aere-contracts/contracts/pqc/AerePQCAttestation.sol
Aere Network a13a649b77
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Initial public release
Aere Network public source. Everything here can be checked against the live
chain (chain id 2800, https://rpc.aere.network).

Scope note, stated up front rather than buried: consensus on chain 2800 is
classical secp256k1 ECDSA QBFT. The post-quantum work in this repository is at
the signature, precompile, account and transport layers. Nothing here makes the
consensus post-quantum, and no document in it should be read as claiming so.
2026-07-20 01:02:37 +03:00

356 lines
17 KiB
Solidity

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity 0.8.23;
/**
* @title AerePQCAttestation, quantum-durable on-chain attestations for AERE (chain 2800)
*
* @notice A permissionless registry that turns AERE's LIVE native post-quantum
* verification precompiles into a usable primitive: bind a NIST PQC public
* key to your address, then record attestations whose validity rests on a
* real post-quantum signature verified in full, on-chain, by a native
* precompile. No funds are ever held by this contract.
*
* HONEST SCOPE. This is application-layer PQC signature verification. It
* does NOT change AERE consensus: blocks are still produced and signed by
* Besu QBFT validators with ECDSA (secp256k1). What is new and live is the
* set of native precompiles this contract calls, activated on mainnet 2800
* at block 9,189,161. Each precompile wraps the audited Bouncy Castle NIST
* verifiers. This contract makes those precompiles USABLE end to end: it
* is the difference between "PQC verification is callable" and
* "quantum-durable attestations are recorded on-chain".
*
* LIVE PRECOMPILES (chain 2800):
* scheme 1 = Falcon-512 at 0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000AE1
* scheme 2 = Falcon-1024 at 0x...0AE2
* scheme 3 = ML-DSA-44 at 0x...0AE3 (FIPS 204, internal interface)
* scheme 4 = SLH-DSA-128s at 0x...0AE4 (FIPS 205 SPHINCS+, internal interface)
*
* @dev PRECOMPILE INPUT ENCODING (exactly what the live precompiles parse):
*
* Falcon-512 / Falcon-1024 (0x0AE1 / 0x0AE2):
* input = pk || sm
* pk = (0x00+logn) || packed_h (897 bytes logn=9, 1793 bytes logn=10)
* sm = sigLen(2, big-endian) || nonce(40) || message || esig
* esig = (0x20+logn) || compressedSig, sigLen == esig.length
*
* ML-DSA-44 (0x0AE3): input = pk(1312) || sig(2420) || message
* SLH-DSA-128s (0x0AE4): input = pk(32) || sig(7856) || message
*
* Output for every scheme: a 32-byte word, 0x..01 valid else 0x..00.
* An empty/zero return is treated as INVALID (this is the pre-fork behaviour
* of an address with no precompile, so a stale caller can never record).
*
* @dev SIGNATURE ENVELOPE handed to attest() / verifySignature():
* Falcon (1,2): signature = nonce(40) || esig (esig starts 0x29 / 0x2A)
* ML-DSA-44 (3): signature = sig, exactly 2420 bytes
* SLH-DSA-128s (4): signature = sig, exactly 7856 bytes
* The contract supplies the 32-byte message itself, so the signer can never
* choose a different message than the one this contract binds and records.
*
* @dev POST-QUANTUM AUTHORSHIP. Authorship of an attestation is the PQC signature
* alone. attest() may be relayed by any msg.sender: only the holder of the
* registered private key can produce a valid signature over this contract's
* per-key nonce challenge, so a relayer only pays gas and can never forge or
* replay. Binding authorship to the ECDSA tx sender would defeat the purpose,
* since secp256k1 is exactly what a quantum computer breaks.
