a13a649b77
Aere Network public source. Everything here can be checked against the live chain (chain id 2800, https://rpc.aere.network). Scope note, stated up front rather than buried: consensus on chain 2800 is classical secp256k1 ECDSA QBFT. The post-quantum work in this repository is at the signature, precompile, account and transport layers. Nothing here makes the consensus post-quantum, and no document in it should be read as claiming so.
63 lines
2.8 KiB
JavaScript
63 lines
2.8 KiB
JavaScript
const { expect } = require("chai");
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const { ethers } = require("hardhat");
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// Off-chain WOTS+ signer matching AerePQCVerifier exactly.
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function chain(x, count) { for (let i = 0; i < count; i++) x = ethers.keccak256(x); return x; }
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function digits(mHex) {
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const m = ethers.getBytes(mHex); const d = new Array(67); let csum = 0;
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for (let i = 0; i < 32; i++) { const b = m[i], hi = b >> 4, lo = b & 0x0f; d[2 * i] = hi; d[2 * i + 1] = lo; csum += (15 - hi) + (15 - lo); }
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d[64] = (csum >> 8) & 0x0f; d[65] = (csum >> 4) & 0x0f; d[66] = csum & 0x0f; return d;
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}
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function keygen() {
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const sk = []; for (let i = 0; i < 67; i++) sk.push(ethers.hexlify(ethers.randomBytes(32)));
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const pkEnds = sk.map(s => chain(s, 15));
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const compressedPK = ethers.keccak256(ethers.concat(pkEnds));
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return { sk, compressedPK };
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}
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function sign(sk, msgHash) { const d = digits(msgHash); return sk.map((s, i) => chain(s, d[i])); }
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describe("AerePQCVerifier (WOTS+ post-quantum)", function () {
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async function deploy() {
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const V = await ethers.getContractFactory("AerePQCVerifier");
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const v = await V.deploy(); await v.waitForDeployment(); return v;
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}
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it("accepts a valid WOTS+ signature", async function () {
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const v = await deploy();
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const { sk, compressedPK } = keygen();
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const msgHash = ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("AERE is post-quantum ready"));
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const sig = sign(sk, msgHash);
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expect(await v.verify(msgHash, sig, compressedPK)).to.equal(true);
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// derivePublicKey helper agrees
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expect(await v.derivePublicKey(sk)).to.equal(compressedPK);
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});
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it("rejects a wrong public key", async function () {
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const v = await deploy();
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const { sk } = keygen();
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const msgHash = ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("m"));
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const sig = sign(sk, msgHash);
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expect(await v.verify(msgHash, sig, ethers.keccak256("0xdead"))).to.equal(false);
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});
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it("rejects a signature reused on a DIFFERENT message (forgery-resistant)", async function () {
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const v = await deploy();
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const { sk, compressedPK } = keygen();
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const m1 = ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("original"));
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const sig = sign(sk, m1);
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const m2 = ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("forged"));
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expect(await v.verify(m2, sig, compressedPK)).to.equal(false);
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});
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it("checksum blocks a naive forge (raising a digit without lowering checksum)", async function () {
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const v = await deploy();
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const { sk, compressedPK } = keygen();
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const m = ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("x"));
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const sig = sign(sk, m);
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// advance one message-chain by 1 (attacker can hash forward) — checksum digits stay, so PK mismatch
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const tampered = [...sig];
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tampered[0] = ethers.keccak256(tampered[0]);
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expect(await v.verify(m, tampered, compressedPK)).to.equal(false);
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});
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});
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