aere-contracts/test/AereAgentActionReceipt.test.js
Aere Network a13a649b77
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Initial public release
Aere Network public source. Everything here can be checked against the live
chain (chain id 2800, https://rpc.aere.network).

Scope note, stated up front rather than buried: consensus on chain 2800 is
classical secp256k1 ECDSA QBFT. The post-quantum work in this repository is at
the signature, precompile, account and transport layers. Nothing here makes the
consensus post-quantum, and no document in it should be read as claiming so.
2026-07-20 01:02:37 +03:00

577 lines
27 KiB
JavaScript

const { expect } = require("chai");
const { ethers, network } = require("hardhat");
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// AereAgentActionReceipt — PQC-anchored, publicly verifiable AI provenance.
//
// An agent commits the HASH of an output it produced, signed by a short-lived
// secp256k1 SESSION key issued under a quantum-durable Falcon ROOT via AereAgentDID
// (Falcon PoP verified on-chain by the live native precompile — here the mock at
// 0x0AE1..0x0AE4, exactly as in AereAgentDID.test.js). The receipt is append-only,
// re-verifiable by anyone in one read, and cross-wires to the agent's AereAgentBond
// stake + AereAIReputation score at the canonical key (operator = DID controller,
// agentId = bytes32(rootKeyId)).
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
const PRECOMPILE = {
1: ethers.getAddress("0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000ae1"),
2: ethers.getAddress("0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000ae2"),
3: ethers.getAddress("0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000ae3"),
4: ethers.getAddress("0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000ae4"),
};
const META = {
1: { pkLen: 897, pkHeader: 0x09, esigHeader: 0x29, falcon: true },
2: { pkLen: 1793, pkHeader: 0x0a, esigHeader: 0x2a, falcon: true },
3: { pkLen: 1312, sigLen: 2420, falcon: false },
4: { pkLen: 32, sigLen: 7856, falcon: false },
};
function makeRng(seedText) {
let seed = ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes(seedText));
function bytes(n) {
const out = new Uint8Array(n);
let i = 0;
while (i < n) {
seed = ethers.keccak256(seed);
const chunk = ethers.getBytes(seed);
for (let j = 0; j < chunk.length && i < n; j++, i++) out[i] = chunk[j];
}
return out;
}
function int(n) {
const b = bytes(4);
return (((b[0] << 24) | (b[1] << 16) | (b[2] << 8) | b[3]) >>> 0) % n;
}
return { bytes, int };
}
function makePubKey(scheme, rng) {
const m = META[scheme];
const raw = rng.bytes(m.pkLen);
if (m.falcon) raw[0] = m.pkHeader;
return ethers.hexlify(raw);
}
function commitmentFor(pubKey, message) {
return ethers.keccak256(ethers.concat([pubKey, message]));
}
function envelope(scheme, commitment, rng) {
const m = META[scheme];
if (m.falcon) {
const nonce = rng.bytes(40);
const esig = ethers.concat([new Uint8Array([m.esigHeader]), commitment]);
return ethers.hexlify(ethers.concat([nonce, esig]));
} else {
const sig = new Uint8Array(m.sigLen);
sig.set(ethers.getBytes(commitment), 0);
return ethers.hexlify(sig);
}
}
function genuine(scheme, pubKey, message, rng) {
return envelope(scheme, commitmentFor(pubKey, message), rng);
}
// secp256k1 signature (r||s||v, low-s, v in {27,28}) by `wallet` over the 32-byte digest.
function ecdsaSign(wallet, digest) {
return wallet.signingKey.sign(digest).serialized;
}
const ONE_AERE = ethers.parseUnits("1", 18);
const TEN_AERE = ethers.parseUnits("10", 18);
describe("AereAgentActionReceipt (PQC-anchored AI provenance)", function () {
let owner, attestor, relayer, other;
let reg, did, bond, rep, aere, sink, receipt;
let mockCode;
before(async function () {
[owner, attestor, relayer, other] = await ethers.getSigners();
mockCode = {};
const F = await ethers.getContractFactory("MockPQCPrecompile");
for (const scheme of [1, 2, 3, 4]) {
const mock = await F.deploy(scheme);
await mock.waitForDeployment();
mockCode[scheme] = await ethers.provider.getCode(await mock.getAddress());
}
});
async function installMocks() {
for (const scheme of [1, 2, 3, 4]) {
await network.provider.send("hardhat_setCode", [PRECOMPILE[scheme], mockCode[scheme]]);
}
}
beforeEach(async function () {
await installMocks();
// PQC key registry + Falcon-rooted DID (real Falcon-PoP session issuance).