*/
contract AerePQCAttestation {
// ----- scheme identifiers -----
uint8 public constant SCHEME_FALCON512 = 1;
uint8 public constant SCHEME_FALCON1024 = 2;
uint8 public constant SCHEME_MLDSA44 = 3;
uint8 public constant SCHEME_SLHDSA128S = 4;
// ----- live precompile addresses on chain 2800 -----
address public constant PRECOMPILE_FALCON512 = address(0x0AE1);
address public constant PRECOMPILE_FALCON1024 = address(0x0AE2);
address public constant PRECOMPILE_MLDSA44 = address(0x0AE3);
address public constant PRECOMPILE_SLHDSA128S = address(0x0AE4);
// ----- public key sizes / headers -----
uint256 internal constant FALCON512_PK_LEN = 897;
uint256 internal constant FALCON1024_PK_LEN = 1793;
uint256 internal constant MLDSA44_PK_LEN = 1312;
uint256 internal constant SLHDSA128S_PK_LEN = 32;
uint8 internal constant FALCON512_PK_HEADER = 0x09; // 0x00 | logn=9
uint8 internal constant FALCON1024_PK_HEADER = 0x0A; // 0x00 | logn=10
// ----- signature sizes (fixed-length schemes) -----
uint256 internal constant MLDSA44_SIG_LEN = 2420;
uint256 internal constant SLHDSA128S_SIG_LEN = 7856;
uint256 internal constant FALCON_NONCE_LEN = 40;
// ----- domain separator for the attestation challenge -----
bytes32 public constant CHALLENGE_DOMAIN = keccak256("AerePQCAttestation.v1.challenge");
// ----- registered keys -----
struct Key {
address owner; // address that registered the key (informational; not an authority)
uint8 scheme; // one of SCHEME_*
uint64 nonce; // strictly increasing per-key replay counter
bytes pubKey; // the raw NIST public key for the scheme
}
Key[] private _keys; // keyId is the index into this array
// ----- recorded attestations, keyed by keccak256(keyId, nonce) -----
struct Attestation {
bytes32 messageHash; // the caller-supplied 32-byte payload commitment
bytes32 challenge; // the exact 32 bytes the PQC signature verified over
uint256 keyId;
uint64 nonce; // the per-key nonce this attestation consumed
uint64 blockNumber; // block the attestation was recorded at
bool exists;
}
mapping(bytes32 => Attestation) private _attestations;
/// @notice Total number of attestations recorded across all keys.
uint256 public attestationCount;
// ----- events -----
event KeyRegistered(uint256 indexed keyId, address indexed owner, uint8 indexed scheme, uint256 pubKeyLen);
event Attested(
uint256 indexed keyId,
uint8 indexed scheme,
uint64 indexed nonce,
bytes32 messageHash,
bytes32 challenge,
uint256 blockNumber
);
error InvalidScheme(uint8 scheme);
error InvalidPubKey();
error UnknownKey(uint256 keyId);
error InvalidSignatureLength();
error PQCVerificationFailed();
// ==========================================================================
// Registration
// ==========================================================================
/**
* @notice Register a PQC public key and bind it to msg.sender. Multiple keys
* per address are allowed; each call returns a fresh keyId. Registration
* validates the key length (and, for Falcon, the header byte) against the
* scheme so a malformed key cannot be stored.
* @param scheme one of 1=Falcon-512, 2=Falcon-1024, 3=ML-DSA-44, 4=SLH-DSA-128s.
* @param pubKey the raw NIST public key for the scheme (see contract NatSpec).
* @return keyId the identifier assigned to this key.
