg31.json` | SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s (SPHINCS+-SHA2-128s-simple), FIPS 205 | NIST ACVP SLH-DSA-sigVer-FIPS205 test vectors, github.com/usnistgov/ACVP-Server, gen-val/json-files/SLH-DSA-sigVer-FIPS205 | `943811677f3a2549` |