const R = await ethers.getContractFactory("AerePQCKeyRegistry");
reg = await R.deploy();
await reg.waitForDeployment();
// Economic layer: AERE token + sink + slashable bond + composable reputation.
const T = await ethers.getContractFactory("MockERC20Lending");
aere = await T.deploy("AERE", "AERE", 18);
await aere.waitForDeployment();
const S = await ethers.getContractFactory("MockSinkSimple");
sink = await S.deploy();
await sink.waitForDeployment();
const B = await ethers.getContractFactory("AereAgentBond");
bond = await B.deploy(await aere.getAddress(), await sink.getAddress(), [owner.address]); // owner = slashing oracle
await bond.waitForDeployment();
const Rep = await ethers.getContractFactory("AereAIReputation");
rep = await Rep.deploy(await bond.getAddress(), [attestor.address]);
await rep.waitForDeployment();
const D = await ethers.getContractFactory("AereAgentDID");
did = await D.deploy(await reg.getAddress(), await bond.getAddress(), await rep.getAddress());
await did.waitForDeployment();
const AR = await ethers.getContractFactory("AereAgentActionReceipt");
receipt = await AR.deploy(await did.getAddress(), await bond.getAddress(), await rep.getAddress());
await receipt.waitForDeployment();
// Fund owner (operator) so it can post a bond under the canonical key.
await aere.mint(owner.address, ethers.parseUnits("100", 18));
await aere.connect(owner).approve(await bond.getAddress(), ethers.MaxUint256);
});
// Register a Falcon root key under `signer`, return { rootKeyId, rootPk, scheme }.
async function registerFalconRoot(scheme, signer = owner, rng = makeRng("root-" + scheme)) {
const pk = makePubKey(scheme, rng);
const nonce = await reg.identityNonce(signer.address);
const ch = await reg.popChallenge(signer.address, scheme, pk, nonce);
const tx = await reg.connect(signer).registerKey(scheme, pk, genuine(scheme, pk, ch, rng));
const rc = await tx.wait();
const log = rc.logs.map((l) => reg.interface.parseLog(l)).find((p) => p && p.name === "KeyRegistered");
return { rootKeyId: Number(log.args.keyId), rootPk: pk, scheme };
}
// Issue a session with a genuine Falcon PoP (relayed by anyone).
async function issueSession(root, { sessionAddr, scopeHash, spendCap, expiry, rng, caller = relayer }) {
const nonce = (await did.getAgent(root.rootKeyId)).sessionNonce;
const challenge = await did.sessionChallenge(root.rootKeyId, nonce, sessionAddr, scopeHash, spendCap, expiry);
const pop = genuine(root.scheme, root.rootPk, challenge, rng);
const tx = await did.connect(caller).issueSession(root.rootKeyId, sessionAddr, scopeHash, spendCap, expiry, pop);
const rc = await tx.wait();
const log = rc.logs.map((l) => did.interface.parseLog(l)).find((p) => p && p.name === "SessionIssued");
return Number(log.args.sessionId);
}
async function futureTs(secs = 3600) {
const b = await ethers.provider.getBlock("latest");
return b.timestamp + secs;
}
// Full setup: Falcon root + DID agent + one session, ready to emit receipts.
async function setupAgentSession(seed, scopeLabel = "infer:v1") {
const rng = makeRng(seed);
const root = await registerFalconRoot(1, owner, rng);
await did.createAgent(root.rootKeyId);
const session = ethers.Wallet.createRandom();
const scopeHash = ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes(scopeLabel));
const sid = await issueSession(root, {
sessionAddr: session.address,
scopeHash,
spendCap: 1000n,
expiry: await futureTs(5000),
rng,
});
return { root, session, scopeHash, sid, rng };
}
// Sign + emit a receipt for `outputHash` under session `sid` with `scope`.