*/
function registerKey(uint8 scheme, bytes calldata pubKey) external returns (uint256 keyId) {
_validatePubKey(scheme, pubKey);
keyId = _keys.length;
_keys.push(Key({owner: msg.sender, scheme: scheme, nonce: 0, pubKey: pubKey}));
emit KeyRegistered(keyId, msg.sender, scheme, pubKey.length);
}
function _validatePubKey(uint8 scheme, bytes calldata pubKey) internal pure {
if (scheme == SCHEME_FALCON512) {
if (pubKey.length != FALCON512_PK_LEN || uint8(pubKey[0]) != FALCON512_PK_HEADER) revert InvalidPubKey();
} else if (scheme == SCHEME_FALCON1024) {
if (pubKey.length != FALCON1024_PK_LEN || uint8(pubKey[0]) != FALCON1024_PK_HEADER) revert InvalidPubKey();
} else if (scheme == SCHEME_MLDSA44) {
if (pubKey.length != MLDSA44_PK_LEN) revert InvalidPubKey();
} else if (scheme == SCHEME_SLHDSA128S) {
if (pubKey.length != SLHDSA128S_PK_LEN) revert InvalidPubKey();
} else {
revert InvalidScheme(scheme);
}
}
// ==========================================================================
// Attestation
// ==========================================================================
/**
* @notice Record a quantum-durable attestation. Verifies, on-chain via the live
* precompile for the key's scheme, that `signature` is a valid PQC
* signature by the registered public key over this contract's challenge:
*
* challenge = keccak256(abi.encode(
* CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, block.chainid, address(this), keyId, nonce, messageHash))
*
* where `nonce` is the key's current per-key nonce. On success the
* attestation is recorded and the nonce is incremented, so the same
* (messageHash, signature) can never be replayed and no signature made
* for a different key, message, contract or chain verifies.
*
* Reverts with PQCVerificationFailed on any invalid signature; nothing
* is recorded and the nonce is unchanged.
* @param keyId the registered key to attest under.
* @param messageHash the 32-byte payload commitment being attested.
* @param signature the PQC signature envelope for the key's scheme.
*/
function attest(uint256 keyId, bytes32 messageHash, bytes calldata signature) external {
if (keyId >= _keys.length) revert UnknownKey(keyId);
Key storage k = _keys[keyId];
uint64 nonce = k.nonce;
bytes32 challenge = attestChallenge(keyId, nonce, messageHash);
if (!_verify(k.scheme, k.pubKey, challenge, signature)) revert PQCVerificationFailed();
// Effects: consume the nonce and record before emitting.
k.nonce = nonce + 1;
bytes32 id = attestationId(keyId, nonce);
_attestations[id] = Attestation({
messageHash: messageHash,
challenge: challenge,
keyId: keyId,
nonce: nonce,
blockNumber: uint64(block.number),
exists: true
});
attestationCount += 1;
emit Attested(keyId, k.scheme, nonce, messageHash, challenge, block.number);
}
// ==========================================================================
// Verification (views)
// ==========================================================================
/**
* @notice Verify a PQC signature over a raw 32-byte message on-chain, for any
* scheme, using the live precompile. Unbound utility: `messageHash` is
* used directly as the signed message (no contract/nonce binding), so
* anyone can check any NIST PQC signature via eth_call for free.
* @return true iff the live precompile accepts the signature.
*/
function verifySignature(uint8 scheme, bytes calldata pubKey, bytes32 messageHash, bytes calldata signature)
external
view
returns (bool)
{
return _verify(scheme, pubKey, messageHash, signature);
}
/**
* @notice The exact 32-byte challenge that a signature for `keyId` must sign at a
* given nonce. Off-chain signers query this to know what to sign.
*/
function attestChallenge(uint256 keyId, uint64 nonce, bytes32 messageHash) public view returns (bytes32) {
return keccak256(abi.encode(CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, block.chainid, address(this), keyId, nonce, messageHash));
}
/// @notice Deterministic id for the attestation recorded by `keyId` at `nonce`.
function attestationId(uint256 keyId, uint64 nonce) public pure returns (bytes32) {
return keccak256(abi.encode(keyId, nonce));
}
// ==========================================================================
// Internal verifier
// ==========================================================================
/**
* @dev Build the exact precompile input for `scheme` with `message` as the signed
* 32-byte message, staticcall the live precompile, and return true iff it
* answers 0x..01. Any empty/short/zero return is invalid.
