Aere Network public source. Everything here can be checked against the live chain (chain id 2800, https://rpc.aere.network). Scope note, stated up front rather than buried: consensus on chain 2800 is classical secp256k1 ECDSA QBFT. The post-quantum work in this repository is at the signature, precompile, account and transport layers. Nothing here makes the consensus post-quantum, and no document in it should be read as claiming so.
250 lines
10 KiB
Solidity
250 lines
10 KiB
Solidity
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
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pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
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import {ECDSA} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/cryptography/ECDSA.sol";
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/// @title AereSessionKeyValidator - scoped session keys for AereModularAccount
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/// @notice Singleton validator module (ERC-7579 module type 1). Per-account state
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/// is keyed by msg.sender: ALL mutating functions take effect for the
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/// calling account, so registration is owner-only by construction (the
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/// account's execute()/installModule() paths are gated to the EntryPoint,
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/// self-calls and the root owner).
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///
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/// A session is (key, validAfter, validUntil, maxValuePerOp) plus an
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/// allowlist of (target, selector) pairs. Selector 0x00000000 is the
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/// sentinel for plain native transfers (empty calldata).
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///
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/// validateUserOp returns the CANONICAL ERC-4337 validationData packing:
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/// authorizer (160 bits) | validUntil (48) << 160 | validAfter (48) << 208
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/// with authorizer = 0 on signature+scope success, 1 on failure.
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/// AereModularAccount unpacks it and enforces the time window itself
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/// because AereEntryPointV2 reverts on any non-zero account return.
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contract AereSessionKeyValidator {
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struct Session {
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bool enabled;
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uint48 validAfter;
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uint48 validUntil;
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uint256 maxValuePerOp;
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}
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uint256 internal constant SIG_VALIDATION_FAILED = 1;
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bytes4 internal constant EIP1271_MAGIC = 0x1626ba7e;
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bytes4 internal constant EIP1271_FAIL = 0xffffffff;
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/// @notice Sentinel selector matching an empty-calldata (native transfer) call.
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bytes4 public constant SELECTOR_NATIVE_TRANSFER = 0x00000000;
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/// @notice Selectors of AereModularAccount execution functions a session key
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/// is allowed to enter through.
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bytes4 public constant EXECUTE_SELECTOR = bytes4(keccak256("execute(address,uint256,bytes)"));
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bytes4 public constant EXECUTE_BATCH_SELECTOR = bytes4(keccak256("executeBatch((address,uint256,bytes)[])"));
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/// @dev Mirror of AereModularAccount.Call for callData decoding.
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struct Call {
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address target;
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uint256 value;
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bytes data;
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}
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/// @notice account => sessionKey => session parameters.
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mapping(address => mapping(address => Session)) public sessions;
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/// @notice account => sessionKey => target => selector => allowed.
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mapping(address => mapping(address => mapping(address => mapping(bytes4 => bool)))) public allowedCall;
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event SessionEnabled(address indexed account, address indexed key, uint48 validAfter, uint48 validUntil, uint256 maxValuePerOp);
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event SessionRevoked(address indexed account, address indexed key);
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event PermissionAdded(address indexed account, address indexed key, address target, bytes4 selector);
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event PermissionRemoved(address indexed account, address indexed key, address target, bytes4 selector);
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error InvalidSessionKey();
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error InvalidWindow();
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error LengthMismatch();
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error SessionNotEnabled();
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// ---- ERC-7579-style module base -------------------------------------------
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function isModuleType(uint256 moduleTypeId) external pure returns (bool) {
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return moduleTypeId == 1;
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}
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/// @notice Optional initial session at install time. initData layout:
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/// abi.encode(address key, uint48 validAfter, uint48 validUntil,
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/// uint256 maxValuePerOp, address[] targets, bytes4[] selectors)
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/// Pass empty bytes to install with no session.
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function onInstall(bytes calldata data) external {
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if (data.length == 0) return;
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(
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address key,
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uint48 validAfter,
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uint48 validUntil,
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uint256 maxValuePerOp,
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address[] memory targets,
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bytes4[] memory selectors
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) = abi.decode(data, (address, uint48, uint48, uint256, address[], bytes4[]));
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_enableSession(msg.sender, key, validAfter, validUntil, maxValuePerOp, targets, selectors);
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}
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/// @notice Per-account session state is NOT bulk-cleared on uninstall (nested
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/// mappings are not enumerable). The account removes routing on
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/// uninstall, which makes stale state unreachable; revoke sessions
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/// explicitly before a planned reinstall.