// `signWallet` defaults to the session key; `signHash` lets us sign a DIFFERENT
// hash than the one submitted (to force a tampered-output rejection).
async function emitReceipt(sid, scope, outputHash, session, opts = {}) {
const nonce = await receipt.receiptNonceOf(sid);
const agentId = (await did.getSession(sid)).rootKeyId;
const signHash = opts.signHash ?? outputHash;
const digest = await receipt.receiptDigest(agentId, sid, signHash, scope, nonce);
const wallet = opts.wallet ?? session;
const sig = ecdsaSign(wallet, digest);
return receipt.connect(opts.caller ?? relayer).emitReceipt(sid, scope, outputHash, sig);
}
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// Deployment & wiring
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
describe("deployment", function () {
it("wires the DID + read-only economic cross-links and the domain separator", async function () {
expect(await receipt.did()).to.equal(await did.getAddress());
expect(await receipt.agentBond()).to.equal(await bond.getAddress());
expect(await receipt.aiReputation()).to.equal(await rep.getAddress());
expect(await receipt.RECEIPT_DOMAIN()).to.equal(
ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("AereAgentActionReceipt.v1.receipt"))
);
expect(await receipt.receiptCount()).to.equal(0n);
});
it("reverts on a zero DID", async function () {
const AR = await ethers.getContractFactory("AereAgentActionReceipt");
await expect(
AR.deploy(ethers.ZeroAddress, await bond.getAddress(), await rep.getAddress())
).to.be.revertedWithCustomError(AR, "ZeroDID");
});
it("bondKeyOf(rootKeyId) is the canonical bytes32(rootKeyId) cross-wire key", async function () {
expect(await receipt.bondKeyOf(7)).to.equal(ethers.zeroPadValue("0x07", 32));
});
});
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// emit + verify (happy path)
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
describe("emit + verify", function () {
it("records a provenance receipt signed by the session key and re-verifies it", async function () {
const { session, scopeHash, sid, root } = await setupAgentSession("emit-happy");
const outputHash = ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("model produced: hello world"));
await expect(emitReceipt(sid, scopeHash, outputHash, session))
.to.emit(receipt, "ReceiptEmitted")
.withArgs(0, root.rootKeyId, sid, session.address, outputHash, scopeHash, 0);
expect(await receipt.receiptCount()).to.equal(1n);
// Stored record.
const r = await receipt.getReceipt(0);
expect(r.agentId).to.equal(BigInt(root.rootKeyId));
expect(r.sessionId).to.equal(BigInt(sid));
expect(r.signer).to.equal(session.address);
expect(r.outputHash).to.equal(outputHash);
expect(r.scope).to.equal(scopeHash);
expect(r.nonce).to.equal(0n);
// One-read independent verification: signature genuine + session live now.
const v = await receipt.verifyReceipt(0);
expect(v.sigValid).to.equal(true);
expect(v.sessionLiveNow).to.equal(true);
expect(v.agentId).to.equal(BigInt(root.rootKeyId));
expect(v.signer).to.equal(session.address);
expect(v.outputHash).to.equal(outputHash);
// verifyReceiptOutput matches the true output, rejects any other.
expect(await receipt.verifyReceiptOutput(0, outputHash)).to.equal(true);
expect(await receipt.verifyReceiptOutput(0, ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("different")))).to.equal(false);
// Indexing by agent + session.
expect((await receipt.receiptsOf(root.rootKeyId)).map(Number)).to.deep.equal([0]);
expect((await receipt.receiptsOfSession(sid)).map(Number)).to.deep.equal([0]);
});
it("per-session nonce advances so many distinct receipts can be recorded", async function () {
const { session, scopeHash, sid } = await setupAgentSession("emit-multi");
expect(await receipt.receiptNonceOf(sid)).to.equal(0n);
const h1 = ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("out-1"));
const h2 = ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("out-2"));
await emitReceipt(sid, scopeHash, h1, session);
await emitReceipt(sid, scopeHash, h2, session);
expect(await receipt.receiptNonceOf(sid)).to.equal(2n);
expect(await receipt.receiptCount()).to.equal(2n);
expect((await receipt.getReceipt(0)).nonce).to.equal(0n);
expect((await receipt.getReceipt(1)).nonce).to.equal(1n);
expect(await receipt.verifyReceiptOutput(0, h1)).to.equal(true);
expect(await receipt.verifyReceiptOutput(1, h2)).to.equal(true);
});
it("emitting is permissionless — the session signature is the sole authority", async function () {
const { session, scopeHash, sid } = await setupAgentSession("emit-relay");
const outputHash = ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("relayed output"));
// `other` relays and pays gas; authorship is still the session key.