*/
function _verify(uint8 scheme, bytes memory pubKey, bytes32 message, bytes memory signature)
internal
view
returns (bool)
{
(address precompile, bytes memory input) = _buildInput(scheme, pubKey, message, signature);
(bool ok, bytes memory ret) = precompile.staticcall(input);
return ok && ret.length >= 32 && ret[31] == 0x01;
}
/// @dev Assemble (precompile, input) for a scheme. Reverts only on a length that
/// cannot form a valid input; a well-formed-but-wrong signature returns an
/// input the precompile will reject with 0.
function _buildInput(uint8 scheme, bytes memory pubKey, bytes32 message, bytes memory signature)
internal
pure
returns (address precompile, bytes memory input)
{
if (scheme == SCHEME_FALCON512 || scheme == SCHEME_FALCON1024) {
// signature = nonce(40) || esig
if (signature.length <= FALCON_NONCE_LEN) revert InvalidSignatureLength();
uint256 sigLen = signature.length - FALCON_NONCE_LEN; // esig length
if (sigLen > type(uint16).max) revert InvalidSignatureLength();
bytes memory nonce = _slice(signature, 0, FALCON_NONCE_LEN);
bytes memory esig = _slice(signature, FALCON_NONCE_LEN, sigLen);
// sm = sigLen(2, big-endian) || nonce(40) || message(32) || esig
bytes memory sm = abi.encodePacked(uint16(sigLen), nonce, message, esig);
input = abi.encodePacked(pubKey, sm);
precompile = scheme == SCHEME_FALCON512 ? PRECOMPILE_FALCON512 : PRECOMPILE_FALCON1024;
} else if (scheme == SCHEME_MLDSA44) {
if (signature.length != MLDSA44_SIG_LEN) revert InvalidSignatureLength();
input = abi.encodePacked(pubKey, signature, message); // pk(1312) || sig(2420) || message(32)
precompile = PRECOMPILE_MLDSA44;
} else if (scheme == SCHEME_SLHDSA128S) {
if (signature.length != SLHDSA128S_SIG_LEN) revert InvalidSignatureLength();
input = abi.encodePacked(pubKey, signature, message); // pk(32) || sig(7856) || message(32)
precompile = PRECOMPILE_SLHDSA128S;
} else {
revert InvalidScheme(scheme);
}
}
function _slice(bytes memory data, uint256 start, uint256 len) internal pure returns (bytes memory out) {
out = new bytes(len);
for (uint256 i = 0; i < len; i++) {
out[i] = data[start + i];
}
}
// ==========================================================================
// Views
// ==========================================================================
/// @notice Number of registered keys (keyIds run 0..keyCount-1).
function keyCount() external view returns (uint256) {
return _keys.length;
}
/// @notice Read a registered key.
function getKey(uint256 keyId)
external
view
returns (address owner, uint8 scheme, uint64 nonce, bytes memory pubKey)
{
if (keyId >= _keys.length) revert UnknownKey(keyId);
Key storage k = _keys[keyId];
return (k.owner, k.scheme, k.nonce, k.pubKey);
}
/// @notice The current (next unused) nonce for a key.
function nonceOf(uint256 keyId) external view returns (uint64) {
if (keyId >= _keys.length) revert UnknownKey(keyId);
return _keys[keyId].nonce;
}
/// @notice Read a recorded attestation by (keyId, nonce).
function getAttestation(uint256 keyId, uint64 nonce)
external
view
returns (bool exists, bytes32 messageHash, bytes32 challenge, uint256 blockNumber)
{
Attestation storage a = _attestations[attestationId(keyId, nonce)];
return (a.exists, a.messageHash, a.challenge, a.blockNumber);
}
/// @notice True iff the attestation at (keyId, nonce) exists and committed to `messageHash`.
function isValidAttestation(uint256 keyId, uint64 nonce, bytes32 messageHash) external view returns (bool) {
Attestation storage a = _attestations[attestationId(keyId, nonce)];
return a.exists && a.messageHash == messageHash;
}
/// @notice The live precompile address for a scheme (reverts on an unknown scheme).
function precompileFor(uint8 scheme) external pure returns (address) {
if (scheme == SCHEME_FALCON512) return PRECOMPILE_FALCON512;
if (scheme == SCHEME_FALCON1024) return PRECOMPILE_FALCON1024;
if (scheme == SCHEME_MLDSA44) return PRECOMPILE_MLDSA44;
if (scheme == SCHEME_SLHDSA128S) return PRECOMPILE_SLHDSA128S;
revert InvalidScheme(scheme);
}
}