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function onUninstall(bytes calldata) external {}
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// ---- Owner-only registration (msg.sender = the smart account) ------------
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function enableSession(
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address key,
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uint48 validAfter,
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uint48 validUntil,
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uint256 maxValuePerOp,
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address[] calldata targets,
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bytes4[] calldata selectors
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) external {
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address[] memory t = targets;
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bytes4[] memory s = selectors;
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_enableSession(msg.sender, key, validAfter, validUntil, maxValuePerOp, t, s);
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}
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function revokeSession(address key) external {
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if (!sessions[msg.sender][key].enabled) revert SessionNotEnabled();
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sessions[msg.sender][key].enabled = false;
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emit SessionRevoked(msg.sender, key);
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}
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function addPermission(address key, address target, bytes4 selector) external {
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if (!sessions[msg.sender][key].enabled) revert SessionNotEnabled();
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allowedCall[msg.sender][key][target][selector] = true;
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emit PermissionAdded(msg.sender, key, target, selector);
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}
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function removePermission(address key, address target, bytes4 selector) external {
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allowedCall[msg.sender][key][target][selector] = false;
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emit PermissionRemoved(msg.sender, key, target, selector);
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}
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function _enableSession(
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address account,
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address key,
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uint48 validAfter,
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uint48 validUntil,
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uint256 maxValuePerOp,
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address[] memory targets,
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bytes4[] memory selectors
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) internal {
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if (key == address(0)) revert InvalidSessionKey();
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if (validUntil != 0 && validUntil <= validAfter) revert InvalidWindow();
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if (targets.length != selectors.length) revert LengthMismatch();
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sessions[account][key] = Session({
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enabled: true,
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validAfter: validAfter,
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validUntil: validUntil,
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maxValuePerOp: maxValuePerOp
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});
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for (uint256 i = 0; i < targets.length; i++) {
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allowedCall[account][key][targets[i]][selectors[i]] = true;
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emit PermissionAdded(account, key, targets[i], selectors[i]);
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}
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emit SessionEnabled(account, key, validAfter, validUntil, maxValuePerOp);
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}
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// ---- Validation (called by the account, msg.sender = account) -------------
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/// @param userOpHash hash the session key signed (EIP-191 envelope).
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/// @param accountCallData the userOp.callData; must be execute()/executeBatch()
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/// on the account, fully inside the session allowlist.
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/// @param signature 65-byte ECDSA signature by the session key.
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function validateUserOp(
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bytes32 userOpHash,
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bytes calldata accountCallData,
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bytes calldata signature
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) external view returns (uint256 validationData) {
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address account = msg.sender;
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(address key, ECDSA.RecoverError err) =
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ECDSA.tryRecover(ECDSA.toEthSignedMessageHash(userOpHash), signature);
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if (err != ECDSA.RecoverError.NoError || key == address(0)) return SIG_VALIDATION_FAILED;
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Session memory s = sessions[account][key];
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if (!s.enabled) return SIG_VALIDATION_FAILED;
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if (!_checkCallData(account, key, s.maxValuePerOp, accountCallData)) {
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return SIG_VALIDATION_FAILED;
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}
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// Canonical 4337 packing; the account enforces the time window.
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return (uint256(s.validUntil) << 160) | (uint256(s.validAfter) << 208);
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}
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function _checkCallData(
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address account,
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address key,
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uint256 maxValuePerOp,
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bytes calldata accountCallData
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) internal view returns (bool) {
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if (accountCallData.length < 4) return false;
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bytes4 outer = bytes4(accountCallData[0:4]);
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if (outer == EXECUTE_SELECTOR) {
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(address target, uint256 value, bytes memory data) =
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abi.decode(accountCallData[4:], (address, uint256, bytes));
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return _checkSingle(account, key, maxValuePerOp, target, value, data);
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}
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if (outer == EXECUTE_BATCH_SELECTOR) {
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Call[] memory calls = abi.decode(accountCallData[4:], (Call[]));
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if (calls.length == 0) return false;
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for (uint256 i = 0; i < calls.length; i++) {
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if (!_checkSingle(account, key, maxValuePerOp, calls[i].target, calls[i].value, calls[i].data)) {
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return false;
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}
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}
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return true;
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}
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// Session keys may only enter through execute/executeBatch.
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return false;
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}
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function _checkSingle(
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address account,
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address key,
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uint256 maxValuePerOp,
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address target,
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uint256 value,
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bytes memory data
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) internal view returns (bool) {
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if (value > maxValuePerOp) return false;
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bytes4 sel;
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if (data.length == 0) {
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sel = SELECTOR_NATIVE_TRANSFER;
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} else if (data.length >= 4) {
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assembly {
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sel := mload(add(data, 32))
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}
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} else {
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return false; // 1-3 byte calldata is never in scope
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}
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return allowedCall[account][key][target][sel];
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}
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// ---- EIP-1271 pass-through (msg.sender = account) --------------------------
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/// @notice Validates an off-chain signature by a currently-active session key.
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/// Scoping does not apply (no call is being made); only key validity
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/// and the time window are enforced.
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function isValidSignatureWithSender(address, bytes32 hash, bytes calldata signature)
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external
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view
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returns (bytes4)
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{
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address account = msg.sender;
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(address key, ECDSA.RecoverError err) =
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ECDSA.tryRecover(ECDSA.toEthSignedMessageHash(hash), signature);
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if (err != ECDSA.RecoverError.NoError || key == address(0)) return EIP1271_FAIL;
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Session memory s = sessions[account][key];
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if (!s.enabled) return EIP1271_FAIL;
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if (s.validAfter != 0 && block.timestamp < s.validAfter) return EIP1271_FAIL;
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if (s.validUntil != 0 && block.timestamp > s.validUntil) return EIP1271_FAIL;
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return EIP1271_MAGIC;
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}
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}
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