await emitReceipt(sid, scopeHash, outputHash, session, { caller: other });
expect((await receipt.getReceipt(0)).signer).to.equal(session.address);
});
});
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// tampered outputHash rejected
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
describe("tampered outputHash rejected", function () {
it("rejects a receipt whose submitted outputHash differs from the signed one", async function () {
const { session, scopeHash, sid } = await setupAgentSession("tamper");
const realOutput = ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("genuine output"));
const tampered = ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("tampered output"));
// Session signs the REAL output hash, but a tampered hash is submitted.
await expect(
emitReceipt(sid, scopeHash, tampered, session, { signHash: realOutput })
).to.be.revertedWithCustomError(receipt, "BadSessionSignature");
expect(await receipt.receiptCount()).to.equal(0n);
});
it("rejects a signature by a non-session key", async function () {
const { session, scopeHash, sid } = await setupAgentSession("tamper-signer");
const outputHash = ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("out"));
const stranger = ethers.Wallet.createRandom();
await expect(
emitReceipt(sid, scopeHash, outputHash, session, { wallet: stranger })
).to.be.revertedWithCustomError(receipt, "BadSessionSignature");
});
it("rejects a malformed (wrong-length) signature", async function () {
const { scopeHash, sid } = await setupAgentSession("tamper-malformed");
const outputHash = ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("out"));
await expect(
receipt.connect(relayer).emitReceipt(sid, scopeHash, outputHash, "0x1234")
).to.be.revertedWithCustomError(receipt, "BadSessionSignature");
});
it("rejects an empty (zero) output hash", async function () {
const { session, scopeHash, sid } = await setupAgentSession("tamper-empty");
await expect(
emitReceipt(sid, scopeHash, ethers.ZeroHash, session)
).to.be.revertedWithCustomError(receipt, "EmptyOutputHash");
});
it("rejects a scope that does not match the session scope", async function () {
const { session, scopeHash, sid } = await setupAgentSession("tamper-scope");
const wrongScope = ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("other:scope"));
const outputHash = ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("out"));
await expect(
emitReceipt(sid, wrongScope, outputHash, session)
).to.be.revertedWithCustomError(receipt, "ScopeMismatch");
});
});
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// revoked / invalid agent rejected
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
describe("revoked / invalid session rejected", function () {
it("rejects an emit under a session the controller has revoked", async function () {
const { session, scopeHash, sid } = await setupAgentSession("revoke-session");
const outputHash = ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("out"));
// A genuine receipt works before revocation.
await emitReceipt(sid, scopeHash, outputHash, session);
// Controller fast-revokes the session.
await did.connect(owner).revokeSession(sid);
await expect(
emitReceipt(sid, scopeHash, ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("out2")), session)
).to.be.revertedWithCustomError(receipt, "RevokedOrInvalidSession");
});
it("rejects an emit after the Falcon ROOT is revoked (all its sessions die)", async function () {
const { session, scopeHash, sid, root } = await setupAgentSession("revoke-root");
await reg.connect(owner).revokeKey(root.rootKeyId);
await expect(
emitReceipt(sid, scopeHash, ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("out")), session)
).to.be.revertedWithCustomError(receipt, "RevokedOrInvalidSession");
});
it("rejects an emit under an expired session", async function () {
const { session, scopeHash, sid } = await setupAgentSession("expire");
await network.provider.send("evm_increaseTime", [6000]);
await network.provider.send("evm_mine", []);
await expect(
emitReceipt(sid, scopeHash, ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("out")), session)
).to.be.revertedWithCustomError(receipt, "RevokedOrInvalidSession");
});
it("rejects an emit under an unknown session id", async function () {
await expect(
receipt.connect(relayer).emitReceipt(999, ethers.ZeroHash, ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("x")), "0x" + "00".repeat(65))
).to.be.revertedWithCustomError(receipt, "RevokedOrInvalidSession");
});
it("a pre-existing receipt stays genuine but flips sessionLiveNow=false after revocation", async function () {
const { session, scopeHash, sid } = await setupAgentSession("revoke-after");
const outputHash = ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("still-genuine"));
await emitReceipt(sid, scopeHash, outputHash, session);
let v = await receipt.verifyReceipt(0);
expect(v.sigValid).to.equal(true);
expect(v.sessionLiveNow).to.equal(true);
await did.connect(owner).revokeSession(sid);
v = await receipt.verifyReceipt(0);
// The signature is still cryptographically valid (provenance is permanent)...
expect(v.sigValid).to.equal(true);
// ...but the authoring session is no longer live.
expect(v.sessionLiveNow).to.equal(false);
// The output is still verifiable against the recorded hash.
expect(await receipt.verifyReceiptOutput(0, outputHash)).to.equal(true);
});
});
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// reputation / bond cross-read
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
describe("reputation + bond cross-read", function () {
it("provenanceOf surfaces the agent's live stake + reputation + slashing history", async function () {
const { session, scopeHash, sid, root } = await setupAgentSession("crossread");
const bondKey = await receipt.bondKeyOf(root.rootKeyId); // bytes32(rootKeyId)
// Operator (= DID controller = owner) posts a bond under the canonical key.
await bond.connect(owner).postBond(bondKey, TEN_AERE);
// Attestor records 5 positive observations for (operator, bondKey).
for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
const ev = ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes(`ev-pos-${i}`));
await rep.connect(attestor).attest(owner.address, bondKey, 1, ev, "");
}
// One dispute.
await rep.connect(attestor).attest(owner.address, bondKey, -1, ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("ev-dispute")), "");
// Oracle (owner) slashes 2 AERE (20% of 10, under the 25% per-call cap).
await bond.connect(owner).slash(owner.address, bondKey, ONE_AERE * 2n, ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("s1")), "");
// Emit a receipt so provenanceOf has something to bind the cross-read to.
const outputHash = ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("scored output"));
await emitReceipt(sid, scopeHash, outputHash, session);
// Expected score: 5*10 - 2*10 - 1*20 = 10 (matches AereAIReputation formula).
const expectedScore = await rep.scoreOf(owner.address, bondKey);
expect(expectedScore).to.equal(10n);
const p = await receipt.provenanceOf(0);
expect(p.agentId).to.equal(BigInt(root.rootKeyId));
expect(p.operator).to.equal(owner.address);
expect(p.signer).to.equal(session.address);
expect(p.outputHash).to.equal(outputHash);
expect(p.scope).to.equal(scopeHash);
expect(p.sigValid).to.equal(true);
expect(p.sessionLiveNow).to.equal(true);
// Cross-reads match the underlying contracts exactly.
expect(p.reputationScore).to.equal(expectedScore);
expect(p.bondAmount).to.equal(TEN_AERE - ONE_AERE * 2n); // 8 AERE remaining
expect(p.bondLifetimeSlashed).to.equal(ONE_AERE * 2n);
expect(p.operatorTotalSlashed).to.equal(ONE_AERE * 2n);
// operatorOf resolves the canonical operator (DID controller).
expect(await receipt.operatorOf(root.rootKeyId)).to.equal(owner.address);
});
it("cross-reads default to zero when the operator never posted a canonical bond", async function () {
const { session, scopeHash, sid, root } = await setupAgentSession("crossread-zero");
const outputHash = ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("no-bond output"));
await emitReceipt(sid, scopeHash, outputHash, session);
const p = await receipt.provenanceOf(0);
expect(p.operator).to.equal(owner.address); // controller still resolves
expect(p.reputationScore).to.equal(0n);
expect(p.bondAmount).to.equal(0n);
expect(p.bondLifetimeSlashed).to.equal(0n);
expect(p.operatorTotalSlashed).to.equal(0n);
expect(p.sigValid).to.equal(true);
});
it("provenanceOf still works when economic cross-links are unset (zero addresses)", async function () {
// Deploy a receipt contract with no bond / reputation wiring.
const AR = await ethers.getContractFactory("AereAgentActionReceipt");
const bare = await AR.deploy(await did.getAddress(), ethers.ZeroAddress, ethers.ZeroAddress);
await bare.waitForDeployment();
const { session, scopeHash, sid } = await setupAgentSession("crossread-unset");
const outputHash = ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("bare output"));
const nonce = await bare.receiptNonceOf(sid);
const agentId = (await did.getSession(sid)).rootKeyId;
const digest = await bare.receiptDigest(agentId, sid, outputHash, scopeHash, nonce);
await bare.connect(relayer).emitReceipt(sid, scopeHash, outputHash, ecdsaSign(session, digest));
const p = await bare.provenanceOf(0);
expect(p.sigValid).to.equal(true);
expect(p.reputationScore).to.equal(0n);
expect(p.bondAmount).to.equal(0n);
});
});
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// view guards
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
describe("view guards", function () {
it("getReceipt / verifyReceipt / provenanceOf revert on an unknown receiptId", async function () {
await expect(receipt.getReceipt(0)).to.be.revertedWithCustomError(receipt, "UnknownReceipt");
await expect(receipt.verifyReceipt(0)).to.be.revertedWithCustomError(receipt, "UnknownReceipt");
await expect(receipt.provenanceOf(0)).to.be.revertedWithCustomError(receipt, "UnknownReceipt");
});
it("verifyReceiptOutput returns false (no revert) on an unknown receiptId", async function () {
expect(await receipt.verifyReceiptOutput(0, ethers.ZeroHash)).to.equal(false);
});
});
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// digest cross-check (contract view == local keccak of the abi.encode preimage)
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
describe("digest preimage", function () {
it("receiptDigest matches keccak256(abi.encode(DOMAIN, chainid, this, agentId, sessionId, outputHash, scope, nonce))", async function () {
const agentId = 3n;
const sessionId = 5n;
const outputHash = ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("o"));
const scope = ethers.keccak256(ethers.toUtf8Bytes("s"));
const nonce = 7n;
const domain = await receipt.RECEIPT_DOMAIN();
const { chainId } = await ethers.provider.getNetwork();
const local = ethers.keccak256(
ethers.AbiCoder.defaultAbiCoder().encode(
["bytes32", "uint256", "address", "uint256", "uint256", "bytes32", "bytes32", "uint64"],
[domain, chainId, await receipt.getAddress(), agentId, sessionId, outputHash, scope, nonce]
)
);
expect(await receipt.receiptDigest(agentId, sessionId, outputHash, scope, nonce)).to.equal(local);
});
});
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// seeded invariant fuzz
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
describe("seeded invariant fuzz", function () {
it("genuine receipts verify; tampered/wrong-signer always reject across random rounds", async function () {
const { session, scopeHash, sid, root } = await setupAgentSession("fuzz-receipt-v1");
const rng = makeRng("fuzz-body-v1");
const ROUNDS = 20;
const emitted = [];
for (let i = 0; i < ROUNDS; i++) {
const outputHash = ethers.hexlify(rng.bytes(32));
// (a) A genuine receipt is accepted and re-verifies.
await emitReceipt(sid, scopeHash, outputHash, session);
const rid = emitted.length;
emitted.push(outputHash);
const v = await receipt.verifyReceipt(rid);
expect(v.sigValid).to.equal(true);
expect(v.sessionLiveNow).to.equal(true);
expect(await receipt.verifyReceiptOutput(rid, outputHash)).to.equal(true);
// A one-bit-different hash never matches.
const flipped = ethers.getBytes(outputHash);
flipped[rng.int(32)] ^= 0x01;
expect(await receipt.verifyReceiptOutput(rid, ethers.hexlify(flipped))).to.equal(false);
// (b) A tampered submit (sign hash A, submit hash B) always reverts.
{
const signed = ethers.hexlify(rng.bytes(32));
let submitted = ethers.getBytes(signed);
submitted[rng.int(32)] ^= 0x01;
await expect(
emitReceipt(sid, scopeHash, ethers.hexlify(submitted), session, { signHash: signed })
).to.be.revertedWithCustomError(receipt, "BadSessionSignature");
}
// (c) A stranger key never authorizes a receipt.
{
const stranger = ethers.Wallet.createRandom();
const h = ethers.hexlify(rng.bytes(32));
await expect(
emitReceipt(sid, scopeHash, h, session, { wallet: stranger })
).to.be.revertedWithCustomError(receipt, "BadSessionSignature");
}
// (d) A wrong scope always reverts.
{
const badScope = ethers.hexlify(rng.bytes(32));
const h = ethers.hexlify(rng.bytes(32));
await expect(
emitReceipt(sid, badScope, h, session)
).to.be.revertedWithCustomError(receipt, "ScopeMismatch");
}
}
// Every genuine receipt is indexed and still verifiable.
const ids = (await receipt.receiptsOf(root.rootKeyId)).map(Number);
expect(ids.length).to.equal(ROUNDS);
expect(Number(await receipt.receiptCount())).to.equal(ROUNDS);
for (let rid = 0; rid < ROUNDS; rid++) {
expect(await receipt.verifyReceiptOutput(rid, emitted[rid])).to.equal(true);
}
});
});
});